Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

9expected: results were poor in the management of public resources and their reallocationto the social sectors; sectoral strategies were not redefined and public expenditures andthe budget not readjusted accordingly, a major shortcoming in the years leading to thepreparation of a PRSP. Leadership and commitment were missing to make strides ingovernance, and the efficiency of state institutions in delivering public services was notimproved, except for some progress under the judicial component. Most opportunitiesfor reform were missed.INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT3.19 Modest. Impact on the different ministries and entities involved was limited.Some progress was made in the formulation of the macro-economic framework, themanagement of the budget cycle, the oversight of public accounts, and the judicialsystem, but there was no improvement in revenue mobilization (see Table 1 in Section 4).Also, there was no progress in raising GOM’s capacity to manage and redirect resourcesin line with a program of poverty reduction. In fact, there was no attempt to formulatesuch a program and redesign institutional frameworks accordingly. A broad vision wasmissing in that respect. Finally, key reforms were abandoned in the areas most likely toraise the efficiency of public expenditure and quality in the delivery of public services,i.e., civil service and decentralization.SUSTAINABILITY3.20 Likely. The rating is justified on the basis of increased capacity in macroeconomicmanagement, budget cycle, treasury operations, and the judiciary. Also, therewas no reversal in policies, even in 2002. The consolidation of policy-making and itsmonitoring under a single ministry after the crisis should facilitate the sustainability ofwhatever was achieved under the project.BANK PERFORMANCE3.21 Moderately Unsatisfactory. Quality at entry was unsatisfactory, despite theamount of work that went into project preparation. The Bank overestimated GOM’scommitment and paid insufficient attention to the possible consequences of a fragileinstitutional set-up. The project was also overburdened by too many and too differentcomponents. Risks were well identified but insufficient care was taken to define andprepare mitigating measures. In fact, this task turned out to be done by QAG inadvocating safeguards against the risk of even greater difficulties in implementation.Although the Bank team heeded QAG’s recommendations and acted swiftly bystreamlining the project, supervision continued to suffer from poor design at entry.However, task management in the field, permitted a constant dialogue with officials, thusminimizing the risk for negative developments.BORROWER PERFORMANCE3.22 Unsatisfactory. GOM’s commitment was weak, showing no resolve in tacklingthe institutional problems besetting implementation. GOM was essentially passive, lettingthe Bank team assume decisions and tasks falling normally under its responsibility. QAG