Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

5fragmented structure of the central ministries. Although this had been identified by theBank during preparation as a source of potential conflicts and as an obstacle to effectiveimplementation, political pressure prevented any streamlining of those ministries prior toproject approval. The negative impact of this situation was underestimated at entry andassistance to policy-making was often undermined by this state of affairs during thewhole period covered by the adjustment program. The matter was only solved by aministerial reorganization after the 2002 crisis. In addition, the design of the operationwas too complex with too many different types of activities dispersed over several centraland technical ministries, despite the fact that the administration was known to be weakand lacking in coordination capacity.IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS3.4 Implementation suffered from overambitious goals, complexity in design, andlukewarm commitment to reforms. Equally important, it took place in a fluid politicalsituation, frequent changes in appointments, restructurings of the central ministries, anduncertainties raised by a revision of the Constitution in July 1998. The project did notsucceed in adapting to such important and rapid changes. Without strong leadership fromGOM, repeated adjustments had to be made in project activities to match strategicrealignments by the authorities. At the same time, the project management found itdifficult to coordinate various sub-components.3.5 In July 1998, QAG rated a rapid quality of supervision assessment as "marginal".It noted that: (i) the Bank team was fulfilling a management rather than a supervisionrole; (ii) structural reforms were severely lagging; (iii) constant political change and staffturnover were requiring continued remedial education of officials on the project and itsobjectives; and (iv) the project had not taken root. It recommended that, at the mid-termreview, the project be more narrowly focused on key priorities of interest to GOM andconsistent with structural reforms, with new indicators agreed. It concluded that thefocus on development impact was marginal, that design, readiness for implementation,and borrower commitment were questionable, and that the project was too complex.3.6 In October 1998, the mid-term review recommended a substantial restructuring tofacilitate implementation, without modifying objectives. The restructuring was decidedon the basis of the following: (i) the QAG assessment; (ii) the revision of theConstitution; and (iii) changes in the organization of key ministries in 1998. In addition,it was largely inspired by the need to refocus support to the implementation of SAC-II,which was under preparation.3.7 The restructuring, effective on May 1, 1999, consisted of closing somecomponents and streamlining others as follows: (i) the Statistical Office component wasclosed because 2 sub-components (national accounts and business cycles) had beencompleted satisfactorily; the third one (household-welfare surveys) was transferred to theMFB component; (ii) the State Secretariat for Economy and Planning component wasclosed (except for the study fund transferred to the TSA), because of its weaker role afterthe 1998 ministerial restructuring; (iii) the Civil Service reform component was to beclosed by end 1999 (after a national seminar) for lack of political support; (iv) the