wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and

Chap. I. Atomkal Philofophy leads to Incorporeallfm.47XXXVIII. We have now fufficiently "performed our firfl tafk, whichwas to fhow from the origin of the atomical phyfiology, that the doctrineof incorporeal fubftance muft needs fpring up together with it. Wefliall, in the next place, make it manifeft, that tiie inward conftitution ofthis philofophy is alfo fuch, that whofoever really entertains it, and rightlyunderftands it, muft of necefTity admit incorporeal fubftance likewife,Firft therefore, the atomical hypothefis, allowing nothing to body, butwhat is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, orcan clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or lefs magnitude,with divifibihty, figure, fite, motion and reft, together with the refults oftheir feveral combinations, cannot polTibly make life and cogitation tobe qualities of body -, fince they are neither contained in thofe things beforementioned, nor can refult from any (tj^uJ/ij;!, or conjugations ofthem. Wherefore it muft needs be granted, that life and cogitationare the attributes of another fubftance diftinft from body, or incorporeal.Again, fince according to the tenour of this phyfiology, body hath noother aftion belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion,as fuch, is eflentially heterokinefy, that which never fprings originally fromthe thing it felf moving, but always from the aftion of fome other agentupon it ; that is, fince no body could ever move it felf, it follows undeniably,that there muft be fomething elfe in the world befides body,or elfe there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we Ihallfpeak more afterwards.Moreover, according to this philofophy, the corporeal phasnomena themfelvescannot be folved by mechanifm alone without fancy. Now fancyis no mode of body, and therefore muft- needs be a mode of fome otherkind of being in ourfelves, that is cogitative and incorporeal.Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philofophy, thatfenfe it felf is not a mere corporeal paffion from bodies without, in thatit fuppofeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to thole fantaftickideas that we have of fenfible things, as of hot and cold, red and green,bitter and fwcet, and the like, which therefore muft needs owe theirbeing to fome ad:ivity of the foul it felf ; and this is all one as to makeitincorporeal.Laftly, from this philofophy, it is alio manifeft, that fenfe is not thexfilri^iou of truth concerning bodies themfelves, it confidently pronouncing,that thofe fuppofed qualities of bodies, reprefented fuch by fenfe, aremerely fantaftical things -, from whence it plainly follows, that there isfomething in us fuperior to fenfe, which judges of it, detects its fantaftry,and condemns its impofture, and determines what really is and is not,in bodies without us, which muft needs be a higher felf-adive vigour ofthe mind, that will plainly fpeak it to be incorporeal.3 XXXIX.