wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and

andwas'Chap. IV. of Dlvim Hypojlafes. 387n«fj«Evidri5, «y.jietr"£^ov AeJ'kv, S^ciph air aXXriTwuv, to w^utov ev, o «'jf jwt«06v 'a'. s^T;/. 5. Z, l.f. S.(TsuTEpov £v iroAAjt ae'J'ui/' jt, rpircu £1/ xaj iroXAa,' xjii (jvfji(p'j3'ji^ St^ y.zl avro; eVjrxTg Tfio-iV Parmenides /« Plato, /peaking more exa£lly, dijiinguipes three divineunities fubordinate ; thefirfi of that, which is ferfe£lly and moft properlyone ; the fecond of that, vjhich 'was called by him cne-many ; the third cf ihat^ivhich is thus expre£ed, one and many. So that Parmenides did alfo agree inthis acknozvledgment of a trinity cf divine or archical hypojlafes. Wliica obfervationoi' Flotinus is, by tl e way, the beft key, that we know of, for thatobfcure book of Plato's ParmeniufS. Wherefore Parmenides thus afferting atrinity of divine hypollafes, it was the firil of thofe hypoftafes, that wasproperly called by nim, Vi/ to Trav, one the tmiverfe or all: tliat is, one moftiimple being, the fountain and original of all. And the fecond of them(which is a perfeft inttlkft) was, it fi.ems, by him called, in way ofdiflindion,V'j nro).Xy. or st-mix, one-many or one all things % by which all things are meantthe intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfedtmind. And of thofe was Parmenides to be underftood alfo, wlien heaffirmed, that all things did (land, and nothing flow ; not of fmgular andfenfible things, which, as the Heracliticks rightly affirmed, do indeed allflow ; but of the immediate objtds of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Arijlctle himftlf acknowledging, that no generation nor corruptionbelongtth to them, fince there could be no immutable and certainIcience, unlets there were fom.e im.mutable, neceflTary and eternal objefts ofit. Wherefore, as the fame Ariflotle alfo declares, the true meaning of thatA/^f. l.^c. ycontroverfy betwixt the Heracliticks and Parmenideans, Whether all things ,[P- ^PS..''did flow, or fome thirgs ftand the fame with this. Whether there q"''-,were any other objedls ot the mind, beudes fingular fcnfibles, that were immutableconfequently, whether there were any fuch thing as fcience.''or knowledge which had a firmitude and fl:ability in it .^ For thofe Heracliticks,who contended, that the only objects of the mind were fingular andfenfible things, did with good reafon confequently thereupon deny, that therewas any certain and conltant knowledge, fince there can neither be any definitioncf fingular fenfibks, (as Arijlotle ' writes) nor any demonftrationconcerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintainedthe firmitude and fl;abi]ity of fcience, did as reafonably conclude thereupon,that bcfides fingular fenlibles, there were other objecls of the mind, univerfal,eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originallycontained in one archetypal mind or underftanding, and from thenceparticipated by inferiour minds and fouls. But it mull be here acknowledged,that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a fl:ep further, anddid not only fuppofe thofe intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutableobjecls of all fcience, but alfo, as they are contained in the divine intelledt,to be the principles and caufes of all other things. For thus Arijlotle declarestheir fenfe, aiTia t« Ei'J't] roiV ojAAcic, and again, to t< h eivxi ixdr'-o lia'j^h't.r r c.6.kAAui) -ra. iih-3a.^iyj,v\c.i, -roti ii itSi