wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and

«86 Parmenldes his Trinity Book I.'thcp err funJry wsys. But here is a great difi'erence betwixt thcfe two to beoblerved, in that, the athciltical afferters of one and all (whether they meantwater or air by it, or fomething e'fc) did none ot them fuppofe their one andail to be immoveable, but moveable : but they, whole principle was one andall immoveable (as ParmeniJes, Melijfus and Zeno) could not poffibly mean anythino- elle thereby, but the Deity ; that there was one moft fimple, perfeftand immutable being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things,and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus^ who is one of thofe,who are faid to have affirmed 'h ^^jxi to ttZv, that one was nil, or that the imi-•verfe ivas but one things might poifibly have taken both thole fenfes together(which will alfo agree in the Stoical hypothefis) that all things were bothfrom one God, and froni one fire •, they being both alike corporeal Theilts,.who fuppofed an intellectual fire to be the firft principle of all things.And though Arijlotle in his Phyftcks quarrels very much with Parmenidesand MeliJJiis-, for making one immoveable principle ;yet in his Metaplyjickshimfelf doth plainly dole with it, and own it as very good divinity, that thereis one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the fu-6ypreme Deity is an immoveable nature: utte^ J^^fp^fi n; ^Via TOiau'Tn, xiyta Tii' J" V - Vapir'i >h »''>c''i'''iT^, o'^^e TTEtpjtcrofxai Stty.VJVXi, ivtocmBx av uy\ ttv Jtaii to ^tTov, ymia-jTJi a.j f i'n TTfUTii ^ avfioTXT/i i^yjr If there be any fuch fubfiance as this, that isfeparate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable [as we Jhall afterwardsendeavour to fjew that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, andthis miift be acknowledged to be the firfl and moft proper principle of all. Butleft any fhould fufpeft, that Ariflotle, if not Parmenides alfo, might, for allthat, hold many fuch immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreatedand fclf-exiflent beings, as fo many partial caufes of the world ;'Simpliciiisaffures us, I'M 'yiyvA\,oi.i So^av -sjoXAa? y.x\ axiv/ira? txc cl^^x; XiynTocv, i.e. that thoughdivers of the antient philofophers ajjerted a plurality of moveable principles (andfeme indeed an infinity) yet there never was any opinion entertained among ftphilofophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles. From wiienceit may be concluded, that no philofopher ever afTertcd a multitude of unmade,felf-cxiftent minds, "or independent deities, as co-ordinate principlesof the world.Indeed Plotinus fecms to think, that Parmenides in his writings, by liis tot-j, or ens, did frequently mean a perfed mind or intellect, there being notrue entity (according to him) below that, which underRands -, (which mind,thou' h incorporeal, was likened by him to a fphere, bccaufe it comprehendsall wthin it felf, and becaufe intelleftion is not from without, but fromwithin :) But that when again he called his On or Ens one, he gave occifionthereby to fonie, to quarrel v/ith him, as making the fame both one and many;intelled being that, v/hich contains tlie id.as of aJl things in it. WhereforePc.rmcnides his whole phitofophy (faith he) was better digeftcd and morecxaftly and diftindly fet down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeththree unities fubordinate, or a trinity of divine hypftafcs jo -x^x UXxTmi.» InPhyf. Arlftotel. fol. 17.