wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and

•theandandbutxxxviii 57;^ PREFACEand upon inartificial arguments, or teftimonies only -, 'a certain higherand diviner power in the ibul, chat peculiarly correfpondeth with the Deity,Notwithftanding which, knowledge or fcience added to this faith, (accordtothe Scripture advice) will make it more firm and ftedfaft, and thebetter able to re fi ft thofe alFaults of Ibphillical reafonings, that fhall be madeag:iinftit.In this fifth chapter, as fometimes eUewhere, we thought one fclves concerned,in defence of the divine Wifdom, Goodnefs, and Perfedion againilAtheills, to maintain, (with all the antient phiJolbphick Theifts,) the perfectionof the creation alfo -, or that the whole fyftem of things, taken all together,could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And indeed,this divine Goodnefs and Perfeition, as difplaying and manifefting itfclf in the works of Nature and Providence, is fuppofed in Scripture to bethe very foundation cf our Chriftian faith; when that is defined to be thefubilance and evidence rerum fperandarum ; that is, of ivhatfoever is (by agood man) to be hoped for. Notwithftanding which, it was far from ourintendon therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providencecould be otherwife than it is •, or that there is nothing left to the freewill and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third fedion, infiftlargely upon that ancient Pythagorick Cabala, that fouls are always unitedto fome body or other, as alfo, that all rational and inteiledual creaturesconfilt of foul and body •, fuggell feveral things from reafon and Chriftianantiquity in favour of them both ;yet would we not be tinderllood todogmatize in either of them, but to fubmit all to better judgments.Again, we fhall here advertilb the reader, (though we have caudon'd concerningit in the book it fell) that in our defence of incorporeal fubftanceagainfl the Atheifts, however we thought ourfelves concerned to fayutmofl, that poffibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, whogenerally maintained it to be unextendcd, (which to fome feems an abfoluteimpoffibility ;) yet we would not be fuppofed our felves dogmatically to affertany more in this point, than what all Incorporealills agree in, that thereis a fubftance fpecifically diflind from body ; namely fuch, as confifteth notof parts feparable from one another, and which can penetrate body, andlaftly, isfelf aflive, and hath an internal energy, diftind from that of localmotion. (And thus much is undeniably evinced, by the arguments beforepropofed.) But whether this fubftance be altogether unextended, or extendedotherwife than body ; we fliall leave every man to make his own judgmentconcerning it.Furthermore, we think fit here to fuggeil, that whereas throughout thischapter and whole book, weconftantly oppofe the generation of fouls, that is,the produiStionof life, cogitation and underftanding, out of dead and fenfelefsmatter •, aflert all fouls to be as fubftantial as matter it (d't: this isnot done by un, out of any fond addiftednefs to Pythagorick whimfcys, norindeed out of a mere partial regard to that caufe of Theifm neither, whichwe were engaged in, (though we had great reafon to be tender of that too j)but becaufe we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reafon •, itbeing