wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and
wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and
nor194 715^^ there muft he fome unmade SuhJlancCi Book LII. But whatever thefe Atheifts deny in words, it is notwithftandingevident, that even themfelves have an idea or conception in their mindsanfwering to the word God, when they deny his cxiftence, becaufcotherwife they fhould deny the exiftence of nothing. Nor can it be at alldoubted, but that they have alio the lame idea of God with Theifts,they denying the exiftence of no other thing than what thefe aflert.And as in all other controverfies, when men difpute together, the onsaffirming, the other denying, both patties muft needs have the fame idea intheir minds of what they difpute about, or otherwife their whole difputationwould be but a kind of Babel language and confufion ; fo multit be likewife in this prefent controverfy betwixt Theifts and Atheifts;Neither indeed would there be any controverfy at all between them,did they not both by God mean one and the fame thing -, wouldthe Atheifts be any longer Atheifts, did they not deny the exiftenceof that very fame thing, which the Theifts affirm, but of fomethingclfe.III. Wherefore we fhall in the next place declare what this idea ofGod is, or what is that thing, whofe exiftence they that affirm, are calledTheifts, and they who deny Atheifts. In order whereunto, we muft firfblay down this lemma or preparatory propofition, that as it is generally acknowledged,that all things did not exift from eternity, fuch as they are,unmade, but that fome things were made a^nd generated or produced •, fo itis not poffible that all things fhould be made neither, but there muft ofnecefllty be fomething felf-exiftent from eternity, and unmade •, becaufeif there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing.The reafon of which is fo evident and irrefiftible, that even the Atheillsconfefsthemfelves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitabletruth, that there muft be fomething a.y'mn\ov, fomething which wasnever made or produced, and which therefore is the caufe of thofe otherthings that are made, fomething Mr6(pvtg and au^uTroValev, that was felf'originated and felj-exifling, and which is as well aKuAfSfOD and a.'(p9a^1w, asesj'twrilov, incorruptible and undejlroyable, as ingenerable ; whofe exiftence thereforemuft needs be necelTary, becaufe if it were fuppofed to have happenedby chance to exift from eternity, then it might as well happen againto ceafe to be. Wherefore all the queftion now is, what is this a-yi-jM-^m andavwXtfljov, auTo'ipuef and aJSuTroValoi', this ingenerable and incorruptible, felforiginatedand felf-exijlent thing, wliich is the caufe of all other things thatare made.IV. Now there are two grand opinions oppofite to one another concerningit : for firft, fome contend, that the only felf-exiftent, unmade andincorruptible thing, and firft principle of all things, is fenflefs matter, thatis, matter either perfedtly dead and ftupid, or at leaft devoid of all animaliftiand confcious life. But becaufe this is really the loweft and moftimperfeft of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reafonable, thacthe firft principle and original of all things Ihould be that, which is moft5perfect
Chap. IV. the Principle of other things made. 195perfedl (as Arifiotle ' obfervcs of Pherecydes, and his followers, to ysma-xoTrcuTcv af irs'j TifiEaa-i, ihat they made the firjl caufe end principle of generationto be the bejl) and then apprehending, that to be endued with confcious lifeand underrtanding is much a greater perfecflion than to be devoid of both,(as Balbus in Cicero declares upon this very occafion. Nee dubium quin quod DeKat. Detr.cnimansfit, habedtque mentem, ^ rationem, id fenfum^ id fit meliusI'quam id 2-quod his careat) they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, whichl-^^P" ^'^^'was the principle, caufe and original of all other things, was not fenflefs xom ^1 X.matter, but a perfeft confcious underftanding nature, or mind. And thefeOper ]are they, who are ftriftly and properly called Theifts, who affirm, that a pcrfecllyconfcious underlhinding being, or mind, exifting of itfelf frometernity, was the caufe of all other things ; and they on the contrary, whoderive all things from fenflefs matter, as the firft original, and deny thatthere is any confcious underllanding being fclf-exiftent or unmade, are thofethat are properly called Atheifts. Wherefore the true and genuine idea ofGod in general, is this, A perfe£f confcious under/landing being (^or mind)exifting of itfelf from eternityy and the caufe of all other things.V. But it is here obfervable, that thofe Atheifts, who deny a God, accordingto this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, dooften abufe the word, calling fcnflel^ matter by that rvame -, partly perhapsas indeavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious nameof Atheifts, and partly as conceiving, that whatfoever is the firft principleof things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the caufe of all other thingsbefides itfelf, muft therefore needs be the divineft thing of all. Whereforeby the word God thefe mean nothing elfe, but that which is oLyiyjnrovy unmadeor felf-exiftent, and the .le\ feems to agree with that of Epicharmus *, 'AAXa xiyflai lAvX'^"'^ T-uToy ym^xi Sftov, But chaos is Jaid to have made the firft of gods ;unlefs we fliould rather underftand him thus, That chaos was faid to havebeen made before the gods. And this abufe of the word God is a thing,which» Metaphyficcr. Lib. XII. Cap. IV. p. 446. /^i^oc/rr, and his well known principles of TTeTx!;?Tom. IV'. Oper. and ^Mi'a. De Generatione & Corruptionc,» Chap. III. i XX. Cap. VI. p. 734. Tom. I. Oper.s Phis is a miftake of Dr. Cudicorth, for Apud Diogen. Laert. Lib. III. ff£m»Arifiotle does not fpeak of thofe philofophers, 10. p. 171.yttio confidered the elements as gods, but oi Em-
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nor194 715^^ <strong>the</strong>re muft he fome unmade SuhJlancCi Book LII. But whatever <strong>the</strong>fe A<strong>the</strong>ifts deny in words, it <strong>is</strong> notwithft<strong>and</strong>ingevident, that even <strong>the</strong>mfelves have an idea or conception in <strong>the</strong>ir mindsanfwering to <strong>the</strong> word God, when <strong>the</strong>y deny h<strong>is</strong> cxiftence, becaufco<strong>the</strong>rwife <strong>the</strong>y fhould deny <strong>the</strong> exiftence <strong>of</strong> nothing. Nor can it be at <strong>all</strong>doubted, but that <strong>the</strong>y have alio <strong>the</strong> lame idea <strong>of</strong> God with Theifts,<strong>the</strong>y denying <strong>the</strong> exiftence <strong>of</strong> no o<strong>the</strong>r thing than what <strong>the</strong>fe aflert.And as in <strong>all</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r controverfies, when men difpute toge<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> onsaffirming, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r denying, both patties muft needs have <strong>the</strong> fame idea in<strong>the</strong>ir minds <strong>of</strong> what <strong>the</strong>y difpute about, or o<strong>the</strong>rwife <strong>the</strong>ir whole difputationwould be but a kind <strong>of</strong> Babel language <strong>and</strong> confufion ; fo multit be likewife in th<strong>is</strong> prefent controverfy betwixt Theifts <strong>and</strong> A<strong>the</strong>ifts;Nei<strong>the</strong>r indeed would <strong>the</strong>re be any controverfy at <strong>all</strong> between <strong>the</strong>m,did <strong>the</strong>y not both by God mean one <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fame thing -, would<strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>ifts be any longer A<strong>the</strong>ifts, did <strong>the</strong>y not deny <strong>the</strong> exiftence<strong>of</strong> that very fame thing, which <strong>the</strong> Theifts affirm, but <strong>of</strong> fomethingclfe.III. Wherefore we fh<strong>all</strong> in <strong>the</strong> next place declare what th<strong>is</strong> idea <strong>of</strong>God <strong>is</strong>, or what <strong>is</strong> that thing, wh<strong>of</strong>e exiftence <strong>the</strong>y that affirm, are c<strong>all</strong>edTheifts, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y who deny A<strong>the</strong>ifts. In order whereunto, we muft firfblay down th<strong>is</strong> lemma or preparatory prop<strong>of</strong>ition, that as it <strong>is</strong> gener<strong>all</strong>y acknowledged,that <strong>all</strong> things did not exift from eternity, fuch as <strong>the</strong>y are,unmade, but that fome things were made a^nd generated or produced •, fo it<strong>is</strong> not p<strong>of</strong>fible that <strong>all</strong> things fhould be made nei<strong>the</strong>r, but <strong>the</strong>re muft <strong>of</strong>necefllty be fomething felf-exiftent from eternity, <strong>and</strong> unmade •, becaufeif <strong>the</strong>re had been once nothing, <strong>the</strong>re could never have been any thing.The reafon <strong>of</strong> which <strong>is</strong> fo evident <strong>and</strong> irrefiftible, that even <strong>the</strong> A<strong>the</strong>illsconfefs<strong>the</strong>mfelves conquered by it, <strong>and</strong> readily acknowledge it for an indubitabletruth, that <strong>the</strong>re muft be fomething a.y'mn\ov, fomething which wasnever made or produced, <strong>and</strong> which <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>is</strong> <strong>the</strong> caufe <strong>of</strong> th<strong>of</strong>e o<strong>the</strong>rthings that are made, fomething Mr6(pvtg <strong>and</strong> au^uTroValev, that was felf'originated <strong>and</strong> felj-exifling, <strong>and</strong> which <strong>is</strong> as well aKuAfSfOD <strong>and</strong> a.'(p9a^1w, asesj'twrilov, incorruptible <strong>and</strong> undejlroyable, as ingenerable ; wh<strong>of</strong>e exiftence <strong>the</strong>reforemuft needs be necelTary, becaufe if it were fupp<strong>of</strong>ed to have happenedby chance to exift from eternity, <strong>the</strong>n it might as well happen againto ceafe to be. Wherefore <strong>all</strong> <strong>the</strong> queftion now <strong>is</strong>, what <strong>is</strong> th<strong>is</strong> a-yi-jM-^m <strong>and</strong>avwXtfljov, auTo'ipuef <strong>and</strong> aJSuTroValoi', th<strong>is</strong> ingenerable <strong>and</strong> incorruptible, felforiginated<strong>and</strong> felf-exijlent thing, wliich <strong>is</strong> <strong>the</strong> caufe <strong>of</strong> <strong>all</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r things thatare made.IV. Now <strong>the</strong>re are two gr<strong>and</strong> opinions opp<strong>of</strong>ite to one ano<strong>the</strong>r concerningit : for firft, fome contend, that <strong>the</strong> only felf-exiftent, unmade <strong>and</strong>incorruptible thing, <strong>and</strong> firft principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>all</strong> things, <strong>is</strong> fenflefs matter, that<strong>is</strong>, matter ei<strong>the</strong>r perfedtly dead <strong>and</strong> ftupid, or at leaft devoid <strong>of</strong> <strong>all</strong> animalifti<strong>and</strong> confcious life. But becaufe th<strong>is</strong> <strong>is</strong> re<strong>all</strong>y <strong>the</strong> loweft <strong>and</strong> m<strong>of</strong>timperfeft <strong>of</strong> <strong>all</strong> beings, o<strong>the</strong>rs on <strong>the</strong> contrary judge it reafonable, thac<strong>the</strong> firft principle <strong>and</strong> original <strong>of</strong> <strong>all</strong> things Ihould be that, which <strong>is</strong> m<strong>of</strong>t5perfect