wherein all the reason and philosophy of atheism is confuted, and

Chap. II. Atheijls mah Knowledgejunior to the World. 77the iiibjed of it, or, as the fame thing is expreired by a modern writer, Nothingtaketh beginning from it felf but from the ailion of fame other immediateage.it without it. Wherefore no thinking being could be a firft caiife, anymore than an automaton or machine could. To this purpofe, it is furtherargued, that thcfe two notions, the one of a knowing underflanding being,the other of a perfecftly happy being, are contradictious, becaufe ail knowledgeeflentially implies dependance upon fomething dfe, as its caufe ; fcientiai£ intel'.eHus fignum eji pctentia ab alio dependentis, id quod non eft beatiffimum.They conclude, that cogitation, and all adion whatfoever, is really nothingelfe but local motion, which is eflentially heterokinefy, that which can neverrife of it felf,but is caufcd by fome other agent without its fubjed.XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritick Atheifls reafon thus : If the•world were made by any antecedent mind or underftanding, that is, by aDeity ; then there mud needs be an idea, platform and exemplar of thewhole world before it was made ; and confequently adual knowledge, bothin order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the informationof the things themfclves known ; all conception of the mind is a paffionfrom the things conceived, and their adivity upon it ; and is therefore juniorto them. Wherefore the world and things were before knowledge andthe conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind or deity before theworld as its caufe. This argument is thus propofed by the atheiftick Poetj'Exemphm porro gignundis rebus iS ipfaNotities hominum Di vis unde infita primiim,^id vclknt facere^ ut fcirent, animoque viderent ?^ove mode eft unquam vis cognita principiorum,^idnam inter fefe permutato ordine poffentSi non ipfa deditfpecimen natura creandi ?How could the fuppofed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind., to framethe vjorldby, and whence fl:ould he receive it ? How could he have any knowledgeof men before they were made, as alfo what himfelffliould will to do., whenthere was nothing ? Hoiv could he underftand the force and pofftbility of theprinciples., tvhat they ivould produce when varioufiy combined together., beforenature and things themfclves., by creating., had given a fpecimen ?XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiftsagainll a Deity is to this purpofe : that things could not be made by aDeity, that is fuppofed to be a being every way perfed, becaufe they are fofaulty and fo ill made: the argument is thus propounded by Lucretius ^ ;^iodfijam rerum ignorem primordia quafint.Hoc tamen ex ipfis caii rationibus aufimConfirmare., aliifque ex rebus reddere multis,Nequaquam nobis divinitiis cjfe paratamNaturam rerum, tantdftat pradita culpa.* Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 1S2. f Lib. II.vci". 1:7. ScLib.V.vcr. i;yu.This