Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ...
Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ... Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ...
32 Managing Conflict of InterestYeltsin’s Russia, with Suharto (and his family) benefiting hugely fromhis connections with Indonesia’s own “oligarchs” to the detrimentof the nation and his own legitimacy. Suharto and many of his colleaguesin government were hopelessly conflicted through theirclose links with the private sector and their revenue-raising activitiesassociated with the military and other branches of government.Moreover, they exploited these conflicts. Suharto’s family membersand the “oligarchs” effectively “captured the state,” similar to whattranspired in Russia.Suharto was forced out of office in 1998 partly on account ofgrowing resentment of corruption. Since then, Indonesia has madeimpressive strides in terms of institutional reform—the holding ofdirect (and generally clean) elections for president, for provincial andlocal officials, and for national and local parliaments; the strengtheningof the role of these parliaments; the removal of the militaryfrom government; the decentralization of power from Jakarta tolocal governments; and the setting up of an array of new institutionsaimed at reducing corruption and political patronage, e.g. an independentGeneral Elections Commission, a Supreme Audit Agency,an Anti-Corruption Commission, an Anti-Corruption Court, and anOmbudsman’s Office.Yet, progress in actually reducing corruption and in controllingconflicts of interest has been slow. Indonesia has significantlyimproved its WGI ranking on the control of corruption over the pastfew years—but it is still in the bottom quartile at about the samelevel as Russia. There have been hundreds of investigations by theAnti-Corruption Commission and some high-profile convictions; butcorruption remains pervasive. In central government it may havediminished, but this is offset by an increase at local levels as powerhas been devolved from Jakarta. (Businesses complain that havingto pay bribes at the local level creates greater uncertainty thanpaying bribes at the center. However, it is possible that, as in P.R.China, it reduces the risks of “state capture”). The media, with theirnewfound freedom, as well as other civil society organizations, haveplayed a useful role in exposing corruption; but the national parliamenthas been disappointing—indeed, as in Russia, there is routinebribery of MPs by the powerful interests who wish to resist reform.Political leadership on the issue has been variable. PresidentYudhoyono has a reputation for honesty and has been keen tomake progress on the corruption issue; but the same cannot beADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific
Defining Conflict of Interest 33said of certain other political leaders. As in Russia, booming naturalresource revenues have made embezzlement by politicians andofficials that much easier. Senior politicians retain major businessinterests, and directly or indirectly continue to exercise their authorityin respect of these interests. Low civil service and parliamentarysalaries also encourage bribe taking.Worst of all, the court system has performed poorly in bringingthe corrupt to justice: relative to the scale of the problem, convictionshave been few and some of the sentences derisory. Manysenior judges have a history of corruption, and the Supreme Courthas made it difficult for the Anti-Corruption Court to function. As inother countries in political transition, the informal norms and practicesof the past have tended to carry on into the present—not justfrom the Suharto period but also from the older tradition of offeringgifts in return for services. And finally, there has been resistance toreform from those powerful interests that “captured the state” inthe late Suharto period.In short, democratization has to yet to be accompanied by adequatelyfunctioning checks and balances or by a sufficiently supportivepolitical and cultural environment.SingaporeSingapore is a paradox. It has one of the cleanest governmentsin the world. Yet, as one scholar has observed, “the line betweenbusiness and government is systematically blurred.” The tiesbetween politicians, civil servants, and private businesspeople areclose. They have careers that involve moving from one sphere tothe other; and the structures of ownership provide many opportunitiesfor the abuse of power. In the light of these ties, “it would notbe surprising if government was unable to enforce prudential regulationand resist rent-seeking.” 23 In addition, Singapore is effectivelya one-party state, there is a lack of transparency in the way governmentconducts its business, the media are controlled and uncritical,23Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. Pacific Review 13 (2). This section draws on her analysisand also that of Tan, Tay Keong. 2003. Masters, Mandarins and Mortals: TheConstitution of Singapore’s National Integrity System. In The Enemy Within:Combating Corruption in Asia, edited by Simon Tay and Maria Seda. EasternUniversity Press.ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific
- Page 23 and 24: Keynote Addresses xxiI, therefore,
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32 <strong>Managing</strong> <strong><strong>Co</strong>nflict</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Interest</strong>Yeltsin’s Russia, with Suharto (and his family) benefiting hugely fromhis connections with Indonesia’s own “oligarchs” to the detriment<strong>of</strong> the nation and his own legitimacy. Suharto and many <strong>of</strong> his colleaguesin government were hopelessly conflicted through theirclose links with the private sector and their revenue-raising activitiesassociated with the military and other branches <strong>of</strong> government.Moreover, they exploited these conflicts. Suharto’s family membersand the “oligarchs” effectively “captured the state,” similar to whattranspired in Russia.Suharto was <strong>for</strong>ced out <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice in 1998 partly on account <strong>of</strong>growing resentment <strong>of</strong> corruption. Since then, Indonesia has madeimpressive strides in terms <strong>of</strong> institutional re<strong>for</strong>m—the holding <strong>of</strong>direct (and generally clean) elections <strong>for</strong> president, <strong>for</strong> provincial andlocal <strong>of</strong>ficials, and <strong>for</strong> national and local parliaments; the strengthening<strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong> these parliaments; the removal <strong>of</strong> the militaryfrom government; the decentralization <strong>of</strong> power from Jakarta tolocal governments; and the setting up <strong>of</strong> an array <strong>of</strong> new institutionsaimed at reducing corruption and political patronage, e.g. an independentGeneral Elections <strong>Co</strong>mmission, a Supreme Audit Agency,an Anti-<strong>Co</strong>rruption <strong>Co</strong>mmission, an Anti-<strong>Co</strong>rruption <strong>Co</strong>urt, and anOmbudsman’s Office.Yet, progress in actually reducing corruption and in controllingconflicts <strong>of</strong> interest has been slow. Indonesia has significantlyimproved its WGI ranking on the control <strong>of</strong> corruption over the pastfew years—but it is still in the bottom quartile at about the samelevel as Russia. There have been hundreds <strong>of</strong> investigations by theAnti-<strong>Co</strong>rruption <strong>Co</strong>mmission and some high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile convictions; butcorruption remains pervasive. In central government it may havediminished, but this is <strong>of</strong>fset by an increase at local levels as powerhas been devolved from Jakarta. (Businesses complain that havingto pay bribes at the local level creates greater uncertainty thanpaying bribes at the center. However, it is possible that, as in P.R.China, it reduces the risks <strong>of</strong> “state capture”). The media, with theirnewfound freedom, as well as other civil society organizations, haveplayed a useful role in exposing corruption; but the national parliamenthas been disappointing—indeed, as in Russia, there is routinebribery <strong>of</strong> MPs by the powerful interests who wish to resist re<strong>for</strong>m.Political leadership on the issue has been variable. PresidentYudhoyono has a reputation <strong>for</strong> honesty and has been keen tomake progress on the corruption issue; but the same cannot beADB/OECD Anti-<strong>Co</strong>rruption Initiative <strong>for</strong> Asia and the Pacific