Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ...

Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ... Managing Conflict of Interest - Organisation for Economic Co ...

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84 Managing Conflict of Interestimplementation and enforcement tools. In response to thesetrends, OECD has compiled checklists, model codes, and trainingmaterials to assist public and private sector officials in putting COIregulations into practice.Practitioners from Thailand, Hong Kong, China, and the UnitedStates describe the laws, procedures, and enforcement instrumentsin use in their countries, and reflect on the unique challengesthey face in dealing with COIs. Medhi Krongkaew, Commissionerwith the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), toutsrecent efforts to strengthen enforcement in Thailand, including thepassage of several new laws and regulations targeting COI issuesand the establishment of the NCCC as the primary anti-corruptionagency charged with enforcement. However, he admits that NCCChas rarely been able to enforce these laws, citing a backlog of corruptionand malfeasance cases that has made it difficult to focusspecial attention on COI issues. In contrast, Samuel Hui, AssistantDirector of Corruption Prevention with the Independent CommissionAgainst Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, China, credits arobust and flexible enforcement regime, ICAC’s efforts to work withthe private sector, and consideration of public perceptions for HongKong, China’s success in implementing new legislative measures.The examples from the United States highlight the complexityof COI and suggest that informal monitoring by watchdog groupsand the media may be just as important as official monitoring ofregulations and statutes in ensuring adequate enforcement. PeterAinsworth, Senior Deputy Chief of the Public Integrity Sectionwithin the Criminal Division of the United States Departmentof Justice, provides an overview of the key statutes addressingconflict -of-interest violations in the US, indicating that the primarychallenge in enforcing these statutes is determining intent. LarryMakinson, former Executive Director of the Center for ResponsivePolitics (CRP), explores the intersection between politics and publicadministration, where there appears to be no doubt regarding theintent of campaign contributions to influence policy making.These diverse examples indicate that the success of any country’slegislative and administrative frameworks in addressing COImust be measured by the record of enforcement.ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific

Conflict of interest: The challenge to developtools for implementation and enforcementJános BertókPrincipal Administrator, Innovation and Integrity Division,Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development,Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)Definition of Conflict of Interest: Actual, Potential, and ApparentConflict of interest (COI) arises when public officials have tomake decisions at work that may affect their private interests. TheOECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the PublicService define conflict of interest as “a conflict between the publicduties and private interests of a public official, in which the publicofficial has private-capacity interests which could improperly influencethe performance of their official duties and responsibilities.”COI situations can be real and immediate when public officials arein a situation where their private interests could bias the way they dotheir job. COI situations could also be “potential” or “ apparent”:• A potential COI exists when a public official may have privatecapacityinterests that may be such as to cause a COI situationin the future. For example, a public official owns a largenumber of shares in a forestry company, which could, in thefuture, decide to compete for a timber-production contractwith the official’s organization, where the official is currentlyin charge of all procurement contracts.• An apparent COI exists where it appears that an officialhas a conflict of interest but this is not in fact the case. Forexample, the senior official with shares in a corporationhas actually made formal internal arrangements to standaside from all decision making (“recusal”) in relation to thecontract for which this corporation is competing, in orderto resolve the conflict. The arrangements are not knownto the public at large, but are satisfactory to the official’sorganization.ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific

84 <strong>Managing</strong> <strong><strong>Co</strong>nflict</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Interest</strong>implementation and en<strong>for</strong>cement tools. In response to thesetrends, OECD has compiled checklists, model codes, and trainingmaterials to assist public and private sector <strong>of</strong>ficials in putting COIregulations into practice.Practitioners from Thailand, Hong Kong, China, and the UnitedStates describe the laws, procedures, and en<strong>for</strong>cement instrumentsin use in their countries, and reflect on the unique challengesthey face in dealing with COIs. Medhi Krongkaew, <strong>Co</strong>mmissionerwith the National <strong>Co</strong>unter <strong>Co</strong>rruption <strong>Co</strong>mmission (NCCC), toutsrecent ef<strong>for</strong>ts to strengthen en<strong>for</strong>cement in Thailand, including thepassage <strong>of</strong> several new laws and regulations targeting COI issuesand the establishment <strong>of</strong> the NCCC as the primary anti-corruptionagency charged with en<strong>for</strong>cement. However, he admits that NCCChas rarely been able to en<strong>for</strong>ce these laws, citing a backlog <strong>of</strong> corruptionand malfeasance cases that has made it difficult to focusspecial attention on COI issues. In contrast, Samuel Hui, AssistantDirector <strong>of</strong> <strong>Co</strong>rruption Prevention with the Independent <strong>Co</strong>mmissionAgainst <strong>Co</strong>rruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, China, credits arobust and flexible en<strong>for</strong>cement regime, ICAC’s ef<strong>for</strong>ts to work withthe private sector, and consideration <strong>of</strong> public perceptions <strong>for</strong> HongKong, China’s success in implementing new legislative measures.The examples from the United States highlight the complexity<strong>of</strong> COI and suggest that in<strong>for</strong>mal monitoring by watchdog groupsand the media may be just as important as <strong>of</strong>ficial monitoring <strong>of</strong>regulations and statutes in ensuring adequate en<strong>for</strong>cement. PeterAinsworth, Senior Deputy Chief <strong>of</strong> the Public Integrity Sectionwithin the Criminal Division <strong>of</strong> the United States Department<strong>of</strong> Justice, provides an overview <strong>of</strong> the key statutes addressingconflict -<strong>of</strong>-interest violations in the US, indicating that the primarychallenge in en<strong>for</strong>cing these statutes is determining intent. LarryMakinson, <strong>for</strong>mer Executive Director <strong>of</strong> the Center <strong>for</strong> ResponsivePolitics (CRP), explores the intersection between politics and publicadministration, where there appears to be no doubt regarding theintent <strong>of</strong> campaign contributions to influence policy making.These diverse examples indicate that the success <strong>of</strong> any country’slegislative and administrative frameworks in addressing COImust be measured by the record <strong>of</strong> en<strong>for</strong>cement.ADB/OECD Anti-<strong>Co</strong>rruption Initiative <strong>for</strong> Asia and the Pacific

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