The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...
The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...
The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...
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THE DISTRIBUTION OFIRANIAN AMMUNITIONIN AFRICAEVIDENCE FROM A NINE-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION
Published <strong>in</strong> the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research Ltd., London, 2012First published <strong>in</strong> December 2012All rights reserved. No part <strong>of</strong> this publication may be reproduced, stored <strong>in</strong>a retrieval system, or transmitted <strong>in</strong> any form or by any means without theprior permission <strong>in</strong> writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research, or as expresslypermitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographicsrights organisation. Enquiries concern<strong>in</strong>g reproduction outside the scope <strong>of</strong> theabove should be sent to the secretary, <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research (adm<strong>in</strong>@conflictarm.com).Copy-edited by Alex Potter (fpcc@mtnloaded.co.za)Design and layout by Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com)Cartography by Jillian Luff (mapgrafix.com)
CONTRIBUTORS TOTHIS REPORT<strong>The</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g contributors provided comprehensiveresearch and analysis from a wide range <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigationsconducted <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n conflicts between the years 2006 and2012:HOlGER ANDERSHolger Anders is an experienced field researcherwork<strong>in</strong>g on conventional arms proliferation. He alsoworks as a consultant on develop<strong>in</strong>g small armsand light weapons control capacities, particularly<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Africa</strong>n context. He is a lead<strong>in</strong>g specialist <strong>in</strong>trac<strong>in</strong>g arms and ammunition <strong>in</strong> conflict sett<strong>in</strong>gs,and has previously served as an arms expert on UNsanctions-monitor<strong>in</strong>g groups.JAMES BEVANJames Bevan has more than a decade <strong>of</strong> experience<strong>in</strong> track<strong>in</strong>g weapons <strong>in</strong> armed conflicts across<strong>Africa</strong>. A former field researcher with the SmallArms Survey and head <strong>of</strong> the UN Group <strong>of</strong> Expertson Côte d’Ivoire, he is now the director <strong>of</strong> <strong>Conflict</strong><strong>Armament</strong> Research.ClAUDIO GRAMIzzIClaudio Gramizzi is an <strong>in</strong>dependent researcher onweapons, arms flows and conflicts. In addition toexperience gathered while work<strong>in</strong>g for Europeannon-governmental organisations, he served asan arms expert and consultant on UN sanctionsmonitor<strong>in</strong>ggroups <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire, the DemocraticRepublic <strong>of</strong> the Congo and Sudan until 2011.JONAH lEFFJonah Leff is the project coord<strong>in</strong>ator for the SmallArms Survey’s Human Security Basel<strong>in</strong>e Assessment(HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan. He establishedthe HSBA Arms and <strong>Ammunition</strong> Trac<strong>in</strong>g Desk <strong>in</strong>October 2011, which aims to identify weapons typesand their modes <strong>of</strong> transfer <strong>in</strong> the two countries. Heformerly served on UN sanctions-monitor<strong>in</strong>g groupson Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, and has authorednumerous papers on armed violence and weaponsproliferation.MIkE lEwISMike Lewis is an experienced researcher onconflict, arms and f<strong>in</strong>ancial crime. He has workedextensively <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, with a particular focus onEast <strong>Africa</strong>n conflicts. In 2011 he served as aviationexpert on the UN Panel <strong>of</strong> Experts on the Sudan. Hecurrently works for a UK-based non-governmentalorganisation research<strong>in</strong>g corporate tax evasion <strong>in</strong><strong>Africa</strong> and Asia.<strong>The</strong> contributors would like to thank a number <strong>of</strong> peopleand organisations who provided extensive assistance to thedevelopment <strong>of</strong> this report: Alex Diehl for his technical supportand analysis <strong>of</strong> ammunition types, Russ Cornell for shar<strong>in</strong>ghis ammunition samples, Chris Chivers for his photographicevidence and <strong>in</strong>sights from Afghanistan, and the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute for br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g a number <strong>of</strong>arms experts around one table. Many people supplied <strong>in</strong>valuable<strong>in</strong>formation dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigations for this report, some <strong>of</strong> them ona confidential basis. <strong>The</strong> list, which extends back some six years, istoo long to give here. You know who you are. Thank you all for yourcontributions.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 5
ABBREVIATIONSANd ACRONYMSAMIG<strong>Ammunition</strong> and Metallurgical Industries GroupIRGC<strong>Iranian</strong> Revolutionary Guard CorpsAQIMal-Qaeda <strong>in</strong> the Islamic MaghrebMICMilitary Industrial CorporationBICBureau International des Conta<strong>in</strong>ersNISSNational Intelligence and Security ServicesDIODefence Industries OrganisationSAFSudanese Armed ForcesDRCDemocratic Republic <strong>of</strong> the CongoYICYarmouk Industrial ComplexFRRForces Républica<strong>in</strong>es Fédéralistes6<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
INTRODUCTION<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 9
PHYSICAL EVIdENCE OFIRANIAN AMMUNITIONTRANSFERSThis section presents evidence derived from <strong>in</strong>vestigationsconducted between June 2006 and November 2012. Itdocuments the characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> small-calibreammunition—<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g its packag<strong>in</strong>g—from a range <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>vestigations conducted <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. It also draws heavilyon <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identified <strong>in</strong> cases outside <strong>Africa</strong>,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g maritime <strong>in</strong>terceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weaponry, andmateriel circulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Iraq and Afghanistan.CARTRIDGES<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has gatheredevidence <strong>of</strong> three types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>-manufacturedsmall-calibre ammunition circulat<strong>in</strong>g on the<strong>Africa</strong>n cont<strong>in</strong>ent. <strong>The</strong> first two types are 7.62 x39 mm <strong>in</strong> calibre; the third is 7.62 x 54R mm <strong>in</strong>calibre. <strong>The</strong>re are commonalities among the threetypes, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the composition <strong>of</strong> cartridgecases, mark<strong>in</strong>g formats and projectile (bullet)construction.As Image 1 illustrates, the mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the first 7.62x 39 mm cartridge—known as the headstamp 1 —<strong>in</strong>dicate a calibre designation (‘7.62 x 39’) and adate mark. In these examples the date mark ‘02’<strong>in</strong>dicates manufacture <strong>in</strong> 2002. <strong>The</strong> cartridgesfeature a red primer annulus lacquer.<strong>The</strong> second type <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge featuresa lot number (‘257’) at the four o’clock position anda date mark (‘06’) at eight o’clock to form a threeentryheadstamp (rather than the two entries <strong>in</strong> thetype 1 examples <strong>in</strong> Image 1). <strong>The</strong> primer annuluslacquer is green rather than red (see Image 2).Of the two types <strong>of</strong> cartridges illustrated above,<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has documented theImage 1<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge, type 1© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research,2012<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 11
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 2<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge, type 2Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridge is spent(i.e. the empty cartridge casealone), hav<strong>in</strong>g been fireddur<strong>in</strong>g the events <strong>in</strong> Conakry<strong>of</strong> 28 September 2009. See thecase study on Gu<strong>in</strong>ea <strong>in</strong> thisreport for further <strong>in</strong>formation.© Mike Lewis/AmnestyInternational, 2009first type <strong>in</strong> seven <strong>Africa</strong>n states, but only identifiedthe second <strong>in</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>ea. However, cartridges <strong>of</strong> thesecond type have been identified elsewhere <strong>in</strong>the world, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g widespread distribution <strong>in</strong>Afghanistan.With the exception <strong>of</strong> the headstamp configurationand primer annulus lacquer, the two types <strong>of</strong>cartridge are identical <strong>in</strong> construction, weightand physical dimensions. Each conforms to themanufactur<strong>in</strong>g specifications <strong>of</strong> ‘7.62 x 39 ball’provided by the <strong>Ammunition</strong> and MetallurgicalIndustries Group (AMIG) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iranian</strong> DefenceIndustries Organisation (DIO). 2 Annex 1 <strong>of</strong> thisreport provides technical <strong>in</strong>formation on physicalsamples held by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research.Headstamp analysis also <strong>in</strong>dicates the identicalstamp<strong>in</strong>g font <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual letters on the twoammunition types. Table 1 provides a visual crosscomparison<strong>of</strong> the two types <strong>of</strong> ammunition,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g samples documented <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> andAfghanistan. Although stamp<strong>in</strong>g quality 3 differs,particular attention should be paid to thedownward ‘tick’ on the horizontal part <strong>of</strong> the ‘7’, thedimensions <strong>of</strong> the ‘6’ and the relative size <strong>of</strong> the ‘X’.Table 1Visual comparison<strong>of</strong> headstampmark<strong>in</strong>gsNo.Close-up <strong>of</strong> mark<strong>in</strong>gcharacteristicsCartridge <strong>in</strong>formation1 Documented after recovery from the 28September 2009 stadium massacre <strong>in</strong>Conakry, Gu<strong>in</strong>ea2 Documented after recovery from Talibanforces <strong>in</strong> Nawa-I-Barakzayi District,Helmand Prov<strong>in</strong>ce, Afghanistan, January20103 Recovered from an unspecified location <strong>in</strong>Afghanistan, date not providedSources: (1) © Mike Lewis/Amnesty International, 2009;(2) © C. J. Chivers/New YorkTimes, 2010; (3) © Russ Cornell,2012; (4) © <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong>Research, 20124 Documented <strong>in</strong> service with rebel forces <strong>in</strong>northern Côte d’Ivoire, 200912<strong>Conflict</strong> Arms Rearch<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 3<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mmcartridgeNotes: Precise date and place<strong>of</strong> documentation withheldfor reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.<strong>The</strong> ammunition is packed <strong>in</strong>quantities <strong>of</strong> 20 rounds <strong>in</strong>tocardboard boxes. Each greenbattle bag conta<strong>in</strong>s ten suchboxes, totall<strong>in</strong>g 200 cartridgesper bag.Source: Confidential<strong>The</strong> third type <strong>of</strong> ammunition is 7.62 x 54R mm<strong>in</strong> calibre and marked <strong>in</strong> the same format as thefirst type <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm examples. As Image 3illustrates, it also features a calibre designation(‘7.62 x 54’) at the 12 o’clock position and a datemark at six o’clock. In this example, the date mark‘01’ <strong>in</strong>dicates manufacture <strong>in</strong> 2001.<strong>The</strong> cartridge conforms to the manufactur<strong>in</strong>gspecifications <strong>of</strong> ‘7.62 x 54 heavy’ provided by Iran’sDIO. 4 Annex 2 <strong>of</strong> this report provides technical<strong>in</strong>formation from physical samples held by <strong>Conflict</strong><strong>Armament</strong> Research. 5None <strong>of</strong> the cartridges pictured above is markedwith factory identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation. While mostSoviet-calibre ammunition (e.g. Russian or Ch<strong>in</strong>eseproduction) features a two- or three-digit code to<strong>in</strong>dicate the factory <strong>of</strong> manufacture, the <strong>Iranian</strong>examples do not. This is the primary reason why,when first document<strong>in</strong>g these types <strong>of</strong> ammunition,<strong>in</strong>vestigators did not identify them as <strong>Iranian</strong>.A second reason is that, although now beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gto grow <strong>in</strong> scope and detail, literature on <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition was previously very limited.Additionally, early <strong>in</strong>vestigations found mostsamples <strong>of</strong> this ammunition unboxed—whetherfound on the battlefield, repacked <strong>in</strong>to bags ortaken from the magaz<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> users. It was not until<strong>in</strong>vestigators began to document ammunitionpackag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> shipments proven to have orig<strong>in</strong>ated<strong>in</strong> Iran that they were able to identify the cartridgesas be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> manufacture.PACkAGING<strong>Iranian</strong> small-calibre ammunition packag<strong>in</strong>g—whether for 7.62 x 39 mm or 7.62 x 54R mm—consists <strong>of</strong> several components. <strong>The</strong>se componentsare pictured <strong>in</strong> Image 4 and <strong>in</strong>clude an outerwooden box, green plastic ‘battle bags’ andcardboard sub-units.Image 4<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmammunition box andcontentsNotes: <strong>The</strong> box conta<strong>in</strong>s 1,0007.62 x 39 mm cartridges. <strong>The</strong>cartridges are identical <strong>in</strong>construction to those pictured<strong>in</strong> Image 1 and feature theheadstamp mark<strong>in</strong>gs ‘7.62 x39’ at the 12 o’clock positionand ‘94’ at six o’clock.Source: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 13
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSIN THE CASES DOCUMENTEDTO DATE NEITHER THEOUTER WOODEN BOXESNOR THEIR CONTENTS HAVESPECIFIED ANY INFORMATIONTHAT MIGHT IDENTIFY THEMANUFACTURER.<strong>The</strong> outer wooden boxes differ greatly <strong>in</strong> designfrom other common types <strong>of</strong> Soviet-calibreammunition box, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those <strong>of</strong> Bulgaria, Ch<strong>in</strong>aand Russia. <strong>Iranian</strong> boxes are approximately 10 cmtaller and feature dist<strong>in</strong>ctive rope handles, whileBulgarian, Ch<strong>in</strong>ese and Russian examples employwooden handles.<strong>The</strong>re are some small variations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition box construction. For example, thebox pictured <strong>in</strong> Image 4 has nailed jo<strong>in</strong>ts, whileother examples (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm boxesdocumented <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>) feature dovetail jo<strong>in</strong>ts.However, these differences are m<strong>in</strong>or and there arevery few visual differences between <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x39 mm and 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition boxes.In all documented cases, the outer wooden boxesconta<strong>in</strong> five plastic battle bags, the colour <strong>of</strong> whichis <strong>in</strong>variably green. In the case <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 54R mmammunition the bags feature mark<strong>in</strong>gs that specifythe quantity, calibre, lot and date <strong>of</strong> manufacture(see Image 5). Some examples <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmbags documented by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Researchfeature only the quantity and calibre. 6 RegardlessImage 5Internal configuration <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mmammunition packag<strong>in</strong>gNotes: Location and date <strong>of</strong>photograph withheld for reasons<strong>of</strong> confidentiality.© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research,201214<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 6Extract from a US military report detail<strong>in</strong>g weapons seizures <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, 6 November 2008Notes: Mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the bags <strong>in</strong>dicate each conta<strong>in</strong>s 200 rounds <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition. <strong>The</strong>y <strong>in</strong>clude two lots: lot number96 manufactured <strong>in</strong> 2006 and lot number 13 manufactured <strong>in</strong> 2007. Image k<strong>in</strong>dly supplied by Matt Schroeder, manager <strong>of</strong> theArms Sales Monitor<strong>in</strong>g Project <strong>of</strong> the Federation <strong>of</strong> American Scientists. Image obta<strong>in</strong>ed through a Freedom <strong>of</strong> Information Actrequest ‘for documents and photographs <strong>of</strong> weapons seized from arms caches <strong>in</strong> or near Baghdad from September 2008 untilSeptember 2009’; Matt Schroeder submitted the request to the US Central Command on 23 September 2009.<strong>of</strong> calibre, each bag conta<strong>in</strong>s ten grey cardboardboxes (unmarked), each <strong>of</strong> which conta<strong>in</strong>s 20cartridges.In the cases documented to date neither the outerwooden boxes nor their contents have specified any<strong>in</strong>formation that might identify the manufacturer.For these reasons, <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Researchhad to employ cross-case analysis—compar<strong>in</strong>gammunition and packag<strong>in</strong>g documented <strong>in</strong> known<strong>Iranian</strong> shipments with ammunition and packag<strong>in</strong>gdiscovered elsewhere—to identify the ammunitionas <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>in</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>.To summarise these <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong> brief, <strong>Conflict</strong><strong>Armament</strong> Research observed ammunitionpacked <strong>in</strong> green battle bags <strong>in</strong> Kenya (2008) andCôte d’Ivoire (2010). It also documented completepackag<strong>in</strong>g (outer wooden boxes and their contents)<strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire <strong>in</strong> 2009 and 2012. In none <strong>of</strong>these cases did it f<strong>in</strong>d any evidence to <strong>in</strong>dicatemanufacture by Iran.However, a review <strong>of</strong> known <strong>Iranian</strong> shipments or<strong>of</strong> confirmed <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identifies thesame packag<strong>in</strong>g. First, <strong>in</strong> October 2010 Nigerianauthorities seized a consignment <strong>of</strong> weapons andammunition <strong>in</strong> Apapa port, Lagos. Analysis <strong>of</strong>the bill <strong>of</strong> lad<strong>in</strong>g (see Annex 4) and <strong>in</strong>vestigationsby <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research revealed thatthe shipment orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Iran and conta<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured weapons. News mediaphotographs <strong>of</strong> the seizure <strong>in</strong>cluded pictures <strong>of</strong>green ammunition bags identical to those observed<strong>in</strong> Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. 7Second, <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research obta<strong>in</strong>eddocuments compiled by US forces operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Iraqdocument<strong>in</strong>g seizures <strong>of</strong> green ammunition bags,which US forces described as ‘<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62’. <strong>The</strong>bags are identical to those observed <strong>in</strong> Kenya, Côted’Ivoire and Nigeria (see Image 6).Third, <strong>in</strong> January 2002 the Israeli military seizeda merchant ship, the Kar<strong>in</strong>e A, that was carry<strong>in</strong>g acargo <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons. 8 Among a range <strong>of</strong> otherordnance found on board, Israeli forces seized largequantities <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> green bags <strong>of</strong>the type documented <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Kenyaand Nigeria. 9F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong>vestigations by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong>Research identified ammunition packed <strong>in</strong> thesame green bags on the US civilian market. 10<strong>The</strong> results <strong>of</strong> these <strong>in</strong>vestigations have allowed<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research to identify <strong>Iranian</strong>manufacturedcartridges and various items <strong>of</strong>packag<strong>in</strong>g across <strong>Africa</strong>.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 15
AFRICAN GOVERNMENTSAPPEAR TO BE THE MAINVECTORS IN THE SUPPLYOF IRANIAN AMMUNITION[AND WEAPONS] TO ILLICITMARKETS IN AFRICA.
IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAYEARS OF MANUFACTURE AND DATES OF SUPPlY TO AFRICAIran manufactured a majority <strong>of</strong> the ammunitiondocumented <strong>in</strong> this study with<strong>in</strong> the past decade.Analysis <strong>of</strong> dates marked on cartridges andammunition packag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicate production <strong>in</strong>2001 and later, with most production concentrated<strong>in</strong> the 2002–03 period. <strong>The</strong> last recorded date <strong>of</strong>manufacture is 2006.<strong>The</strong> only exceptions to these observations arethe 7.62 x 51 mm cartridges dated 1970 and 1971documented <strong>in</strong> southern Sudan (now South Sudan)<strong>in</strong> the hands <strong>of</strong> civilian users <strong>in</strong> 2008 (see Image 7).Interviews with users suggest they date from thefirst Sudanese civil war (1955–72). Investigationshave not publicly documented the cartridgeselsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. 11Dates <strong>of</strong> manufacture provide some <strong>in</strong>dication <strong>of</strong>dates <strong>of</strong> supply. Table 2 lists the 14 cases <strong>in</strong> thestudy. In each case it notes the manufactur<strong>in</strong>gdates <strong>of</strong> the cartridges observed and the date<strong>of</strong> observation. <strong>The</strong>se dates bracket a range <strong>of</strong>potential supply dates—i.e. the ammunition cannothave been delivered before it was manufactured,nor could it have been delivered after the date onwhich <strong>in</strong>vestigators first observed it.While these supply date ranges may appear verybroad, <strong>in</strong> all probability they are narrower, for tworeasons. First, lead times between production <strong>in</strong>Iran and delivery to an <strong>Africa</strong>n country could run tomonths, not to mention the fact that ammunitionmay have been stored <strong>in</strong> the factory for sometime before shipp<strong>in</strong>g. Second, the date on which<strong>in</strong>vestigators documented the ammunition wasunlikely to be the one on which the ammunitionentered service. For example, <strong>in</strong> the Kenya<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>terviews conducted <strong>in</strong> June 2006suggest that the <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition had beenobserved <strong>in</strong> service with Kenya Police units at leasta year before (i.e. <strong>in</strong> or before June 2005). 12In summary, some <strong>of</strong> the supply date ranges<strong>in</strong> Table 2, such as for Gu<strong>in</strong>ea and Kenya, aresufficiently narrow to date ammunition transfersfrom Iran to with<strong>in</strong> a period <strong>of</strong> two or three years.In the case <strong>of</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>ea it is worth not<strong>in</strong>g that theearliest supply date is very close to the March 2007UN Security Council sanctions on <strong>Iranian</strong> armsexports. 13LEAD TIMES BETWEENPRODUCTION IN IRAN ANDDELIVERY TO AN AFRICANCOUNTRY COULD RUN TOMONTHS.Image 7Farsi-marked <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition dat<strong>in</strong>g from the 1970s, southern Sudan, 2008Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridges feature the manufacturer’s name, Sazman Sanaye Defa (i.e. DIO) at the 12 o’clock position and date codesfor 1970 (left) and 1971 (right) at the six o’clock position.© James Bevan, 200818<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICATable 2Documented <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, 2006–12, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g supply date rangesNotes: All sources are provided <strong>in</strong> the case study section <strong>of</strong> this report.Case Country Location Most recentdate <strong>of</strong>manufacture aEarliestobservation bSupplydaterangeCircumstances1 Côted’Ivoire2 Côted’IvoireFormer rebelheldnorth <strong>of</strong>the countryGovernmentforces2003 2009 2003–09 7.62 x 39 mm, supplied to formerrebel forces from the territory <strong>of</strong>Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso2001 2009 2001–09 7.62 x 54R mm, <strong>in</strong> service withformer government forces3 DRC South Kivu 2003 2009 2003–09 7.62 x 39 mm, identified <strong>in</strong> servicewith the Forces Républica<strong>in</strong>esFédéralistes operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the HautsPlateaux area <strong>of</strong> South Kivu4Gu<strong>in</strong>ea Conakry 2006 2009 2006–09 7.62 x 39 mm, <strong>in</strong> service withGu<strong>in</strong>ean government forces5 Kenya TurkanaDistrict2003 2006 2003–06 7.62 x 39 mm, <strong>in</strong> service with Kenyangovernment forces; also supplied tonon-state Turkana groups6 Niger North <strong>of</strong> Arlit 2002 2012 2002–12 7.62 x 54R mm, recovered dur<strong>in</strong>gmilitary engagements between theNigerien military and al-Qaeda <strong>in</strong>the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)7 Niger Burk<strong>in</strong>aFaso–Nigerborder8 Nigeria Apapa port,Lagos2002 2012 2002–12 7.62 x 39 mm, <strong>in</strong>tercepted shipmentreportedly orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theterritory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso2006 2010 2010 7.62 x 54R mm, seized dur<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>spection <strong>of</strong> 13 shipp<strong>in</strong>g conta<strong>in</strong>ers9 SouthernSudanEasternEquatoriaState2003 2008 2003–08 7.62 x 39 mm, documented <strong>in</strong>service with civilians groups;orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> service with Kenyansecurity forces10 SouthSudan11 SouthSudanJonglei State 2012 N/A Significant quantity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ordnance <strong>in</strong> service with Khartoumbackedforces; no small-calibreammunition documentedUnity State 2011 N/A Significant quantity <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ordnance <strong>in</strong> service with Khartoumbackedforces; no small-calibreammunition documented12 Sudan South Darfur 2003 2008 2003–08 7.62 x 39 mm, <strong>in</strong> service withKhartoum-backed forces13 Sudan SouthKord<strong>of</strong>an14 Uganda Karamojaregion2001 2012 2001–12 7.62 x 54R mm, <strong>in</strong> service withKhartoum-backed forces2003 2006 2003–06 7.62 x 39 mm, documented <strong>in</strong>service with civilians groups;orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong> service with Kenyansecurity forcesaIndicates the year <strong>of</strong> manufacture as marked on cartridge cases or packag<strong>in</strong>g.bIndicates the year <strong>in</strong> which <strong>in</strong>vestigators first observed ammunition marked with a particular year <strong>of</strong> manufacture.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 19
IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAAMMUNITION USERS<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition is <strong>in</strong> service with a variety<strong>of</strong> users. <strong>The</strong>se fall <strong>in</strong>to three broad categories:national defence and security forces, rebel or<strong>in</strong>surgent groups, and civilians.In the case <strong>of</strong> national defence and security forces,there is clear evidence that <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitionis <strong>in</strong> service with Gu<strong>in</strong>ean, Ivorian and Kenyanforces. <strong>The</strong>re is also grow<strong>in</strong>g evidence to suggestthat Sudan’s security forces also deploy <strong>Iranian</strong>materiel—evidenced by extensive supplies toarmed groups <strong>in</strong> Darfur and South Sudan, andammunition found <strong>in</strong> positions vacated by theSudanese Armed Forces (SAF) <strong>in</strong> southern Sudan(see the case study sections <strong>of</strong> this report).Rebel and <strong>in</strong>surgent movements also deploy<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition. <strong>The</strong> Darfur and South Sudancases have already been noted, but this study alsodocuments <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> service withformer rebel forces <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire and factionsaligned with AQIM operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Niger. With theexception <strong>of</strong> Khartoum-aligned forces <strong>in</strong> Darfurand South Sudan, the regional sources <strong>of</strong> thisammunition are unclear. In the Côte d’Ivoire case,ammunition deliveries certa<strong>in</strong>ly transited theterritory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso and match the types <strong>of</strong>ammunition circulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Darfur, but it rema<strong>in</strong>sunclear if they orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> another <strong>Africa</strong>n country(see the case study sections <strong>of</strong> this report).Civilians <strong>in</strong> several countries also possess <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition. In Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda,supply clearly po<strong>in</strong>ts to the Kenyan defence andsecurity forces (see the case study sections <strong>of</strong> thisreport). <strong>The</strong> diversion <strong>of</strong> weapons and ammunitionfrom government forces to civilian markets is apersistent and well-documented problem <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>and the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> this study add yet another layer<strong>of</strong> confirmation.TRANSFERS OF IRANIAN AMMUNITIONwITHIN AFRICAThis study primarily documents the distribution<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition rather than its transferwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. This is for the simple reason that <strong>in</strong>many <strong>of</strong> the cases pr<strong>of</strong>iled <strong>in</strong> this report there islittle firm evidence to elucidate any clear transferdynamics. <strong>The</strong>re are, however, some clear cases<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>traregional ammunition transfers <strong>in</strong> Eastand West <strong>Africa</strong>. <strong>The</strong>re is also some evidence thatmight <strong>in</strong>dicate trans-Saharan/Sahelian traffick<strong>in</strong>gbetween the two regions (see Map 1).In East <strong>Africa</strong> transfers <strong>in</strong>clude supplies by Sudan(Khartoum) to various armed forces operat<strong>in</strong>g20<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAEVIDENCE FROM NORTHERNNIGER SUGGESTS THATIRANIAN AMMUNITION IS INSERVICE WITH SAHARA-BASED GROUPS THAT AREREPORTEDLY ALIGNED WITHAL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMICMAGHREB.<strong>in</strong> Darfur and South Sudan. In some cases thesesupplies also <strong>in</strong>clude weapons, such as <strong>Iranian</strong>manufacturedrocket launchers, and other militarymateriel (see the case study sections <strong>of</strong> this report).A separate set <strong>of</strong> transfers can be identified <strong>in</strong>the Kenya–South Sudan–Uganda border region.<strong>The</strong>se <strong>in</strong>volve the retransfer by civilians <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition that was formerly <strong>in</strong> service withKenyan defence and security forces. <strong>The</strong> transfersare very localised, but nevertheless significant (seethe case study sections <strong>of</strong> this report).In West <strong>Africa</strong> there is clear evidence <strong>of</strong> significanttransfers from the territory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso torebel forces operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> northern Côte d’Ivoire. Inaddition, reports from Niger suggest that <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition has entered the country from Burk<strong>in</strong>aFaso. Further evidence from northern Nigersuggests that <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition is <strong>in</strong> service withSahara-based groups that are reportedly alignedwith AQIM (see the case study sections <strong>of</strong> thisreport). While there may be no l<strong>in</strong>k whatsoeverbetween these cases, the fact that <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition appears to proliferate <strong>in</strong> the Sahara/Sahel region <strong>in</strong> addition to East and West <strong>Africa</strong> isnoteworthy.Moreover, when <strong>in</strong>vestigators discovered largequantities <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> bags <strong>in</strong>northern Côte d’Ivoire, they also documented largequantities <strong>of</strong> Sudanese-manufactured ammunitionstored <strong>in</strong> the same bags and <strong>in</strong> the same locations.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> and Sudanese ammunition are <strong>of</strong>the same types as those documented together<strong>in</strong> Darfur and Southern Sudan. While there is noevidence to suggest transfers between these Eastand West <strong>Africa</strong>n regions, this f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g, together withdocumented <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> the Sahara/Sahel region, should be considered <strong>in</strong> future<strong>in</strong>vestigations.VIOlATIONS OF INTERNATIONAlSANCTIONS REGIMESSupplies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition to rebel forces <strong>in</strong>northern Côte d’Ivoire clearly contravened the armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire imposed by UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1572 (2004). It is unclear exactlywhich parties were responsible for the transfers,although UN reports implicate the Government <strong>of</strong>Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso <strong>in</strong> similar transfers to rebel forces <strong>in</strong>Côte d’Ivoire at the time (2005–11).Beyond this case there are reasonable grounds toconclude that <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition, dated 2003, mayhave entered the DRC <strong>in</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> the UN armsembargo imposed by Resolution 1493 (2003) onarmed groups and militias operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> North andSouth Kivu and Ituri. <strong>The</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> this ammunition(follow<strong>in</strong>g manufacture <strong>in</strong> Iran) are not known.Similarly, 2004-dated <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identified<strong>in</strong> the Darfur region <strong>of</strong> Sudan may have enteredthe region <strong>in</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> sanctions imposed byResolution 1591 (2005). <strong>The</strong> date <strong>of</strong> manufacture issufficiently close to the date on which the sanctionscame <strong>in</strong>to force to suspect this. Sudan cont<strong>in</strong>uesto supply <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons and ammunition to theDarfur region.<strong>The</strong> 2010 Nigerian case <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the direct supply<strong>of</strong> weapons and ammunition from Iran is a clearbreach <strong>of</strong> UN sanctions on <strong>Iranian</strong> arms exports.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 21
IRANIAN WEAPONS ANDAMMUNITION ARE INSERVICE WITH FOREIGN-BACKED INSURGENTS,REBEL FORCES, ISLAMIST-ORIENTED ARMED GROUPSAND WARRING CIVILIANCOMMUNITIES.
CASE STUDIES<strong>The</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g case studies present detailed evidence <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identified <strong>in</strong> specific countries andregions <strong>of</strong> sub-Saharan <strong>Africa</strong>. In addition to ammunition,the cases also document <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons, which are also<strong>in</strong> service with government and non-state forces on thecont<strong>in</strong>ent.kENYA, SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA, 2006–08Between May 2006 and January 2008 a researcherwork<strong>in</strong>g for the Geneva-based Small Arms Surveydocumented 3,382 small-calibre cartridges <strong>in</strong>service with a range <strong>of</strong> state armed forces andnon-state armed groups <strong>in</strong> the border triangle<strong>of</strong> Kenya, southern Sudan (now South Sudan)and Uganda. 14 This ammunition <strong>in</strong>cluded variouscalibres, but the most common type <strong>in</strong> circulation(approximately 75 per cent <strong>of</strong> the sample) was theSoviet-designed 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge. Althoughthere was no evidence to suggest it at the time <strong>of</strong>the study, <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has s<strong>in</strong>ceidentified more than 25 per cent <strong>of</strong> this 7.62 x 39mm ammunition as hav<strong>in</strong>g been manufactured <strong>in</strong>Iran (Image 8).In 2006–08 no prior studies had documented thistype <strong>of</strong> ammunition on the <strong>Africa</strong>n cont<strong>in</strong>ent. Inaddition, the ammunition <strong>in</strong> the sample was largelydiscovered loose (or loaded <strong>in</strong>to magaz<strong>in</strong>es) ratherthan boxed <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>al packag<strong>in</strong>g. For this reason<strong>in</strong>formation such as factory mark<strong>in</strong>gs or shipp<strong>in</strong>glabels that might have identified the ammunition ashav<strong>in</strong>g orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Iran was not available.<strong>The</strong> study did, however, record one <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong>which the ammunition was found packaged <strong>in</strong>sealed green polythene bags. <strong>The</strong> bags featured twomoulded handles and had to be cut to ga<strong>in</strong> accessto the cartridges. Each bag conta<strong>in</strong>ed 20 cardboardboxes, each packed with 20 cartridges. <strong>The</strong> bagsImage 8<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom northern KenyaNotes: <strong>The</strong> cartridge illustratedis one <strong>of</strong> several recoveredfrom various locations <strong>in</strong>Eastern Equatoria (SouthSudan), Karamoja (Uganda)and Turkana District (Kenya).<strong>The</strong> fir<strong>in</strong>g p<strong>in</strong> mark on theprimer cap results fromdischarge <strong>in</strong> a weaponfollow<strong>in</strong>g the demilitarisation<strong>of</strong> the cartridge (by bulletpull<strong>in</strong>g). Photograph <strong>of</strong> aphysical sample held by<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research.© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research,2012<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 23
CASE STUDIESwere marked with yellow/gold letter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>gthe quantity <strong>of</strong> ammunition, the calibre, lot numberand year <strong>of</strong> manufacture. Although the sensitivesecurity environment prevented photography <strong>of</strong> thepackag<strong>in</strong>g, 15 the bags were identical <strong>in</strong> constructionand mark<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition ‘battle bags’later found elsewhere on the cont<strong>in</strong>ent (see thecases presented below).<strong>The</strong> Small Arms Survey study concluded thatKenyan security forces were the primary source<strong>of</strong> the (then-unidentified) <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmammunition circulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the region—specificallythe Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reserves.Evidence for these assertions <strong>in</strong>cluded thefollow<strong>in</strong>g:In 2008 <strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured ammunition <strong>of</strong> thetype illustrated <strong>in</strong> Image 8 comprised 70 per cent<strong>of</strong> sampled 7.62 x 39 mm cartridges <strong>in</strong> servicewith the Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reserves.<strong>The</strong> study observed first-hand the Kenya Policesupply<strong>in</strong>g this type <strong>of</strong> ammunition to armedTurkana civilians <strong>in</strong> 2007 and 2008.Reports by those supplied with the ammunitionconfirmed that the Kenya Police and Kenya PoliceReserves had distributed it.<strong>The</strong> prevalence <strong>of</strong> this type <strong>of</strong> ammunitiondim<strong>in</strong>ished at greater distances from Kenya (andfrom the Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reservesthat supplied it). 16Although not recognised <strong>in</strong> 2008 as hav<strong>in</strong>gorig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Iran, it is clear that the Government<strong>of</strong> Kenya imported very large quantities <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition—probably <strong>in</strong> the range <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong>rounds.Analysis <strong>of</strong> the date marks applied to cartridges<strong>in</strong>dicate production <strong>in</strong> the years 2001, 2002 and2003, with 97 per cent <strong>of</strong> the cartridges bear<strong>in</strong>g2003 date marks. A logical conclusion is that thecartridges cannot have been supplied prior to thedate <strong>of</strong> manufacture (2001), nor can they have beensupplied after the date they were observed (2008).Moreover, given that the majority <strong>of</strong> cartridges datefrom 2003 and that large-scale observation began<strong>in</strong> 2006, there are some grounds for conclud<strong>in</strong>g thatthe Government <strong>of</strong> Kenya acquired the ammunitionbetween 2003 and 2006. This conclusion is arguablylent greater weight by the fact that UN SecurityCouncil prohibited the export <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> militarymateriel <strong>in</strong> March 2007, which should have deterreddirect Kenyan ammunition acquisition from Iranafter that date. 17However, these observations shed little light onthe actual circumstances <strong>of</strong> Kenya’s acquisition<strong>of</strong> the ammunition. Without evidence to thecontrary, supply by a third party (other than Iran)cannot be excluded. However, the time betweenmanufacture and supply (plausibly as little as threeyears) would suggest a very rapid series <strong>of</strong> transfersbetween three parties—i.e. export from Iran to athird country and subsequent re-export to Kenya.Requests for clarification made to the Government<strong>of</strong> Kenya at the time <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vestigation ands<strong>in</strong>ce rema<strong>in</strong> unanswered. 18DARFUR, SOUTHERN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, 2006–12<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition is <strong>in</strong> service with Khartoumbackedforces <strong>in</strong> the Darfur region <strong>of</strong> Sudan. It isalso <strong>in</strong> service with SAF troops operat<strong>in</strong>g on theborder with South Sudan. Although <strong>in</strong>vestigationshave not documented supplies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition to Khartoum-backed militias <strong>in</strong> SouthSudan, they have identified <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons <strong>in</strong> allthree regions—Darfur, southern Sudan 19 and SouthSudan.<strong>The</strong>re is also grow<strong>in</strong>g evidence to suggest thatthe Government <strong>of</strong> Sudan manufactures weapons<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> design, operates weapon productionfacilities with <strong>Iranian</strong> assistance and supplies<strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured weapons to forces allied to it<strong>in</strong> the region.Work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> conjunction with <strong>in</strong>dependent<strong>in</strong>vestigators, <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research hasdocumented two types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong>service with Khartoum-backed militia forces <strong>in</strong>Darfur and southern Sudan. <strong>The</strong> first type is 7.62 x39 mm <strong>in</strong> calibre and is identical <strong>in</strong> construction tothe examples documented elsewhere <strong>in</strong> this report(see Image 9).<strong>The</strong> second type <strong>of</strong> ammunition, documented <strong>in</strong>use <strong>in</strong> Darfur and southern Sudan, is 7.62 x 54Rmm <strong>in</strong> calibre (see Image 10). <strong>The</strong> cartridge isalso identical to <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identifiedelsewhere <strong>in</strong> this report. A third cartridge is 12.7 x108 mm <strong>in</strong> calibre, resembles <strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured24<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESImage 9<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom Darfur, 2008Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridge caseillustrated was one amonga number <strong>of</strong> identical typesfound follow<strong>in</strong>g a militaryaction launched by Khartoumbackedmilitia forces <strong>in</strong> April2008 (location withheld forreasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality).Source: Confidentialammunition, but has not been identified positively(see Annex 3 for photographs).Investigators have identified the two types <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition pictured <strong>in</strong> Images 9 and 10among seizures <strong>of</strong> weapons from Khartoum-backedforces <strong>in</strong> Darfur or <strong>in</strong> abandoned SAF facilities—<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm cartridgesdocumented <strong>in</strong>side an abandoned SAF garrison <strong>in</strong>Tess, South Kord<strong>of</strong>an <strong>in</strong> May 2012. 20It is unclear why <strong>in</strong>vestigators have not yetdocumented <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> service withKhartoum-supplied forces operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> SouthSudan, particularly s<strong>in</strong>ce these forces—like theircounterparts <strong>in</strong> Darfur—field a range <strong>of</strong> weaponsthat are <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> manufacture or design.For example, a grow<strong>in</strong>g number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weaponsare <strong>in</strong> service with Khartoum-backed militia forces<strong>in</strong> Darfur and South Sudan, <strong>in</strong> addition to <strong>Iranian</strong>weapons deployed by SAF troops operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>southern Sudan. <strong>The</strong>y <strong>in</strong>clude numerous RPG-7-pattern rocket launchers <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> design (seeImage 11), 21 <strong>Iranian</strong> anti-personnel m<strong>in</strong>es and avariety <strong>of</strong> other <strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured militarymateriel. 22 Interviews with captured or defect<strong>in</strong>gmilitia leaders confirm that the weapons have beensupplied directly from Khartoum, specifically byelements with<strong>in</strong> the Sudanese National Intelligenceand Security Services (NISS). 23<strong>The</strong> manufactur<strong>in</strong>g dates <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitionidentified <strong>in</strong> the region range from 2001 to 2004.<strong>The</strong> 2004-dated ammunition identified <strong>in</strong> Darfur(see Image 10) <strong>in</strong>dicates potential supplies <strong>in</strong>violation <strong>of</strong> the UN Security Council arms embargoon the region (<strong>in</strong> place s<strong>in</strong>ce 2004). 24 Although yet tobe documented as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> service with Khartoumbackedforces <strong>in</strong> South Sudan, extensive <strong>Iranian</strong>weapons supplies to these forces suggest theprobable supply <strong>of</strong> such ammunition.Image 10<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mmcartridge recoveredfrom South Darfur,April 2010Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridge caseillustrated was one amonga number <strong>of</strong> identical typesfound follow<strong>in</strong>g a militaryaction launched by Khartoumbackedmilitia forces <strong>in</strong> Kalma<strong>in</strong>ternally displaced personscamp (near Nyala) anddocumented <strong>in</strong> April 2010.Source: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 25
CASE STUDIESImage 11RPG-7-pattern rocket launcher <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> design recovered from Khartoum-supplied militia <strong>in</strong>South Sudan, 2012Notes: <strong>The</strong> weapon is unmarked. It features a moulded pistol grip and a second, pillar-like grip to the rear <strong>of</strong> the trigger assembly.<strong>The</strong>se characteristics are unique to <strong>Iranian</strong>-designed RPG-7-pattern launchers. It was seized <strong>in</strong> Mankien, South Sudan and viewed atthe Sudan People’s Liberation Army 4th Division headquarters <strong>in</strong> Rubkhona, Unity State on 27 January 2012.© Mike Lewis/Small Arms SurveyBeyond the evidence presented above, thereare grow<strong>in</strong>g (albeit fragmentary) <strong>in</strong>dications <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> cooperation and technical assistance <strong>in</strong> themanufacture or retransfer <strong>of</strong> weapons <strong>in</strong> Khartoum.<strong>The</strong>se <strong>in</strong>dications are best listed rather thancomprehensively analysed because, while they maysuggest close cooperation between Iran and Sudan,they are not def<strong>in</strong>itive:In January 2007 Iran and Sudan reportedly signeda military cooperation agreement and <strong>in</strong>itiateddiscussions on the sale <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ‘<strong>Iranian</strong> missiles, RPGs, UAVs andother equipment’. 25 <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Researchhas received credible reports that the YarmoukIndustrial Complex (YIC) <strong>in</strong> Khartoum serves as aproduction/onward shipment facility for <strong>Iranian</strong>/<strong>Iranian</strong>-designed weapons. 26<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has also receivedcredible reports that personnel work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theYIC visit Tehran for regular technical tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g onweapons or ammunition production. <strong>The</strong> precisenature <strong>of</strong> this tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g has not been documented.Reports suggest two or three such visits <strong>in</strong> 2011–12. 27Images <strong>of</strong> weapons displayed on the SudaneseMilitary Industrial Corporation (MIC) websitedepict weapons <strong>of</strong> recognisably <strong>Iranian</strong> design. 28<strong>The</strong> YIC operates under the umbrella <strong>of</strong> the MIC,which is controlled by the NISS.Documented cases <strong>of</strong> weapons transfers toKhartoum-backed militias operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Darfurand South Sudan have <strong>in</strong>volved the supply <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> weapons and also ammunition consignedto the YIC. 29 Interviews with militia commanders<strong>in</strong>dicate that the Sudanese NISS organised thetransfers. 3026<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESIsrael targeted the YIC (although did not claimresponsibility) with air strikes on 23 October2012. Air attacks attributed to Israel and target<strong>in</strong>gvehicles bound from eastern Sudan to S<strong>in</strong>ai <strong>in</strong>January 2009 and April 2011 were reportedlyorchestrated to disrupt shipments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>weapons bound for Gaza. 31<strong>The</strong>se reports do not constitute comprehensiveevidence <strong>of</strong> Iran’s role <strong>in</strong> the manufacture orredistribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>-designed weapons <strong>in</strong>or from Khartoum. However, viewed aga<strong>in</strong>st thephysical evidence <strong>of</strong> weapons documented <strong>in</strong>Darfur, southern Sudan and South Sudan, and <strong>in</strong>light <strong>of</strong> the proliferation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition<strong>in</strong> the region, they po<strong>in</strong>t towards <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gKhartoum–Tehran cooperation <strong>in</strong> the defencesector.GUINEA, 2009–10In 2009 researchers work<strong>in</strong>g for AmnestyInternational documented numerous types <strong>of</strong>ammunition recovered from the 28 September 2009stadium massacre <strong>in</strong> Conakry, Gu<strong>in</strong>ea and nearbyparts <strong>of</strong> the city. 32 <strong>The</strong>se types <strong>in</strong>cluded several7.62 x 39 mm cartridges, <strong>of</strong> which an example ispictured <strong>in</strong> Image 12. <strong>The</strong> cartridges are identical <strong>in</strong>construction to <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm ammunitiondocumented elsewhere <strong>in</strong> this report. However, <strong>in</strong>addition to a ‘06’ date mark <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g production<strong>in</strong> 2006, the cartridges also feature lot marks,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g ‘161’ and (<strong>in</strong> Image 12) ‘257’.Although the lot mark differentiates thisammunition from known <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitiondocumented elsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, its construction isidentical. <strong>The</strong> cartridges are brass cased, while theprojectiles are constructed <strong>of</strong> a lead core encased<strong>in</strong> a tombak jacket. 33 In each case the primer issecured with three 120-degree stab crimps.In addition to shar<strong>in</strong>g physical characteristicswith <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition identified elsewhere <strong>in</strong><strong>Africa</strong>, it is identical to ammunition documented <strong>in</strong>Afghanistan and attributed to Iran (see Image 13). 34Although the lot numbers differ from the Gu<strong>in</strong>eansamples, the cartridge construction, primer annuluscolour and headstamp font are the same.Amnesty International concluded that theammunition pictured <strong>in</strong> Image 12 was <strong>in</strong> servicewith Gu<strong>in</strong>ean security forces at the time <strong>of</strong> thestadium massacre. In March 2010 <strong>in</strong>vestigators withaccess to ammunition used by the Gu<strong>in</strong>ean securityforces confirmed that the same type <strong>of</strong> ammunitionrema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> government service. 35Production dates (2006) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitionfound <strong>in</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>ea <strong>in</strong>dicate post-2006 transfer to thecountry. This, and the fact that <strong>in</strong>vestigators firstdocumented the ammunition as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> servicewith Gu<strong>in</strong>ean armed forces <strong>in</strong> September 2009,suggests acquisition by the Government <strong>of</strong> Gu<strong>in</strong>eabetween 2006 and 2009. <strong>The</strong> circumstances <strong>of</strong> thisacquisition are unclear. Any such transfer afterMarch 2007 would have contravened UN SecurityCouncil sanctions on <strong>Iranian</strong> arms exports. 36Image 12<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom Conakry, Gu<strong>in</strong>eaon 28 September 2009Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridge is spent(i.e. the empty cartridgecase alone), hav<strong>in</strong>g beenfired dur<strong>in</strong>g the events <strong>of</strong> 28September 2009.© Mike Lewis/AmnestyInternational, 2009<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 27
CASE STUDIESImage 137.62 x 39 mmammunition recoveredfrom Taliban forces<strong>in</strong> Nawa-I-BarakzayiDistrict, HelmandProv<strong>in</strong>ce, Afghanistan,documented <strong>in</strong>January 2010Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridgeillustrated is one <strong>of</strong> a numberdocumented dur<strong>in</strong>g the NewYork Times <strong>in</strong>vestigationthat conform to the physicalcharacteristics <strong>of</strong> ammunitionpositively identified as <strong>Iranian</strong><strong>in</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> and documented <strong>in</strong>this report.© C. J. Chivers/New York Times,2010CôTE D’IVOIRE, 2009–12Evidence compiled by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Researchfrom a range <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>dicates at leasttwo, unconnected supplies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitionto Côte d’Ivoire. <strong>The</strong> first occurred between 2002and 2009 and <strong>in</strong>volved transfers <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39mm ammunition to former rebel forces operat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> northern Côte d’Ivoire. <strong>The</strong> second case suggeststhat former government forces acquired quantities<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition after 2000,but plausibly s<strong>in</strong>ce a November 2004 UN armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire.<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition transfers tonorthern Côte d’IvoireIn October 2009 <strong>The</strong> UN Group <strong>of</strong> Experts onCôte d’Ivoire 37 reported extensive transfers <strong>of</strong>ammunition from the territory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Fasoto rebel forces <strong>in</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> the country. <strong>The</strong>setransfers violated the UN Security Council armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire imposed by Resolution1572 (2004).<strong>The</strong> transfers consisted <strong>of</strong> large numbers <strong>of</strong>cartridges—then estimated to be <strong>in</strong> excess <strong>of</strong> 0.5million rounds—a substantial proportion <strong>of</strong> whichthe Group <strong>of</strong> Experts was unable to identify. 38<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has s<strong>in</strong>ce obta<strong>in</strong>edsamples <strong>of</strong> the unidentified ammunition andconfirmed that it is <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>in</strong> orig<strong>in</strong> (see Image14). <strong>The</strong> cartridges are identical <strong>in</strong> construction,mark<strong>in</strong>gs and date <strong>of</strong> manufacture to numerousexamples identified <strong>in</strong> East <strong>Africa</strong> (see the casespresented above). 39<strong>The</strong> Group <strong>of</strong> Experts found no examples <strong>of</strong>the <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>al, factorypackag<strong>in</strong>g. Instead, it noted that the ammunitionhad been repacked <strong>in</strong>to hessian bags (see Image15). <strong>The</strong> Group <strong>of</strong> Experts concluded that theremoval <strong>of</strong> ammunition from its packag<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>creased the risks <strong>of</strong> damage from environmentalexposure and handl<strong>in</strong>g, and served no militarypurpose beyond concealment. 40<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs supportthis conclusion. First, many <strong>of</strong> the hessian bagsconta<strong>in</strong>ed only one type <strong>of</strong> identically marked<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition. This suggests the unpack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>homogeneous ammunition straight from its orig<strong>in</strong>alfactory packag<strong>in</strong>g. Second—and support<strong>in</strong>g thisargument—some <strong>of</strong> the cartridges had been packed<strong>in</strong>to small black plastic bags, each conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gexactly 20 rounds <strong>of</strong> ammunition. 4128<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESImage 14<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge recovered from northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented <strong>in</strong> 2009Notes: Photographed <strong>in</strong> situ. Date and place <strong>of</strong> documentation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.Source: ConfidentialImage 15Bagged ammunition <strong>in</strong> northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented <strong>in</strong> 2009Notes: Photographed <strong>in</strong> situ. Date and place <strong>of</strong> documentation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.Source: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 29
CASE STUDIESImage 16Sudanese-manufactured 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition <strong>in</strong> northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented <strong>in</strong>2011Notes: <strong>The</strong> cartridges pictured on the left and right are date-marked ‘04’, <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g production <strong>in</strong> 2004. <strong>The</strong> cartridge pictured <strong>in</strong>the centre dates from 2003. <strong>The</strong> three cartridges feature the number ‘39’. This is the second part <strong>of</strong> the calibre designation (i.e.7.62 x 39 mm), which is typical <strong>of</strong> Sudanese-manufactured ammunition. More <strong>in</strong>formation on Sudanese mark<strong>in</strong>g practices can befound <strong>in</strong> Small Arms Survey (2011).© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research, 2011Factory-packaged <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition is supplied<strong>in</strong> 20-round cartons, which aga<strong>in</strong> suggestsdeliberate repackag<strong>in</strong>g directly from factory boxes.Although these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs suggest deliberateattempts to conceal the orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> the ammunition,reports by successive Groups <strong>of</strong> Experts on Côted’Ivoire firmly implicate the territory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>aFaso <strong>in</strong> ammunition supplies to Ivorian rebelforces. 42 <strong>The</strong>se reports suggest the delivery by truck<strong>of</strong> bagged ammunition across the border betweenthe two countries. 43 Nonetheless, the absence <strong>of</strong>ammunition packag<strong>in</strong>g (and potential evidencesuch as lot mark<strong>in</strong>gs and shipp<strong>in</strong>g documents)prevents identify<strong>in</strong>g the cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> custody beforearrival <strong>in</strong> the territory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso and onwardshipment to Côte d’Ivoire.<strong>The</strong>re are, however, some <strong>in</strong>dications that theammunition may have transited a third <strong>Africa</strong>ncountry. First, there is no documented record <strong>of</strong>Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso hav<strong>in</strong>g procured <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition(although there are records <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso’sprocurement <strong>of</strong> other types <strong>of</strong> ammunition found<strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire). 44 More significantly, Groups <strong>of</strong>Experts documented Sudanese ammunition, alsostored <strong>in</strong> hessian bags, together with the <strong>Iranian</strong>cartridges (see Image 16). 45This f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g may suggest a possible l<strong>in</strong>k betweenthe bagged ammunition found <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoireand regions where <strong>Iranian</strong> and Sudaneseammunition proliferates <strong>in</strong> similar quantities.For example,<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research’s analysis<strong>of</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> Darfur presented <strong>in</strong> this reportmay suggest some l<strong>in</strong>k between the two regions—rais<strong>in</strong>g the prospect <strong>of</strong> trans-Saharan/Sahelian landtransfers. However, at present there is <strong>in</strong>sufficientevidence to draw firm conclusions.<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> service with formergovernment forcesIn addition to the <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm ammunitionidentified <strong>in</strong> service with former rebel forces,<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has comprehensivelydocumented <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm cartridges <strong>in</strong>Côte d’Ivoire. As the follow<strong>in</strong>g account describes,evidence suggests that, while some <strong>of</strong> theammunition may have entered the country priorto the November 2004 UN arms embargo, efforts toconceal box mark<strong>in</strong>gs on other examples suggestspossible post-embargo shipment to Côte d’Ivoire.Investigators <strong>in</strong>itially documented <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x54R mm ammunition held by rebel forces <strong>in</strong> 2010. 46<strong>The</strong>y observed the ammunition <strong>in</strong> very limitedquantities (about 2,000 cartridges) <strong>in</strong> only onerebel-controlled location (see Image 17). Unlike the7.62 x 39 mm <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> service withrebel forces and repacked <strong>in</strong>to hessian bags, thisammunition rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> its orig<strong>in</strong>al green factorypackedbattle bags. <strong>The</strong> fact that it had not beenrepacked and no effort appeared to have beenmade to conceal its orig<strong>in</strong>s suggested a differentsource <strong>of</strong> supply.30<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESImage 17<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition <strong>in</strong> service with rebel forces <strong>in</strong> northern Côte d’Ivoire,documented <strong>in</strong> 2010Notes: Precise date and place <strong>of</strong> documentation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality. <strong>The</strong> ammunition is packed <strong>in</strong> quantities <strong>of</strong>20 rounds <strong>in</strong>to cardboard boxes. Each green battle bag conta<strong>in</strong>s ten such boxes, totall<strong>in</strong>g 200 cartridges per bag.Source: Confidential<strong>The</strong> date <strong>of</strong> manufacture (2001) pre-dates thearms embargo (November 2004) on Côte d’Ivoireby approximately three years. It also pre-dates thedivision <strong>of</strong> the country after a military mut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>in</strong>September 2002, which left rebel forces <strong>in</strong> control<strong>of</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> Côte d’Ivoire. This, and the factthat rebel arsenals <strong>in</strong>cluded arms captured fromgovernment forces, may suggest that the <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition had been <strong>in</strong> government servicebefore 2002. If this is the case, its supply to theGovernment <strong>of</strong> Côte d’Ivoire would have beenlegal, contraven<strong>in</strong>g neither the 2004 embargo onCôte d’Ivoire nor the 2007 sanctions on exports <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> weapons. 47An analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> service withformer government forces would appear theeasiest way to resolve this puzzle. However, thisis complicated by two pieces <strong>of</strong> contradictoryevidence.First, <strong>in</strong> 2009 an observer <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoirephotographed part <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitionbox (see Image 18). 48 <strong>The</strong> box was then under thecontrol <strong>of</strong> forces loyal to the former president,Laurent Ggagbo (who was deposed on 11 April2011). Although the photograph <strong>in</strong>dicates no date<strong>of</strong> manufacture, it is clear that no attempt has beenmade to erase and conceal the mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the box.Image 18Partial <strong>in</strong>formationon an <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x54R mm ammunitionbox <strong>in</strong> service withgovernment forces<strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire,documented <strong>in</strong> 2009Notes: Precise date and place<strong>of</strong> documentation withheldfor reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.<strong>The</strong> date <strong>of</strong> manufactureis not visible <strong>in</strong> the abovephotograph due to themisaligned camera angle.Source: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 31
CASE STUDIES32<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESSecond, <strong>in</strong> 2011 and 2012 <strong>in</strong>vestigators discovered<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R ammunition boxes <strong>in</strong> severalseparate locations <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire. 49 <strong>The</strong>se boxeshad been <strong>in</strong> service with forces loyal to the formergovernment. But, unlike the box observed <strong>in</strong> 2009(Image 18), they had been systematically pa<strong>in</strong>ted toconceal marks applied to their sides (see Image 19).In all cases, and despite hav<strong>in</strong>g been observed <strong>in</strong>different locations, the mode and colour <strong>of</strong> pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gwere consistent—light blue pa<strong>in</strong>t applied only tothe marked sides <strong>of</strong> the boxes.Because it is difficult to imag<strong>in</strong>e someone tak<strong>in</strong>gthe trouble to pa<strong>in</strong>t out the mark<strong>in</strong>gs on onlysome boxes <strong>in</strong> an ammunition shipment, thesef<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs suggest two separate shipments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition to the former Government <strong>of</strong> Côted’Ivoire. In one shipment there was no attempt toconceal the mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the ammunition boxes,plausibly because the transfer was legal. In thesecond shipment the mark<strong>in</strong>gs were deliberatelyconcealed, perhaps because it violated either the2004 embargo on Côte d’Ivoire or the 2007 embargoon <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons exports.Without further evidence, this conclusion rema<strong>in</strong>sa hypothesis. Similarly, available evidence to datedoes not establish a cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> custody and thereis no <strong>in</strong>formation marked on—or found <strong>in</strong>—theammunition boxes to <strong>in</strong>dicate how and whenthey entered the country. <strong>Ammunition</strong> identifiedthus far dates from 2000 and 2001—well beforethe aforementioned embargoes, but the effortsto conceal mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the boxes still provide thefirmest evidence to suggest quasi-legal or illegaltransfer at some po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the ammunition’s history.Image 19<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition boxes with concealed mark<strong>in</strong>gs and their contents,documented <strong>in</strong> 2012Notes: Precise date and place <strong>of</strong> documentation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality. Clockwise from top left: (1) typical<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition box construction with rope handles; (2) blue pa<strong>in</strong>t applied to box sides to conceal factory mark<strong>in</strong>gs; (3)battle bag conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 200 rounds, lot-marked ‘18’ and manufactured <strong>in</strong> 2001.© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research, 2012<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 33
CASE STUDIESON OPENING THE CONTAINERS, THE NIGERIAN AUTHORITIESDISCOVERED THAT CIVILIAN BUILDING MATERIALS, INCLUDINGSTONE SLABS AND GLASS FIBRE INSULATION PANELS, HADBEEN STACKED IN FRONT OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONTO CONCEAL THEM.NIGERIAN wEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SEIzURE, 2010On 26 October 2010 Nigerian security forces seized13 shipp<strong>in</strong>g conta<strong>in</strong>ers <strong>in</strong> the port <strong>of</strong> Apapa <strong>in</strong>Lagos, Nigeria. In the conta<strong>in</strong>ers they found 240tonnes <strong>of</strong> ammunition, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 107 mm rockets;60, 80 and 120 mortar bombs; grenades; and 7.62x 54R mm <strong>Iranian</strong>-manufactured ammunitiondated 2006 and packed <strong>in</strong> green battle bags. 50<strong>The</strong> ammunition and the green battle bags wereidentical to the types described elsewhere <strong>in</strong> thisreport. Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria confirmed thatthe shipment had orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Iran, specifically theport <strong>of</strong> Bandar Abbas. 51<strong>The</strong> history <strong>of</strong> this case <strong>in</strong>dicates various effortson the part <strong>of</strong> entities operat<strong>in</strong>g from Iran, Nigeriaand possibly Gambia to conceal the shipment. InSeptember 2010 an <strong>Africa</strong>n government <strong>in</strong>telligenceservice 52 received <strong>in</strong>formation that entities <strong>in</strong>Gambia had ordered a consignment <strong>of</strong> weaponsand ammunition from Iran. 53 <strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligenceservice contacted a third party request<strong>in</strong>g that itattempt to trace 13 conta<strong>in</strong>ers featur<strong>in</strong>g conta<strong>in</strong>eridentification codes with the prefix ‘SOLE’. This wasreportedly not possible because the conta<strong>in</strong>erswere ‘shipper owned’ and not registered with theBureau International des Conta<strong>in</strong>ers (BIC). 54<strong>The</strong> cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> events that led to the seizure <strong>of</strong> theconsignment becomes unclear from this po<strong>in</strong>tforward. <strong>The</strong> consignment that arrived <strong>in</strong> Apapaport (<strong>of</strong>floaded at T<strong>in</strong> Can Island port on 15 July2010) was not dest<strong>in</strong>ed for Gambia, but for Nigeria. 55<strong>The</strong> orig<strong>in</strong>al bill <strong>of</strong> lad<strong>in</strong>g consigned the shipmentto a person and address <strong>in</strong> Nigeria. After some time(precise duration unknown) the owner <strong>of</strong> the goods<strong>in</strong>structed the shipper to forward the conta<strong>in</strong>ers toGambia. It was at this stage that Nigerian securityforces <strong>in</strong>spected and seized the consignment.<strong>The</strong> only firm conclusions that can be drawn fromthis case are that there was an attempt to concealthe contents and that the shipment orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong>Iran. First, the bill <strong>of</strong> lad<strong>in</strong>g issued on 2 June 2010does not describe the contents <strong>of</strong> the shipment(see Annex 4). On open<strong>in</strong>g the conta<strong>in</strong>ers, theNigerian authorities discovered that civilianbuild<strong>in</strong>g materials, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g stone slabs and glassfibre <strong>in</strong>sulation panels, had been stacked <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong>the weapons and ammunition to conceal them.Second, reports <strong>in</strong>dicate that the freight forwarder,Beh<strong>in</strong>eh Trad<strong>in</strong>g, is a front company for the <strong>Iranian</strong>Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and had been<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> earlier shipments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons(seized outside <strong>Africa</strong>). 56 In addition, one member <strong>of</strong>the IRGC was reportedly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> organis<strong>in</strong>g theshipment from Nigeria. 57 Confidential reports cit<strong>in</strong>gstatements by Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria suggestthat this was not only a direct shipment from Iran,but was preceded by two similar shipments.<strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended recipient <strong>of</strong> the shipment isunclear. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally consigned to Nigeria, butlater to Gambia, it could plausibly have beendest<strong>in</strong>ed for any number <strong>of</strong> recipients—<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gregional governments. <strong>The</strong> fact that the shipmentcontravened the UN sanctions on <strong>Iranian</strong> armsexports (<strong>in</strong> force s<strong>in</strong>ce 2007) would justifyconcealment, regardless <strong>of</strong> whether the recipientwas a national government or non-state group.34<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESADDITIONAl CASESInvestigations compiled by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong>Research also document <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong>eastern DRC and the West <strong>Africa</strong>n state <strong>of</strong> Niger.While there is very little evidence to <strong>in</strong>dicatesources <strong>of</strong> supply <strong>in</strong> each case, they neverthelessprovide important additional <strong>in</strong>formation on thedistribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> countriesother than those described above.DRC, 2009In 2009 <strong>in</strong>vestigators documented <strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x39 mm <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>of</strong> the type pictured <strong>in</strong>Image 1 at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this report. Reports bythe user suggest that the ammunition was <strong>in</strong> servicewith the Forces Républica<strong>in</strong>es Fédéralistes (FRR), aBanyamulenge armed group operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the HautsPlateaux region <strong>of</strong> South Kivu, eastern DRC. 58Investigators also documented Sudanesemanufacturedammunition together with the<strong>Iranian</strong> types. <strong>The</strong>re is no available evidenceto suggest from where the FRR acquired theammunition.Niger, 2011–12Reports from Niger <strong>in</strong>dicate two <strong>in</strong>terceptions <strong>of</strong><strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition by Nigerien security forces. InSeptember 2011 Nigerien military forces recoveredweapons and ammunition <strong>in</strong> northern Nigerfollow<strong>in</strong>g an engagement with forces reportedlyaligned with AQIM. <strong>The</strong> seizure <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>Iranian</strong>7.62 x 54R mm ammunition dated 2002 and <strong>of</strong> thetype documented elsewhere <strong>in</strong> this report (seeImage 20).In May 2012 Nigerien authorities <strong>in</strong>tercepted asmall shipment <strong>of</strong> weapons close to the borderwith Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso. <strong>The</strong> seizure <strong>in</strong>cluded 2002-dated<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition <strong>of</strong> the typepictured <strong>in</strong> Image 1 at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> this report.Information obta<strong>in</strong>ed from Niger suggests that theshipment entered Nigerien territory from Burk<strong>in</strong>aFaso, but may have orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire. 59Image 20<strong>Iranian</strong> 7.62 x 54R mm, unspecified location <strong>in</strong> northern Niger, 2011Source: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 35
THE ONLY PROVENCASE INVOLVING DIRECTSUPPLY BY IRAN TOENTITIES OTHER THANAFRICAN GOVERNMENTSIS THE 2010 SEIzURE OFIRANIAN WEAPONS ANDAMMUNITION IN NIGERIA.
CONCLuSIONIran is a recent supplier <strong>of</strong> ammunition to <strong>Africa</strong>. <strong>The</strong>reis only trace evidence <strong>of</strong> supply before 2001, but <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition manufactured <strong>in</strong> 2002–03 and later-datedexamples are <strong>in</strong> widespread circulation across thecont<strong>in</strong>ent.<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition is <strong>in</strong> service with four <strong>Africa</strong>ngovernments: Côte d’Ivoire (until 2011), Gu<strong>in</strong>ea,Kenya and Sudan. Although the circumstances <strong>of</strong>acquisition are unclear, the quantities <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>the Sudan, Gu<strong>in</strong>ea and Kenya cases suggest directsupply by Iran. A question mark hangs over theIvorian case because <strong>of</strong> clear attempts to concealthe shipment.Ten additional <strong>in</strong>vestigations f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>Iranian</strong> weaponsand ammunition <strong>in</strong> service with a variety <strong>of</strong> nonstateentities, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g foreign-backed <strong>in</strong>surgents,rebel forces, Islamist-oriented armed groups andwarr<strong>in</strong>g civilian communities. <strong>The</strong> sources <strong>of</strong> thismateriel are difficult to ascerta<strong>in</strong>. All <strong>in</strong>dicationssuggest that direct supply by Iran is unlikelyand that retransfer or diversion from <strong>Africa</strong>ngovernment forces is the most likely source.This is certa<strong>in</strong>ly the case for <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition(and weapons) supplied by Sudan to forces <strong>in</strong>Darfur and South Sudan. <strong>Ammunition</strong> transfers t<strong>of</strong>ormer rebel forces <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire also suggest<strong>in</strong>direct supply by entities other than Iran,evidenced by the fact that the same transfers<strong>in</strong>clude non-<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition. Kenyan securityforces are the confirmed source <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition that is <strong>in</strong> widespread circulation <strong>in</strong> theborder regions <strong>of</strong> Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.<strong>The</strong> only proven case <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g direct supply by Iranto entities other than <strong>Africa</strong>n governments is the2010 seizure <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons and ammunition<strong>in</strong> Nigeria. In the rema<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> cases, <strong>Africa</strong>ngovernments appear to be the primary vectors <strong>in</strong>the supply <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition to <strong>Africa</strong>’s illicitmarkets.In terms <strong>of</strong> its role <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Africa</strong>n arms market,although a recent entrant, Iran’s ammunition‘footpr<strong>in</strong>t’ is widespread. <strong>The</strong> 14 cases presented<strong>in</strong> this report are evidence <strong>of</strong> this alone. <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition circulates <strong>in</strong> conflict-affected regionsfrom East to West <strong>Africa</strong>. But it is important torecognise that, despite extensive circulation, <strong>Iranian</strong>ammunition and weapons are small <strong>in</strong> number<strong>in</strong> comparison to materiel supplied from formerSoviet-bloc countries and, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly, Ch<strong>in</strong>a.<strong>The</strong> only case to <strong>in</strong>dicate the susta<strong>in</strong>ed—andpotentially escalat<strong>in</strong>g—supply <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> materielis Sudan. In this case there is grow<strong>in</strong>g evidenceto <strong>in</strong>dicate large-scale supplies <strong>of</strong> weapons andammunition from Iran to Sudan and <strong>Iranian</strong>technical assistance <strong>in</strong> Sudanese weaponsproduction. This trend appears to result from theclose political alignment <strong>of</strong> Khartoum and Tehran.In all other cases, <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition found <strong>in</strong>service with <strong>Africa</strong>n government forces appears tobe the result <strong>of</strong> ‘opportunistic’ supply. Acquisitionsby Gu<strong>in</strong>ea, Kenya and (possibly) Côte d’Ivoire<strong>in</strong>volved large quantities <strong>of</strong> ammunition, but,TEN ADDITIONALINVESTIGATIONS FIND IRANIANWEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONIN SERVICE WITH A VARIETYOF NON-STATE ENTITIES,INCLUDING FOREIGN-BACKEDINSURGENTS, REBEL FORCES,ISLAMIST-ORIENTED ARMEDGROUPS AND WARRINGCIVILIAN COMMUNITIES.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 37
CONCLUSIONTHE AFRICAN ARMS MARKET IS CHANGING, WITH THEINVOLVEMENT OF NEW SUPPLIERS AND THE APPEARANCE OFNEW SUPPLY VECTORS, BOTH LEGAL AND ILLICIT.unlike Sudan, they do not appear to have <strong>in</strong>volvedthe transfer <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> weapons. Moreover, dates<strong>of</strong> manufacture suggest that these transfers tookplace with<strong>in</strong> a relatively short time period and donot appear to have been repeated—although thiscannot be ruled out.F<strong>in</strong>ally, this report’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs have widerimplications for weapons and ammunitionproliferation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. First, relatively recentsupplies <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition emphasise theevolv<strong>in</strong>g nature <strong>of</strong> the market. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n armsmarket is chang<strong>in</strong>g, with the <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> newsuppliers and the appearance <strong>of</strong> new supplyvectors, both legal and illicit. Exporters such asCh<strong>in</strong>a (and to a lesser extent Iran) appear to beheavily <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the supply <strong>of</strong> weapons to <strong>Africa</strong>nstates that are embroiled <strong>in</strong> armed conflicts.Countries such as Sudan are not simply end users<strong>of</strong> foreign-manufactured materiel, but <strong>in</strong>tensiveredistributors.Second, the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs re-emphasise the critical rolethat <strong>Africa</strong>n governments play <strong>in</strong> feed<strong>in</strong>g weaponsand ammunition to illicit markets. Investigations<strong>in</strong> this report pr<strong>of</strong>ile ongo<strong>in</strong>g problems associatedwith either the loss or theft <strong>of</strong> weapons fromgovernment arsenals or deliberate governmentarms supplies to neighbour<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgencies. <strong>The</strong>setwo factors make <strong>Africa</strong>n governments the primary<strong>in</strong>direct source, not only <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunitioncirculat<strong>in</strong>g on illicit markets, but arms andammunition from a host <strong>of</strong> other manufacturers.transfers to <strong>Africa</strong> are relatively recent, they stillencompass a decade <strong>of</strong> activity. <strong>The</strong> fact that thisis the first major report to note Iran’s decade-long<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong>dicates a worry<strong>in</strong>g lack <strong>of</strong> capacitydevoted to monitor<strong>in</strong>g illicit proliferation. Despitemillions <strong>of</strong> dollars spent on <strong>in</strong>ternational diplomatic<strong>in</strong>itiatives, such as the UN Programme <strong>of</strong> Action onSmall Arms or the Arms Trade Treaty process, theresources allocated to field <strong>in</strong>vestigations rema<strong>in</strong>slight <strong>in</strong> the extreme.Interested members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity stand a far greater chance <strong>of</strong> assist<strong>in</strong>g—or pressur<strong>in</strong>g—<strong>Africa</strong>n governments to curtailunchecked arms transfers than they have <strong>of</strong>persuad<strong>in</strong>g emerg<strong>in</strong>g arms producers to abandonnewly found market opportunities. But to do this,the <strong>in</strong>ternational community must <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> thenecessary diagnostic side <strong>of</strong> arms control. <strong>The</strong>problem cannot be adequately addressed unless itis fully understood. Donor governments need to actquickly and provide the appropriate resources t<strong>of</strong>ield-based <strong>in</strong>vestigations.Third, these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs suggest severe weaknesses<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s capacity tomonitor—and subsequently address—illicitweapons flows. Although <strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition38<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
ANNExESANNEX 1: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF IRANIAN 7.62 x 39 mm CARTRIdgES 60<strong>The</strong> ammunition is 7.62 x 39 mm <strong>in</strong> calibre andhas a brass cartridge case. <strong>The</strong> projectile (bullet)weighs 8.1 grams, is 24.6 mm <strong>in</strong> length and boattailed<strong>in</strong> design, with a lead core encased <strong>in</strong> atombak jacket. 61 Numerous documented examples<strong>in</strong>dicate that the primer annulus colour varies fromred to green (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g various shades <strong>of</strong> the two).<strong>The</strong> primer is secured with three 120-degree stabcrimps. <strong>The</strong> headstamp follows a standard formatdisplay<strong>in</strong>g the full calibre designation (‘7.62 x39’) at the 12 o’clock position and an abbreviateddate code at the 6 o’clock position (‘03’ for 2003).<strong>The</strong> dimension and weight specifications <strong>of</strong> thiscartridge are consistent with those provided by the<strong>Iranian</strong> DIO’s AMIG.Notes: Photographs <strong>of</strong> aphysical sample held by<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research.Clockwise from top left: (1)full pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> the cartridge; (2)cartridge headstamp; (3) base<strong>of</strong> the projectile; (4) full pr<strong>of</strong>ile<strong>of</strong> the projectile.© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research,2012<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 39
ANNEXESANNEX 2: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF IRANIAN 7.62 x 54R mm CARTRIdgES 62<strong>The</strong> ammunition is 7.62 x 54R mm <strong>in</strong> calibre and hasa brass cartridge case. <strong>The</strong> projectile weighs 11.2 g,is 31.3 mm <strong>in</strong> length and boat-tailed <strong>in</strong> design, witha lead core encased <strong>in</strong> a tombak jacket. 63All documented cartridges feature a green primerannulus (various shades). <strong>The</strong> primer is securedwith three 120-degree stab crimps. <strong>The</strong> headstampfollows a standard format display<strong>in</strong>g the full calibredesignation (‘7.62 x 54’) at the 12 o’clock positionand an abbreviated date code at the 6 o’clockposition (‘01’ for 2001). <strong>The</strong> dimension and weightspecifications <strong>of</strong> this cartridge are consistent withthose provided by the <strong>Iranian</strong> DIO’s AMIG.<strong>The</strong> DIO lists two types <strong>of</strong> 7.62 x 54R <strong>in</strong> production.<strong>The</strong> first is described as ‘7.62 x 54 Light’, which hasa bullet weight <strong>of</strong> 9.7 g. <strong>The</strong> cartridge conformsto standard Soviet cartridges <strong>in</strong>tended for use<strong>in</strong> weapons such as the PKM-pattern mach<strong>in</strong>egun, which is <strong>in</strong> widespread service <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. DIOdescribes the second type as ‘7.62 x 54 Heavy’.<strong>The</strong> ammunition presented here is <strong>of</strong> this type.It has a heavier bullet weight (11.2 g) and wasdesigned for use <strong>in</strong> weapons that are now largelyobsolete, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Maxim M1910 and SG-43mach<strong>in</strong>e guns (dat<strong>in</strong>g from the first half <strong>of</strong> the 20 thcentury). Although this cartridge can be fired fromPKM-pattern weapons, its ballistic characteristicsdiffer from the ‘7.62 x 54 Light’ variant. <strong>The</strong> resultis that accurate fir<strong>in</strong>g would be impaired, primarilybecause PKM-pattern weapon sights are notconfigured for this type <strong>of</strong> ammunition.Notes: Photographs <strong>of</strong> aphysical sample held by<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research.Clockwise from top left: (1)full pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> the cartridge; (2)cartridge headstamp; (3) base<strong>of</strong> the projectile; (4) full pr<strong>of</strong>ile<strong>of</strong> the projectile.© <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research,201240<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
ANNEXESANNEX 3: SuSPECTEd IRANIAN 12.7 x 108 mm AmmuNITIONSource: Confidential<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 41
ANNEXESANNEX 4: NIgERIAN wEAPONS ANd AmmuNITION SEIzuRE, OCTOBER 2010: BILL OFLAdINg dATEd 2 JuNE 2010Source: Confidential42<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
ENdNOTES1 <strong>The</strong> headstamp is applied to the cartridge dur<strong>in</strong>g manufacture. Specifically, it is applied dur<strong>in</strong>g aprocess known as ‘draw<strong>in</strong>g’ or ‘extrusion’. In the draw<strong>in</strong>g process a mach<strong>in</strong>e forces a cup-shaped piece<strong>of</strong> brass <strong>in</strong>to a mould or ‘die’ to form the <strong>in</strong>itial, elongated shape <strong>of</strong> the cartridge case. A hardenedsteel plug, called a ‘bunter’, then punches a hole (the primer pocket) <strong>in</strong> the base <strong>of</strong> the cartridge andsimultaneously impresses the headstamp on the cartridge base.2 See DIO (2012) for technical specifications.3 In the examples given <strong>in</strong> Table 1 the stamp<strong>in</strong>g quality differs primarily due to the condition <strong>of</strong> thebunter used to impart the headstamp. <strong>The</strong> bunter features raised mark<strong>in</strong>gs. After cont<strong>in</strong>uous use thebunter becomes worn and the mark<strong>in</strong>gs imparted to the cartridge head become less well def<strong>in</strong>ed andshallower. Variations <strong>in</strong> the quality and depth <strong>of</strong> mark<strong>in</strong>gs on the headstamps pictured <strong>in</strong> Table 1 arethe result <strong>of</strong> this process.4 See DIO (2012) for technical specifications.5 <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research has also documented a fourth type <strong>of</strong> cartridge that may be <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>in</strong>orig<strong>in</strong>. <strong>The</strong> cartridge is 12.7 x 108 mm <strong>in</strong> calibre and features a similar headstamp configuration to thecartridges described above. See Annex 3 for details.6 Information obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> email and telephone discussions with US-based cartridge collectors, May–June2012.7 Agence France Press photographs <strong>of</strong> the shipment display<strong>in</strong>g the green battle bags can be found at.8 For detailed photographs, see IMFA (2002).9 See IMFA (2002) for images <strong>of</strong> the seized ammunition.10 US-based ammunition collectors report that the ammunition first appeared on the US market <strong>in</strong> thelate 1990s, described as ‘Portuguese ammunition’ (<strong>in</strong>formation obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> email and telephonediscussions, May–June 2012).11 Observations and <strong>in</strong>terviews by James Bevan <strong>in</strong> Eastern Equatoria State, (then) southern Sudan,February 2008.12 Interviews conducted by James Bevan <strong>in</strong> November and December 2006 with civilian users <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Iranian</strong> ammunition <strong>in</strong> Turkana North District, Kenya.13 See UNSC (2007).14 For a full presentation <strong>of</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, see Bevan (2008a; 2008b).15 Observations made by James Bevan <strong>in</strong> Lokichoggio, northern Kenya <strong>in</strong> January 2008.16 See Bevan (2008a, pp. 46–51) for a presentation <strong>of</strong> the methodology and f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 43
ENDNOTES17 See UNSC (2007, para. 5) for the text <strong>of</strong> the resolution, which prohibits the supply, sale or transfer <strong>of</strong>arms and related materiel from the territory <strong>of</strong> Iran or by <strong>Iranian</strong> nationals.18 <strong>The</strong> Small Arms Survey questioned government m<strong>in</strong>isters at the time <strong>of</strong> the study as to the orig<strong>in</strong>s<strong>of</strong> the ammunition, but received no adequate response. In 2009 the UN Group <strong>of</strong> Experts on Côted’Ivoire reportedly requested <strong>in</strong>formation on the ammunition concerned, but apparently received noresponse from the Government <strong>of</strong> Kenya. Back-channel <strong>in</strong>quiries by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research with<strong>in</strong>the Kenyan defence establishment did not achieve a def<strong>in</strong>itive response. Additionally, <strong>in</strong> November2012 <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research addressed a letter to the Government <strong>of</strong> Kenya (via the PermanentMission <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Kenya to the UN <strong>in</strong> New York) request<strong>in</strong>g clarification on the orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> theammunition. It still awaits a response.19 South Kord<strong>of</strong>an and Blue Nile States.20 Information provided by Claudio Gramizzi <strong>in</strong> correspondence, November 2012.21 Some <strong>of</strong> the RPG-7-pattern launchers are marked with the designation A-30, while others feature nomark<strong>in</strong>gs. Investigators have documented one A-30 (source and location withheld) with a pack<strong>in</strong>g list<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g production at the Yarmouk Industrial Complex (YIC) <strong>in</strong> Khartoum. Compar<strong>in</strong>g known <strong>Iranian</strong>examples and A-30 types <strong>in</strong>dicates the poorer-quality construction <strong>of</strong> A-30 models. This may suggestthat <strong>Iranian</strong>-designed RPG-7-pattern launchers are manufactured at the YIC—particularly given the<strong>in</strong>formation found on the abovementioned pack<strong>in</strong>g list.22 See Small Arms Survey (2012a, p. 3; 2012c).23 Interviews conducted with defect<strong>in</strong>g militia leaders by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research and the Small ArmsSurvey <strong>in</strong> South Sudan, September 2012.24 See UNSC (2004b; 2005) for the text <strong>of</strong> the relevant resolutions on Darfur.25 See reports <strong>of</strong> the visit <strong>of</strong> Sudanese defence m<strong>in</strong>ister, Abdelrahim Husse<strong>in</strong>, to Tehran <strong>in</strong> January 2007,reported <strong>in</strong> the Sudan Tribune (2007a; 2007b).26 Confidential exchange with a source connected to the YIC (date and location withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong>confidentiality).27 Confidential exchange with a source connected to the YIC (date and location withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong>confidentiality).28 First reported by the Small Arms Survey’s Sudan Human Security Basel<strong>in</strong>e Assessment Project (seeSmall Arms Survey, 2012c). <strong>The</strong> Sudanese MIC website lists three weapons that closely resemble<strong>Iranian</strong> types: the ‘S<strong>in</strong>ar’ RPG-7-pattern rocket launcher, the ‘Karar’ general-purpose mach<strong>in</strong>e gunand the ‘D<strong>in</strong>ar’ assault rifle. <strong>The</strong> Arabic version <strong>of</strong> the website provides greater detail than the Englishpages. See MIC (2012) for more <strong>in</strong>formation.29 See, for example, ammunition boxes consigned to the YIC documented <strong>in</strong> Small Arms Survey(2012b, p. 7).30 Interviews conducted with defected militia leaders by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research and the Small ArmsSurvey <strong>in</strong> South Sudan, September 2012.31 International news media widely reported the attacks. See also reports by the Meir Amit Intelligenceand Terrorism Information Center (MAITIC, 2009, pp. 8–10; 2011, pp. 16–17). <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong>Research has received credible <strong>in</strong>formation implicat<strong>in</strong>g Israel <strong>in</strong> the 23 October 2012 <strong>in</strong>cident. It alsobases its analysis on Israeli assertions <strong>of</strong> Iran’s role <strong>in</strong> Sudan, as expressed <strong>in</strong> confidential <strong>in</strong>terviewswith representatives <strong>of</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> Israel at various meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> 2012.44<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
ENDNOTES32 See Amnesty International (2010, pp. 28–29) for details <strong>of</strong> the sample collected.33 Tombak is a brass alloy with a high copper content. Investigations <strong>in</strong> 2010 ascerta<strong>in</strong>ed with the use <strong>of</strong>a magnet that the projectiles conta<strong>in</strong>ed no ferrous material (source and circumstances <strong>of</strong> observationwithheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality).34 Interviews with British and US military observers <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan <strong>in</strong>dicate concerns that the late date <strong>of</strong>production <strong>of</strong> this ammunition, together with documented supplies <strong>of</strong> military materiel from Iran toTaliban forces found together with it, suggest <strong>Iranian</strong> manufacture.35 Source and circumstances <strong>of</strong> observation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.36 See UNSC (2007).37 Group <strong>of</strong> Experts on Côte d’Ivoire established pursuant to paragraph 11 <strong>of</strong> Security Council Resolution1842 (2008).38 See UNSC (2009, paras. 135–51) for details, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g photographs <strong>of</strong> the cartridges, which arepresented beneath para. 137. Reports from Côte d’Ivoire <strong>in</strong> 2011–12 suggest that, with rebel forceshav<strong>in</strong>g ga<strong>in</strong>ed control <strong>of</strong> Côte d’Ivoire <strong>in</strong> April 2011, the ammunition <strong>in</strong> question is now distributedacross the country. In 2009–10 the ammunition was conf<strong>in</strong>ed to rebel-held territory <strong>in</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> thecountry (confidential <strong>in</strong>terviews with observers <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire conducted <strong>in</strong> 2011 and 2012).39 A physical exam<strong>in</strong>ation conducted by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research <strong>of</strong> recovered samples from the tworegions demonstrates the follow<strong>in</strong>g: the materials and construction; the headstamp design, font andtool mark<strong>in</strong>gs; and the bullet composition and weights are all identical. In each case the technicalcharacteristics <strong>of</strong> the cartridges recovered from the two regions conform to data presented by Iran’sDIO (see DIO, 2012).40 Identify<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation on or <strong>in</strong> factory boxes—detail<strong>in</strong>g manufacturer, lot numbers or consignees—could otherwise have been used to establish a cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> custody (and the immediate supplier).41 Source and circumstances <strong>of</strong> observation withheld for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.42 UNSC (2011, paras. 92–110) presents additional evidence <strong>of</strong> weapons and ammunition transfers fromthe territory <strong>of</strong> Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g from Burk<strong>in</strong>abé security forces. UNSC (2012, paras. 24–26;Annexes 6a, 6b) provides evidence <strong>of</strong> Romanian ammunition <strong>in</strong>itially shipped to the Government <strong>of</strong>Burk<strong>in</strong>a Faso hav<strong>in</strong>g been diverted <strong>in</strong>to what was then rebel-held northern Côte d’Ivoire.43 See UNSC (2009, paras. 145–49).44 See UNSC (2012, paras. 24–26).45 <strong>The</strong> 2009 Group <strong>of</strong> Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2009, Table 4) identified some 7.62 x 39 mmcartridges as be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Sudanese manufacture. Additional analysis by <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research <strong>of</strong> asecond type <strong>of</strong> cartridge (described by the Group <strong>of</strong> Experts as hav<strong>in</strong>g headstamp mark<strong>in</strong>gs 1_39_04)confirms that this ammunition is also manufactured <strong>in</strong> Sudan.46 Confidential report from northern Côte d’Ivoire provided to <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research <strong>in</strong> 2011.47 See the respective UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC, 2004a; 2007).48 Confidential <strong>in</strong>formation reported to <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research <strong>in</strong> 2011 concern<strong>in</strong>g observationsmade at a military facility <strong>in</strong> 2009.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 45
ENDNOTES49 Information supplied by an <strong>in</strong>dependent observer <strong>in</strong> Côte d’Ivoire to <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research <strong>in</strong>2011 and 2012. Confidential source.50 <strong>The</strong> ammunition is marked with the calibre designation (7.62 x 54), a date code (06) and a lot number(128). <strong>The</strong> lot number 128 is also marked on the green battle bags (confidential source).51 Confidential source.52 Reportedly <strong>in</strong> conjunction with a Western <strong>in</strong>telligence service (precise details unknown) (confidentialsource).53 Confidential source.54 See BIC for more details: .55 <strong>The</strong> consignment was later diverted to T<strong>in</strong> Can Island port and from there to an <strong>in</strong>land conta<strong>in</strong>erterm<strong>in</strong>al under the authority <strong>of</strong> Apapa port, reportedly due to congestion at Apapa (confidentialsource).56 Confidential source.57 Confidential source.58 Information supplied to <strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research by a confidential source, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g photographicevidence. <strong>The</strong> photographs have not been reproduced here for reasons <strong>of</strong> confidentiality.59 Confidential source.60 Technical analysis k<strong>in</strong>dly provided by Alexander Diehl; see DIO (2012) for technical specifications.61 See endnote 33 for an explanation <strong>of</strong> ‘tombak’.62 Technical analysis k<strong>in</strong>dly provided by Alexander Diehl; see DIO (2012) for technical specifications.63 See endnote 33 for an explanation <strong>of</strong> ‘tombak’.46<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
BIBLIOgRAPHYAmnesty International. 2010. ‘Gu<strong>in</strong>ea: You did not want the military, so now we are go<strong>in</strong>g to teach you alesson: <strong>The</strong> events <strong>of</strong> 28 September 2009 and their aftermath.’ Index AFR 29/001/2010. London:Amnesty International. February.Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit <strong>Ammunition</strong> Problem <strong>in</strong> Turkana North District. Geneva: SmallArms Survey. June.——. 2008b. Crisis <strong>in</strong> Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure <strong>of</strong> Disarmament <strong>in</strong> Uganda’s Most DeprivedRegion. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. June.—. 2012. ‘Assessment <strong>of</strong> weapons seized from the forces <strong>of</strong> George Athor and John Duit.’ HSBA Arms and<strong>Ammunition</strong> Trac<strong>in</strong>g Desk. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.DIO (Defence Industries Organization). 2012. An untitled list<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ballistic and technical data on DIO AMIGsmall-calibre ammunition. Accessed 22 November 2012. IMFA (Israeli M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs). 2002. ‘Seiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Palest<strong>in</strong>ian weapons ship Kar<strong>in</strong>eA—photos.’ 4 January. Accessed 22 November 2012. MAITIC (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center). 2009. Iran’s Activity <strong>in</strong> East <strong>Africa</strong>, theGateway to the Middle East and the <strong>Africa</strong>n Cont<strong>in</strong>ent. Tel Aviv: MAITIC. 29 July.——. 2011. In Recent Months Two More <strong>Iranian</strong> Attempts to Ship Weapons Were Exposed. Tel Aviv: MAITIC. 15March.MIC (Military Industrial Corporation). 2012. ‘Products.’ Company website. Accessed 1 November 2012.Small Arms Survey. 2011. A Guide to Sudanese <strong>Ammunition</strong> (1954–present). Sudan Human Security Basel<strong>in</strong>eAssessment Trac<strong>in</strong>g Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.——. 2012a. SAF Weapons Documented <strong>in</strong> South Kord<strong>of</strong>an. Sudan Human Security Basel<strong>in</strong>e AssessmentTrac<strong>in</strong>g Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. April.——. 2012b. ‘Bus<strong>in</strong>ess as usual: Arms flows to Darfur 2009–12.’ Sudan Human Security Basel<strong>in</strong>e AssessmentIssue Brief No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. September.——. 2012c. Assessment <strong>of</strong> Weapons Seized from the Forces <strong>of</strong> George Athor and John Duit. Sudan HumanSecurity Basel<strong>in</strong>e Assessment Trac<strong>in</strong>g Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.Sudan Tribune. 2007a. ‘Sudanese m<strong>in</strong>ister visits <strong>Iranian</strong> military airplane complex.’ 17 January.——. 2007b. ‘Iran <strong>of</strong>fers to tra<strong>in</strong> and equip Sudan’s army.’ 9 January.UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Resolution 1493 (2003), adopted by the Security Council atits 4797 th meet<strong>in</strong>g on 28 July. S/RES/1493.<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation 47
BIBLIOGRAPHY——. 2004a. Resolution 1572 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 5078 th meet<strong>in</strong>g on 15 November.S/RES/1572.——. 2004b. Resolution 1556 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 5015 th meet<strong>in</strong>g on 30 July. S/RES/1556.——. 2005. Resolution 1591 (2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5153 rd meet<strong>in</strong>g on 29 March. S/RES/1591.——. 2007. Resolution 1747 (2007), adopted by the Security Council at its 5647 th meet<strong>in</strong>g on 24 March 2007.S/RES/1747——. 2009. ‘Letter dated 8 April 2009 from the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concern<strong>in</strong>g Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President <strong>of</strong> theSecurity Council.’ S/2009/188. Enclosure: ‘Letter dated 20 March 2009 from the Group <strong>of</strong> Expertson Côte d’Ivoire to the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee established pursuant toresolution 1572 (2004).’ 8 April.——. 2011. ‘Letter dated 20 April 2011 from the Chair <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concern<strong>in</strong>g Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President <strong>of</strong> theSecurity Council.’ S/2011/271. Enclosure: Letter dated 17 September 2010 from the Group <strong>of</strong>Experts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004).’ 27 April.——. 2012. ‘Letter dated 15 October 2012 from the Chair <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concern<strong>in</strong>g Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President <strong>of</strong> theSecurity Council.’ S/2012/766. Enclosure: ‘Letter dated 14 September 2012 from the Group <strong>of</strong>Experts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chair <strong>of</strong> the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004).’ 15 October.48<strong>Conflict</strong> <strong>Armament</strong> Research<strong>The</strong> <strong>Distribution</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iranian</strong> <strong>Ammunition</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>: Evidence from a N<strong>in</strong>e-country Investigation
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