Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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Rajapakse has not put forward an alternative agenda for anymeaningful dialogue except to say “the political solution to alasting peace should be based on a consensus reached throughdiscussion among all parties linked to the problem and it shouldreceive the approval of the majority of the people of the country”.Pirapaharan said in his Heroes’ Day speech that a criticalevaluation of Rajapakse’s policy statement revealed that he hadfailed to grasp the fundamentals. However, the LTTE consideredRajapakse a realist committed to pragmatic politics and wantedto find out how he was going to handle the peace process andwhether he would offer justice to the Tamil people. Pirapaharan’sidea of a reasonable solution is based on the recognition of theSri Lankan Tamils as a nation, and of this nation’s right to selfdetermination.This is a question of Colombo’s sovereignty overthe Tamils living in the North-east. The Sri Lanka governmentsurrendered its sovereignty over 70 per cent of the north-eastunder the control of the LTTE while signing the Memorandumof Understanding on the ceasefire with the militant group on 23February 2003.Article 1.4 of the MoU says: “Where forward defence localitieshave been established, the Sri Lankan armed forces and theLTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions”.This gave the LTTE the space and legitimacy to continue to buildits parallel state structure within the lines of control. The LTTEcelebrated the legitimacy thus gained by hoisting Eelam flags,declaring a national flower different from Colombo’s, establishingthe Eelam police force and courts of law and even setting upcustoms posts at the Omantha and Muhamalai checkpoints toproject an image of a separate de facto state.With increasing skirmishes between the Sri Lankan armed forces,paramilitaries and the LTTE, the situation is heading towards aresumption of war. Rajapakse is relying heavily on the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi andPresident Jayewardene which took away Sri Lanka’s sovereignright to freely enter into military or intelligence relationships withany external power other than India. Article 2.16 of the agreement58
says: “The governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operatein ensuring the physical security and safety of all communitiesinhabiting the Northern and Eastern provinces”. Ven. EllawalaMedananda Thero, leader of the JHU, has urged Rajapakse toplace the country on war alert.Lt.-Gen. Sarath Fonseka, newly appointed Commander of the SriLankan Army, recently visited the Palaly military base in Jaffnaand key forward defence lines. Also present at Palaly were the Chiefof the Defence Staff, Admiral Daya Sandagiri, Commander of theNavy, Vice-Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander of theAir Force, Air Marshal G.D. Perera, Defence Secretary, GotabayaRajapakse, the President’s brother, and Lalith Weerathunga,President’s Secretary. Two Indian naval ships, INS Sukanya andINS Kirpan, have just completed a joint exercise in Sri Lankanwaters in the presence of Vice-Admiral Suresh Mehta, Flag OfficerCommanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command.A week earlier, Lt.-Gen. B.S. Thakar of the Indian Army visitedSri Lanka. India has much to fear from a recurrence of warfarebetween the Sri Lanka armed forces and the LTTE. The only wayto prevent that is to prevail on Rajapakse to give up his idea ofpreserving the unitary form of government and restructure theisland nation’s polity towards a confederal arrangement with allrepresentative Tamil groups in Sri Lanka.(Statesman - Editorial of 18 th December 2005)59
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ContentsIntroduction ..............
Page 9 and 10:
IntroductionThe prospects for peace
Page 17 and 18:
that I haven’t voted in the elect
Page 19 and 20: Is Peace Feasible?- Wakeley Paul[Wa
Page 21 and 22: In short, Rajapakse’s conception
Page 23 and 24: their leader should be? Obviously n
Page 25 and 26: The Vaddukodai resolutionIf there i
Page 27 and 28: due to the depopulation of vast are
Page 29 and 30: east because the Muslims reacted to
Page 31 and 32: usually tends to be obfuscated in d
Page 33 and 34: consider federal structures based o
Page 35 and 36: The official languageThe question o
Page 37 and 38: the LTTE-led Tamil National Movemen
Page 39 and 40: the LTTE to deliver humanitarian ai
Page 41 and 42: to power sharing. This behaviour, t
Page 43 and 44: political stand of the overwhelming
Page 45 and 46: Sudan’s Interim Power-sharing and
Page 47 and 48: of Norway and with the support of t
Page 49 and 50: inception of the CFA, they laid out
Page 51 and 52: determination, many analysts and co
Page 53 and 54: The peace talks were mediated by th
Page 55 and 56: Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam: The Part
Page 57 and 58: e trusted on a permanent basis. The
Page 59 and 60: their times and climes but their vo
Page 61 and 62: 4. Consequently the feeling of a mi
Page 63 and 64: The Armed StruggleIn the arena of c
Page 65 and 66: aircraft, the world has chosen to l
Page 67 and 68: Former President Bill Clinton, who
Page 69: epresentative, was “review of the
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Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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