Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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War or PeaceAppendix BThe only way to prevent war between the armed forces and LTTEis to prevail on the new President to give up his idea of a unitaryform of government and work for a confederalIn his annual Heroes’ Day address on 27 November, the LTTEsupremo, Velupillai Pirapaharan, virtually served an ultimatumon the new President, Mahinda Rajapakse, that if his governmentdid not come forward with a “reasonable solution” by the end ofthis month, his organisation would intensify the struggle for aseparate Tamil Eelam in the New Year. It was the LTTE’s call tothe Tamils in the north-east to boycott the election that enabledRajapakse to become the President, albeit by the narrowestmargin. Although Rajapakse said his government was giving thehighest priority to the peace process, his options to find a solutionwithin the unitary form of government are limited.His commitment to protect the unitary form of government invogue since independence, given in writing to the Left-wingJanatha Vimukthi Peramuna and the conservative Jathika HelaUrumaya of the Buddhist clergy, ensured the support of themajority Sinhala community to Rajapakse. The LTTE’s minimumdemand is acceptance of the Internal Self Governing Authority(ISGA) proposals submitted by it two years ago as the startingpoint for resuming negotiations. The Sri Lanka government andthe LTTE have taken up firm positions on two parallel lines.Parallel lines never meet.The Japanese government’s offer to host direct talks betweenColombo and the LTTE is welcome because neither side wantedthe talks to be held in each other’s territory. Norway’s compromiseproposal of holding the talks in the international airport nearColombo was rejected by the LTTE as the venue was underthe effective control of the Sri Lankan government. What wasenvisaged, according to Yasushi Akashi, Tokyo’s visiting special56
epresentative, was “review of the operational aspects” of theceasefire agreement, in force since 2002, and not a review of theagreement as such. Akashi did not meet the LTTE leadershipin Kilinochchi in deference to the wishes of the Rajapaksegovernment which was engaged in a comprehensive review of theentire situation. The JVP and the JHU, electoral allies of the SriLanka Freedom Party of Rajapakse, want a review of the ceasefireagreement. Rajapakse, while wanting Norway to continueas facilitator between his government and the LTTE, wants Osloto give up its role as monitor of the cease-fire agreement. Thepresent Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission consists of representativesfrom the Nordic countries chaired by Norway. Rajapakse toldAkashi that he would welcome monitors from Japan and SouthAsian countries.Elected on a hardline nationalist platform and having won themajority of Sinhala votes, Rajapakse had rejected the concept ofa Tamil homeland and the notions of power-sharing federalism,agreed upon by the previous government and the LTTE in theOslo round of peace talks in 2002. He had also rejected the ideaof sharing tsunami-related aid pledged by international donorswith the LTTE. Liberal aid has been pledged by the internationalcommunity as an inducement to both sides to resume peace talks.The Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS), ajoint mechanism the former President, Chandrika Kumaratunga,had entered into with the LTTE, was abrogated by Rajapaksesaying only the “Jaya Lanka” reconstruction programme run byColombo will handle tsunami funds. Regretting the stand takenby Rajapakse, Kumaratunga claimed in an interview: “I am sayingthis from the very bottom of my heart, I feel it deeply in everyfibre of my body, that every single person who opposed PTOMSwill, very soon be known by Sri Lanka as the biggest traitor thiscountry has ever known. This was the beginning of the solution,quite definitely..”.More important is Rajapakse’s refusal to countenance an interimadministration. Given his well known hardline position, no oneexpected him to concede this demand of the LTTE. While rulingout short-term and long-term solutions enunciated by the LTTE,57
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ContentsIntroduction ..............
Page 9 and 10:
IntroductionThe prospects for peace
Page 17 and 18: that I haven’t voted in the elect
Page 19 and 20: Is Peace Feasible?- Wakeley Paul[Wa
Page 21 and 22: In short, Rajapakse’s conception
Page 23 and 24: their leader should be? Obviously n
Page 25 and 26: The Vaddukodai resolutionIf there i
Page 27 and 28: due to the depopulation of vast are
Page 29 and 30: east because the Muslims reacted to
Page 31 and 32: usually tends to be obfuscated in d
Page 33 and 34: consider federal structures based o
Page 35 and 36: The official languageThe question o
Page 37 and 38: the LTTE-led Tamil National Movemen
Page 39 and 40: the LTTE to deliver humanitarian ai
Page 41 and 42: to power sharing. This behaviour, t
Page 43 and 44: political stand of the overwhelming
Page 45 and 46: Sudan’s Interim Power-sharing and
Page 47 and 48: of Norway and with the support of t
Page 49 and 50: inception of the CFA, they laid out
Page 51 and 52: determination, many analysts and co
Page 53 and 54: The peace talks were mediated by th
Page 55 and 56: Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam: The Part
Page 57 and 58: e trusted on a permanent basis. The
Page 59 and 60: their times and climes but their vo
Page 61 and 62: 4. Consequently the feeling of a mi
Page 63 and 64: The Armed StruggleIn the arena of c
Page 65 and 66: aircraft, the world has chosen to l
Page 67: Former President Bill Clinton, who
Page 71 and 72: says: “The governments of India a
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Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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