Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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The executive presidencyThe executive presidency embodies the acute centralisation ofpolitical power in the current unitary State. If the Tamil NationalQuestion is to be resolved short of an independent State of TamilEelam that requires an extreme federal system of government forwhich the executive presidency must be abolished or at the veryleast divested of considerable powers.But President Rajapakse’s policy statement waffles on thesubject. “Our manifesto has also proposed abolishing the ExecutivePresidency. For this purpose Constitutional reform based on abroad consensus is required. Until then our Government hopes tointroduce Constitutional reforms by which the President will beofficially answerable to Parliament.” Anyone with an even cursoryunderstanding of Sri Lankan politics knows that the “broadconsensus” is a myth. Whenever a Sinhala politician invokes theneed for a consensus, it is a dodge to blame every one else for notimplementing proposals. The reason is obvious. The psychologyof power dictates that power must be consolidated and builtupon. No politician would willingly dilute his or her powers. Thevague provisions in Rajapakse’s policy statement on the futureof the presidency confirm this fact. The new Executive Presidentwill assume all powers of that office and, where possible, furtherextend and reinforce the powers.The semi-feudal Sinhala leadership will hold on to the strongexecutive presidency and militarised Sinhala State for another,structural reason. The Sinhala ruling classes rely on the highlycentralised executive presidency and authoritarian powers of thenational security State to contain rising class antagonism amongthe impoverished and radicalised Sinhala working classes whopay the human price for globalisation.By restricting himself to making the President “answerable toParliament” – that too requires the elusive consensus – PresidentRajapakse confirmed he will hold on to all powers of the ExecutivePresidency. Consequently, there is no scope for abolishing ordiluting presidential powers. So there is no political space for24
the LTTE-led Tamil National Movement to exercise its right ofnational self-determination within the context of the ethnoreligiousunitary State.Can the President then avoid war?A military solution?President Rajapakse has been in his Sri Lanka Freedom Party(SLFP) government or sat in the Opposition for more than threedecades when successive governments waged disastrous militarycampaigns. He must surely know that the morale of large sectionswithin the Sinhala armed forces is low. The extremely highlevels of desertion clearly demonstrate this. During “OperationJayasikuru” in the late 1990s, for example, about 45 thousandSinhala soldiers – about 30% of the army – deserted carryingwith them arms and ammunition.While trying to mollify recalcitrant Sinhala soldiers, a formerUnited National Party (UNP) Deputy Minister in effect confirmedtheir poor morale. At an election campaign meeting in support ofthe UNP presidential candidate held in Hatton on 3 rd of November,he explained that Sinhala soldiers need not fear. “Americanand Indian forces will fight the LTTE if Liberation Tigers’ leaderPirapakaran opts to wage a war,” he explained with a flourish;and added reassuringly, “there will be no need for Sri Lankanforces to do the fighting.”But President Rajapakse has informed his coalition partnersthat it would take him about three months to modernise andstrengthen his armed forces. Is the President preparing for warwhile talking peace?25
Page 7 and 8: ContentsIntroduction ..............
Page 9 and 10: IntroductionThe prospects for peace
Page 17 and 18: that I haven’t voted in the elect
Page 19 and 20: Is Peace Feasible?- Wakeley Paul[Wa
Page 21 and 22: In short, Rajapakse’s conception
Page 23 and 24: their leader should be? Obviously n
Page 25 and 26: The Vaddukodai resolutionIf there i
Page 27 and 28: due to the depopulation of vast are
Page 29 and 30: east because the Muslims reacted to
Page 31 and 32: usually tends to be obfuscated in d
Page 33 and 34: consider federal structures based o
Page 35: The official languageThe question o
Page 39 and 40: the LTTE to deliver humanitarian ai
Page 41 and 42: to power sharing. This behaviour, t
Page 43 and 44: political stand of the overwhelming
Page 45 and 46: Sudan’s Interim Power-sharing and
Page 47 and 48: of Norway and with the support of t
Page 49 and 50: inception of the CFA, they laid out
Page 51 and 52: determination, many analysts and co
Page 53 and 54: The peace talks were mediated by th
Page 55 and 56: Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam: The Part
Page 57 and 58: e trusted on a permanent basis. The
Page 59 and 60: their times and climes but their vo
Page 61 and 62: 4. Consequently the feeling of a mi
Page 63 and 64: The Armed StruggleIn the arena of c
Page 65 and 66: aircraft, the world has chosen to l
Page 67 and 68: Former President Bill Clinton, who
Page 69 and 70: epresentative, was “review of the
Page 71 and 72: says: “The governments of India a

Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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