Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond
Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond
Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond
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usually tends to be obfuscated <strong>in</strong> discussions on the structure ofthe state, or on federal versus unitary constitutions, is that theyrepresent different aspects of the m<strong>in</strong>dset of the rul<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>in</strong>Colombo. Whether we like it or not, the rul<strong>in</strong>g class has with<strong>in</strong>itself substantial elements which are loath to share political powerwith the <strong>Tamil</strong>s through constitutional means. With Rajapakseassum<strong>in</strong>g the presidency, these elements have acquired greatlegitimacy. What is more, no solution to the ethnic problem <strong>in</strong>the future is go<strong>in</strong>g to be devoid of a substantial <strong>in</strong>put from theextreme nationalist sections of <strong>Sri</strong> <strong>Lanka</strong>’s southern populationand their political representatives.It has been the ploy of the rul<strong>in</strong>g class <strong>in</strong> Colombo to speak abouta consensus whenever it has had to take pa<strong>in</strong>ful decisions ofshar<strong>in</strong>g power with the <strong>Tamil</strong>s. What is important <strong>in</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>gof this consensus is that the JHU with n<strong>in</strong>e seats is treated asimportant as the UPFA (105 seats) and UNP (82 seats)! (The actual<strong>in</strong>fluence of the JHU <strong>in</strong> gett<strong>in</strong>g Rajapakse elected as presidentcannot be quantified, but it is unlikely to be substantial). Thequestion we have to ask is: why is the S<strong>in</strong>hala polity, whichplaces faith <strong>in</strong> numbers and numerical majorities (as it does <strong>in</strong>parliament) to defeat everyth<strong>in</strong>g that affects its <strong>in</strong>terests, bend<strong>in</strong>gover backwards to solicit the op<strong>in</strong>ion of the m<strong>in</strong>iscule JHU? Theanswer is obvious – to ensure that the <strong>in</strong>transigence of JHU (andof course the JVP) could be used to dilute what is offered to the<strong>Tamil</strong>s as the ‘consensus op<strong>in</strong>ion of the south,’ and thereby seeto it that hegemony does not slip out of the S<strong>in</strong>hala rul<strong>in</strong>g class.The fact is that it is not the <strong>in</strong>dividual political parties that matterwhen decid<strong>in</strong>g what ought to be ‘conceded’ by the Colombopolitical elite. It is the rul<strong>in</strong>g class as a whole, which is reluctantto share power, us<strong>in</strong>g the mechanisms built <strong>in</strong>to the politicalsystem to frustrate <strong>Tamil</strong> aspirations. This is not the first time<strong>in</strong> the recent past that presidents have used the consensuscard to delay act<strong>in</strong>g decisively. In 2000 for <strong>in</strong>stance, formerpresident Chandrika Kumaratunga presented her proposal forconstitutional reform. For some months preced<strong>in</strong>g this, activenegotiations were undertaken by the PA with the UNP to arriveat a consensus. The upshot of it was the orig<strong>in</strong>al draft readied <strong>in</strong>19