Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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Accord (1987) states that both Sinhala and Tamil are officiallanguages of this country, official correspondence, court recordsand even bus boards are in Sinhala. Second, a new constitutionhas replaced the one against which the authors of the Resolutionhad expressed their vehement opposition, but this constitution(1978) too has not alleviated discrimination against the Tamils.On the contrary the three branches of government – but especiallythe judiciary – have deliberately and consistently ensured thatthe Tamils are denied equal opportunity. Further, the judiciarypermitted indiscriminate arrest, torture and even murder ofTamil youth by not challenging provisions of the PTA, which hasbeen in existence for 25 years. Today the judiciary has postponedindefinitely an inquiry into the P-TOMS agreement therebydepriving Tamil survivors of the tsunami even a pittance forrehabilitation and resettlement. And third, bouts of communalviolence referred to in the Resolution gradually transmogrifiedinto one of Asia’s longest and most deadly civil wars.The CFAIf we turn to another document of more recent origin – the CFA(February 2002) – we would find an almost identical problem. TheCFA assumes the two parties to the conflict – the government andLTTE – entered into a ceasefire because they are of equal status,which entails that both parties should adhere to implementingits provisions on a reciprocal basis. But the government hasrepeatedly reneged on what it had undertaken to do under theCFA, and has flatly refused to implement the clauses it is expectedto for the agreement is to be honoured by both sides.Of these provisions, most detrimental to the Tamils is the nonimplementationof Clause 1.8 that stipulates all paramilitarycadres have to be disarmed by the government. The government’srefusal to adhere to this clause permits the shadowy Karuna tocontinue operating with impunity under the protection of thearmy. Second, despite commitment to ‘normalisation’ findinggreat prominence in the CFA, Tamil civilians in the northeastsuffer untold deprivation. They are unable to enjoy ‘normalcy’14
due to the depopulation of vast areas in and around militaryinstallations due to high security zones remaining intact; thearmy, whose conduct is a constant irritant to the Tamils, remainsin occupation of schools, public buildings, sports stadiums etc.The various institutions set up under the ceasefire – JTF, SIRHN,ISGA – proved to be non-starters because the unitary constitutiondoes not allow meaningful power sharing between the governmentand LTTE even within the bounds of a ceasefire.The examples of the Vaddukodai Resolution and the CFA havebeen dealt with in some detail to show the long and unacceptabledelay in addressing and remedying the profound problems thathave beset the Tamils from the time of independence.The Rationale for the strategy of delayThe reason for this strategy is clear: it is to keep hope alive amongthe Tamils that substantial restitution would be made, while atthe same time unleashing a counterinsurgency war that disruptsthe day-to-day life of the community through systematic andwidespread use of terror such as assassination, indiscriminatedetention, torture etc., which result in the community becomingunstable.The other reason for delaying tactics undertaken by the SriLankan state is with the intention of creating enmity between theLTTE and the Tamil people. The state hopes that by prolongingthe conflict and creating an environment where existence is on theverge of barbarity, tensions, fears and hopelessness in the Tamilcivilian population would force it to react negatively towards therebels, which would result in undermining the support the rebelshave from the community. The army, STF and intelligence havebeen doing this consistently in the northeast hoping that it woulderode the confidence Tamils have in the LTTE. Tensions createdbetween the civilian population and the Tigers by governmentforces deliberately engaging in counterinsurgency operationsenhance the friction that naturally arises between those whowield power and the people that are governed. The state hopesthat by prolonging the state of conflict these tensions might,eventually, deprive a population’s will to fight.15
Page 7 and 8: ContentsIntroduction ..............
Page 9 and 10: IntroductionThe prospects for peace
Page 17 and 18: that I haven’t voted in the elect
Page 19 and 20: Is Peace Feasible?- Wakeley Paul[Wa
Page 21 and 22: In short, Rajapakse’s conception
Page 23 and 24: their leader should be? Obviously n
Page 25: The Vaddukodai resolutionIf there i
Page 29 and 30: east because the Muslims reacted to
Page 31 and 32: usually tends to be obfuscated in d
Page 33 and 34: consider federal structures based o
Page 35 and 36: The official languageThe question o
Page 37 and 38: the LTTE-led Tamil National Movemen
Page 39 and 40: the LTTE to deliver humanitarian ai
Page 41 and 42: to power sharing. This behaviour, t
Page 43 and 44: political stand of the overwhelming
Page 45 and 46: Sudan’s Interim Power-sharing and
Page 47 and 48: of Norway and with the support of t
Page 49 and 50: inception of the CFA, they laid out
Page 51 and 52: determination, many analysts and co
Page 53 and 54: The peace talks were mediated by th
Page 55 and 56: Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam: The Part
Page 57 and 58: e trusted on a permanent basis. The
Page 59 and 60: their times and climes but their vo
Page 61 and 62: 4. Consequently the feeling of a mi
Page 63 and 64: The Armed StruggleIn the arena of c
Page 65 and 66: aircraft, the world has chosen to l
Page 67 and 68: Former President Bill Clinton, who
Page 69 and 70: epresentative, was “review of the
Page 71 and 72: says: “The governments of India a

Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

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