Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The Strategy of Delay- J. S. Tissainyagam[J S Tissainyagam exposes and explores the strategy of ‘masterlyinaction’ that Sri Lankan Governments have used with successto avoid meeting Tamil demands and reaching a political solutionto the conflict He also identifies other strategies employed bythe Government both before and after the Cease-Fire to deny apolitical resolution.. He concludes that “Unless the internationalcommunity is able to use diplomatic clout and political skillsto apply pressure on Colombo to address problems withoutresorting to procrastination and political manoeuvring, theLTTE would have no option but to slough off the shackles ofthe CFA and resort to other ways of achieving its goal”]The history of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka reveals that aparticular line of action has been exploited by successive Sinhaladominatedgovernments until it has become threadbare withuse. But, despite overuse, this strategy could be banked upon todeliver desired results. One sees it in operation when one surveysthe broad sweep of history of the conflict from the time it becamean armed struggle in 1983. On the other hand, its presence isalso unmistakable when examining shorter timeframes such asthe period the CFA has been in operation.The strategy in question is masterly inaction. As a militarytactic it is not new and was used very creatively by the Romangeneral Q. Fabius Maximus, who became known as ‘cunctator’(the delayer) for this very reason. In a sense, there are definiteparallels between the reason the famous Roman used it around200 B.C against the Carthaginians and why our local politiciansgo back to it to contain the Tamil problem in contemporary times.Delay is a tried and tested method that makes the weaker partyget exhausted, lose its nerve and throw in the towel.12
The Vaddukodai resolutionIf there is any document where the Tamils state their disgust atthe perfidy of successive governments this country had had, andthe Tamil resolve to deal firmly with matters arising from suchhypocrisy, it is the Vaddukodai Resolution. The document states:“…Successive Sinhalese governments since independence havealways encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism ofthe Sinhalese people and have used their political power to thedetriment of the Tamils,” and goes on to enumerate the differentspheres of life – political, social, economic and physical – inwhich Sinhala nationalism has been used “to the detriment ofthe Tamils.”The relevant portions of the Vaddukodai Resolution are too longto quote here. Suffice it to say that the areas highlighted are:depriving the Tamils of recent Indian origin their citizenship;sponsoring state-aided colonisation in the Tamil-majority areas;denying the use of Tamil as an official language; giving Buddhismthe foremost place to the detriment of other religions; denyingequality of opportunity to the Tamils in education, employmentand economic life; denying the Tamils’ right to freely enjoytheir culture. The Resolution goes on to accuse governments ofunleashing successive bouts of communal violence on both theTamils and Muslims; torturing, terrorising and imprisoning Tamilyouth on flimsy excuses; imposing upon the Tamils the (1972)constitution without their consent, which gave weightage toSinhala representation on the basis of mere numerical strength,while depriving the Tamils of the few safeguards they had hadunder the earlier constitution (1948).The Vaddukodai Resolution was drafted in 1976. Thirty yearslater, has any one of these problems except that of grantingcitizenship to the Tamils of recent Indian origin, been addressedcomprehensively, let alone resolved to the satisfaction of theTamil people?Just three examples, would suffice to delineate the procrastinationof the state in recognising Tamil grievances articulated in theVaddukodai Resolution. First, even though the Indo-Lanka13
Page 7 and 8: ContentsIntroduction ..............
Page 9 and 10: IntroductionThe prospects for peace
Page 17 and 18: that I haven’t voted in the elect
Page 19 and 20: Is Peace Feasible?- Wakeley Paul[Wa
Page 21 and 22: In short, Rajapakse’s conception
Page 23: their leader should be? Obviously n
Page 27 and 28: due to the depopulation of vast are
Page 29 and 30: east because the Muslims reacted to
Page 31 and 32: usually tends to be obfuscated in d
Page 33 and 34: consider federal structures based o
Page 35 and 36: The official languageThe question o
Page 37 and 38: the LTTE-led Tamil National Movemen
Page 39 and 40: the LTTE to deliver humanitarian ai
Page 41 and 42: to power sharing. This behaviour, t
Page 43 and 44: political stand of the overwhelming
Page 45 and 46: Sudan’s Interim Power-sharing and
Page 47 and 48: of Norway and with the support of t
Page 49 and 50: inception of the CFA, they laid out
Page 51 and 52: determination, many analysts and co
Page 53 and 54: The peace talks were mediated by th
Page 55 and 56: Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam: The Part
Page 57 and 58: e trusted on a permanent basis. The
Page 59 and 60: their times and climes but their vo
Page 61 and 62: 4. Consequently the feeling of a mi
Page 63 and 64: The Armed StruggleIn the arena of c
Page 65 and 66: aircraft, the world has chosen to l
Page 67 and 68: Former President Bill Clinton, who
Page 69 and 70: epresentative, was “review of the
Page 71 and 72: says: “The governments of India a

Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?