Conflict in Sri Lanka: Ground Realities - Tamil Nation & Beyond

that I haven’t voted in the election. It in turn would senda wrong message to my Singhalese [friends] as we aresupporters of the LTTE. That would lead to intimidationfrom the majority community. [Friday, 18 November,2005]That the Tamil leadership, the LTTE and the TNA, was of theopinion that the Tamil people should ignore this presidentialelection is no secret. They did make this quite clear to the Tamilpeople, and backed it up with valid reasons, reasons that theTamil people understood. As leaders, it is in fact their civic-dutyto analyse the political situation affecting their people, and advicethem accordingly, which is what they did. But to say that theyintimidated them into a boycott is hyperbole.If one wants to see real intimidation one should walk the streetsof Jaffna – hundreds of T-56 carrying Sinhala soldiers in fullpublic view patrolling, army observation posts at every junction,mini army-camps every few hundred yards, heavy army vehiclesbarrelling down the streets. Contrast this with the scenery inKilinochchi or Paranthan or any other LTTE controlled town,where you don’t see a single gun in public.To suggest that in the Sinhala army controlled Jaffna districtthe LTTE was able to intimidate the people into doing anythingflies in the face of commonsense. As Tamilselvan rightly asked,“how [could] the allegation of intimidation… be levelled againstthe LTTE when the voters in question were living under the gunsof the occupying Sri Lankan forces? There are forty thousandSri Lankan troops in Jaffna alone exercising a clear intimidatorypresence…” [TamilNet, November 22, 2005]In the same report, Tamilselvan also pointed out that “LTTEmembers had long ago been withdrawn from SLA held areasin the wake of Sri Lankan military intelligence supportedparamilitary attacks on them.”Some LTTE supporters or a few local civilian leaders may havegotten overenthusiastic about their leaders’ advice on this matter,5