Illan Nam, Colgate University, Feb 2011Draft <strong>in</strong> progress, please do not quote or citeand labor, they <strong>in</strong>crease the costs of production for capital. In an open-trade economy,the entry <strong>in</strong>to the domestic markets of goods made <strong>in</strong> lower-wage countries disadvantageslocal producers, encourag<strong>in</strong>g them to lobby their governments to reduce the burden off<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g welfare programs. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this perspective, openness to capital flowsspurred a similar dynamic. With “footloose” capital, firms have the ability to move theirassets and <strong>in</strong>vestments across borders; consequently, profit-seek<strong>in</strong>g firms will locate their<strong>in</strong>vestments to countries where the costs of do<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess are lower and where states canprovide a stable macroeconomic environment, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g lower <strong>in</strong>flation and tighter fiscaldiscipl<strong>in</strong>e, which generous welfare programs are assumed to impede. 19 By impos<strong>in</strong>g thelogic of the market upon countries’ domestic policies, globalization forces states to forgocollective social protection schemes and to adopt neoclassical economic alternatives thatemphasize <strong>in</strong>dividual over collective responsibility.This logic is thought to be even more <strong>in</strong>exorable <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries becausethey rely more heavily on foreign capital <strong>in</strong>flows to supplement lower levels of domesticsav<strong>in</strong>gs, and their domestic producers are less competitive <strong>in</strong> world markets. Inparticular, analysts argued that the fiscal constra<strong>in</strong>ts imposed by neoliberal economicpolicy prescriptives left little room for states to negotiate protective social policy. 20Theimperatives of this policy regime significantly reduced domestic policymakers’<strong>in</strong>dependence s<strong>in</strong>ce their capacity to attract trade and capital <strong>in</strong>vestments depended onma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g budgetary discipl<strong>in</strong>e and flexible labor markets.19 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C.: Institute of International Economics,1997)20 Nita Rudra, “Globalization and the Decl<strong>in</strong>e of the Welfare State <strong>in</strong> Less-Developed Countries”International Organization 56:2 (2002)16
Illan Nam, Colgate University, Feb 2011Draft <strong>in</strong> progress, please do not quote or citeThis first generation of literature has come under considerable fire. A substantialresponse to this earlier th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g presents persuasive evidence that left governments and<strong>in</strong>stitutions still yield salubrious effects on welfare spend<strong>in</strong>g and social policies.Garrett’s work on the advanced <strong>in</strong>dustrial economies perhaps best represents thisscholastic response; he found that <strong>in</strong> countries where left parties were allied withencompass<strong>in</strong>g labor organizations, governments were able to pursue economic policiesthat redistribute wealth and risk <strong>in</strong> favor of the more vulnerable, <strong>in</strong> spite of <strong>in</strong>creasedeconomic openness. 21 In a related ve<strong>in</strong>, Swank made the case that “the <strong>in</strong>stitutionalstructure of the polity and programmatic structures of the welfare state are fundamentallyimportant for determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the quality and character of <strong>in</strong>terest representation of prowelfarestate <strong>in</strong>terest, the relative political capacity of these <strong>in</strong>terests, and the broaderconstellation of supportive norms and values.” 22Scholars work<strong>in</strong>g on welfare spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g countries have <strong>in</strong>vestigatedthis relationship as well. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) demonstrates that amongLat<strong>in</strong> American countries, popularly-based governments (def<strong>in</strong>ed as governments thathave close historical l<strong>in</strong>ks with labor unions or a long-stand<strong>in</strong>g programmatic orientationtoward the “popular sector”) have a significant and positive short-term effect on socialspend<strong>in</strong>g. 23Rudra (2002), <strong>in</strong> a study of 53 less-developed countries, found that, <strong>in</strong>contrast to Garrett’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the OECD sample of countries, <strong>in</strong>creased capital andtrade openness comb<strong>in</strong>ed with weak labor power produced a significant and negative21 Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics <strong>in</strong> the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998)22 Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change <strong>in</strong> Developed Welfare States(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)23 Robert Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, “Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Lat<strong>in</strong> America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-97,” World Politics 53 (2001)17
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