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Out of Captivity : Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle

Out of Captivity : Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle

Out of Captivity : Surviving 1,967 Days in the Colombian Jungle

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Settl<strong>in</strong>g In 133We did it know<strong>in</strong>g that we had to get it out <strong>of</strong> our system. The FARCreceived <strong>the</strong>ir fair share <strong>of</strong> our anger along with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Colombian</strong> military.That said, Tom, Marc, and I understood that we had not been <strong>the</strong>focus. We trusted that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Colombian</strong>s did not know that we were <strong>in</strong> acamp nearby <strong>the</strong>ir targets.On one level, we understood <strong>the</strong> game. The FARC used <strong>the</strong> presence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> secuestrado, <strong>the</strong> hostages, as a way to try to tie <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Colombian</strong> government. In that sense, we were human shields. TheFARC hoped that by hold<strong>in</strong>g hostages <strong>in</strong> various locations along withor nearby <strong>the</strong>ir units, <strong>the</strong> military wouldn’t attack for fear <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g or<strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g hostages. We’d just had close-up evidence that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Colombian</strong>military wasn’t go<strong>in</strong>g to let <strong>the</strong> FARC employ that strategy with impunity.We understood that <strong>the</strong> government couldn’t let <strong>the</strong> FARC get <strong>the</strong>upper hand, couldn’t just freeze all <strong>the</strong>ir military action. If <strong>the</strong>y stoppedbomb<strong>in</strong>g FARC targets, <strong>the</strong>y wouldn’t be an effective fight<strong>in</strong>g force and<strong>the</strong> FARC <strong>in</strong>surgency would ga<strong>in</strong> more traction.In <strong>the</strong> aftermath <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bomb<strong>in</strong>gs, Tom said someth<strong>in</strong>g that we allhad to agree with. We were on <strong>the</strong> back side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> power curve as hostages.We were be<strong>in</strong>g sacrificed. We had no idea how many casualties<strong>the</strong>y took as a result <strong>of</strong> that attack, but as a rule, when <strong>the</strong> FARC took ahit, we would take a hit, too. On this occasion, we were lucky. We hatedbe<strong>in</strong>g bombed, but we took satisfaction <strong>in</strong> know<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> FARC had<strong>in</strong>curred damages and were on <strong>the</strong> los<strong>in</strong>g side <strong>of</strong> this; even though itnearly cost us our lives, it was cause for celebration. We also hated <strong>the</strong>idea that simply by hold<strong>in</strong>g us as hostages, <strong>the</strong> FARC could claim somesort <strong>of</strong> victory. As hostages or prisoners, <strong>the</strong>re wasn’t a lot that we coulddirectly do to defeat <strong>the</strong> FARC ourselves. There were th<strong>in</strong>gs we coulddo <strong>in</strong> small ways—like not believ<strong>in</strong>g any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir Marxist propagandabullshit and by conduct<strong>in</strong>g ourselves <strong>in</strong> ways that countered <strong>the</strong>ir op<strong>in</strong>ion<strong>of</strong> us as imperialist pigs.In <strong>the</strong> end, we chalked this one up as a victory—one that scared <strong>the</strong>

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