1966 US Army Vietnam War ARMOR ... - Survival Books

WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMtributing to the overall mission of the this position. The enemy is nowbrigade.obliged to fight according to the com-(2) CA 2 fails to provide for the timely mander's plan; thus he succeeds inseizure of the objective. Seizure ofimposing his will upon the enemy inHill C subjects his force to unneces-this situation. The depth of the forsarycontact with the enemy andmation provides for maintenance ofcould ultimately preclude seizure ofthe momentum of the attack and willHill B. Failure to accomplish a timelyprovide for unforeseen contingencies.seizure of the objective in this situa- (4) Based on this principle, CA 3 is fationfails to contribute to the overallvored.mission of the force and is a violation e. Surprise. Striking the enemy when,of the principle of the objective. where, or in a manner that he does not antici-(3) In CA 3 the objective is seized and pate, will help the commander to attain surthemission accomplished as in CA 1. prise. The commander must consider under(4) CA 1 or CA 3 is favored based on this this principle, time of attack, direction, combatprinciple.power to be employed, deception measures, sed.Principle of the Offensive. The correct applicationof this principle requires that thecrecy, and rapid movement. Night attacks, al-though more difficult to execute, should be emcommanderimpose his will upon the enemy to ployed frequently and considered as normalset the pace and course of battle; maintaining operations. Continuation of the attack duringan aggressive attitude and the initiative, ex- darkness is also effective and serves to gainploiting enemy weaknesses, and meeting un- surprise. Attacking at generally the same timeforeseen contingencies are an integral part of each day, such as BMNT or BMNT 30, shouldapplying this principle.be avoided. Deception measures are employed(1) In CA 1, the commander reasons that to mislead the enemy as to the true status orhe can exploit and take advantage of purpose of friendly activities. The deceptionthe enemy's dispositions. By attack- measures are a part of the commander's couningon two axes of advance, he causes terintelligence measures which include denialthe enemy on Hill C to react against measures. Communication security is an imeitherthe north or south axis or both portant denial measure. Camouflage is used assimultaneously, thus creating favora- a denial and deception measure. Rapid movebleconditions for defeat or contain- ment is associated not only with surprise, butment of the enemy. Under these con- it affords some security. Factors that contrib-ditions the commander can succeed in ute each to course the possible of action attainment areimposingof surprise inhis will upon the enemy.(2) In CA 2, the commander fails to (1) CA 1.maintain the offensive by stopping (a) The time of attack. The unusualunnecessarily on Hill C and in so do-hour at which the attack comingalso fails to-mences could certainly cause sur-(a) Maintain the momentum of the at-prise.tack.(b) The direction of attack. The enemy(b) Retain the initiative.must decide whether to divide his(c) Maintain an aggressive attitude (inforces and engage friendly forcesterms of (a) and (b) above).on both axes or engage either one,(3) In CA 3, the commander outflanks the and which one.enemy by an attack on Hill D from (c) The resultant application of allthe south, and exploits an open flankcombat power from both directionswhile attacking in mass. The com-of attack. Once the enemy on Hill Cmander envisions that he will out-discovers the strength of the attackflank the enemy positions on Hilland the directions of attack, he isC and cause the enemy to abandonforced to decide whether to remain304