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1966 US Army Vietnam War ARMOR ... - Survival Books

1966 US Army Vietnam War ARMOR ... - Survival Books

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WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMtration and the envelopment. The frontal at- battlefield environment. Although the techtackis a variation of the penetration; a double niques of night operations will include the useenvelopment and a turning movement are var- of night viewing devices, the principles ofiations of the envelopment. Each form will as- movement and combat will not change markedsignobjectives deep in the enemy rear and the ly. Frequency of limited-visibility operationsadoption of any one form will depend in vary- will increase in the conduct of troop moveingdegrees upon the mission, the terrain, the ments, realinement of forces on the battlefield,enemy situation, and the troops available. In a movement to attack positions, movement tonuclear war, the penetration as a form of lines of departure, and attack of limited objecoffensiveoperation may be used more frequent- tives.ly than was previously considered normal forarmor units. When time, space, and an assaila- 18. Nonactive Nuclear <strong>War</strong>fareble flank are available, the envelopment may be Nonactive nuclear war is a condition that reusedin preference to the penetration. After quires the conduct of operations without usingachieving success through the penetration or nuclear weapons although the threat of theirenvelopment, the attack progresses into an ex- use may be present. The firepower availableploitation and pursuit. The preferred use of ar- under conditions of nonactive nuclear war ismor units in the defense is as a counterattack reduced materially. The tactics of the nonacforcewherein their inherent mobile charac- tive nuclear battlefield and the forces employedteristics are exploited fully. Organization for may be similar to those employed in past wars.combat in the mobile defense will stress the The armored division will continue to be aprovision of a reserve weighted heavily with powerful striking or exploiting force for thetanks. The commander dispersing his forces as corps. Within the division, the brigade will bea passive defense measure against enemy nu- assigned missions involving wide envelopmentsclear weapons must recognize that he may or penetrations to seize deep objectives. Briaffordthe enemy opportunity to infiltrate in gade commanders and staffs can expect to reforce.To prevent infiltration, the commander ceive mission-type orders and substantial tactimustinsure thorough surveillance of the areas cal freedom in carrying out assigned missions.between the dispersed formations 24 hours a Great reliance is placed on the initiative of bridayin all weather.gade and subordinate unit commanders. Norb.Greater use of night or other limited visi- mally, brigades will be able to rely on eachbility conditions will be a result of a nuclear other for a degree of mutual support.Section III.CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT19. General have separate missions. The mission of the ma-The successful employment of armor forces neuvering force is to close with and destroy theis dependent upon certain fundamentals. The enemy by fire and shock effect. It will consistdegree of success obtained in the use of these of all available tank and infantry units. Thefundamentals depends largely on imaginative, mission of the base of fire is to minimize theresourceful, audacious, prudent, progressive, enemy's capability to interfere with the moveandflexible thinking commanders and staffs. ment of the maneuver force and, within its ca-The commander must be willing to take calcu- pabilities, to destroy the enemy. The base oflated risks.fire normally does not join the maneuveringforce in the assault. The base of fire may con-20. Fire and Maneuver sist of mortars, attached antitank weapons,Armor units fight by combining fire and ma- supporting artillery, tactical air, and navalneuver. This is a tactic used by the com- gunfire. Tanks and air cavalry are not normalmander,of establishing a base of fire and a ly included in the base of fire because this rolemaneuvering force. These two distinct forces does not take maximum advantage of their10

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