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1966 US Army Vietnam War ARMOR ... - Survival Books

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WWW.SURVIVALEBOOKS.COMMass does not require continued concentration tion of the principle of maneuver requires notof forces; it does require that forces be so dis- only the full use of combat power at the deciposedthat maximum combat power can be con- sive time and place but includes the movementcentrated at the decisive time and place. The of elements of combat power (including comuseof nuclear weapons by enemy forces will bat service support) to the area of operations.require greater dispersion for passive defense; Application of this principle is a function oftherefore, greater stress must be placed on the command at all levels. At the highest level itapplication of mass from the point of view of usually means the movement of men, means,time rather than space. Whenever possible, and supplies to an area of operations, and attanks are employed in mass. The speed, maneu- the lowest level it means the positioning ofverability, and communication of armor permit troop units and fires to destroy the enemy.the rapid massing of mobile firepower. The ar- h. Surprise. Surprise connotes striking themor leader seeks to concentrate his mobile fire- enemy when, where, or in a manner that he ispower at one decisive point, overcome that unable to counter effectively. The achievementpoint, then shift to another decisive point. Vio- of surprise is not necessarily dependent uponlation of this principle exposes the commander misleading the enemy as to intentions, such as,to the risk of piecemeal defeat by even an infe- for example, concealing from him an intentionrior enemy.of attacking. He may know from the situationf. Economy of Force. Economy of force re- that he will be attacked, yet the attacker mayquires that sufficient force be applied at other achieve surprise by the time, place, direction,than the decisive time and place to permit size or composition of forces, or tactics emmassto be applied at the point of decision. ployed.These two principles are so closely related that i. Security. Security provides readiness forthey cannot be considered singly. Application action or counteraction and is enhanced greatlyof the two principles requires a sound estimate by flexibility. Flexibility in mind, organization,of what is sufficient elsewhere to permit the at- and means contributes to security. Its attaintainmentof decisive superiority at the decisive ment embraces all measures designed to avoidtime and place. "Sufficient" is the key. It con- being surprised or interfered with seriously,notes the application of the force necessary to and the retention of freedom of action. Securiaccomplishthe purpose and not the application ty does not imply undue caution and avoidanceof as little force as possible.of all risks, for bold action is essential to sucg.Maneuver. Maneuver requires that all cess in war. When security is provided, unexmilitaryresources be brought to bear in the ac- pected developments will not interfere seriouscomplishmentof the objective. Correct applica- ly with the pursuit of vigorous operations.Section II. ACTIVE AND NONACTIVE NUCLEAR WARFARE16. Genetal b. A primary distinction between the nua.Basic armor doctrine is generally applica- clear and nonactive nuclear battlefield may beble under conditions of both active and nonac- the dispersion of forces. On the nucleartive nuclear war and major changes in tactics battlefield, greater dispersion between princiandtechniques are not required. The impact of pal elements or battalion-sized elements will benuclear weapons on the battlefield is considered required. The requirements for dispersion areto require, primarily, increased emphasis on not new to armor elements, and massing fordispersion and the armor protection and mobil- the attack or assault can be accomplished inity of armor units. The employment of armor space and time by reason of inherent armorunits in nuclear war will not vary significantly unit mobility.from that of the nonactive nuclear environment.Armor missions will remain essentially 17. Active Nuclear <strong>War</strong>fareunchanged and will continue the employment a. Employment of armor on the nuclearof armor units in wide envelopments or deep battlefield in the offense will be based primaripenetrationsto seize objectives.ly on the basic forms of maneuver: the pene-9

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