Second Year (1949-1950): Toward Economic Growth ... - PDF, 101 mb

Emergence of the Marshall Plan
have always wondered," remarked one, "if Mr.. Marshall expected the
reaction that his speech received. Bevin heard of it in bed and got in
touch with the Foreign Office immediately. It was astonishing the way
in which he, with his elephantine frame, sprang into action. It is most
important that Mr. Marshall's speech envisaged a self-help approach
-not aid to down-and-ouf nations." 9 "We now realize I1?-0re clearly
than then," stated another, "that the United States was going to have to
get the economies of the free world going before we could stand up to
Russia. This was a great political judgment. Mr. Bevin was very quick
off the mark in appreciating its significance; The joint result was really
a turning point in the context of what came afterward." 10
French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault also reacted decisively. On
June 13 he invited Bevin to discuss the proposal in Paris. The talks were
soon suspended in order that Molotov might be invited to attend.
On June 23 this invitation was accepted, and four days afteIward a Big
Three conference opened in Paris.
During the period of this session and other negotiations which followed;
American representatives-including Under-Secretary Clayton,
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and Henry Labouisse in Paris and Ambassador
Lewis Douglas in London-kept in close touch with the European
ministers and special delegates concerned and with the State
Department in Washington.
The deliberations with Molotov did not last long. The British and
French proposed a steering committee, composed of representatives of
the Big Three and other states, to coordinate the work of subcommittees
appointed to survey resources and develop the outlines of a European
recovery program. The Soviets contended that such a committee would
meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign nations; they presented a
counterproposal that the United States be asked to specify the exact
amount of help it was prepared to grant and that each country make
its own surveys and estimates. The British and French governments adhered
to their insistence upon a cooperative approach. When it became
clear that they could not be pried from this position, the Soviet delegation
withdrew.
The turning point in the conference was described later to Acheson.
9 "I heard later," said Acheson, "that Bevin was advised to make an inquiry to
the State Department to find out whether Marshall really meant what had been
said in the Harvard speech, but that. Bevin, who was very shrewd, didn't want to
take the chance and preferred to go on the assumption that the statement, as made,
.was fully intended." Interview cited. .
10 Sir Robert L. Hall, director, Economic Section, Cabinet Planning Office. Interview,
London, November 12, 1952.