ISSUE 125 : Jul/Aug - 1997 - Australian Defence Force Journal

4AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Later on he proposes that night and weekendtraining be curtailed as uneconomical and thatcollective training be at a “training centre”.Could someone please explain how this training isto be conducted on only two weeks of service eachyear? Two weeks is the best you can rely on in thecurrent civilian environment. What do the soldiers dofor the other 50 weeks in the year and how do theycomplete any individual specialist training? We havetried eliminating night training before. It’s verydifficult to retain soldiers without continuity ofcontact.2. Officers. How does the part-time Army obtainand retain its Lieutenants? The current patternwhich requires several weeks training each yearbefore commissioning will collect its recruitsfrom students and the unemployed. What happensthen to the officer’s development if the trainingtime is restricted to two weeks each year? Forhow long will the Lieutenant’s family toleratetaking recreation leave to boost training time?Captains and majors can be obtained by theexpedients of PSOs and enlisting former full-timeofficers. While there are exceptions, these twomethods are, in my experience, not conducive toquality or stability. Local experience suggests aconsiderable shortage of junior officers. We may getthem in but how long will they stay under theproposed training regime?I think we have to decide, although it seems tohave been decided already, between two strategies forthe part-time Army.(a) Try to make the quality of training of the parttimesoldier equal to that of the full-time soldier.or(b) Accept the fact that the performance standardscannot be the same with a part-time soldier andallow a catch-up period before being deemedready for action.I know there was a third strategy which had someof (a) and some of (b) (RRes and GRes) but we havejust discarded that as too expensive.The risks of these two appear to be that if youadopt (a) you may not get enough people and for (b)you may not reach the standard you want as thecatch-up time may not be available. (Kokodarevisited). It comes to a choice of quantity or quality.We used to go for the latter: now we are trying theformer. I hope we have considered some method ofmeasuring its success or failure.Any more ideas out there?Elvin SmithMajor11 Trg GpA Trap for the UnwaryDear Editor,On reading the article, “The Application of FalsePrinciples and the Misapplication of ValidPrinciples”, in your May/June edition, I wasdismayed to see elements of anti-American bias andattempts to denigrate air power. Indeed, the authorseems to have acted, in part, in accordance with hisopening quote: “Military history has been used andabused by academics and military professionals alikein their endeavours to either explain, support, promoteor refute military events, developments and theories.”As a first example of this, on the fourth page ofthe article, the following statement appears: “Thestrategic bombing campaign of the Second WorldWar had produced dubious results and questioned theeffectiveness of attacks on infrastructure targets.” Onthe fifth page a similar statement appears: “But thedoubts that had existed over the efficacy of theSecond World War bombing campaign were to beraised in both Korea and Vietnam.” Neither of thesestatements was attributed to a reference so,presumably, they are the author’s opinion. Suchattempts to deny the effectiveness of BomberCommand’s role in WWII have been around forsome years, but, can be shown to be based on somepeculiar anti-air power bias and not on facts. Some ofthe published facts, resulting from the efforts ofBomber Command, apart from the destruction offactories, etc., were as follows:• As a direct result of Bomber Command, theGermans were forced to employ some 1 000 000men to operate their air defence system and afurther 1 500 000 were involved in air raidprecautions work and repair of industrial facilities.These able-bodied men would otherwise havebeen available for the armed services.• There were some 30 000 anti-aircraft gunsdefending the Ruhr Valley, again absorbing manpowerand production capacity.• German bomber aircraft production was reducedfrom 60 per cent of their total aircraft productionin 1942, to under 8 per cent by late 1944. Thisresulted from the need to switch to production offighter aircraft (75 per cent of total production in1944) in order to try and counter the raidingBritish bombers and their USAF allies.• Nearly 50 000 sea mines were laid by BomberCommand which accounted for 40 per cent ofGerman shipping losses.• The number of coal trucks needed to supportGerman industry was assessed to be 55 000 butbombing reduced their number progressively to8 000 by 1945.

6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Instructions were issued by AA Group HQ thatowing to the strong possibility of air attack, allaircraft entering the Gun Defended Area and notgiving the Recognition Signal of the period wereto be engaged. More importantly however, adviceand instructions were issued to all AA gun sitesthat as some Hudsons had been captured, therewas that possibility of their use by the enemy, alsothat six Hudsons were on route from Timor toDarwin with refugees on board, that these aircraftmay not possess current recognition signals, butwould enter the GDA on a given bearing as ameans of establishment of identity. The aircraftwere identified by Fannie Bay gun site asHudsons, gave no Recognition Signal and theirapproach was well outside the prearrangedbearing to the GDA. The gun site at Fannie Bayhad every justification to engage, but fired tworounds ONLY at a short fuze setting and aswarning shots, whereupon Recognition Signalswere fired from the aircraft. No further roundswere fired by any AA guns. The officer in chargedoes, I believe, deserve every commendation forhis discreet action.5. Page 62 Col 1 Lines 9-13. “It was subsequentlylearnt, however, that the cause was due toincorrect setting of the fuzes laid down in tablesbased on the more temperate zones of Europe,with no adjustment for the tropical conditions.”Anti-Aircraft Units elsewhere were issued withclockwork fuzes No. 208, which required noadjustment for temperature or barometricvariations. The fuzes issued in Darwin werepowder burning No. 199 needing adjustment forconditions of the moment. Also, we ascertainedby way of a Fuze Factor Calibration Shoot thatthe basic Fuze Factor supplied for these Fuzeswas incorrect. Thereafter there were superiorresults. Furthermore, there was a total ban on theuse of ammunition for practice shoots. Had thisban not existed, I feel I am confident to say, thebasic fuze factor error would not only have beendetected prior to 19/2/42, but the gunnersthemselves would have had that much neededpractice in the use of live ammunition; anessential training requirement. It was not until thefirst raid on 19/2/42 the gunners had anyexperience with the use of live 3.7 inchammunition. European conditions to whichreference is made do not apply.Mr Justice Lowe in his first report on page 10stated “The evidence before me was all to theeffect that the anti-aircraft batteries operatedefficiently and that the personnel of the A.M.F.performed very credibly in their baptism of fire.Their earlier shooting seemed somewhat short ofthe planes at which they were firing, but later theirrange was better and the defence becameeffective.”6. Page 70 Col 2 Lines 46-49. “Mr Lowe then wenton to comment that; “On the night of the 19thlooting broke out… and (continued) thereafter…even to the time when the commission wassitting.”Assuming the above is from “Australia’s PearlHarbor” page 202 by Douglas Lockwood andfrom the Lowe first report – page 11, then omittedfrom the Lockwood quotation is the following;“in some of the business premises and sporadiclooting occurred.”Hence the actual quotation reads:“On the night of the 19th looting broke out insome of the business premises and sporadic lootingoccured even to the time the commission was sitting.”The above lessens considerably the implicationthat looting was widespread. If I may commentfurther on this subject, with Darwin coming undermilitary control on 21st February, the Town Majorwas appointed from whom I obtained permission toremove food, which would have been wasted and avast improvement on Bully Beef and Lima Beans. Agreat moral improver! Also approval was given forbatteries and battery chargers, which were needed toreplace those that were becoming unserviceable,supply from Army sources was unavailable. Beassured without these, the data transmission to gunsand the shell loading equipment would have becomeinoperable.I trust you accept the above as a correction ofsome points of facts in which I was involved, to aninteresting article that I was pleased to read.Dudley H. VoseLieutenant Colonel ED (RL)President14 Anti Aircraft Battery (Darwin)AssociationOlympic Memorabilia – Melbourne OlympicGames 1956Dear Editor,I am a Secondary Physical Education Teacher insuburban Melbourne and am currently compiling adisplay for students of memorabilia from theMelbourne Olympic Games in 1956 for exhibitionduring the Sydney Olympics in the year 2000.I understand that the Melbourne Olympics had asubstantial input from the Department of Defence in

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR1956. I am currently collecting memorabilia fromthese Olympics and would be pleased to hear fromany serving or retired members of the Departmentwho may be able to assist me in this endeavour.Matthew Squire15 Nelson RoadCamberwell Vic. 3124Ph: 03 9882 6165Dear Editor,Recently whilst reading the review of TorresStrait Force – Cape York, Thursday Island, Merauke,1942-45 (Reg A. Ball Author) in Australian DefenceForce Journal No. 123 Mar/Apr 1997, I discoveredan oversight that I believe requires clarification.The final paragraph of the review quite rightlyspoke of the “immense interest that the book will beto Torres Strait Islanders who today carry on thetradition in NORFORCE”.Without putting too fine a point on thegeographical impossibility of this contention, themajority of soldiers who carry on the traditionactually serve in 51 FNQR which, like NORFORCEand the Pilbara Regiment, is a Regional ForceSurveillance Unit (RFSU).Members of Charlie Company, The 51st BattalionFar North Queensland Regiment, proudly carry onthe traditions of all Torres Strait Islanders who haveserved in the Defence Force. From their CompanyHeadquarters located at Thursday Island, thesesoldiers, drawn from 11 different island communitiesin the Torres Strait, contribute a real-time presence inthe Torres Strait region.51 FNQR is an integral element of the defence ofNorthern Australia and members of the Unit regardthemselves as the “eyes and ears of the North”. Thisbook will be of immense interest to all Torres StraitIslanders who carry on the tradition across a varietyof individual units arms and services in the DefenceForce.A.J. EganCaptainAdjutant, 51 FNQR

The Spratly Islands: Potential Flashpoint for Conflictin the South China SeaBy Major M.J. Dugdale, RA Sigs.“The furtherest reaches of the South China Seastretch some 1800km from undisputed Chineseterritory on Hainan Island, and touch NatunaIsland (in the south of the South China Sea) heldby Indonesia. China moved south by stages,taking the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1974,then in the 1980s China extended its control intothe southerly Spratly group.” 1IntroductionThe appearance of the Spratly Islands belies theirstrategic and political importance. In thisarchipelago of tiny rocky outcrops in the South ChinaSea only 26 remain above water at the high tide markand none is capable of sustaining a permanentpopulation. The largest of the group is less than half asquare kilometre in area, yet the Spratly Islands areembroiled in a bitter territorial dispute, not for theoutcrops themselves but for their wealth of naturalresources to feed and fuel growing regionalpopulations and economies. China may be the mostrecognised claimant, espousing sovereignty of theentire archipelago, but the ASEAN states ofMalaysia, Philippines, Brunei and the recentlyadmitted member state of Vietnam to various extentslay claim to the islands and the surroundingcontinental shelf. In some respects, the Spratly Islandsdispute is an extension of other territorial disputesbetween the claimants and perpetuates long heldenmities and distrust. The nature of the claims, thestrategic location of the Spratlys and the open clashesof competing national interests means that the SpratlyIslands dispute is a potential flashpoint of conflict inthe South China Sea. It certainly has the potential togalvanise attitudes towards the regional balance ofpower and security.With the end of the Cold War there is little doubtthat China is the most important state in East andSouth East Asia. How China fares in the future, andhow it develops its relationships in the region willdominate the prospects for regional security, stabilityand prosperity. Its relationships with ASEAN will becentral to achieving recognition as a great globalpower and to this end China-ASEAN resolution ofthe Spratly Islands dispute will be fundamental toestablishing long-term political, economic andsecurity trends. The dispute can therefore be viewedas the distillation of simmering regional rivalries. Thisis particularly the case given that ASEAN is in manyrespects a grouping of states in name only; there is nohistorical precedent for a security alliance in theregion. The fractured internal policies of ASEANmirror the regional uncertainties about how to dealwith China. Whether the Spratly Islands dispute willbe resolved amicably or through conflict will set thetone for either future China-ASEAN cooperation orcompetition. This article will examine the SpratlyIslands dispute in the context of China’s relationswith ASEAN states. It will particularly look at theprospects for resolution given Vietnam’s recentadmission to ASEAN.Spratly Islands: Flashpoint of ConflictEast and South East Asia is a region of dramaticeconomic growth, in many cases concomitant withmodernisation of political and social systems.Sustainment of such rapid growth depends both oncontinued access to resources as well as the need todevelop mechanisms to resolve conflicts.Unfortunately the former is being pursuedassiduously while the latter has become almost anafterthought. Nowhere is this more evident than in theSpratly Islands dispute with military clashes,historical rivalries and arguable claims.The Spratly Islands are believed to hold vastreserves of oil and minerals, as well as significantfisheries resources all of which are vital to thesustainment of China’s burgeoning economy andsocial stability. Several states, including China,Vietnam and the Philippines, maintain a militarypresence in the archipelago and have attempted tooccupy some of the outcrops. These countries havealready proven willing to resort to military action toback territorial claims. The potential for furthermilitary action is strong, particularly given that rapid

12AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997territorial disputes, present challenges to ASEAN’sability to find a unity of effort, particularly given theinability of the non-Communist members to resolvedifferences prior to Vietnam’s membership. It may bethat the expansion of the forum to include differentideological approaches will force ASEAN toreconsider how it approaches intra and internationalrelations, and specifically how consensus decisionmaking is to be achieved. At the time of Vietnam’sadmittance, Singapore’s Foreign Minister warned that“an expanded ASEAN would face ongoingchallenges of remaining robust and united. All is notrosy. There are worrying trends and developments inthe Asia-Pacific region. The challenges ahead willtest our unity and diplomatic skills”. 6The “challenges of remaining robust and united”,especially when resolving territorial disputes andavoiding military conflict in the South China Sea, liefirstly in Vietnam having to adapt to the atmosphereof mutual trust, confidence and informality thatcharacterises ASEAN relations. Hanoi’s politicalsystem is still mistrusted by other ASEAN states, andit has no experience of bilateral or multilateralnegotiation outside the strictly centralised controlsand collective decision making of Communistideology. Reaching comfortable middle ground forintra-ASEAN negotiations will take time and effortby all parties. A foreign affairs analyst from Thailandhas stated that “there has been an underlyingapprehension among ASEAN members that Hanoiwill not be an easy partner to deal with considering itsdiplomatic history has been shaped by the need todeal with adversaries.” 7 This same analyst has alsostated an ASEAN concern that “Vietnam will not beable to understand or abide by the unwritten rules ofASEAN diplomacy and after its entry, posturing andbargaining will replace consultation and consensusbuilding as the predominant form of conductingintramural affairs.” 8 The future for Vietnam settlinginto ASEAN ways of doing business does not lookpromising. In the meantime, ASEAN will still lack acommon approach towards China, and Beijing willcontinue to progress its efforts to control the Spratly’sresources.Whilst Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippineshave a tendency to be suspicious of China, Singaporeand Thailand tend to be more sanguine. Overlayed onthis is now the more aggressive approach taken byVietnam. The legacy of mistrust between Vietnamand China includes serious military conflict over theParacel Islands, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in1979 in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia,and continual military and diplomatic sparringregarding the overlapping claims to the SpratlyIslands. Though there was some diplomatic thawingbetween the two nations after Vietnam acceded tointernational arbitration on the Cambodian issue,Vietnam has consistently maintained that its claim tothe entire Spratly archipelago and continental shelfhas precedence over China’s claims. As a member ofASEAN, Vietnam would expect that the otherASEAN states would at the least provide diplomaticsupport in resolving its conflicting claim with China.It is unlikely that either Singapore or Thailand wouldbe amenable to this. Vietnam may still find itselfisolated from its neighbours regarding its position onthe Spratly Islands dispute.ASEAN’s ApproachASEAN’s key issues of concern surroundingChina’s involvement in the dispute are its burgeoningmilitary capability and the ASEAN perception thatthis is aimed at destabilising the South China Sea, anarea that is clearly the confluence of strategicallyimportant trade routes between the Indian and PacificOceans. In addition, ASEAN’s future as a crediblefoundation for regional security is being tested and insome respects is being found wanting.ASEAN, and in particular the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF), is a recent and tentative organisationof states primarily designed to progress economic andsecurity issues for the prosperity of all members.However, ASEAN does not exist to determine thesecurity policies of its member states, nor canASEAN prevent its members dealing with Chinaoutside ASEAN’s policies. There is also the addeddifficulty that ASEAN does not want to antagoniseChina, particularly with large ethnic Chinesepopulations in some of its member states such asMalaysia and Singapore, so refrains from openlyvoicing security fears regarding Beijing’s actions inthe South China Sea. Since the members of ASEANare so far from reaching consensus on the level andnature of threat from China it is not surprising thatASEAN’s responses to China’s actions have beenfragmented and usually not timely.Though China and the ASEAN claimants pursuedbilateral approaches to resolving the disputethroughout most of the 1980s, the end of the ColdWar and particularly the reduction of the US presencein the region has forced the ASEAN states to movetoward multilateral discussions. These states haverecognised that “if they do not hang together, theywill certainly hang separately”. 9 ASEAN has come torecognise the necessity of a multilateral policy inorder to avoid destabilising regional relations. Thisview is pitted against China’s insistence on bilateralresolution with other claimants, both to ensure its

THE SPRATLY ISLANDS: POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT FOR CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 13greater bargaining power and to prevent the growth ofASEAN, especially the ARF, as a regional powerbloc. Any success by ASEAN in achieving a unifiedfront in a negotiated settlement with China will be thelong-awaited precedent that establishes ASEAN as aforce to be reckoned with in representing South EastAsian interests, and a legitimate counterbalance toChina’s growing regional power. This is clearly not inChina’s interests.The Spratly Islands dispute can be viewed as thetest case which determines the viability of ASEANand the ARF as effective and influential organisations.Already there are signs that the ASEANstates are unable to present China with a united front.The various claimants are unable to negotiate anASEAN approach, and in the wake of its militaryclashes with China the Philippines, probably theweakest ASEAN member claiming the Spratlys, hasentered into a bilateral agreement with China forexploitation of the Spratly’s resources. Though itcannot be said that Manila has abandoned ASEAN’spreferred multilateral approach, it clearly sees thatshort-term stability of relations with China dependson reaching a bilateral consensus. This tends to playinto China’s hands, ensuring a bilateral approach isestablished as the precedent, reinforcing a sense oflegitimacy to China’s sovereignty claims, and placingChina firmly in a position of strength to dictate theconditions of any future negotiations. ASEAN stateswill have to work harder to overcome internaldifferences regarding the perceived level of threatposed by China and to establish a defensible principlefor ASEAN regarding sovereignty of the Spratlys thatcan stand up to multilateral discussions with China.Bilateral economic engagement, while anchoringChina’s economic and diplomatic developmentfirmly in the region, will not of itself resolve this longsimmering dispute where China feels morallyjustified to pursue territorial claims and control ofresources.For China, the entry of Vietnam into ASEANmay present unexpected rewards in that ASEAN’sability to resolve its internal claims for the Spratlyswill be further complicated by Vietnam’s extensiveclaims to the area, opening the door for China to pushmore strongly for bilateral discussions with ASEANstates. Though Vietnam has openly acknowledgedthat other ASEAN states have claims to the territory,a concession that China has refused to make, Vietnamwill not easily acquiesce to other ASEAN claimants,particularly given the depth of its rivalry with China.Vietnam’s admission that other claimants may belegitimate may open the door for a joint ASEANstrategy, but the prospects of a multilateral ASEANpolicy remain remote since Vietnam continues topursue its competing territorial claims with China.Clearly, China will retain the diplomatic upper-handtowards controlling the Spratlys for the short-tomedium-term while ASEAN seeks to resolve thetangle of conflicting internal approaches to achieve acohesive policy.There have been numerous discussions betweenthe claimants, the most recent having been sponsoredby Indonesia in 1994-95. Though a non-claimant tothe Spratly Islands, Indonesia has a growing concernabout the extent of China’s interests in the SouthChina Sea, especially given Beijing’s reluctance toclarify the extent of its claims in the rich gas fields ofthe Naturna Islands controlled by Indonesia. Anintense round of diplomatic discussions followingChina’s move against the Philippines in 1995succeeded in eliciting reluctant agreement by Chinato support peaceful solutions, and this at least forcesChina to review its propensity to use military force inthe area.Future China-ASEAN RelationsThough a number of ASEAN states lay claim tothe islands it is unclear whether any one of them hasthe capacity to exploit the resources withoutassistance. Additionally, there is the very realpossibility that an ongoing dispute, particularly amilitary confrontation, will so destabilise the regionthat the disruptions to trade, investments anddiplomatic relations would outweigh the economicbenefits to be gained by unilateral control of theislands’ resources. A multilateral resolution, withpossibly joint development of the resource potential,may be the only realistic approach. This has certainlybeen identified by ASEAN and is not beyond therealms of possibility for China.Any military solution that sees China dominatethe South China Sea will have grave economicconsequences not only for ASEAN but also for statessuch as US, Japan and the Koreas. It would inevitablywiden the dispute to include all nations that rely onfree passage of trade through the area. The backlashto China politically, economically and militarilywould be formidable, causing setbacks to China’sdevelopment that may take generations to overcome.The effect on China’s social conditions and domesticunrest, already a profound problem for Beijing and itsmilitary, would be substantial serving only to speedregression toward political and social anarchy. Thelong-term effects on Beijing’s relationship withASEAN would be significant with two possibleresponses by ASEAN states: a unified ASEAN couldbecome truly representative as a regional power bloc,

14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997unlikely to accommodate any moves by China fordevelopment and expansion in the future, or ASEANmay split into pro-China and anti-China states,effectively negating ASEAN as a meaningful playerin regional security and stability. It is not clear whichof these eventualities is the more probable.Consequently, a unilateral military solution fromChina is unlikely. This does not however negate theprospects of future small scale military clashes, as theproximity of weapons platforms will inevitably raisetensions and precipitate local clashes.ConclusionThe strategic importance and abundant resourcesof the Spratly Islands archipelago make it one of themost sought after, and fought over, territories in Asia.The desire of countries such as China and Vietnam tocontrol the entire island group will only continue togrow in order to sustain expanding economies andpopulations. It can therefore be expected that theSpratlys will remain central to determining thestrategic balance of power in Asia.The resolution of the Spratlys dispute will be thebarometer against which regional relations will bemeasured in the future. Though economicengagement of China is one means to ensure thedependence of China on regional stability, it willrequire more than this to defuse simmering tensionsand prevent the involvement of other regional orwestern powers. The intransigence of China indealing in other than bilateral discussions with otherclaimants, together with the inability of ASEAN toresolve internal wrangling to develop an ASEAN“national interest” may mean that any peacefulsolution to the dispute can only be resolved throughbilateral negotiations. This has taken on addedvalidity following the recent admission of Vietnam toASEAN and the further complications this introducesto resolving an agreed ASEAN way ahead. In thelong-term, Vietnam’s more assertive approach toterritorial disputes with China, together with itsdifferent political structure, may force ASEAN toreview its approach to regional security andcooperation. In short, ASEAN may develop thepolitical will to take on a true regional security role.The proximity of opposing forces in the Spratlygroup and the recent history of military clashes raisesquestions about whether negotiations can beconducted free of further clashes. Though Indonesiansponsorship of discussions has created severalopportunities to progress the situation, confidence thatresolution can be reached has been hampered byChina’s unwillingness to match its actions to itswords. It remains to be seen whether the most recentChinese agreements to resist the use of force in thearea and pursue discussions with ASEAN will behonoured.From a purely military perspective the Spratlysare indeed a potential flashpoint for conflict in theSouth China Sea. The strengthening ties that bindChina regionally and globally may negate militaryposturing and force all claimants to pursue resolutionthrough economic, diplomatic and securityengagement rather than confrontation. To dootherwise would likely result in economic anddiplomatic disaster for the protagonists, yet thereremains a strong possibility that reason will notprevail and that at least localised military clashes willcontinue.NOTES1. Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China” inInternational Security, Vol 20 No 4, Spring 1996. p.117.2. ibid., p.117.3. A. James Gregor, “China, the United States, and SecurityPolicy in East Asia”, in Parameters: US Army War CollegeQuarterly, Vol XXVI No 2, Summer 1996. p.97.4. Colin MacKerras (Ed), Eastern Asia, Second Edition, LongmanAustralia, Sydney, 1995, p.578. During the 1985-92 period therise in regional defence spending was 12.6% for China, 28.5%for Japan, 22.4% for North Korea, 63.5% for South Korea,31.2% for Malaysia, 36.2% for Singapore, 29.9% for Taiwan,and 27.6% for Thailand.5. Segal, op cit., p.116.6. Dr Frank Frost, Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: Issues andImplications, Parliamentary Research Service, Current IssuesBrief No 3 1995-96. p.5.7. ibid., p.11.8. ibid., p.11.9. Segal, op cit., p.115.BIBLIOGRAPHYBooksBroinowski Alison (Ed), ASEAN into the 1990s, MacMillan PressLtd, Hong Kong, 1990.Dobbs-Higginson, M.S., Asia-Pacific - Its Role in the New WorldDisorder, William Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 1993.Dibb, Paul, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, AdelphiPaper 295, The International Institute for Strategic Studies,Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.Frost, Dr Frank, Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: Issues andImplications, Parliamentary Research Service, Current IssuesBrief No 3 1995-96.MacKerras, Colin (Ed), Eastern Asia, Longman, Sydney, 1995.McInnes, C. and Rolls, M.G., Post Cold War Security Issues in theAsia Pacific, Frank Cass, Ilford, 1994.Malik, J.M. (Ed), Asian Defence Policies: Regional Conflicts andSecurity Issues Book Two, Deakin University, Geelong, 1994.Miller, T.B. and Walter, James (Eds), Asian Pacific Security Afterthe Cold War, Allen and Unwin, Canberra, 1993.Neher, Clark D., Southeast Asia in the New International Era,Westview Press, Oxford, 1991.

THE SPRATLY ISLANDS: POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT FOR CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA15SarDesai, D.R., Southeast Asia: Past and Present, Westview Press,San Francisco, 1994.Shambaugh, David (Ed), Studies on Contemporary China,Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford, 1995.ArticlesMelanie Beresford and Bruce McFarlane, “Regional Inequity andRegionalism in Vietnam and China” in Journal ofContemporary Asia, Vol 25, No 1, 1995.Zara Dian, “Vietnam in ASEAN” in Asian Defence Journal, Vol8/95, 1995.M.G. Gallagher, “China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea”in International Security, Vol 19 No 1, Summer 1994.A. James Gregor, “China, the United States, and Security Policy inEast Asia” in Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly,Vol XXVI No 2, Summer 1996.Ann M. Morrison, “No Easy Highway - Vietnam Gets Ready toJoin ASEAN” in Asiaweek, July 1995.George Segal, “East Asia and the Constainment of China” inInternational Security, Vol 20 No 4, Spring 1996.E.D. Smith, “China’s Aspirations in the Spratly Islands” inContemporary South East Asia, Vol 16 No 3, December 1994.“Vietnam Joins ASEAN” in International Institute for StrategicStudies, Strategic Comment No 5, June 1995.Reference BooksAsian Survey, Vol XXXVI No 2, February 1996.Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1996, A Review of the Eventsof 1995.Far Eastern Economic Review: Asia 1995, A Review of the Eventsof 1994.Major Dugdale graduated from WRAAC in 1982. She has held a variety of corps and non-corps postings including HQADF, OS 73Electronic Warfare Squadron, 7 Signal Regiment EW, project Manager in Materiel Division, Army, instructor at the School of Signalsand Contingent Commander, Exercise Long Look. Major Dugdale complemented Army Command at Staff College in 1992 and iscurrently studying for a Masters of Defence Studies and International Relations through the Deakin University.

16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Trainee with the UNTAC Mine Clearance Team. Photo by Major Andre Obradovic

Demining Operations – Pandora’s Box or Treasure Chest?By Major D.J. McGuire, RAE“On the evening of assuming the position ofSupreme Allied Commander South East Asia Ireturned to my quarters... drew a sheet of paperand began to write down all the things I wouldhave to do. After some thought I wrote “M” fourtimes on the sheet of paper. When laterquestioned by Churchill as to their significance Iexplained – morale, malaria, monsoon andmovement; when I address these issues then wecan achieve victory in South East Asia.”Lord Louis Mountbatten, August 1943IntroductionLord Mountbatten’s appreciation of the problemsfaced by forces in South East (SE) Asia is assalient today as it was in 1943. Only one “M” need beadded to his notes to modernise the appreciation, thatbeing for mines. Current estimates indicate that morethan 100 million landmines have been laid worldwide across 60 countries – at least 20 million of theseare laid in SE Asia stretching through Laos, Burma,Cambodia and Vietnam (Blagden, Kuwait MineClearing after Iraqi Invasion, US Army Quarterly &Defence Journal,1996, p.11).Landmines are unique among weapons in thatthey are both cheap to produce and almostindefinitely lethal. It is estimated that over 250million landmines have been produced over the past25 years. Main producers have been China, Italy, theUnited States and the former Soviet Union. ManyAsian countries have, through necessity, copied thesemines and produced their own lethal arsenal, furtherexacerbating the problem (ibid., p.12). Recentmoratoriums on the subject have lead many countriesto limit or ban the export and, in some cases, the useof anti-personnel mines. While positive, it fails toremove the current legacy or address the operationalrequirements that armed forces have for such devices.Many commanders consider the use of militaryforces for the clearance of landmines, outside anoperational environment, to be inappropriate. This isbecause it is deemed to have negligible applicabilityto the training of combat troops. The aim of thisarticle is to give some background to the scope of thelandmine problem and highlight some importantlessons to be learned from demining operations.Finally, it will examine some of the benefits to begained through Australian military involvement insuch operations.The Scope of the ProblemLandmines are cheap to produce and quick to lay.Estimates put that the cost of clearing a minefield is atleast 100 times that of laying it using currenttechnology. These figures are for mine clearanceoperations rather than tactical breaching operations 1 .In addition the work is dangerous, painfully slow andpersonnel intensive. For example, the number ofdeminers killed in Kuwait since the Gulf War isgreater than the total of US soldiers killed duringDesert Storm (ibid., p.12). Exasperating the problemis that every country’s mine problem is seen asunique. Many of the underlying lessons to be learntmay be applied in almost every mined area but it isfirst necessary to understand some of the differencesbetween theatres of operation.The Post Desert StormExperienceUnlike the tropics, the troops operating in Kuwaitafter Operation Desert Stormhad a dry and dusty heatto contend with when faced with clearing thehundreds of thousands of mines that ringed Kuwaitcity. The task was aggravated by an enormousamount of unexploded ordinance (UXO) that litteredthe battlefield and increased notably the threat todeminers. Further complicating factors includeddense, often toxic smoke from burning oil wells,moving sands that covered perimeter fences andmoved mines, and dust storms that often startedwithout warning causing an immediate halt tooperations.Most of the post-war clearance operations werecontracted to civilian companies like CommercialMunitions Systems International (CMSI). CMSI had,by August 1994, cleared more than 338 000 mines,millions of pieces of fragmentation and severalhundred tons of UXO (Chirio, Lessons LearntDemining Kuwait, US Engineer Magazine No.23,1994, p.25). Other companies, such as RoyalOrdnance plc, mirror these figures. The Allied Forces

18AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997cleared an estimated 200 000 mines before handingover responsibility.The minefields laid in Kuwait were generallymixed and contained a proportion of blast andbounding fragmentation mines. A high number wereburied (approximately 55 per cent) and most largeminefields were fenced in a similar manner towestern doctrine.Cambodia and SE AsiaM, M, M, M, M – monsoons, malaria, morale,movement, and mines. These key considerations arecomprehensive and accurate. The wet and humidclimate of the SE Asian region creates equally asmany problems for demining operations as do thesandy deserts of the Middle East. As with Kuwait, inmost cases mined areas are littered withfragmentation and UXO. Though moving sands arenot a consideration, monsoonal flooding createssimilar problems for demining operations. UnlikeKuwait, most minefields in SE Asia are not markedor recorded. This creates an invisible threat that bothmentally and physically retards the country’sdevelopment.Mines in Cambodia are generally older generationmines compared to those in the Middle East and 96per cent are anti-personnel mines. A high proportionof mines were originally surface laid, though jungleregrowth and humus from the vegetation has rapidlycovered these. Metal mines like the POM/Z are oftenbadly corroded and highly unstable while the plasticPMN range and 72 A/B range withstand the moistconditions much better (CMAC Brief, 1996).Cambodia still has in excess of 8 million minescovering an area of 3 billion square metres (CMACStatistical Data, 1996). Clearance operations areprioritised such that useable land is cleared first.Many mines are laid in remote areas of the countryand are of little threat to the majority of thepopulation. On current clearance rates, it is expectedthat 80 per cent of the arable land will be cleared bythe year 2010.AfghanistanYears of war against the former Soviet Union leftAfghanistan with a dangerous legacy of mines andUXO. Unlike SE Asia, deminers in Afghanistan arefaced with a mixture of low and high technologymines. High technology mines detonate with changesin magnetic field, vibration and other triggers, as wellas pressure, and are fitted with anti-handling devicesthat greatly increase the threat to deminers.Many of these landmines were laid in and aroundvillages and were often buried under rubble duringbattles and new mines laid on top. Many villages havemultiple minefields laid on top of one another – aperplexing problem for clearance teams (Van Ree,Presentation on Lessons from Demining Afghanistan,1996).The harsh climate bakes the clay soils in summerand freezes then in winter making normal proddingimpossible. Instead, all indications must be excavatedto determine their nature. When over 99 per cent ofindications given by the detectors are only metalfragments, it is obvious that much time is wasted.Deminers cannot ignore an indication as the risks andvariables are too high.Other NationsDemining operations are also being conducted inSomalia, Angola, Mozambique, and throughoutAfrica and South America. British Forces have, inmost cases, fenced off minefields in the FalklandIslands as the benefits of clearance do not warrant therisk or cost involved. Each country presents thedeminer with unique climatic and geographicaldemands that, on the surface, appear to bear noresemblance to other countries with mine threats. Amore holistic examination of the problem indicatesthat most clearance operations have similardifficulties, and that lessons learnt from one operationare applicable, at least in part, to others.Lessons LearntThe following lessons learnt from deminingoperations are born out of necessity (and Engineer“ingenuity”). Many lessons are learned in isolationand, in some cases, this is the first time they arediscussed in a general demining article. Many lessonsare applicable to the Army and the ADF in general,though these would not be passed on except for theAustralian Army’s ongoing involvement inhumanitarian demining operations.Mine DogsThe use of dogs in warfare is an age-old traditiondating back to the Assyrians and Germanic hordes ofEurope (Maclean, Warfare in the Ancient World,1984, p. 21). As recently as Vietnam, dogs were usedas trackers and detectors of mines and explosiveordinance stashes. Their use has diminished greatly inAustralia in recent years and the focus of existing dogteams in the Army has moved away from purelymilitary tasks to more “High Risk Search” relatedtasks.

DEMINING OPERATIONS – PANDORA’S BOX OR TREASURE CHEST?19A marked minefield in CambodiaRecently, deminers in Afghanistan have“rediscovered” this valuable asset and have hadoutstanding success in using specially bred dogs todetect minefield perimeters and to aid in the clearanceof routes and minefields by indicating the location ofburied mines. Their success has been impressive, withdogs being able to detect some mines to a one metredepth and UXO up to three metres depth (Van Ree,et.al., 1996).Many countries have religious and social taboosagainst dogs. Demining Technical Advisers havesuccessfully overcome these barriers bydemonstrating the skill of the dogs, their versatilityand by emphasising the reduced risk to the deminersas a result of using dogs.Dogs are not without their fair share of problemsand the following is by no means an exhaustive list ofthese:• Training. A mine dog can take up to 12 monthsto train and can be found unacceptable during latestages of training.• Fatigue. Extreme weather conditions and windscan greatly reduce the effectiveness of the dogscausing fatigue and confusion.• Disease. Most areas of operation are in thirdworld countries with poor medical facilities andlow hygiene standards. Ticks, lice, ulcers andinfections can severely affect dogs, especially intropical environments.• Scent. Heavy leaching of the soil during the wetseason potentially reduces the scent signature ofexplosives over time making mines harder todetect. The opposite appears to be the case inAfghanistan and other middle eastern countrieswhere rainfall is less, hence the greatereffectiveness of dogs in those areas.Regardless of these and other difficulties the highproductivity of dogs (up to 100 times more efficientthan hand demining under ideal conditions), has leadmost countries affected by mines to establish pilotprograms to gauge the suitability of dogs in that area.The military benefit of mine dogs is slowly being reexaminedas their use in the detection of minefield

20AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997perimeters and route clearance is demonstrated indemining operations worldwide.The potential to combine dogs with mechanicalclearance techniques is also being examined and, ifsuccessful, will greatly reduce the cost and risk ofclearance along routes and in open terrain.Tripwires and Anti-handling DevicesThe task of clearance is complicated by the use oftripwires and anti-handling devices being used astriggering devices for, or in conjunction with, mines.The obvious problem is the threat of detonating amine metres from where it is laid before it can bedetected. This is a major problem in SE Asia wherejungle regrowth rapidly covers old minefields anddisguises tripwires. For this reason the search fortripwires is the first drill of any demining team. Onlyafter the area is checked for tripwires will vegetationbe cleared to allow a detector search and proddingwhere necessary.As safety is of paramount importance duringdemining operations, mines are generally blown insitu to minimise the threat of anti-handling devices.Generally a partial excavation of mines is necessaryso a destructive charge can be placed near the mine.This is not a major problem in Cambodia though thehard-baked soils of Afghanistan and Mozambiqueoften make this task more dangerous.The burning of vegetation to uncover tripwiresand surface laid mines does not appear to greatlyeffect mines in Afghanistan (ibid.), as the vegetationis limited and the heat build up is negligible. In partsof SE Asia the dense vegetation greatly increases theheat generated when burning off. Anti-personnelmines like the PMN-2 and the 72A/B often partiallymelted during burn-off operations and this has thepotential to increase the sensitivity of the mines.Clearance TechniquesAll international recognised demining operationsnow have centralised training facilities, though insome cases primitive, to train deminers, ExplosiveOrdinance Disposal Teams, Mine Awareness Teamsand intelligence gathering and minefield markingteams (Johnson, The Lethal Legacy of Landmines,1994, p.38). These schools give the teams theconsistency in training that is vital for safe deminingoperations. Most demining teams are trained andoperate in two-man teams with a safety observer whomonitors between one and four teams at a time.Unlike Australian military doctrine, the primarymeans of detection is by mine detector and notprodding. The sequence of work is generally asfollows:• Tripwire Detection. A deminer will moveforward to the mine perimeter and check a onesquare metre area in his lane for tripwires and anysurface laid mines. Any excess vegetation is thencleared and removed to allow the area to be sweptwith a detector.• Mine Sweeper. The mine sweeper movesforward and sweeps the area. Any indication willbe marked before he retires.• Prodder. Any indications are then prodded by thesecond member of the team until the source islocated. Prodding is preferably done in the proneposition though environmental hazards andreligious considerations sometimes dictate that asquatting position is used.• Destruction. The placement of charges isgenerally the responsibility of the site supervisorand is done during a break in operations when theminefield is evacuated.Once established, mine teams do not generallychange members or alter their rotation sequenceunless absolutely necessary. This procedure enablesthe teams to establish strong working relationshipsand bonds between members. Generally, a deminerwill work for a maximum of 30 minutes beforerotating with his partner (Chirio, et.al., p. 27).Another key element of any site is the medicalsupport team, usually involving a medical assistanttrained in trauma injuries and an ambulance (often acrudely converted 4x4 vehicle). The presence of thissupport and a clear casualty evacuation plan isessential for morale among the deminers andtechnical advisers. In Cambodia the medical staff aretrained by US Special Forces Patrol Medics and arehighly proficient in their duties.It must be emphasised that these techniques havebeen developed for demining operations where thereis a low or non-existent operational threat. CurrentMLW Pamphlets are the reference for operationalmine breaching and clearance.Laterite Soils and FragmentationFor obvious reasons, humanitarian deminingoperations demand 100 per cent clearance of allmines before an area is declared clear. One incidentafter an area has been declared “clear” will destroythe locals trust in the demining teams and necessarysupport will not be forthcoming.These exacting standards are made even moredifficult by laterite soil and fragmentation. Lateritesoils are high in hydrated iron ores and are formedunder special climatic conditions in tropical regions,such as Cambodia. These iron rich soils confuse minedetectors and make the use of them impossible. These

DEMINING OPERATIONS – PANDORA’S BOX OR TREASURE CHEST? 21soils are by nature very dense and highly compactedmaking prodding difficult (Dictionary of Geology,1979). This dramatically slows output and makesclearance very difficult.When clearing an area all indications by the minedetector must, by necessity, be treated as mines untilproven otherwise. As many minefields occur on andaround old battlefields the ground is often litteredwith metal fragmentation. The extent of this problemis best demonstrated by examining clearance statisticsfor a Demining Unit in Cambodia for 1996 (SeeTable 1).As can be seen, thousands of pieces offragmentation are recovered for every one mine.As a direct result of Australian militaryinvolvement in demining operations Defence Scienceand Technology Organisation (DSTO), aided byother Australian companies, is developing companionsystems to complement the standard detectors andeliminate these problems. The benefits of suchsystems would extend to operational activities as wellas humanitarian demining activities. The primarysystem involves the use of Ultra Wide Band (UWB)radar technology to detect low-metallic content mineswith reduced probability of false detection due tofragmentation and laterite deposits. An effectivehand-held system is likely to combine a GroundProbing Radar (GPR) with a metal detector. An initialversion of such a system could be a cheap, lightweightGPR attachment for current mine detectors.This work is also being extended to cover close-invehicle-mounted systems for road clearance (Chant &Rye, Overview of Current Radar Land MineDetection Research – DSTO, 1996, p.1). Theprospects both economically and militarily of thesedevelopments are very promising. Suchdevelopments are greatly assisted by Defence’songoing involvement with demining operations suchas Cambodia.This is further enhanced by another Australiancompany, “MINELAB”, which has developed aground tracking system which substantially reducesthe ground noise interference caused by iron oxidemineralisation. This advance has given their detectora notable advantage over current military detectors. Ifthis technology is combined with the developmentsmade by DSTO then the benefits to mine clearanceoperations worldwide would be enormous.Effectively, the detector operator will both see andhear the indication and will be able to quickly assessif it is a mine or harmless fragmentation.Mechanical ClearanceAll major demining operations have, at somestage, investigated the use of mechanical clearancedevices. The success of these devices has generallyfallen short of the expectations of the deminingorganisations. In Cambodia, dense regrowth overmany mined areas makes going for vehiclesimpossible. The clearance of this could be done usingdozers and chains though a real risk of detonatingmines exists. Environmental restrictions also prohibitthe use of these techniques. Rollers attached toT54/55 tanks were originally trialed on routeclearance though the tanks proved to be too unreliableand did not achieve the 100 per cent clearancerequired.Trials conducted in Afghanistan found thatmechanical clearance cost approximately $2.25 (US)per square metre compared to 20c for hand clearance.This combined with ongoing maintenance problemsand repair after mine detonations meant that the trialswere deemed a failure. Armoured tractors are beingused to excavate deeply buried mines in and aroundvillages with much success (Van Reed, et.al.).Table 1. Demining Statistics - Demining Unit 1 Kampot Province 1996MONTH SQUARE MTRS A/PERS A/TANK UXO FRAGMENTATIONCLEARED MINES MINES (PIECES)January 289,658 145 4 53 153,000February 305,750 103 0 27 102,531March 447,422 188 2 38 202,100April 384,251 87 0 32 68,175May 330,203 122 0 141 222,165June 178,250* 78 0 63 183,102*Commenced Clearance in an area with high laterite concentration.

DEMINING OPERATIONS – PANDORA’S BOX OR TREASURE CHEST?23to a real threat. Other benefits can be grouped underheadings such as training, cultural and diplomatic.ThreatThe training environment can only expose asoldier to a limited threat due to the OccupationalHealth and Safety issues imposed on the DefenceForce. While such restrictions are necessary they dolimit the realism of training. Such restrictions are lessapparent in an operational environment and there is,in some cases, no control over the threats that exist.The threat is real and puts new pressures on teamsand individuals. These pressures often exposepersonal characteristics that would not be seen in atraining environment. Generally, individuals returnfrom such deployments wiser and with a newperspective on unit training strengths and weaknesses.They also have a better understanding of their ownlimits and strengths which can only assist theirpersonal development.TrainingOverseas deployments give participants theopportunity to evaluate their training “first-hand” andto make recommendations for its development ontheir return. Further, the deployment itself should beviewed as a training and educational experience.Participants are exposed to other armed forces, theirequipment and tactics. They are forced to live inculturally and religiously diverse countries and eatfood that is often different to their normal diet.Basically, they are taken outside their “comfortzone”! Lessons learnt in this atmosphere remain withthe soldier and can be applied again and again intraining.Tactical and strategic training is frequentlyutilised by technical advisers on demining operationsas they are called upon to formulate plans andbudgets at all levels. Further, they are required toteach the indigenous staff these skills to ensure thelong-term viability of these operations. The feasibilityand practicality of our doctrine can be assessed in a“real life” operational environment and the lessonslearnt may be applied within the ADF whereapplicable.These deployments provide an ideal opportunityfor Army trainers to get realistic feedback on coursesand the Army Training System from staff overseasand to examine training techniques used in foreigncountries. This aspect is under utilised and could beexamined further.Culture and DiplomacyIt has been often said that Australian soldiers lackany culture or diplomacy. It would be more correct tosay that Australian service personnel have a uniquebrand of humour and culture that adopts well toadversity and thrives on challenge. The reputation ofAustralian technical advisers worldwide supports thisview and is a compliment to the ADF and ourheritage. Most Australian soldiers develop, after sometime, a cultural tolerance and understanding and arerespected accordingly by the indigenous populations.Past experience shows that the efforts of Australiansoldiers overseas has improved Australia’s diplomaticstanding in the world forum. Continued involvementin humanitarian and operational deployments shouldonly enhance this reputation.ConclusionDemining operations at present are bothdangerous and expensive, yet experts are short onsuggested methods to overcome this. Some treaties toban the future manufacture of mines have beensigned, or are in draft, but there is no easy answer tothe problem of clearing existing mines. Vehicles withflails, rollers and other refinements exist but these aretoo few, too costly and too limited in theirapplication. There is still no economic substitute for aperson with a prodding rod, though ongoingdevelopments in mine detector and mechanicalclearance device technology offers great hope for thefuture.Australian military involvement has encouragedDSTO and companies such as MINELAB to applytheir combined expertise to overcoming the problemsfaced by deminers. These developments arerevolutionary and will bring Australian industryacclaim and financial rewards. Of course, AustralianArmy Engineers can greatly benefit from theknowledge and technological advancements of thesecompanies. This, combined with the knowledgegained from working with other armed forces in anoperational setting, further emphasises the benefits ofsuch deployments.The involvement of Australian service personnelin demining operations has brought the ADFenormous international recognition and appreciation.Aside from the humanitarian and public relationsbenefits, there are considerable lessons to be learntthat apply to the peace and wartime operations of theADF. Further, these operations provide the DefenceForce with an ideal forum in which to evaluatetraining in a “real threat” environment and to developthe skills and knowledge of the service personnel thatparticipate in them.

24AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Such deployments are not without costs andcomplications but the benefits gained far outweighany conceivable cost. The growing pool of veterans isa yet untapped font of valuable knowledge thatshould be utilised widely by units and traininginstitutions. “The failure to learn from experience isas heinous a crime as any; and is one that may cost,not only your life, but the lives of your men… suchfools should be publicly whipped and disgraced forsuch is the severity of their ignorance.” (CAPTRichard Sharpe, 95th Rifles, after the siege ofBadajoz, Spain, 1812).NOTES1. The use of the word demining has become part of engineervocabulary. Without a clear understanding of the terms,confusion will continue.Here is a proposed simple set of definitions:• Breaching. Neutralisation of mines in a limited area tosupport momentum of offensive combat.• Clearing. Removal of mines before cessation of hostilitiesfor military and tactical purposes.• Demining. Removal of mines over large areas after thecessation of hostilities. This term seems appropriate to marka difference between combat clearance and clearance oncessation of major hostilities.• Explosive Ordinance Disposal. Removal of UXO andperformance of other related tasks by soldiers formallytrained and certified in explosive ordinance disposal skills.2. Complaints on housing, pay and welfare have been made bya number of members of the last three contigents toCambodia and selected members interviewed from otherdemining deployments. In all cases the author was assuredthat these complaints have been made formally to theagencies concerned. The nature of these complaints havebeen treated in confidence but are all severe enough to affectmorale of contignent members and their families.BIBLIOGRAPHYBlagden, Brigadier P.M. Kuwait: "Mine Clearing After IraqiInvasion", UK Army Quarterly & Defence Journal Volume126, No. 1, January 1996.Chant I.J. & Rye, A.R. Overview of Current Radar Land MineResearch at the DSTO, Salisbury, SA, 1996.Chirio, Captain L.M., Lessons Learnt Demining Kuwait, USEngineer Magazine, Volume 25, August 1994.Cornwell, B., Sharpes Company, Harper/ Collins, UK, 1982.Davies, P., War of the Mines, Dah Hua Press, Hong Kong,1994.Hough, R., Mountbatten – Hero of Our Time, Pan Books, UK,1980.Johnson, Colonel R.H., (US Army Retired), The Lethal Legacyof Land Mines, US Army Magazine, Volume 44, No. 1,January 1994.Prior, M., Shooting at the Moon, National Capital Printing,ACT, 1994.Wary, J., Warfare in the Classical World, SalamandaPublishing, UK, 1980.Statistical Data & Brief from the Cambodian Mine ActionCentre, 1996.INTERVIEWS1. Contingent Members – ASC 3,4, and 5 – Cambodia.2. Mr B. Van Ree, Demining Technical Adviser and RegionalManager – Afghanistan.3. Major G. Membray, SO2 Development, Directorate ofEngineers.Major McGuire graduated to the RAE from RMC Duntroon in December 1986 after completing a Bachelor of Arts Degree in theFaculty of Military Studies. He has since completed a Graduate Diploma in Industrial Relation through the University of Canberra.He has had a wide range of regimental postings, the most recent being as a Technical Adviser to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre.Major McGuire is currently the Officer Commanding Support Wing at the School of Military Engineering. This is Major McGuire’ssecond article to be published in the Australian Defence Force Journal.

Soldiers Bearing GiftsBy Stephen TullyThe legal aspects of armed escorts for theprotection of humanitarian convoys is amaelstrom of international legal themes. This articleis confined to an examination of the range of actionpermitted within a state of war and evaluated underthe four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977Additional Protocols 1 .Part A of the article will present a typology of thediffering “species” of armed escorts and the materialcommonly transported in humanitarian convoys. Thefour varieties may be delineated as:i) unilateral State-initiated convoys;ii) United Nations (UN) measures, for examplepeacekeeping forces used in conjunction withconvoys of assistance under the auspices of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR);iii) convoys initiated by the International Committeeof the Red Cross (ICRC); andiv) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whocommonly employ locally-hired personnel.Part B of the article will briefly sketch the legalposition of humanitarian relief convoys under theGeneva Conventions and Protocols. Finally, part Cwill explore the most controversial issues arising fromthe discussion: the use of military resources of thearmed escorts to push convoys through armedblockades (from both a legal and a militaryperspective); the nature of State consent to reliefoperations; and limits to the complementarity ofhumanitarian assistance with military protection inview of the emerging practice.Part A: A Typology of Armed Escortsand Humanitarian ConvoysConvoys of supplies are designed to supplementthe local resources, since objects indispensable to thesurvival of the civilian population are ordinarilyprotected from destruction 2 . Prisoners of War 3 andcivilian internees 4 are permitted to receive individualparcels or collective shipments containing foodstuffs,clothing, medical supplies, books and objects of adevotional, educational or recreational characterwhich may be provided by “a humanitarian bodywhich affords every guarantee of impartiality andcompetence” 5 .Humanitarian organisations may also be calledupon to assist with the evacuation of Prisoners of Warto camps away from the combat zone and with theirsubsequent transfer and repatriation 6 , the transfer ofcivilian internees 7 to the evacuation of the occupiedpopulation 8 .The nature of a relief organisation is characterisedas an international body having more than meresporadic humanitarian activities or the mere sendingof relief but the actual personal participation incharitable work 9 . In this respect the InternationalCourt of Justice has commented that the provision ofhumanitarian assistance will not constituteintervention in the domestic sphere of a State if it is“limited to the purpose hallowed in the practice of theRed Cross, namely, to prevent and alleviate humansuffering” and if it is “to protect life and health and toensure respect for human beings, it must also, andabove all, be given without discrimination to all” 10 .Protection is specifically provided for underarticle 63 of the Fourth Geneva Convention toNational Red Cross Societies, other relief societiesand “special organisations of a non-militarycharacter” 11 (emphasis added). That article operateson the assumption that the relief societies observestrict neutrality and abstain from political or militaryactivities 12 .i) Unilateral State-initiated ConvoysArmed assistance or protection afforded tohumanitarian convoys and initiated by only one Stateraises the controversial issue of the circumstances inwhich a State may intervene in the domestic sphere ofanother. 13 Scheffer 14 has noted that whilst endangerednationals may be forcibly rescued, armed interventionto protect the civilian population form totalitarianrepression is not as wholly legitimate. Somecommentators 15 take the view that a genuinehumanitarian intervention does not represent achallenge to the political independence of a State.However, any intrusion upon the manner in which aState treats its domestic population will unavoidablydirectly or indirectly readjust the political balancepreviously in existence (such as the case of theKurdish protection zone in Iraq).Similarly, having intruded into the territorialsovereignty of another State to ensure the safe

26AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997delivery of relief supplies, it seems perverse to arguethat military assaults initiated by a relief convoy couldbe justified by self-defence. Intervention is unlawfulif it employs methods of coercion which is an element“particularly obvious in the case of an interventionwhich uses force, either in the direct form of militaryaction, or in the indirect form of support forsubversive or terrorist armed activities within anotherState.” 16The doctrine of humanitarian intervention and itssusceptibility to abuse by powerful States overweaker ones risks allegations of “imperialism” suchthat strict standards are likely to be imposed by theinternational community if it is to be tolerated. Recentexamples demonstrate that only where fundamentalnon-political human rights 17 are at stake to such adegree that the right to life is threatened on a massivescale will the international community considersupervised unilateral measures.ii) United Nations MeasuresThe Secretary-General of the UN has commentedthat “the 1990s have given peacekeeping another newtask: the protection of the delivery of humanitariansupplies to civilians caught up in a continuingconflict.” 18 The recent General Assembly Resolution46/182 (1991) which aimed at strengthening thecoordination of humanitarian emergency assistanceby the United Nations affirms aspects of the 1949Geneva Conventions 19 but also introduces some novelelements. 20Only pursuant to Chapter 7 enforcement measurescan the UN be authorised under the charter tointervene in the domestic jurisdiction of a Statewithout its consent (Article 2(7)). An alternativejurisdictional foundation is where the UN isspecifically empowered to act under internationaltreaty law. 21 In this respect a significant basis foraction lies in the form of Article 89 of the first 1977Protocol which provides that in “situation of seriousviolations” the High Contracting Parties undertake tocooperate with the UN in action jointly orindividually made pursuant to the Charter. 22a) The Application of International HumanitarianLaw to the UNThe Model Agreement between the UN andMember States concerning contributions topeacekeeping operations provides that the troops“shall observe and respect the principles and spirit ofthe general international conventions applicable to theconduct of military personnel” 23 . However, thesituation is far from satisfactory 24 . The UN takes theview that as it represents the international communityat large, it cannot strictly be considered as a “Party”or“Power” within the terms of the Geneva Conventions.To this end, the Resolution adopted by the Institute ofInternational Law 25 suggests in Article 2 that the lawof armed conflict applies to the UN “as of right andthey must be complied with in every circumstance byUN Forces 26 which are engaged in hostilities”(emphasis added). The proposed Convention on theSafety and Security of UN and Associated Personnel 27only partially addresses the situation; the applicabilityof international humanitarian law to UN personnelwill henceforth turn upon the ill-defined concept of“combatant” which may be the case even in thecontext of a non-forcible peacekeeping mandate.b) UNHCR Convoys of Humanitarian AssistanceUNHCR does not have any specific enablingprovision for its humanitarian assistance function inits Statute of Office or in the 1951 ConventionRelating to the Status of Refugees 28 . However,Resolution 2956 (1972) requested the HighCommissioner “to continue to participate at theinvitation of the Secretary-General, in thosehumanitarian endeavours of the UN for which hisoffice has particular expertise and experience” 29 .Mrs Sadako Ogata, the present HighCommissioner, believes 30 that negotiating with theparties to a conflict to obtain their consent providesUNHCR with the necessary “humanitarian space” inwhich to operate. The High Commissioner furthercommented that “it is not for humanitarianorganisations to support or oppose the use of force,but it may be incumbent on them to distancethemselves from enforcement in order to preservetheir mandates” 31 .iii) ICRC ConvoysThe ICRC has a right of initiative to undertakehumanitarian activities subject to the consent of theparties to the conflict 32 .ICRC negotiations with the militia is less of aninstance of recognising their legitimacy but rather apractical means of obtaining an assurance that theGeneva Conventions would be respected and toobtain authorisation for the ICRC to carry out itsmandate. In addition, ICRC units have been allowedinto a conflict area to evacuate the wounded 33 or todistribute aid throughout the region 34 pursuant to theauthority of Security Council resolutions. During theGulf Conflict, for example, the Security Councilrequested Iraq to cooperate with the Red Cross torepatriate all Kuwaiti and third country nationals 35 aswell as to facilitate the distribution of foodstuffswithin Iraq and Kuwait 36 .

SOLDIERS BEARING GIFTS27The ICRC differentiates between the use of forceas a means of imposing the passage and delivery ofrelief supplies and the use with prior consent of armedescorts for humanitarian purposes 37 . It takes the viewthat the obligation incumbent upon States to respectinternational humanitarian law together with theprotection to be afforded to the protective emblemmeans that the possibility of obtaining consentthrough dialogue can never be ruled out 38 . However,this is not to say that the ICRC is not willing to callupon UN forces in specific situations, such as thetransfer of prisoners through territory where theirlives may be at risk, where the lives of its delegatesare threatened or where military logistical support issought 39 . The Somalia experience represented aprecedent for the ICRC in that it had recourse toarmed protection by clan representatives 40 for its foodconvoys in circumstances where State consent couldnot be obtained.iv) Aid Agencies and the Employment of Locally-Hired PersonnelLocal personnel are often aware of the prevailingconditions for which outside estimates or proceduresare inappropriate. However, humanitarian aidworkers become exposed to extortion or blackmailwhen carrying out their tasks. On the other hand, theraison d’etre of non-governmental organisations isthat they are independent from the institutions,including military resources, of a foreign government,and indeed armed escorts imply the existence ofmaterial which is worthy of protection 41 .The employment of locally-hired gunmen posesproblems in terms of the responsibility of the use offorce being attributed to that organisation. MédecinsSans Frontiéres (MSF) and other “secondgeneration” health care agencies are less constrainedby the passive consequences of neutrality but at thesame time risk losing the permission to pursue theirmission. For example, in the “extreme circumstances”of the genocide in Rwanda – the systematicextermination of the Tutsis and the seizure of aidsupplies to finance the war effort – MSF was willingto override its neutrality to insist upon a humanitarianvolte-face 42 .Part B: The Position of Armed Escortsfor Humanitarian Convoys under the1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977Additional ProtocalsThe fundamental premise under the Conventionsis that “relief actions for the civilian population whichare of an exclusively humanitarian and impartialnature and which are conducted without any adversedistinction shall be undertaken subject to the consentof the High Contracting Party concerned” 43 (emphasisadded). Where the resources of the occupied territoryare inadequate the Occupying Power is bound tounconditional acceptance of external collective reliefand must facilitate it “by all means at its disposal.” 44The consignments consist in particular of foodstuffs,medical supplies and clothing but are not limitedthereto if they have the character of relief supplies.The free passage of consignments is the“keystone of the whole system” 45 in that they beallowed to pass through the blockade and not subjectto seizure. However, the State granting free passagecan inspect the relief supplies to verify that they donot contain material that may be used for a militarypurpose (such as weapons and munitions) but in nocase can this right be abused in order to unduly delaythe forwarding of relief or impede the manner inwhich the supplies are distributed. Nevertheless, theFourth Geneva Convention provides that the passageof relief supplies may be regulated according toprescribed times and routes. The Occupying Powercannot “divert” relief supplies, which is understood ascovering any change to its destination of any kind,and which must remain an absolute exception 46 . To doso requires the concurrent satisfaction of threepreconditions: urgent military necessity; the interestsof the population; and supervision by a ProtectingPower 47 .The three-pronged criteria for relief actions –humanitarian, impartial and non-discriminatory –were formulated with a view to explicity prevent anypretext for interference in the conflict 48 . Only on thisbasis would the Parties to that conflict and each HighContracting Party allow and facilitate the rapid andunimpeded passage of all relief consignments,equipment and personnel. The 1949 Conventions and1977 Protocols were not envisaged to cover thecontemporary phenomena of the hybrid betweenarmed military vehicles and collective relief convoys.For example, protection whilst searching for,removing and transporting injured civilians is onlyafforded to “persons regularly and solely engaged inthe operation and administration of civilianhospitals” 49 (emphasis added).Although Article 21 of the Fourth Conventionprovides that convoys of vehicles conveyingwounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternitycases “shall be respected and protected”, such a trainis to be designated by the distinctive Red Crossemblem and therefore not the blue and white “UN” or“UNCHR” marking. The suggestion that the UNAgencies or the ICRC shall be responsible for the

28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997United Nations relief convoyinternational coordination of the relief action wasspecifically omitted from Article 70 of the FirstProtocol, thus preserving the role exclusively for theParties 50 . The insertion into paragraph 1 of Article 70such that relief actions are subject to the agreement ofthe Parties concerned was accepted on the basis that aParty “refusing its agreement must do so for validreasons, not for arbitrary or capricious ones” 51 .The respect and protection from attack owed tofixed establishments or mobile medical units shall notcease unless they are used to commit outside theirhumanitarian duties acts harmful to the enemy 52 .Significantly, the following conditions do not deprivesuch establishments from protection 53 :i) that the personnel are armed and use the arms intheir own defence orii) that in the absence of armed orderlies, the unit isprotected by a picket or by sentries or by anescort (emphasis added).Finally, it should also be noted that the provisionsof the Conventions “constitute no obstacle to thehumanitarian activities which the ICRC or any otherimpartial humanitarian organisation may, subject tothe consent of the Parties to the conflict,undertake…” 54 .Part C: Three Controversial PolicyIssuesi) Using the Military Force of Armed Escorts toPush Humanitarian Convoys Through ArmedBlockadesa) The Theoretical Legal PerspectiveThe right of the High Contracting Party toprescribe the technical arrangements under whichpassage of humanitarian aid is allowed is oftenidentified as the source of a frustrated humanitarianmission. Under customary international law the use offorce is not the appropriate method for ensuringrespect for human rights. In the Nicaragua case, theCourt held 55 that “the protection of human rights, astrictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatiblewith the mining of ports, the destruction of allinstallations, or again with the training, arming andequipping of the contras”.On the other hand, the Preamble to the UNCharter states that armed force shall not be used savein the common interest. Collective or individual

SOLDIERS BEARING GIFTS29military enforcement action made pursuant toChapter 7 of the Charter is clearly feasible. In thecontext of an enforcement action which dispenseswith the requirement for consent, the use of forcemay create an environment favourable tohumanitarian action and may be the only effectivemethod for deterring genocide.Superficially, it seems paradoxical to argue thatthe use of violent measures to remedy serious humanrights deprivations would be consistent with thepurposes of the UN which prohibit the use of forcebut nevertheless seek to uphold minimum humanrights standards. A specifically directed smotheringmilitary action of short duration has the potential tolimit the extent of the armed conflict as demonstratedby the use of surgical air strikes by NATO in theconflict in the former Yugoslavia. The employmentof military resources by the UN or regionalorganisations thus becomes dependant upon thedegree to which there is consensus by Heads of Stateand concomitantly the perceived level of popularsupport for such action.The Secretary-General of the UN has repeatedlyspecified that peacekeeping missions are authorisedto use weapons only in self-defence which is stated toinclude “resistance to attempts by forceful means toprevent it from discharging its duties under themandate given by the Security Council” 56 (emphasisadded). For example, Resolution 836 (1993) extendedthe mandate of the UN Protection Force in formerYugoslavia (UNPROFOR) “acting in self-defence, totake the necessary measures, including the use offorce, … in the event of any deliberate destruction inor around those [safe] areas to the freedom ofmovement of UNPROFOR or of protectedhumanitarian convoys”. The same Resolution alsoprovided the legal basis for Member States to use “allnecessary measures, through the use of air power …to support UNPROFOR in the performance of itsmandate”.The use of force harks back to just war theory inthat “evil behaviour sometimes warrants the use ofotherwise injustifiable interventionist methods to stopthe harmful consequences” 57 . Economic and tradesanctions directed at the means of perpetratingwarfare such as an arms embargo 58 require the lapseof considerable time to take effect, unduly penaliseParties which were complying with the GenevaConventions and would have only a negligible effectupon existing arms stocks 59 . The much-heraldedpolitical solution to hostilities is difficult where thereexists no single controlling authority (for example, inSomalia) or where assurances made at the politicallevel do not effectively filter to the commander in thefield (as was the case in former Yugoslavia).b) An Evaluation from the Practical MilitaryPerspectiveBrigadier Harbottle, who participated in thepeacekeeping campaign in Cyprus between 1966 and1968, is of the view that, when confronted bydeliberate targeting of vehicles and provocativechallenges to the impartiality of the escort force,“time and again quiet reasoning succeeded wheremilitant action could have further aggravated thesituation” 60 . The military response to a proposed lifelinecorridor must be dictated by the methodology ofwarfare employed by the parties to the dispute. In a“conventional” war, forcible protection forhumanitarian assistance requires overall strategicconsiderations. Alternatively, a show of arms will bea sufficient deterrent to bandits who possess inferiorweaponry or where the readiness of the internationalcommunity to intervene is apparent.Military units deployed as part of a peacekeepingoperation are encouraged to observe the cardinal ruleof absolute impartiality. The use of force offensively– for example, to enforce the mandate of providinghumanitarian assistance to the civilian population –changes the character of the operation frompeacekeeping (the use of force for self-defence) topeace enforcement (the use of force for missionaccomplishment) but in view of recent SecurityCouncil pronunciations the particular instructions areinadvertently creating hybrid forms of militaryoperations and concomitantly practical difficulties forthe commander in the field. Operations havinginadequate strength and inappropriate armamentswould in any event preclude the use of force in manycircumstances. For example, Brigadier Wilsonargues 61 that whilst the escort would have sufficientcombat power to override a recalcitrant check-point,there would be further check-points, a need to returnvia the same route and a desire for continuingcooperation.Rules of engagement (ROE) delineate thecircumstances under which the use of force may beinitiated and the graduated means employed torestrain its use when forces are engaged in activecombat 62 . However, they require adaptation toinstances where troops are charged with theprotection of convoys of relief aid. The military unitin its policing role is mandated to detain criminals orthose who interfere with or threaten deadly forceagainst the convoys and whilst the mission mayinclude the safe transit of collective relief the use of

30AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997force is generally authorised only in response tothreats to human life and not property.ii) The First Preference: Obtaining State Consentto Collective Relief under the Conventions andthe Nature of Consent.It has been argued that “it remains a conditionsine qua non that State consent is necessary for reliefactions” 63 . Consent is considered indispensable toboth peacekeeping operations 64 and ICRC missionsand is specifically referred to in the Conventions andProtocols. In the event of defiance an unenviablebalance must be struck between on the one handretaining the consent of the belligerent and toleratingineffectiveness with on the other swift protectiveaction at the expense of continued impartiality. Asuggested response is to tailor the composition of thearmed escorts to the preferences of the belligerents,which is likely to consist of:a) those personnel from a State perceived to havesympathetic views or at all events consideredneutral;b) personnel drawn from an impartial internationalorganisation such as the ICRC;c) representatives from the UN or regionalorganisation; andd) military personnel from an unselected State butsubject to authoritative appraisal.Consent may become clouded by politicalrequirements (such as the need for the hostgovernment to secure face-saving formalities) andpractical considerations (such as the existence ofmultifarious factions each “sovereign” over particularregions).Although General Assembly Resolution 46/182(1991) affirms that “humanitarian assistance shouldbe provided with the consent of the affected countryand in principle on the basis of an appeal by theaffected country”, such language is sufficientlymalleable 65 to undermine the strictness of such arequirement. An appropriate weapon would thereforebe to adopt what Newman 66 describes as the UN’scapacity for the “mobilisation of shame” or theequivalent label by the ICRC of “discreetindignation”.iii) The Emerging Practice and Limits to theComplementary of Humanitarian Assistancewith Military ProtectionWhilst the employment of locally-hired personnelhas been a standard feature of many relief operations,there is a growing acceptance of prominent militaryinvolvement with emergency relief. With the recentserious moves towards the establishment of a UNrapid deployment force, the provision of “minimalsecurity for humanitarian aid personnel might best beregarded as a legitimate characteristic of non-forciblehumanitarian intervention” 67 .Notwithstanding the increasing propensity ofStates to protect humanitarian convoys with armedmilitary escorts (Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia), itis clearly too early to state that belligerent respect forsuch a practice has assumed distinct legalpersuasiveness independent of Memorandums ofUnderstanding and the obligations pursuant to theGeneva Conventions. In the Bosnia-Herzegovinaexample, despite the fact that the GenevaConventions were blatantly violated (for example, bysabotage of the water supply, levying exorbitant tollsupon convoy vehicles, deliberate targeting of reliefpersonnel and seizure of supplies at gunpoint 68 ) andthe perceived inactivity of the military was the subjectof strident criticism, nevertheless the demonstratedlogistical and relief capability of the Western militaryestablishments enhanced the delivery of emergencyrelief and averted the humanitarian catastrophe duringthe winter of 1992-93. Overlapping mandatesbetween the armed convoys and the aid agenciesprompted the Head of Civil Affairs for UNPROFORto remark that “alone, neither UNHCR norUNPROFOR would have been viable, together theyachieved more than could have been predicted” 69 .Although military resources are Staterepresentatives, they have the advantages (albeitexpensive) of providing security-related functions,technical support, prior organisation, high mobilityand specialised training 70 . Evaluated according tointernational humanitarian law standards, escortsproviding a purely protective function are militarilyneutral in abstaining from forcible interference andare impartial to the extent that they do notdiscriminate between the recipients of aid relief.A recent Symposium on Humanitarian Actionand Peacekeeping Operations 71 concluded that thecoexistence of humanitarian action with the use offorce could only be temporarily initiated. Coercivetechniques altered the nature of the relief operationbeyond the deterrent function and created perceivedcomplicity between aid workers and military forces.The ICRC “works for a faithful application” ofthe Geneva Conventions 72 with a view toconfidentiality and discretion. On the other hand,peacekeeping forces often have a kaleidoscope ofobjectives which may include a law and ordermandate and the investigation and collation ofevidence to be subsequently used in prosecutionsunder the Geneva Conventions. In addition, militaryforces act at the behest of directives devolved

SOLDIERS BEARING GIFTS31Ensuring the safe delivery of relief supplies.downwards from their government’s foreign policymachinations, whereas relief agencies reactresponsively to immediate necessities. It is thereforeappropriate for aid agencies to maintain anautonomous humanitarian channel of strictlyimpartial assistance unencumbered by political andmilitary crosscurrents.ConclusionThe legal regime in relation to the provision ofcollective relief pursuant to the Geneva Conventionsand the Additional Protocols depend upon the moralobligation of States not to defeat the underlying spiritand policy objectives of these instruments. Recently,the Security Council has responded by authorising theuse of all necessary measures 73 to achieve itshumanitarian mandate. In an environment where aidagencies are also likely to be operating, the practicaldetails of cooperation will produce emerging patternsof complementarity within “guidelines of action”such as the rules of engagement and the applicationof humanitarian law to UN forces.The principle impediment to an unhindered flowof emergency relief remains the security situationalong the so-called “corridors of tranquility”. Thesolution is a question of perception: whether armedescorts are merely protective measures to give effectto the international community’s moral convictions orwhether they represent something more sinister. It isthis author’s firm view that the point of a bayonet cannever be incompatible as the protection to be affordedto collective relief. The underlying issue is thesoldier’s willingness to restrain the use of the formerin a demonstrable effort to implement the objectivesof the latter.NOTES1. 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of theCondition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in theField; 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of theCondition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of theArmed Forces at Sea; 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative tothe Treatment of Prisoners of War; 1949 Geneva ConventionIV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar. The Conventions have subsequently been updated by the1977 Geneva Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventionsof 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts and 1977 Geneva Protocol 2Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, andRelating to the Protection of Victims of Non-internationalArmed Conflicts. For a compilation of these and otherConventions, see Roberts A. & Guelff R. (Ed), Documents onthe Laws of War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Second Edition,1989 and Schindler D. & Toman J. (Ed), The Laws of ArmedConflict: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and OtherDocuments, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands,

32AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Third Edition, 1988. For a useful guidebook, see Solf W.A andRoach J.A (Ed), Index of International Humanitarian Law,ICRC, Geneva 1987.2. Article 54(2) Protocol 1. For commentary, see Allen C.A.,“Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed Combat: TheModern Humanitarian Law” (1989) 19(1) Georgia J of Intl &Comp L 1.3. Articles 69-77 of the Third Convention and Annex II relating toRegulations concerning Collective Relief for Prisoners of War.4. Articles 108-112 of the Fourth Convention and Annex IIrelating to draft Regulations concerning Collective Relief forCivilian Internees.5. Pictet J.S. (Ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949:Commentary, ICRC, Geneva, 1958.6. Article 9, Articles 46-8 and Article 118 of the ThirdConvention.7. Article 127 Fourth Convention.8. Article 49 Fourth Convention.9. Pictet (1958) op cit at 5 at pp.556-66 interpreting Article 142 ofthe Fourth Convention.10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua(Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits from 1986 ICJRep 14 at para 242-3.11. Pictet (1958) op cit at 5 p.334.12. Whilst an Occupying Power cannot remove personnel from theICRC’s activities, it may suspend operations if relief societiestake advantage of their privileges to encourage hostile action.Pictet (1958) op cit at 5 at p.333 comments that the nature ofmeasures that will be adopted depends on the circumstancesbut they can only continue for so long as the circumstancespersist.13. For a comprehensive review of the legal, practical and moralarguments for and against unilateral intervention which areoutside the scope of this article, see Benjamin B.M., “UnilateralHumanitarian Intervention: Legalising the Use of Force toPrevent Human Rights Atrocities” (1992-93) 16 Fordham IntlL J 120 or Kresock D.M., “Ethnic Cleansing” in the Balkans:The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention’ (1994) 27Cornell Intl L J 203. Also, Verwey W.D., “HumanitarianIntervention” in Cassesse A., The Current Legal Regulation ofthe Use of Force Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands,1986 at 57; Roberts A., “Humanitarian War: MilitaryIntervention and Human Rights” (1993) 69(3), Intl Affairs 429.14. Scheffer D.J., “Toward a Modern Doctorine of HumanitarianIntervention”(1992) 23(2) Uni of Toledo L R 253.15. Tenson F.R. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Lawand Morality, Transnational Publishers Inc, New York 1988 atp.131; Farer T.J., “Humanitarian Intervention: the view fromCharlottesville” in Lillich R.B.(Ed), Humanitarian Interventionand the United Nations, University Press, Virginia, 1973 p.149at p.177.16. Nicaragua case op cit at 10 para 107-8.17. For a list of threats to fundamental human rights, see BrownlieI., ‘Thoughts on kind-hearted gunmen’ in Lillich (1973) op citat 15 p.139 at p.140.18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations”(1992/93) 72(5) Foreign Affairs 91.19. For example, i) the guiding principles of humanity, neutralityand impartiality; ii) the affected State has the primary role forcoordination; iii) humanitarian organisations workingimpartially with strictly humanitarian motives may supplementnational efforts.20. For example, the UN should ensure the prompt and smoothdelivery of relief assistance (para 12).21. For example, Article VIII of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.22. Murphy, Major T.J., “Sanctions and Enforcement of theHumanitarian Law of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949and Geneva Protocol 1 of 1977” (1984) 103 Military L R 3 atp.64; Bourloyannis C., “The Security Council of the UnitedNations and the Implementation of International HumanitarianLaw” (1992) 20 (2) Denv J of Intl L & Policy 335 at pp.339,343.23. UN Doc A/46/185 Art X, (1991). See also Shraga D andZacklin R, “The Applicability of International HumanitarianLaw to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Conceptual,Legal and Practical Issues” in Palwankar V. (Ed), Report of theSymposium on Humanitarian Action and PeacekeepingOperations, held at Geneva 22-24 June 1994, ICRC,Geneva,1994 at p.44.24. Palwankar V., “Applicability of International HumanitarianLaw to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces” (1993) 294 IntlReview of the Red Cross 227. See also: Sklaire M.R., “TheSecurity Council Blockade of Iraq: Conflicting Obligationsunder the United Nations Charter and the Fourth GenevaConvention” (1991) 6(4) The American Uni J of Intl L andPolicy 609.25. Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of ArmedConflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces may beEngaged; Zagreb Session of 3 September 1971 found inSchindler and Toman (1988) op cit at 1 at p.903.26. Further defined in Article 1 to apply to “all armed units underthe control of the United Nations”; id.27. Established by virtue of GA Resn 48/37. See Shraga andZacklin supra at 23 at pp.45-7 for a fuller exposition.28. Macalister-Smith P., International Humanitarian Assistance:Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organisation,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1985 at p.38.29. For a review of the legal context in which UNHCR operatesand the development of the peacekeeping machinery as a toolfor protecting the delivery of international relief aid, seeDomzalski H., “The Management of Refuges in ArmedConflicts” in Smith H. (Ed), The Force of Law: InternationalLaw and the Land Commander, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, ADFA, Canberra, 1994 p.127.30. Ogata S., “Role of Humanitarian Action in PeacekeepingOperations” Keynote Address at the 24th Annual ViennaSeminar, 5 July 1994, pp.2,5.31. Id p.7. Per contra Sandoz Y., Droit ou Devoir D’Ingerence andthe Right to Assistance: The Issues Involved” (1992) 288 IntlReview of the Red Cross 215 at pp.223-4 takes the view thatUN Specialised Agencies are more accurately characterised ashumanitarian auxiliaries of armed forces and not as a reliefagency as that term is properly understood under theConventions.32. Common Article 9 of the First, Second and Third Conventionsand Article 10 of the Fourth for international armed conflictsand common Article 3 in respect of non-international armedconflicts.33. SC Res 436, UN SCOR; 2089th Mtg, Oct 6 1978.34. SC Res 512, UN SCOR; 2380th Mtg, June 19 1982.35. SC Res 686, UN SCOR; 2978th Mtg, March 2 1991.36. SC Res 666, UN SCOR; 2939th Mtg, Sep 13 1990.37. Sandoz (1992) op cit at 31 at p.220-22. Generally, Maurice F.and de Courten J., “Humanitarian Policy and OperationalActivities: ICRC Activities for Refugees and DisplacedCivilians” (1991) 280 Intl Review of the Red Cross 9.38. Mr Jean de Courten, Director of Operations, ICRC, “Fulfilmentof the humanitarian mandate in the context of peacekeepingoperations” in Palwankar (1994) op cit at 23 p.32.39. Id.40. Id at pp.37-8.

SOLDIERS BEARING GIFTS3341. In 1991 the ICRC distributed $125 million in relief supplies inwar zones: Sommaruga C., “Assistance to victims of war ininternational humanitarian law practice” (1992) 289 Intl Reviewof the Red Cross 373 at p.382.42. Hermet G., “Rwanda: Why Medicins Sans Frontiers made acall for arms” in Jean F. (Ed), Populations in Danger 1995: AMedicins Sans Frontieres Report, Halstead Press, Sydney,(1995) p.91 at p.94.43. Common Article 3; Art 70 Protocol 1; Art 18 Protocol 2.Generally, see Plattner D., “Assistance to the CivilianPopulation: The Development and Present State ofInternational Humanitarian Law” (1992) 288 Intl Review of theRed Cross 259; de Preux J., “Synopsis IV: Relief” (1986) 254Intl Review of the Red Cross 268.44. Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. See also Article69 of the First Protocol.45. Pictet (1958) op cit at 5 at p.321.46. Id pp.323-447. Article 60 Fourth Convention.48. Per Mr Sandoz, ICRC, Meeting of Committee II, 15 April 1977(CDDH/II/SR.84;XII,311) found in Levie H.S., Protection ofWar Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, ARecord of Certain of the Proceedings of the 1974-7 GenevaDiplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Developmentof International Humanitarian Law Applicable in ArmedConflicts, Oceana Publications, New York, 1981, Volume 4,Civilian Population at pp.10-1.49. Article 20 Fourth Convention.50. Draft Report of Working Group B, Committee II, 27 April1977, (CDDH/II/SR.84;XII,311) in Levie (1981) op cit at 48 atpp.13-4, 17-20.51. Id at pp.14-5.52. Article 21 First Convention; Article 34 Second Convention;Article 9 of the Forth Convention further specifies thatprotection may cease only after a due warning naming areasonable time limit has been made and such a warning hasremained unheeded.53. Article 22 First Convention; see also Article 35 SecondConvention; Article 19 of the Fourth Convention specifies thatthe presence of small arms and ammunition shall not beconsidered as acts harmful to the enemy. Compare also Article13 of Protocol 1 which further specifies that the presence ofmembers of the armed forces and other combantants in themedical unit is not a bar to protection.54. Article 9 of the First, Second and Third Convention and Article10 of the Fourth.55. Nicaragua judgment op cit at 10 at para 134-5. See also RodleyN.S., “Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The CaseLaw of the World Court’ (1989) 38 Intl & Comp L Qtly 321 atp.332.56. 8 May 1990 in UN Doc A/45/217.57. Kegley C.W, Jnr, “Thinking Ethically about Peacemaking andPeacekeeping”, Paper presented at the Conference on“Australia, the United Nations, Peacekeeping andPeacemaking”, The Indian Oceans Centre for Peace Studies,University of Western Australia , April 30 to May 1 1995 atp.27.58. For example, against the former Yugoslavia: SC Res 713, UNSCOR 3009th Mtg, Sept 25 1991.59. See Bourloyannis (1992) op cit at 22 pp.354-5 for considerationof this issue.60. Harbottle M., The Impartial Soldier, Oxford University Press,London, 1970 p.45.61. Wilson, Brigadier J.B., “Observations on Peacekeeping andPeacemaking in the former Yugoslavia” in Smith H. (Ed),International Peacekeeping: Building on the CambodianExperience, Australian Defence Studies Centre, ADFA,Canberra, 1994 at 187 at p.191.62. Ord III, Lieutenant General R.L., “Rules of Engagement: ATemplate for Interoperability” in Smith (1994) op cit at 61p.205 at p.209.63. Patrnogic J, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Law:Confluence or Conflict? Commentary” 9 Aust Yearbook ofInternational Law 109 at 111.64. Waddell Major J.G.,“Legal Aspects of UN Peacekeeping” inSmith (1994) op cit at 61.65. Scheffer (1992) op cit at 14 at pp.280-1.66. Newman F.C., “Non-military Intervention by International andRegional Organisations in Regional Conflicts” (1983)Supplement 13 Georgia J of Intl & Comp L 341.67. Scheffer (1994) op cit at 14 at p.288. “Today, nobody should beallowed to use outdated interpretations of weighty documentsas protective walls behind which human rights can besystematically and massively violated with total impunity”:Australian Chancellor Franz Vronitzky quoted at p.285. In asimilar vein, see Fuchs P., “Emergency Coordination: Aproblem of humanitarian agencies or rather of politicians andgenerals?” (1995) 304 Intl Review of the Red Cross 87.68. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State ofthe World’s Refugees: the Challenge of Protection , UNHCR,Penguin Books, 1993 at p.80.69. Vieira de Mello S., “Humanitarian and Military Interface inPeacekeeping: Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina: AComparative Overview” in Palwankar (1994) op cit at 23 p.21at p23. Reference should be made to Guerasseu V. andGoldberg Brig Gen T., “Lessons of UNPROFOR: DiscussionPaper”, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Round Table onMilitary Support for Humanitarian Operations, Geneva, 27-8February 1995.70. Gardenker L. and Weiss T.G., “Humanitarian Emergencies andMilitary Help: Some Conceptual Observations” (1988) 13(2)Disasters 118 at pp.126-9. For a fuller exposition of the natureof the military resources available, see Walker P., “ForeignMilitary Resources for Disaster Relief: An NGO Perspective”(1991) 16(2) Disasters 152 at p.154.71. Palwanker (1994) op cit at 23.72. Statute of the International Red Cross Article 6(4).73. For example, SC Res 794 (1992) for UNITAF in Somalia, SCRes 836 (1993) for UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina andSC 940 (1994) for Haiti.Stephen Tully is presently employed by a law firm in Sydney. He will commence his Master of Law degree later this year at KingsCollege, University of London.Between 1991-1995 Stephen studied for his Bachelor of Commerce/Bachelor of Laws and gained high distinction in InternationalHumanitarian Law and Peaceful Settlements of International Disputes.He won the Australian Red Cross NSW Prize for International Humanitarian Law in 1995.

34AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Australia Remembers records the activities of Australian Servicemen and women who served overseas and at home during WorldWar II. This prestige format book also gives an overview of worldevents and influential figures of the time.■ $49.95An account of the war inVietnam and the 30thanniversary of the Battle ofLong Tan.■ $29.95Highlights the role of Australian sailors andairmen in the Liberation of the Philippines.■ $25.00A tribute to the Greek, Australian, New Zealandand British forces who in 1941 fought to thwartthe German invasion of Greece.■ $20.00Join a group of World War I veterans as they make theirhistoric pilgrimage back to Gallipoli to mark the 75thanniversary of the landings at Anzac Cove.■ $9.95To order any of the above books, please tick your selection and send a cheque or money order made out toThe Receiver of Public Monies to Australian Defence Force Journal, B-4-26, Russell Offices, ACT, 2600.Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I enclose payment made out to The Receiver of Public Monies of $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Significance of Family Factors in the Decision to Leavethe Defence Force – A Conflict of CommitmentsBy Lieutenant Colonel T.P. Hodge, RFDIntroductionEmployee turnover can be costly for anyorganisation. Every time someone quits, areplacement must be recruited, trained and given timeon the job to gain experience. In the meantime, theconsequences of having lost valued skills andknowledge may be felt in a reduction of theorganisation’s effectiveness, loss of custom anddiminished staff morale and commitment.The Costs of TurnoverFor the defence forces, the costs are greater.Firstly, unlike civilian employers, the defence forcesin most cases cannot recruit someone directly into thevacant position. The vacancy will be filled on transferor promotion from within, with subsequent backfillingdown to recruit level and with some of thesemovements involving the relocation of members andtheir families. The time lag in getting an effectivemember in place can lead to serious manpowerdeficits which diminish the capacity of the defenceforces to meet their operational goals 1 .Secondly, there is the higher per capita cost ofthis replacement process. The selection, recruitmentand training of military aircrew, for instance, isexpensive and is an investment that the defence forceshave at times found necessary to protect by the use ofincentives to retain these personnel. Even the cost oftraining and maintaining the infantry soldier at therequired level of proficiency is likely to be well inexcess of costs typically borne by a civilian employerin the induction and training of new employees.Defence force personnel policy must aim to retainmembers at least until there has been sufficient returnon the cost of their training.Thirdly, turnover is a problem for the defenceforces because of an increasing difficulty incompeting for suitable recruits. As the 1988 “CrossCommittee” inquiry into personnel wastage inAustralian Defence Force noted 2 , Defence plannersmust acknowledge demographic and social changeswhich are seeing:• a decline in numbers in the critical 15-24 yearsage group• an increasing level of expectation anddiscernment among a more highly educatedpopulation, and• an apparently increasing reluctance of youngerpeople entering the ADF to commit to a longtermcareer.No longer is it sufficient to appeal to patriotism,adventure and three square meals a day to recruit andretain volunteers for the defence forces. Servingmembers are no longer prepared to accept lowerstandards of housing, working conditions andremuneration than their civilian counterparts 3 . Suchare the changing attitudes of young Australianstowards the long-term vocational commitment andexpectations regarding employment that the ADF hasbeen warned it faces considerable challenge inattracting and retaining the right people to serve 4 andthe prospect of high separation rates in the future 5 .Separation RatesThis is not to say that turnover of defence forcepersonnel is undesirable or unwelcome. There arebenefits for any organisation in being able to displacepoor performers, create promotion opportunities andbring in people with enthusiasm and new ideas 6 .However, this raises the question of whether there isan ideal or desirable wastage rate for the defenceforces and what that rate may be. The Department ofDefence some time ago concluded that the notion of adesirable separation rate for the ADF was unrealistic,given the differences between the single Services and,within each Service, between specialist employmentcategories 7 . A definitive “desirable” or “ideal” ADFseparation rate was, it felt, too simplistic and of littlevalue to detailed workforce planning. This did notdeter the Cross Committee 8 from adopting the notionof a “manageable wastage rate” which would:

36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997• promote a steady flow-through of personnel tokeep the defence forces fit, energetic andenthusiastic;• give some predictability of demands uponrecruitment and training; and• maintain force capabilities.In recent years, separation rates have been low 9 .This has been attributed, at least in part, to Australia’seconomic recession and high unemployment 10 . While,appropriately, the ADF has in the meantime beencontemplating and planning for the impact of thechanges occurring in Australian society, there has notbeen the immediate problem of high turnover tocontend with. However, separation rates are againexpected to rise with the anticipated economicrecovery, and, inevitably, focus will again shift towhat can be done in the short term to retain defenceforce members. It therefore remains important tounderstand the factors that contribute to a member’sdecision to leave the defence force, and to continue toaddress these factors.What follows looks firstly at the nature of defenceforce service, how the service may be changing, andhow these changes may influence recruitment andretention. We then take a closer look at one group offactors, the so-called “family factors”, their essentialconflict with defence force interests, and the effect ofthis conflict on the member’s commitment to his 11military career.The Special Nature of Defence ForceServiceMuch has been said about the unique or specialnature of military service. As the Glenn Reviewnoted 12 , those who join the Services make aprofessional commitment quite unlike any other, to:• accept the risk of serious injury or death indefence of the country;• train for the application of extreme violence;• accept lawful direction without equivocation; and• forgo any right to withdraw labour or refuse a task.This “profession of arms” must also endurearduous physical conditions and disruption of familylife. There are, as the Glenn Review suggests, “manymore congenial and less hazardous occupations.” 13Service in the armed forces involves more thanjust an occupational choice. What differentiates themilitary from civilian occupations is the requirementto commit to a lifestyle that permeates almost everyaspect of the life of the member 14 , including hisfamily life. But it is not a commitment which isnecessarily understood or appreciated by thecommunity it serves, particularly in peacetime when anation not under immediate or foreseeable threat mayquestion the need for, and cost of, maintaining the“custodians of military capability.” 15 While “In war,the special nature of military service is ostensible toall” 16 , “In peacetime the rigours and demands ofmilitary service are much less obvious to thecommunity at large.” 17If the prolonged period of peace and freedomfrom threats has brought changes in the community’sattitude toward the military, it has also broughtchange within the military. The essence of thischange has been what Moskos describes as amovement away from the view of the military as an“institution” whose members have surrendered selfinterestto a higher good and who regard themselvesas different and separate from broader society, to an“occupational” view which sees the military as justanother job in the market place and in which selfinterestis the priority. 18 Under the traditional militaryinstitution, the member’s primary affiliation was withthe military, and he felt bound to others by thecommon cause and conditions under which they allserved. In an occupational military, membersidentified with others who did the same sort of work 19and had no particular commitment or loyalty to anyemployer.If, indeed, the military has been moving towardan occupational format in the 20 or so years sinceMoskos suggested such a trend, one would expectthat by now, it ought to be reflected in surveys ofmembers’ motivation for joining the defence forceand in retention/attrition research. Certainly no suchtrend is reflected in “factors influencing the decisionto join” during the five year period covered in thelongitudinal survey research of Australian DefenceForce Academy cadets reported by Moss 20 , who notedthat institutional model indicators, such ascomradeship and patriotism, were scoring equallyhighly with the occupational model indicators ofsteady job and pay.A similar mix of institutional and occupationalfactors has commonly been reflected in exit andattitude/opinion surveys of ADF personnel. Family,mobility, and jobs have been identified as importantfactors influencing Army officers’ decision to leave. 21At the same time, pay and conditions of service havebeen found to be a strong influence on Army OtherRanks’ decision to stay or leave. 22 Bergin suggeststhat those who join the ADF for institutional reasonsare more likely to serve longer in the military thanthose who join for other reasons but, significantly,only “other things being equal”. 23

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FAMILY FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO LEAVE THE DEFENCE FORCE 37In its second submission to the Cross Committee,the Department of Defence suggested that separationfrom the ADF was influenced by a range of internaland external factors, including demographic, social,economic, industrial, and educational trends. 24 It wenton to list a number of perceptions identified throughService surveys as influencing separation, includingissues such as housing, career management, salaries,conditions of service, and organisational satisfaction.For the serving member, the process of deciding tovoluntarily leave the defence forces is complex andlikely to be influenced by feelings of:• job (dis)satisfaction;• organisational commitment;• future intentions;• the perception of how easy it may be to attaincivilian employment and, ultimately;• the strength of the desire to leave the service. 25Likely to be a significant influence for most inthis process are the so-called family factors – thoseissues such as housing, children’s education, childcare, spouse employment, mobility, separation, andsupport services. We now turn to a consideration ofthe influence of these factors in the decision to leavethe defence force.Balancing Military and Family NeedsThe Significance of Family Factors inthe Decision to LeaveAs the Cross Report noted, “It is a truism that theAustralian Defence Force recruits soldiers and retainsfamilies.” 26 While relative to the civilian workforce,the ADF remains young (with 49% of membersbetween 20-29 years of age), over half (58%) are ineither a de jure or de facto marital relationship, and35% are living with one or more children. 27 Whilemost would be single at the time they join, a partnerand, in most cases, children are acquired at somestage of the member’s military career. This inevitablybrings about some changes to their motivation andsome reordering of priorities. The question is, what isthe nature of these changes and how do they affect themember’s commitment to the defence force?That family factors have a significant influence ona member’s commitment is not questioned. A servicefamily that is dissatisfied with the quality of life thedefence force provide will exert pressure for themember to separate. 28 The way his family is treatedmay be the factor which determines whether he willstay or leave. Traditionally, the military has preferred

38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997single recruits and has in the past, in asserting what itsees as its prior claim on the member, imposedbarriers or disincentives to his marriage. 29 There hasalso been the traditional view of “the service family”as an appendage of the member, part of his kit 30 andsomething that supported and followed him withoutquestion wherever he was posted and whatever hewas asked to do. While not extinct, such traditionalviews no longer prevail, not only because familieshave become more assertive for improvements totheir quality of life, but also because the military isnow aware of the importance of the family’sinfluence on a member’s service intentions. It is nowacknowledged that the family occupies a key positionon the boundary between the military system and thewider community, and will therefore play a decisiverole in the member’s decision to stay in uniform orbecome a civilian. If the military does not assist themember to balance work and family responsibilities,and if instead there is conflict between the militaryand the family, it is inevitable that the family willeventually win and the member will separate. 31Problems Experienced by the FamilyHow a member feels about his military career isinfluenced by different patterns of factors – personal,career/organisational, and family – at different stagesof his career. But there is generally a growingpressure within the family which will increasinglycause conflict between the member’s career andfamily needs. 32 The new service wife will initiallyhave the problem of adjusting to the military cultureand its demands. Then comes the first posting as amarried couple, not only separating her from her ownfamily and friends but placing her in an unfamiliarlocation with little support or assistance to assimilateat a time also, when her husband may be absent undertraining for his new posting, or on deployment. Later,when children are born, the frequent and lengthyabsences of her husband effectively imposes singleparenthood responsibilities and disrupts marital andfilial relationships, not to mention her own socialrelationships and career/employment opportunities.As the children reach school age, postings may beresented because of the disruption to the children’seducation, particularly during the final years ofsecondary schooling. Throughout this period is theuncertainty of the standard of accommodation thatmay be allocated and the difficulties of yet anotherremoval with its inevitable losses and breakages.When Downes speaks of the additional clauses inthe marriage pact for military wives to thosecontained in the civilian version 33 , she refers to theexpectation that the wife will endure all of theseproblems, continue to dutifully support her husbandin his military career, and continue to tolerate theintrusions and demands placed on her and her familyby her husband’s employer. However, there isincreasing indication that they are no longer willing todo so. Social changes, such as the increasing level ofparticipation of women in education and in theworkforce, and the predominance of the two-incomefamily, have impacted upon the military family andhave changed its priorities and expectations. Themember is no longer prepared to automatically putthe demands of his job above his family. 34 Husbandswanting to provide their families a better quality oflife are being supported to this end by wives who areless willing to accept subordinate roles and who aredemanding career opportunities for themselves. 35While the ADF has implemented a range ofinitiatives to address service lifestyle issues, such ashousing, child care, support services, mobility anddislocation 36 , the military remains essentiallyinstitutional in character and in its view of the familyas an integral part of the military community. AsSmith notes, there are sound military reasons why theserviceman must be mobile and, for this reason,arrange his family affairs for the good of the military.And, however else any trend toward an occupationalformat may change the relationship between themilitary and its members, when the time comes forthe member to put his life on the line he will be farmore prepared to do it for his country than for his job.A Conflict of CommitmentsIn its own interests as well as those of itsmembers, the military will undoubtedly continue toaddress service-related family problems. However,because of the military’s need to maintain coretraditional institutional values 37 , there will alsocontinue to be a conflict between the military and themilitary family which the member will experience asa conflict of commitments. Segal refers to this as aconflict between two “greedy” institutions, both ofwhich demand the exclusive and undivided loyalty ofthe serving member. 38 While the military has alwaysbeen “greedy” in this sense, the family has become soas a consequence of social changes.The particular problem that Segal predicts for theserviceman is what follows as wives resist the

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FAMILY FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO LEAVE THE DEFENCE FORCE 39greediness of the family to participate in theworkforce. This not only increases the potential forconflict between partners but also between the familyand the military. 39Jans’ study of the process of career adjustmentamong ADF officers speaks of a similar ongoingconflict of career-family priorities which changesover the officer’s career cycle. 40 Officers tended to puttheir careers ahead of their families when:• their wives did not have a strong careerorientation• they felt their career prospects were good, and• they had strong military values. 41In the early career stage, an officer’s prioritieswere with the military but at later stages career andfamily priorities became more evenly balanced,particularly as his children reached school age.Similarly, Bollen found that among Australian ArmyOther Ranks the effect of moving home on children’seducation and the desire to stay in one place becameincreasingly important from six years serviceonwards and most important after 15 or more yearsservice. 42 The increasing importance of family factorswith length of service has also been reported inoverseas research. 43Jans offers the concept of a “force field” todescribe opposing career development and familyfactors which are, for most service families and mostof the time, in equilibrium. 44 But while there may notbe perpetual conflict, conflict was more likely at laterstages of the member’s career when, for thechildren’s education and the wife’s careerdevelopment, the family wanted more geographicstability. It was at this point that the member reallybegan to experience the conflict of commitments. Hiscareer depended on his mobility but his familywanted stability. Unless he was at what Jans refers toas the “Canberra” stage of his career where most ofhis career paths took him to the Department ofDefence or unless he was posted to a location withinreasonable commuting distance (but possibly stillinvolving at least weekly periods of separation), hemay, depending on how he was feeling about hismilitary career and how he viewed his prospectsoutside the service, decide at that point to put hisfamily priorities ahead of his career and to separate.Inevitably, the consequences of such conflict forthe member will be stress. He faces sanctions andstigma if he fails to meet the military’s requirementsof him, and his family need him as a husband/fatherand wage earner. As Spurgeon suggests, he may tryto “stand with one foot in both camps” or to “placebarriers between the two and protect himself fromone or the other.” Those are at least responses. Aproblem really arises when the member cannotresolve his conflict. 45Enlisting the Family as an AllyAs noted earlier, the ADF accepts that it has anobligation to redress service-related familydisadvantages, not only to meet commitments underinternational convention and to conform withindustrial and anti-discrimination legislation but alsobecause it recognises the link between satisfaction ofservice family needs and ADF recruitment, retention,readiness, performance and morale. 46 Moreover, it isaware that there are dividends for the military intaking such initiatives. As Segal notes, “The more themilitary’s actions make service members and theirfamilies truly hear and believe the message that the“military takes care of its own,” the less will be theconflict between the two greedy institutions…” 47Frowen says much the same thing, suggesting thatmilitary assistance for families increases thecommitment of both family and service member tothe organisation, enabling the military to effectively“enlist the family as an ally, thus increasing itsinfluence over the service member.” 48 According toFrowen, by providing a supportive and satisfyingfamily environment, the military reaps the dividendsof its members”:• greater satisfaction with service life (by relievingthe stressful demands on families and hence onmembers),• improved retention (there being strong evidencethat separation decisions are made by the familyrather than by the member alone),• family adaptation (again recognising the influencethe family has on the member’s careermotivation), and• mission readiness (the evidence being that amember will perform his job better at individualand unit level where he is confident his family canmanage in his absence and has support if theyneed it). 49ConclusionJust as the decision to join the military is an“aggregation of many individual decisions, randomand otherwise, moderated by the selection process” 50 ,the decision to leave is the response of an individualat a particular time to a coincidence of particular

40AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997influences, whether these influences be calledinstitutional and occupational, extrinsic and intrinsic,“push” and “pull”, family and military. But whysomeone joins or leaves are not the only importantquestions. What we also need to know is whathappens in between. What is the process that changesthe enthusiastic, idealistic and committed recruit tothe frustrated and dissatisfied time-server waiting forthe first opportunity to get out?Directions for ResearchWe have seen that the influence of family factorson a member’s career commitment varies over themember’s family life cycle and with changing familystructure 51 , and that it becomes more important withincreasing years of service. The married membermust constantly balance military and family needs,and increasingly the two become contradictory. 52 Thishas been explained in terms of the changing role andexpectations of the family, and how these changes areaccommodated by the military which is itselfpurportedly undergoing a gradual yet fundamentalshift in its values and in the way it treats its members.But in the main, this research has not tended toconsider the member as a variable, overlooking whatinfluence the member himself might have in theprocess. If research is suggesting that people tend tojoin the military as a form of commitment andservice 53 – that is, for institutional reasons – what dowe know about what happens to this commitment? Isit possible that as the military shifts towards anoccupational format, a similar shift from institutionalto occupational values and motivation also occurswithin the individual as his service continues? Afterall, how long can it reasonably or realistically beexpected that a member will continue to submitpersonal interest to the higher good, particularly oncethat member also acquires responsibility for a family?Inevitably and for many reasons there will be adiminution of his institutional commitment, and as theintrinsic appeal of defence force service wanes,extrinsic considerations will gain greater sway. Hemay have joined an institution but he is leaving anoccupation. The member may be able to rationalisethis commitment in terms of “having done my bit”but essentially the situation is that the military nolonger has sufficient “pull” to retain him.While one could perhaps suggest that the reportedlow level of interest of separating Australian RegularArmy personnel in transferring to the Army Reserve 54is indicative of this lost commitment, such research isessentially yet to be done. A proper understanding ofthe process of motivational changes that occur in theindividual over the period of his service requireslongitudinal research of the nature initiated at ADFAfor officer cadets.An Extra Duty of CareIt was mentioned at the outset that the defenceforces are finding it increasingly difficult in achanging employment market and with the changingnature of employee motivation to attract sufficientyoung people prepared to commit themselves on along-term basis. 55 Those it manages to recruit, it willwant to retain but it will only succeed in this for aslong as it continues to support the member and hissubsequently acquired family. In so much thatdefence force service imposes more than normalstresses on family life, the defence forces willcontinue to carry a more than normal duty of care tothe service family.NOTES1. Weisse, U.J.A., A Theoretical Framework for Revising theAustralian Army’s Exit Surveys, Research Report 1/94, 1stPsychological Research Unit, Department of Defence,Canberra, June 1994, p. 5.2. Commonwealth Parliament, Personnel Wastage in theAustralian Defence Force – Report and Recommendations,Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,AGPS, Canberra, November 1988, p. 3.3. Downes, C., High Personnel Turnover: The AustralianDefence Force is not a Limited Liability Company, CanberraPapers on Strategy and Defence, No 44, Strategic DefenceStudies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra,1988, p. 4.4. Australian Defence Force, Serving Australia: The AustralianDefence Force in the Twenty First Century, Personnel PolicyStrategy Review Team, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1995, p.42.This report was otherwise known as the “Glenn Review.”5. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia – DefenceWhite Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, p. 65.6. Mobley, W.H., Employee Turnover: Causes, Consequencesand Control, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1982, p.22.7. Department of Defence, Second Submission to Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,Defence and Trade Inquiry into “Personnel Wastage Rates inthe Australian Defence Force”, Canberra, May 1988, p.2.8. Commonwealth Parliament, op cit, November 1988, p.xxiv.9. Separation rates for the Australian Army were down to 6.25%in 1991/92, rising only slightly to 7.82% in 1992/93. Prior to1984/85 the rate had been fairly constant around 12% butduring a volatile period from 1985/86 to 1989/90 had variedbetween 11.09% and 14.42% (Weisse, U.J.A., op cit, June1994, p.5).10. Weisse, U.J.A., op cit, June 1994, p.l.11. I have opted to use the masculine personal pronoun in theinterests of easier reading and in recognition of the fact that(on 1995 ADF Census figures) 86% of the ADF are males.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FAMILY FACTORS IN THE DECISION TO LEAVE THE DEFENCE FORCE 4112. Australian Defence Force, op cit, 1995, p.61.13. Australian Defence Force, op cit, 1995, p.62.14. Bowen, G.L., “Satisfaction with Family Life in the Military”,Armed Forces and Society, Vol 15, No 4, Summer 1989, 571-592, p.571.15. Australian Defence Force, op cit, 1995, p.62.16. Australian Defence Force, op cit, 1995, p.62.17. Smith, H., “Introduction”, in Smith, H. (Ed), Rewarding theDefence Force, Australian Defence Studies Centre, UniversityCollege, December 1987, p.xv.18. Moskos, C.C., “From Institution to Occupation: Trends inMilitary Organisation”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 4, No1, November 1977, 41-50.19. Moskos, C.C., “Institutional/Occupational Trends in ArmedForces: An Update”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 12, No 3,Spring 1986, 377-382, p.380.20. Moss, S., “Survey of the Military Profession”, in Moss, S.(Ed), Who Will Join? 4DF Recruiting Policy to the Year 2000,Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College,ADFA, Canberra, 21994, p.55.21. Whalley, R., Officer Resignation Survey (April 1988 to August1990), Research Report 9/91, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, April 1991, p.5.22. Cotton, A .J., Rank Differences in Reasons for Discharge fromthe Army, Statistical Report 6/91, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, April 1991, p.4.23. Bergin, A., “The Decision to Enlist”, in Moss, S. (Ed), op cit,1994, p.24.24. Department of Defence, op cit, May 1988, p.8.25. Weisse, U.J.A., op cit, June 1994, p.l9.26. Commonwealth Parliament, op cit, November 1988, p. Lxiii.27. Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force 1995Census: Public Report, Headquarters ADF, Canberra, 1995,p.4 and 10.28. Commonwealth Parliament, op cit, November 1988, p.8.29. Spurgeon, B., “The Service Family: Problems and Prospects”,in Smith, H. (Ed), The Service Family: Problems andProspects, Department of Government, Faculty of MilitaryStudies, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1982,p.l5.30. Smith, H., “Introduction”, in Smith, H. (Ed), ibid, 1982, p. iii.31. Frowen, D.M., Military Family Support Issues in TTCPMember Nations, Technical Panel UTP-3, The TechnicalCooperation Program, November 1995, p.2.32. Jans, N.A., Careers in Conflict: Service Officers’ Careers andFamilies in Peace Time, Canberra College of AdvancedEducation, Canberra, 1988, p.l8.33. Downes, C., op cit, 1988, p.30.34. Commonwealth Parliament, op cit, November 1988, p.217.35. Downes, C., op cit, 1988, p.34.36. Indeed the Final Report of the ADF Families and DislocationStudy – Stage Two (Snider, G., Australian Institute of FamilyStudies, November 1993, p.xiii) reports general satisfaction ofthe typical ADF family with service life.37. Frowen, D.M, op cit, 1995, p.2.38. Segal, M.W., ‘The Military and the Family as GreedyInstitutions, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 13, No 1, 1986, 9-38.39. Ibid, p.l5.40. Jans, N.A., op cit, 1988.41. Jans, N.A. op cit, 1988, p.303.42. Bollen, l.D., Other Ranks Discharge Survey – The First Year,Research Note 3/88, 1st Psychological Research Unit,Department of Defence, Canberra, March 1989, p.10.43. Vernez, G.& Zellman, G.L., Families and Mission: A Reviewof the Effects of Family Factors in Army Attrition, Retentionand Readiness, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, August1987, p.xi.44. Jans, N.A., “Issues in Australian Service Family Life – AnEmpirical Study”, in Smith, H. (Ed), Perspectives on theMilitary Career, Department of Government, Faculty ofMilitary Studies, University of New South Wales, Canberra,1985, s 80-81.45. Spurgeon, B., op cit, 1982, p.l746. Snider, G., op cit, November 1993, p.xiii.47. Segal, M.W., op cit, 1986, p.34.48. Frowen, D.M., op cit, 1995, p.2.49. Frowen, D.M., op cit, 1995, s 2-3.50. McAllister, I. & Smith, H., ‘Selecting the Guardians:Recruitment and Military Values in the Australian OfficerCorps’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol 17(Spring), 1989, 27-42, p.32.51. Vernez, G. & Zellman, G.L., op cit, August 1987, p.61.52. Downes, C.A., op cit. 1988, p.29.53. McAllister, I. & Smith, H., op cit, 1989, p.33.54. Wrigley notes that only 5-6% of the Australian Army Reservehas prior full-time military service, compared to 50-60% in theUS Army Reserve (Wrigley, A.K., The Defence Force and theCommunity, Report to the Minister for Defence, AGPS,Canberra, June 1990, p.330). More recently, and as reportedby Sigma Consultancy, only 25% of surveyed full-time Armypersonnel indicated that they would “probably” or “definitely”join the Reserve. The consultants had been asked to researchthis issue following concern regarding the low rate of transferto the Reserve. (Sigma Consultancy, Army Manpower ControlMechanisms Project – Stage III, March 1996, p.41. )55. Commonwealth of Australia, op cit, 1994, p. 65.BIBLIOGRAPHYAustralian Defence Force, Serving Australia: The AustralianDefence Force in the Twenty First Century, Personnel PolicyStrategy Review Team, Defence Centre Canberra, 1995.Bergin, A., “The Decision to Enlist”, in Moss, S. (Ed), Who WillJoin? ADF Recruiting Policy to the Year 2000, AustralianDefence Studies Centre, University College, ADFA,Canberra, 1994.Bollen, l.D., Other Ranks Discharge Survey – The First Year,Research Note 3/88, 1st Psychological Research Unit,Department of Defence, Canberra, March 1989.Bowen, G.L., “Satisfaction with Family Life in the Military”,Armed Forces and Society, Vol 15, No 4, Summer 1989, 571-592.Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia – DefenceWhite Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994.Commonwealth Parliament, Personnel Wastage in the AustralianDefence Force – Report and Recommendations, JointCommittee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, AGPS,Canberra, November 1988.Cotton, A.J., Rank Differences in Reasons for Discharge from theArmy, Statistical Report 6/91, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, April 1991Department of Defence, Second Submission to Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs,Defence and Trade lnquiry into “Personnel Wastage in theAustralian Defence Force”, Canberra, May 1988.Department of Defence, Australian Defence Force 1995 Census:Public Report, Headquarters ADF, Canberra, 1995.

42AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Downes, C., High Personnel Turnover: The Australian DefenceForce is not a Limited Liability Company, Canberra Papers onStrategy and Defence, No 44, SDSC, ANU, Canberra, 1988.Frowen, D.M., Military Family Support Issues in TTCP MemberNations, Technical Panel UTP-3, The Technical CooperationProgram, November 1995.Jans, N.A., “Issues in Australian Service Life – An EmpiricalStudy”, in Smith, H. (Ed), Perspectives on the MilitaryCareer, Department of Government, Faculty of MilitaryStudies, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1985.Jans, N.A., Careers in Conflict: Service Officers’ Careers andFamilies in Peace Time, Canberra College of AdvancedEducation, Canberra, 1988.McAllister, I. & Smith, H., “Selecting the Guardians:Recruitment and Military Values in the Australian OfficerCorps”, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol 17(Spring), 1989, 27-42.Mobley, W.H., Employee Turnover: Causes, Consequences andControl, Addison-Wesley, Reading (Ma), 1982.Moskos, C.C., “From Institution to Occupation: Trends inMilitary Organisation”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 4, No1, November 1977, 41 -50.Moskos, C.C., “Institutional/Occupational Trends in ArmedForces: An Update” Armed Forces and Society, Vol 12, No 3,Spring 1986, 377-382.Moss, S., “Survey of the Military Profession”, in Moss, S., (Ed),Who Will Join? ADF Recruiting Policy to the Year 2000,Australian Defence Studies Centre, University College,ADFA, Canberra, 1994.Segal, M.W., “The Military and the Family as GreedyInstitutions”, Armed Forces and Society, Vol 13, No 1, 1986,9-38.Sigma Consultancy, Army Manpower Control MechanismsProject – Stage III, March 1996.Smith, H., “Introduction”, in Smith, H. (Ed), The Service Family:Problems and Prospects, Department of Government, Facultyof Military Studies, University of New South Wales,Canberra, 1982.Smith, H., “Introduction”, in Smith, H. (Ed), Rewarding theDefence Force, Australian Defence Studies Centre,University College, December 1987.Snider, G., ADF Families and Dislocation Study – Stage Two.Final Report, Australian Institute of Family Studies,November 1993.Spurgeon, B., “The Service Family: Problems and Prospects”, inSmith, H. (Ed), op cit, 1982.Vernez, G. & Zellman, G.L., Families and Mission: A Review ofthe Effects of Family Factors in Army Attrition, Retention andReadiness, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, August 1987.Weisse, U.J.A., A Theoretical Framework for Revising theAustralian Army’s Exit Surveys, Research Report 1/94, 1stPsychological Research Unit, Department of Defence,Canberra, June 1994.Whalley, R., Officer Resignation Survey (April 1988 to August1990), Research Report 9/91, 1st Psychological ResearchUnit, Department of Defence, Canberra, April 1991.Wrigley, A.K., The Defence Force and the Community, Report tothe Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, June 1990.Lieutenant Colonel Hodge is an Army Reserve officer currently serving with the Reserve Staff Group in Army Headquarters. Havingenlisted with 3 Psych Unit in 1972 and been commissioned with 12 Psych Unit in 1975, he subsequently served with OCTU2Training Group, Headquarters Training Command and I Psychological Research Unit before taking up his current posting. He iscurrently completing a Master of Defence Studies degree at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

Psyops Beyond 2000: Coordinating the MessageBy Corporal C. A. Jamieson, Aust Int.“The supreme act of war is to subdue the enemywithout fighting …”– Sun Tzu 1“… psychological warfare may do more harmthan good unless it is strictly coordinated withdiplomatic and military activity”.– R. Crossman, British WWII Psyops Specialist2Psyops Re-emergesIn 1989 the Australian Defence Force Journalpublished an article entitled PsychologicalOperations: Victoria per Mentem 3 in which the authorargued the need for the Australian Army to maintain apsychological operations (psyops) capability. At thattime the Army’s psyops capability had been allowedto run down, with no dedicated psyops units ortraining courses in existence. Any real psyopscapability was left in the hands of enthusiasts. Sincethat article was published the Army has raised twotactical psyops (tac psyops) platoons, one each for theFirst and Second Divisions, and the School ofMilitary Intelligence now conducts a two-modulepsyops course annually.Under guidelines proposed for restructuring theArmy there is provision for a psyops team per taskforce to conduct tac psyops. These teams wouldprobably have a number of loudspeaker assets and alimited print capability that will be used to support thetask force commander’s mission. However, under therestructure there appears to be no provision forstrategic or operational level psyops and no dedicatedstaff to undertake staff work or to provide thenecessary coordination of the psyops mission andthemes. Moreover, there appears to be no mechanismto coordinate psyops, public relations and civil affairsactivities to ensure that no contradictory messagesconcerning the Army’s (and ultimately theGovernment’s) aims are received by friendly, neutralor hostile audiences. The aim of this article is to showthat there is a need for a pyops unit at joint commandlevel to coordinate psyops activities and to providestrategic and operational psyops guidance andsupport.Psyops at all LevelsPsyops is more than the art of calling out for theenemy to surrender before it is too late or showeringthem with leaflets depicting how well Australianstreat POWs. Psyops is the military application ofadvertising and marketing that gets the commander’smessages to the various target audiences in order tochange attitudes and behaviour, often whilstcompeting with conflicting messages sent by theinternational media or enemy psyops. Psyops shouldbe conducted at all levels to ensure that everybodyunderstands the same thing, i.e. what is happeningand what they should (and should not) do.In order for psyops to be effective it shouldcontain four essential elements. The psyops productshould be simple, truthful, well researched and notcontradict messages originating from the samesponsor/source. A simple, true and believablemessage is much more likely to be acted upon than anavalanche of rhetoric and empty threats. In order forthis to be maintained across a theatre of operationsthere needs to be coordination of psyops activities andit is Australian policy that psyops should be coordinatedat the highest level practicable 4 .Coordination of PsyopsCurrently there is no organised psyops structureabove the tactical level. Therefore it is suggested thata Joint Psyops Unit (JPU) be formed. The JPU wouldprovide the central campaign coordination, conductcentralised research gathering, and formulate psyopspolicy for the ADF. It would advise the CDF andcomponent commanders on strategic and operationalpsyops and undertake the necessary campaignstaffwork. It would design strategic and operationallevelpsyops items, provide design support for tacpsyops teams and coordinate the common psyopsthemes and symbols to be used. It would not be thepurpose of the JPU to over-ride the task forcecommander’s psyops tasking nor to dictate to himhow he may use his psyops assets. The JPU would bethere to ensure that all psyops products and messagescomplement each other theatre wide.

44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997The JPU would provide a greater range of pysopsitems of a higher quality and/or quantity to assist thetac psyops teams. Tac psyops is normally restricted toloudspeaker operations and leaflet/poster productionof limited quality, quantity and colour using in-houseprint equipment. The JPU would assist tac psyopsteams by providing bulk quantities of higher-qualityprinted material. The JPU would also produce printedproducts (using any suitable surface such as clothing,stickers or novelty items in addition to leaflets andposters), audio products (such as radio broadcasts)and audio-visual products (such as video, using inhouseor out-sourced production facilities) forstrategic and operational level psyops. The JPUwould also coordinate the delivery of strategic andoperational psyops products.The JPU could be created from the existing 2ndDivision Intelligence Company Psyops Platoon, usingits allocated reserve manpower of 12 soldiers as thebasis for the part-time component of the new unit.Specialists from other corps (either full or part-time)such as a draftsperson, journalist, clerk, psychiatrists,education officers, video and print-productionpersonnel would be posted to the unit as well asrepresentatives from the Navy and Air Force. Theunit would consist of about 24 people, 50 per centpart-time and 50 per cent full-time. an example of theproposed unit appears at Figure 1.Communication ForumThe JPU would also provide the forum for the coordinationof psyops, public relations and civil affairs.This would allow each of these service providers toknow what the other is doing and how they can helpeach other. It should be made clear that this is not anexcuse to create a mammoth propaganda machinethat would see public relations and civil affairsbecome an extension of psyops. There are cleardeliniations between the three areas and these shouldbe maintained. However, it can be argued that allthree of these areas are inter-related, in that the effectsof any one can have a flow-on effect to the other two.For example, in 1994 the Australian Medical SupportForce sent to Rwanda was tasked to provide healthsupport for the UN peacekeeping forces, with sparecapacity being used to assist the Rwandan people andsome Non-Government Organisations 5 . The initialcivil affairs aspect of this assistance to the Rwandanpeople brought much local good-will, whilst the flowonpublic relations aspect provided a positive imageof the ADF to the Australian people. Furthermore,these actions had a favourable strategic psychologicalimpact on both the countries within the region andthose with troops on UN service there.HEADQUARTERSDESIGN ANDPRODUCTIONSECTIONRESEARCHANALYSIS ANDMONITORINGSECTIONDISSEMINATIONSECTIONFigure 1. Organisation of the proposed Joint Psyops Unit

PSYOPS BEYOND 2000: COORDINATING THE MESSAGE 45The Malayan LessonThe importance of a fully coordinated psyopscampaign was clearly illustrated during the MalayanEmergency of 1948-60. During this campaign thesuccessful coordination of psyops objectives withnational military and civilian activities brought aboutthe demise of the communist-inspired Malaya RacesLiberation Army (MRLA).Initially the psyops effort against the MRLA wasdriven by revenge, as many friends and relatives ofofficials and planters had been murdered by thecommunists 6 . The police and military wereencouraged to kill the insurgents or, if possible,capture them for later trial and execution.Understandably this only stiffened the resolve of theterrorists as it gave them no alternative but to fight.This situation was also exploited by the communistleadership who used photos of dead MRLA membersto inspire the rank and file to avenge these deaths 7 .In September 1950 Hugh Carleton Greene 8 wasappointed Director of Emergency InformationServices – Malaya. Greene is credited withintroducing the surrender and rewards policy whichwas crucial to the success of the campaign. Thepolicy allowed for insurgents to voluntarily surrenderthemselves to the security forces and be absolvedfrom prosecution regardless of their crimes. Rewardsfor information given by the public had been in placesince the beginning of the emergency, but Greeneinsisted that special rewards be offered to namedinsurgents for helping other insurgents to escape theMRLA 9 .At first there was great opposition to the policy,but gradually it gained acceptance as officials came tounderstand the psychological impact of the policy.The surrender and rewards policy provided a way outfor disenchanted communists. This policy, combinedwith an effective food denial campaign andaggressive patrolling, reduced the communists to arabble more concerned with survival than withrevolution.Another strategic/operational psyops tool isterminology. In 1952, despite much politicalopposition, the Psywar Section 10 persuaded theauthorities to refer to the MRLA as the CommunistTerrorist Organisation (CTO). In one move thecommunists had gone from being a “LiberationArmy” to being a terrorist organisation, with all theassociated imagery and horror that the word“terrorist” conjures up in people. Also, the conflictwas always referred to as an emergency, with martiallaw never being declared. The military acted insupport of the police who retained primacy forcounter-terrorist activities. Therefore the terroristswere never given the legitimacy of being an army atwar. Instead the terrorists were outlaws fighting thepolice (who were ably assisted by the military).The final ingredient for success was theestablishment of joint civilian and military commandwith a unified purpose and common goals 11 . Bygiving clear psychological direction to the emergencythe British were able to seize and hold the moral highground which kept the communists from gaininglarge-scale support.This coordination of psychological aims and goalsserves as a reminder today that psychologicalcoordination must occur at the highest levels, for it isoften the psychological dimension of a campaign thatdecides how all other activities will follow. It is veryunlikely that the level of psychological success inMalaya could have been achieved if psyops had beenorganised at the tactical level alone. Without a unifiedpsychological approach, military victories at thetactical level could be squandered because of the lackof support or understanding at the strategic andoperational level by the population we seek to serve.A Failure to CoordinateThe dangers of failing to coordinate psyops weremade all too clear in Somalia following thecommencement of the second UN Operation inSomalia (UNOSOM II). During the operation US andUN officials never fully coordinated their “nationbuilding”activities 12 which resulted in a breakdown incommunication between the UN and the US forces.Elements from the US 4th Psyop Group were taskedwith producing and distributing psyops material insupport of the operation, and there came a pointwhere US officials decided that the actions of warlordGeneral Mohamed Farah Aideed could no longer betolerated. The psyops elements were then tasked tocarry out “character assassination” of Aideed in theirpsyops products.The problem was that at that time the UN wasprivately still negotiating with Aideed, and thesecontradicting activities only served to undermine eachother. Later, US President Bill Clinton, whilstmeeting with the families of the US Rangers killed inthe disastrous firefight against Aideed’s forces inOctober 1993, said that he was surprised that the UNwas still pursuing Aideed 13 . This constant inability ofthe US and the UN to coordinate their activities or to

46AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997implement a clear process for reconciliation inSomalia prompted the Somali people to view the UNand US actions as hostile. 14 The moral high groundhad been lost, and with it the support of the Somalipeople.ConclusionThis article has argued for the creation of a JointPsyops Unit within the ADF that would provide thenecessary psyops guidance and coordination that isrequired by doctrine but has been missing to date. Theproposed restructure of the Army has recognised theneed for psyops, but has given priority to tacticalpsyops over strategic and operational psyops. Thuswe are potentially left with the tail that wags the dog,and if this situation is not corrected pysops coulddevolve into a farce.Australian Army psyops have come a long way inthe last seven years. Thanks to much research,justification, planning and implementation we nowhave two tac psyops platoons that may be replaced bya greater number of smaller tac psyops teams. Theproposed allocation of psyops teams to each taskforce would be more beneficial than the existingsystem of having a tac psyops platoon per divisionbecause the task force commander would have aneffective behavioural-modification tool at his disposalthat could quickly be brought to hand. However, thetac psyops teams need direction, support and coordination,hence the need for the JPU.The ADF needs to remember that psyops is acomplete weapon system, not a collection ofweapons. Without higher control psyops couldcontradict itself and would run the risk of causingmore harm than good. By completing the structurewith a Joint Psyops Unit the ADF would complete theweapon that, in the eyes of Sun Tzu, is the acme ofmilitary achievement.NOTES1. Clavell, J. (Ed), The Art of War by Sun Tzu, Hodder andStoughton, 1981, p.7.2. R.H.S. Crossman, “Psychological Warfare”, in AustralianArmy Journal, No. 49, June 1953, p.11.3. Captain M.J. Davies, “Psychological Operations: Victoria PerMentem”, in Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 78September/October 1989, pp.16-22.4. MLW 1-2-10, Psychological Operations, 1987, para 301b.5. Major J.V. Rosenfeld and Colonel P.G. Warfe, “Moral andPhilosophical Challenges of a Medical Peacekeeping Missionin Rwanda”, in Australian Defence Force Journal, 118May/June 1996, p.39.6. Derry, A. Emergency in Malaya – The PsychologicalDimension, Psychological Operations Section – Joint WarfareWing, National Defence College UK, 1982, p.2.7. Ibid. p.3.8. Later Sir Hugh Greene, Director General of the BBC 1960-69.9. Derry, op cit., pp.3-4.10. During this period Psychological Operations were referred to as“Psywar” (Psychological Warfare). This term has fallen out offavour as it is seen as being limited to referring to thoseactivities solely aimed at the enemy, and it does not embracethe notion that psychological operations can be conductedagainst neutral and friendly audiences as well.11. Pimlott, J, (Ed) British Military Operations 1945-1984,Hamlyn/Bison, London, 1984, p.54.12. Clarke W. and Herbst J., “Somalia and the Future ofHumanitarian Intervention”, in Foreign Affairs, No.2,March/April 1996, pp.72-73.13. Ibid., p.72.14. Cloughley B., “Peace in Mind”, in James International DefenceReview, 3/1996, p.59.Corporal Cameron Jamison enlisted in the Army Reserve as an Infantryman in 1983 and later joined the ARA as an Air Dispatcher.In 1992 he transferred to Aust Int Corps. He has returned to the ARes and is currently posted to 2nd Division Intelligence Companyas a Psyops Specialist. He is in the final year of a BA (Communications) at UWS – Nepean.

Manoeuvre from the Sea – The Forgotten Force MultiplierBy Lieutenant Commander John P. Robinson, RAN“…the goal of Manoeuvre Warfare is toincapacitate an enemy: disrupting his fightingsystem (systemic disruption) by concentratingsuperior force against that element of his fightingsystem most likely to cause incapacitation”“…Maritime combat power can be projectedashore using manoeuvre from the sea throughorganic attack aircraft, submarine and surfacelaunched attack missiles, Naval Gunfire Support(NGS), amphibious forces and special forces”“....The ground combat function of manoeuvreseeks a position of advantage with respect to theenemy from which force can be threatened orapplied. An important role of maritime powerprojection forces, particularly amphibious forces,is to provide manoeuvre from the sea in thissense”– BR 1806 The Fundamentals of British MaritimeDoctrineIntroduction“…Manoeuvre Warfare theory is the intelligentuse of force and is a logical development of thePrinciples of War, particularly the principles ofsurprise, flexibility, concentration of force andeconomy of effort… Maritime forces have thecombination of mobility, firepower, flexibility andresponsive Command and Control systems thatare ideal for Manoeuvre Warfare 1 ”In this regard Manoeuvre from the sea provides aCommander with a versatile and flexible capabilitythat is responsive to changing requirements ashore.Whilst the deployment to and indeed into an Area ofOperations (AO), maybe undertaken by land, sea orair, or by any combination, the ability to conductManoeuvre operations within an AO from seaward,significantly increases the Commander’s range ofoptions. Of primary importance, is the enhanced levelof flexibility that operating from seaward confers. Inparticular it enables the Commander to respond in ameasured and decisive manner, capitalising on thecharacteristics of mobility, firepower, flexibility andresponsive Command and Control systems that areinherent to Maritime Forces.In his address to the International Institute forStrategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre on 3 May 1996 the Minister for Defence, TheHon Ian McLachlan, AO MP stated that:“Australia’s defence does not begin at our coastline.On the contrary, we cannot be secure if theregion is unstable. Defence is making a growingcontribution to our wider regional security aims.One of the issues we need to examine is how farthat particular role can and should be taken..Australia cannot be adequately defended only byguarding our territory and by merely looking onat the changes sweeping through Asia.” He wenton to say “as an island country Australia needs togive special emphasis on sea and air forces. Wewill work to improve our capacity to locate andrespond to potential aggressors in our maritimesurrounds. In terms of land forces, I recognise aneed to increase the flexibility and deployabilityof highly capable Army elements.”These statements, which have been consistentlyreiterated since then, provide an insight into theMinister’s perception of the way Australia’s Defencecapability may be revamped. It is also anacknowledgement of the need to develop an ADFcapability that is responsive and effective to a diverserange of possible scenarios within the region. Thesewould appear to range from threats to continentalAustralia and it’s offshore territories, to providingassistance and support to countries within the region.Paul Dibb, in a more recent article in the WeekendAustralian,entitled “Rethinking our Defence” statedthat:“In my view, the main arguments in favour ofchange to our defence policy are strategic. Sincethe 1994 Defence White Paper was issued by theprevious government, the strategic outlook in theAsia-Pacific region has become more uncertain,”and that“a slide in the regional order in the nextdecade would present Australia with a dangerousprospect.”In noting that whilst the Government’s Defencepriority continued to be to the defence of Australia, anexamination of our Strategic circumstances mightresult in the acquisition of “regional add-ons” to theforce structure 2 .

48AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Regardless of what might comprise “regionaladd-ons,” it will be vital for the credibility of theADF in the region, that the ADF is able to respondquickly and robustly to any situation. The ADF musttherefore aim to become multi-functional and withfinite resources, must ensure that these resources areoptimised and that every capability is maximised as aforce multiplier. A key force multiplier is the conductof Manoeuvre Warfare. As an “island country”, akey component of Manoeuvre Warfare is Manoeuvrefrom the Sea. Whilst the ADF has in recent yearsdeveloped a limited amphibious capability, it’s fullpotential as a significant Force Multiplier in thecontext of Manoeuvre from the Sea, has yet to berealised. The need to capitalise on the inherentversatility of Amphibious Warfare as part ofManoeuvre from the Sea was identified in an abstractof the following paper from the Naval War College,Newport;“Today’s amphibious doctrine faces seriouschallenges from modern technology and anincreasingly lethal battlefield. A possible solutionto the problems thus created rests in the newlyemerging concepts of maneuver warfare. Basedon the principles of rapid reaction to shiftingsituations and decentralised control, maneuverwarfare requires new tactics and techniques foramphibious landings. The new methods must beapplied in an operational context, where navaland land forces are closely integrated. Thisintegration demands new command relationshipsbased on the operational situation, not parochialinterests delineated by sea and land. Whilemaneuver warfare will require some fundamentalchanges in the Navy and Marine Corps approachto landing operations, it will significantly enhancethe flexibility and devastating impact that arehallmarks of amphibious warfare”. 3In a more recent article entitled OperationalManeuver from the Sea, General Charles C. Krulac,Commandant General, United States Marine Corpsstated that:“Our ability to influence events in such a fluidand dynamic world rests on the capabilities weaccrue in our armed forces. We must examine ourorganisations, our training, our equipment, andour institutional attitudes and set a deliberatecourse to cultivate the capabilities we will needtomorrow. Fundamentally, we must alter the waywe view warfare. We must leap forward in ourthinking, leap ahead organizationally, and leapover generations of accumulated hardware.In the 21st century, the Navy – Marine Corpsteam must field a more versatile, capable, andresponsive naval power-projection capability.Uncertainty and the tyranny of distance willrequire the United States to field navalexpeditionary forces that can execute missionsranging from humanitarian relief to high-intensityconflict. They must be capable of operations interrain anywhere from the open oceans to ThirdWorld urban slums. To do this , we need a forcethat blends high – technology and maneuverwarfare with the advantages of sea basing. Theserequirements have given rise to the U.S. MarineCorps’ new operational concept: OperationalManeuver from the Sea (OMFTS)...” 4Within Australia’s region, similar considerationsare equally relevant, where tasks and roles are likelyto be diverse and will be conducted over greatdistances. Whilst Australia does not have a“Navy/Marine’ team to undertake these tasks, there isnevertheless a need to have forces available which arecapable of responding quickly and effectively to arange of possible scenarios within the region.Australia’s geo-strategic situation dictates that suchforces need to be able to respond to tasks oncontinental Australia, the offshore territories and intothe region. In terms of operations being conducted oncontinental Australia, a major consideration must bethe protection of the coastal flank of an AO, giventhat the coastal flank is likely to be extensive andisolated. However, the coastal waters also provide theJoint Force Commander with the means, through theemployment of Manoeuvre from the Sea, with theability to conduct and support operations within theAO, from seaward. In terms of the ADF conductingamphibious operations in northern Australia, thetopography, especially in such isolated areas as CapeYork, Arnhem Land, the Kimberley’s and the Pilbara,poses enormous logistic and resupply problems toGround Forces. These difficulties become even morepronounced, during “the Wet” when many of themain tracks and roads throughout the northern regionare rendered impassable. During Exercise DiamondDollar in 1987, the Forward Arming & RefuellingPoint ( FARP ) could only be established ashore inthe Cape York area, by loading the full fuel bladdersonto LCH for transit to the coast before being liftedashore by Chinook helicopters. During OperationDesert Storm it was necessary for an Advance Forceof Combat Engineers and Infantry to secure andestablish a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for theApache helicopter gunships well forward of theadvancing Coalition Forces, prior to the assault onSaddam Husseins Republican Guard Divisions.How useful for the ADF to have a FOB that canrange along the seaward flank of an AO, or deploy as

MANOEUVRE FROM THE SEA – THE FORGOTTEN FORCE MULTIPLIER49Manoeuvre from the Searequired at the rate of 500 kms in 24hrs to supportoperations ashore. As an afloat Headquarters theCommander and his Sub-Unit Commanders are colocated,which greatly assists in the close coordinationand preparation of orders. The Commander, throughhis C4I facilities, retains flexibility by remainingresponsive to changes within the AO and is thereforeable to amend those orders, if required, to meet thechanged conditions ashore. Manoeuvre from the Sea,also provides the Commander with the ability toconduct concurrent operations into widely separatedlocalities within the AO to either secure objectives orin preparation for the prosecution of further tasks. Inview of the increased mobility and flexibility affordedby Manoeuvre from the Sea, this significant ForceMultiplier capability is worthy of serious reevaluationby the ADF. This is especially relevant, inview of the increased mobility now being sought byArmy. However, the implementation of a rapidresponse capability from seaward into an AO usinghelicopters as the primary means, would require theemployment of highly mobile combat troops withtheir own integral fire support weapons but supportedfrom seaward and from the air. These forces wouldneed to be well trained and highly capable if theywere to provide the level of responsiveness such acapability demands. They would in effect become“Marines” in all but name.The Army is therefore faced with the challenge ofdeveloping effective responses to a variety ofscenarios in a timely and robust manner. As far ascontinental Australia is concerned the Army not onlyhas the challenge of providing an effective defenceand response capability but must do so into a vast andrugged hinterland that is sparsely populated and haslimited infrastructure. In the offshore scenario, thereis a need to deploy, lodge and support a land forceonto isolated and distant territories. In similar style aresponse to provide support and/or assistance to aregional country to meet a variety of contingencieswill require mobility and the ability to remainresponsive to changing requirements. Such operationsmight be undertaken to secure an operating base, suchas an airhead, as a precursor to conducting furtheroperations. An effective means of responding to all ofthese scenarios will be through the deployment ofamphibious forces, conducting Manoeuvre from theSea. Whilst the ADF has developed and maintained alimited amphibious capability over the years, whichincluded the formation and later disestablishment of

50AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997the Australian Amphibious Squadron at HMASMoreton in Brisbane, it has never been fullydeveloped and its significant potential as a forceMultiplier has yet to be realised.It is considered that the development andapplication of such a useful Force MultiplierCapability is entirely relevant to a majority of ADFcontingencies and indeed should, as the “classic JointOperation” become a key element for the furtherdevelopment of this capability. Manoeuvre from theSea enables response forces to operate from seawardon a very fluid and mobile basis and to be supportedon a protracted basis if required.A key attribute of Maritime Power is Poise whichallows that ... “Once in theatre, maritime forces canremain on station for prolonged periods, eithercovertly or more openly. They can keep options openor signal political resolve, and act as a force fordeterrence or active coercion. Poise exploits mobility,versatility, sustained reach and lift capacity 5 .”The reader will no doubt be aware of variousoperations, that have been conducted in recent yearsin which the USN & USMC have conductedevacuations of US and other foreign nationals fromcountries experiencing a total breakdown of Law &Order.“...Operations ashore will usually be joint,requiring effective co-operation and a clearlyunderstood command structure. Contribution to aground campaign by specific manoeuvre operationsfrom seaward can be used for envelopment, turningmovements or infiltration and interdiction of keyvulnerability’s ashore. Poising afloat, powerprojection forces can provide distraction by tyingdown a disproportionate number of enemy forces indefending a coastline thus rendering themunavailable for other operations 6 (e.g embarked USMarine Force standing off Kuwait prior to thecommencement of the Ground War during OperationDesert Storm).”The full development of an Amphibiouscapability by the ADF has in recent years sufferedfrom both a lack of understanding as to the utility ofthis form of warfare as well as some deep seatedSingle Service reluctance to commit to this Jointcapability. Australian Amphibious doctrine hastherefore remained largely moribund and limited tothe conduct of occasional set-piece AmphibiousTactical Lodgments (ATL’s). This has greatlydetracted from the flexibility and force multipliercapability inherent to this style of operation. Whilstthe need to plan and prepare for set piece amphibiousoperations is not questioned, the opportunity shouldnow be taken to expand upon the concept ofManoeuvre from the Sea and to develop it as a keyADF Defence capability. Provided the correct level ofstrategic imperative was attached to the developmentof a more flexible and responsive form ofAmphibious capability than has hitherto been thecase, there is considerable potential to provide theADF with a significant responsive and flexiblecapability to meet a variety of scenarios. As theclassic “Joint Operation” it is wholly relevant toAustralia’s Defence and Geo-Strategic situationwithin the region, where flexibility and a high degreeof mobility and responsiveness is required.It is axiomatic that whilst Marines worldwide,well understand the business of operating ashore intoan AO from seaward, the ADF, which lacks such aforce, arguably has a significant need for such acapability. Whilst the formation of an AustralianMarine Corps would provide the core of an optimummobile and responsive capability able to operate fromseaward, Army has over the years consistently proventhat it is quite capable of operating effectively in anamphibious role. However, the Amphibious optionremains limited in its application and is somewhat the“Ugly Duckling” within the inventory of ADFMilitary options. In the current climate ofreassessment and review of strategic options it isconsidered essential that the role of the amphibiouscapability be fully re-examined from a strategicviewpoint, with a view to expanding its currentlimited utility to encompass Manoeuvre from the Sea.A full assessment must therefore be made as tothe extent to which amphibious warfare, as a functionon Manoeuvre Warfare, can contribute as a ForceMultiplier in the Defence of Australia and within theregion. Such a review must include the developmentof a concept of Amphibious operations as well as theapplication of resources and the training of thoseforces involved. The further development of anamphibious capability should however be centralisedunder an appropriate authority, and comprise aspecialist Joint Amphibious team to ensure that allaspects of this capability are fully addressed andcoordinated. This team would also be able to providethe necessary level of specialist Amphibious advice toall levels of Command and become the focal point forits future development.The need for an ADF amphibious capability to bemanaged on a Joint basis is further reinforced by theneed to coordinate the necessary input into a widevariety of amphibious related projects that arecurrently being processed. To be effective and viablethe development of all current and future projectsrelating to an amphibious capability must becoordinated to ensure that all aspects are considered

MANOEUVRE FROM THE SEA – THE FORGOTTEN FORCE MULTIPLIER 51as part of a total capability. Indeed, in the amphibiouscontext the total Ship-to-Shore requirement must beassessed, in order that a balanced capability,encompassing all air and surface resources, can bedeveloped. It is envisaged that the same would be trueof C4I as well as many other common-userrequirements.This is perhaps, not as formidable a task as mightfirst appear but would require that the utility ofManoeuvre from the Sea be essentially acknowledgedas a strategic capability and that the profile ofAmphibious Warfare be significantly raised byaffording it the level of strategic importance that itmerits. It would then be possible to develop an ADFconcept of Amphibious operations, which capitalisedon the flexibility afforded by such operations.In terms of resources, the ADF has longmaintained a limited amphibious capability, throughthe employment of such Naval units as HMASTobruk, HMAS Jervis Bay, the LCHs and NLE,whilst Army has maintained the LCM 8s andLARCs. However, it is in regard to the acquisitionand development of their successors, such as the twonewly acquired LSTs (HMAS Kanimbla andManoora), that all factors pertaining to theiremployment must be considered to ensure that interms of Manoeuvre from the Sea, a total capability isdeveloped. It should be noted that a significant Jointcapability existed prior to the dis-establishment of theAustralian Amphibious Squadron, when theSquadron was located in Brisbane with 6 Bde. Theproximity of HMAS Moreton to Enoggera ArmyBarracks enabled a considerable level of joint trainingand staff planning to be conducted. This resulted in ahigh level of interoperability and rapport beingachieved between all involved Army and Navalelements.ConclusionThe progression by many countries, towards amore responsive and integrated Joint Forcecomprising a balanced force structure is indicative ofthe reliance now being placed upon the mobility andspeed of response, afforded by Manoeuvre Warfareand in particular Manoeuvre from the Sea. In terms ofmaximising military options available to the ADF, ineither responding to, or pre-empting an incursion ontoAustralian territory, it is considered that the versatilityand Force Multiplier effect afforded by Manoeuvrefrom the Sea, is a capability that the ADF can nolonger afford to ignore. The ability to conduct limitedamphibious operations in set piece scenarios has beenconsistently proven by the ADF since Exercise K81but its full potential as a highly versatile andresponsive “Modus Operandi” has yet to be realised.However, for the ADF to acquire such a capability,will require that the development of AmphibiousWarfare be taken out of the Single Service arena andits future development guided by an appropriateAmphibious Authority.The window of opportunity to develop this latentcapability is now open and should be taken.The concept of Manoeuvre from the Sea as afunction of short warning conflict and or contingencysituations would provide the ADF with an enhancedcapability to respond effectively to a wide variety ofpossible scenarios. Manoeuvre from the Sea affordsthe Joint Force Commander with the ability to use thecoastal flank of a landward AO for manoeuvre,whereby elements of his force can be inserted,reinforced or redeployed from the sea. That hisForward Support Base can range hundreds ofkilometres along a coastline in 24 hours to supportoperations ashore speaks volumes for the flexibilityand logistic sustainment such a capability provides. Interms of any increase to Defence involvement withinthe region, the same attributes remain valid andindeed are enhanced by the significant forcemultiplier effect such capabilities would bring tomany areas of the region. This is especially true ofisolated areas that are lacking in infrastructure andsupport facilities. It is therefore considered to be ofthe utmost strategic importance that the versatility andlatent capability of a Sea-borne Joint Force capable ofproviding either military or humanitarian assistance,be recognised. The ability to undertake suchoperations, is however dependent upon theavailability of appropriate naval and other assignedforces, with suitable amphibious and C4I capability.Whilst landing craft will always be required for themovement of heavier equipment and logistic resupplyashore, either through a Port or over a suitable beachas a LOTS operation, the primary means ofmovement ashore will be by helicopter. Helicoptersprovide the Commander with the most versatile andresponsive movement capability but requires that allof the helicopter force is suitably marinised, so thatthey are able to support operations ashore on a fluidand highly responsive basis. Under these broaderconditions Amphibious operations would be similarto Airmobile operations, except that they would bemounted and supported, from the sea. A high level ofamphibious planning and training would however berequired to ensure that such operations could beplanned and conducted on a fluid and responsivebasis. Whilst this capability may not be relevant to

52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997every future ADF contingency, it is considered that asthe “classic Joint Operation,” Manoeuvre from theSea provides the ADF with a sound basis forconducting a number of ADF Joint Operations. Asarguably the most complex of all Joint Operationsand requiring the greatest levels of integration at alllevels, this capability is regarded as vital. Manoeuvrefrom the Sea should therefore be adopted as a keyADF strategic capability, to ensure that the ADF isable to respond quickly and effectively to anypotential contingency that might arise within theregion in the foreseeable future.“Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategicasset that a sea power possesses”.(Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart , Deterrence orDefence (1960))NOTES1. BR 1806 The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 4.2. Weekend Australian, May 18 1996, Rethinking our Defence,Paul Dibb.3. Blitzkrieg from the Sea: Maneuver Warfare and AmphibiousOperations, Captain Richard S. Moore. United States MarineCorps, Naval War College, Newport, RI (May 1983).4. Operational Maneuver from the Sea, by General Charles C.Krulak, Commandant General United States Marine Corps.Proceedings (January 1997).5. The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 3.6. The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine CH 5.This article first appeared in the Journal of the Australian NavalInstitute.Lieutenant Commander John Robinson joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1985, after 18 years service with the Royal Marines(RM). During his Royal Marines service he served as an Instructor at Commando School RM (1968-1971), Commanded SupportWeapons Troops (Anti-Tank) in 40 Cdo RM (1971 -1973), and (Mortar) 42 Cdo RM ( 1973 - 1976).Qualified as Primary Forward Air Controller to 3 Commando Brigade RM, and appointed OC 611 TACP (1976-1979), CommandedRM Security Detachment Clyde Submarine Base Scotland (1979-1980). Appointed Second-in-Command and Operations Officer,Commachio Company (CT), Arbroath, Scotland (1980-1982). Posted on Exchange to AJWE as RM Amphibious Instructor(1982-1984). On return to UK, he was posted as Adjutant and Second in Command of Royal Marines, Deal, UK (1985).He has undertaken operational tours of duty in The Middle East, Northern Ireland and Belize and training exercises in many othercountries around the world. Since joining the RAN he has served with JEPS (1986-1988) (1992), graduated from the Naval StaffCollege (1988), appointed to Directorate of Naval Operations (DNO) as Staff Officer Joint Warfare (SOJW) then as Director JointWarfare Navy (DJW-N) (1988-1991). Appointed to Directorate of Submarine Policy and Warfare (DSMPW) as Assistant Director(ADSMPW) (Jan 1993 - Dec 1996).Lieutenant Commander Robinson is currently serving as the Staff Officer Support Forces in DGFD (Sea) with special responsibilityfor Joint Project 2048 - LPA Watercraft.

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54AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Surface combatants from six regional nations joined with Australian units in fleet concentrationperiod Kakadu II in 1995.

The Place of the Surface Combatant in Regional NavalDevelopment 1975-96By David Stevens, Department of DefenceIntroductionOver the last two decades the South-East Asianregion has confirmed its reputation as an area ofmajor maritime importance. Not only do significantinternational sea lanes connecting the Indian Oceanand the Western Pacific pass through it, but the regionstill contains enormous untapped resources.Moreover, by carrying the vast bulk of trade andcommunication the sea holds a central place in nearlyall regional economies. These economies includesome of the most dynamic in the world and some ofthe few maintaining or increasing levels of militaryspending. Particular issues of maritime securityconcern include boundary disputes, conflicting claimsto offshore territories and resources, and problemswith piracy, drug smuggling, refugees, marine safetyand illegal fishing. This varied combination means ofcourse that issues of national defence are often hard toseparate from the many other uses that are made ofthe maritime environment. Further complicating thesituation, is the interest that countries outside theregion have in the protection of maritime tradepassing through it and the fact that there are nogeneral security arrangements in place, nor even ajoint approach to matters such as sea lane protection.Despite this apparent hotchpotch of coastguardand naval missions the prime function of regionalnavies has been and will remain to protect nationalsovereignty against seaborne threats. What tends todiffer is the emphasis in how these threats areinterpreted and the assets available to respond.Though in the past suffering from the disproportionateresources devoted to armies – which wereoften seen as the only forces capable of preservingterritorial integrity – regional navies have maderemarkable progress in the last twenty years.Specifically, several have taken steps to acquire moreindependent and comprehensive warfightingcapabilities and in the process graduate fromconstabulary to offshore and trade defence roles.Against this background of increasing capabilityand independence, this article aims to briefly examinehow the role of surface combatants has developed inregional navies over the last twenty years. They havebeen chosen because, unlike submarines – whichthough often planned have seldom been delivered –surface forces have remained a core element ofregional force structures. Surface combatants not onlyprovide the basic requirements of security at sea but,as the most visible and flexible of maritime assets, aremost likely to be on the scene in times of crisis, andthrough their acquisition, modification orenhancement provide a useful window into the moregeneral intentions of nations.ConstraintsThere are some obvious limitations in acomparative examination of regional navaldevelopment. Divergent historical experience forexample, may produce different naval policies innations with outwardly similar geographic positionand status. Thus the Philippines and Indonesia, twoarchipelagic nations, have developed completelydifferent force structures. More fundamentally, someforces, like those possessed by Singapore, boast stateof the art technology, while at the other end of thespectrum, developing nations such as Cambodia andVietnam have had little to spare for basic platforms,let alone high budget equipment. Similarly, issues ofinfrastructure and training standards might easilyprovide a widely differing perspective of capability,while the important role of self-interest groups meansthat there will undoubtedly be other than purelystrategic factors influencing acquisition decisions.Finally, the unique nature of the Asian maritimeenvironment itself means that the determinants ofnaval development frequently interact in ways thatare singular to the region.Clearly it would be an oversimplification tosuggest that all regional maritime forces weredeveloping at either the same pace, to achieve thesame milestones or even in response to the sameinfluences. As James Goldrick, author of the mostrecent and sophisticated analysis of regional navies

56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997has pointed out, the essential difficulty of acomparative analysis lies in identifying theparameters for measurement. 1 Despite theselimitations it is nevertheless possible to identify somekey elements shaping maritime force structures andthere are sufficient similarities to make an overallview of the region a worthwhile exercise. Thus,though reference will continue to be made toindividual navies it is not intended to fully discusseach in turn. Instead a broader approach will be takenin an attempt to understand these more generaldriving forces.The ThreatNotwithstanding maritime traditions stretchingback hundreds of years, in 1975, when the regionwitnessed the last act in the prolonged struggle forVietnam, most navies in the South-East Asian regionwere in only a limited stage of development. Thoughsome such as the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) had beenindependent for a considerable period they hadcontinued to operate under the implied or explicitumbrella provided by an external power, usuallyeither the United States or Britain. 2 Because the needto develop a blue-water capability was not yetparamount, maritime forces for the most part wererestricted to coastal operations and constabulary roles.The frigates or corvettes that were in service had beenobtained largely as gifts, or on extremely favourableterms, and were often of Second World War vintage,lacking in capability and laborious to operate. Assetsmore recently procured were usually of patrol boatsize and though fitted with more capable equipmentand armament – in particular surface-to-surfacemissiles (SSM) – the technical and tactical skills tooperate these vessels effectively would take time toacquire. Furthermore, the formulation of strategy anddoctrine remained essentially reactive and for themost part navies focussed on the sea denial role,hoping that well-armed light forces would be capableof defending or interdicting focal areas by holdingtheir own against larger forces.For the members of the Association of South-EastAsian nations (ASEAN), and in effect the majority ofWestern orientated nations, the only conceivablesource of direct external aggression was one of thecommunist powers. Only the Soviet Union possessedthe naval resources to launch or sustain a seriousattack by sea, but China with its large army andhistorical support of insurgent movements, had longbeen perceived as a far greater menace. Vietnam toohad been a continuing source of concern, particularlyafter its occupation of Kampuchea in 1978 anddomination of Laos, but again this threat wouldalmost certainly have come from an overland assault,the maritime component being limited to tacticaldiversions. Certainly, while the Vietnamese andChinese navies remained relatively weak thearchipelagic states had little to fear from amphibiousoperations. Even in the event of lesser levels ofconflict, or the contesting of conflicting maritimeclaims, there remained the background knowledgethat the United States was still maintaining a powerfulregional naval presence, making serious escalationunlikely.However, after the American defeat in Indochinathe Soviet Union began making concerted attempts toexpand its regional influence through diplomacy andnaval presence. The Pacific Fleet received priority inthe acquisition of increasingly larger and morecapable ships and by the mid-1980s it was the largestTable 1. Regional surface combatants 1975 - numbers and average ageFrigates Corvettes Fast attack Large patrol Coastal patrol(average age) (average age) craft - missile craft craft(average age) (average age) (average age)Brunei - - 1 (8) - 6 (2)Indonesia 12 (16) 16 (24) 12 (15) 51 (15) 2 (1)Malaysia 2 (17) - 8 (5) 24 (10)Philippines 1 (32) - - 19 (24) 24 (6)Singapore - - 6 (2) 7 (6) 4 (20)Thailand 7 (12) 14 (36) - 13 (12) 18 (10)Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1975–76

THE PLACE OF THE SURFACE COMBATANT IN REGIONAL NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 1975-96 57Table 2. Regional surface combatants 1985 - numbers and average ageFrigates Corvettes Fast attack Large patrol Coastal patrol(average age) (average age) craft - missile craft craft(average age) (average age) (average age)Brunei - - 3 (6) - 6 (6)Indonesia 12 (20) - 4 (5) 16 a (22) 8 (9)Malaysia 4 (7) - 8 (9) 27 (17) -Philippines 7 (42) 10 (41)- - 13 (19) 73 (11)Singapore - - 6 (12) 6 (14) 12 (4)Thailand 6 (27) - 6 (7) 25 (19) 33 (8)a. Four of these vessels were listed as corvettes in 1975Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1985–86of the four Soviet fleets. Out of area deploymentswere frequent and of particular concern to theASEAN nations was the Soviet use of Cam RanhBay in Vietnam as a naval and air base, and thepossibility that India might allow similar basingprivileges in the Nicobar or Andaman Islands near theentrance to the Strait of Malacca. Though the Sovietdeployments could be seen as strategically defensiveand were not overtly aggressive, doubts over theirintentions remained and these were not allayed byclear demonstrations of a willingness to use force.Incidents such as the destruction of a Korean airlinerby Soviet air defences in 1983 simply served tofurther strain relations and strengthen the case forregional military expenditure.Over a similar period a parallel maritimeexpansion became apparent in the Chinese Navy(PLA-N). After years of concentration on coastalcraft, in the early 1970s the PLA-N began to alter itsforce structure, curtailing patrol boat constructionwhile accelerating the building of larger surfacecombatants such as the ‘Luda’ class guided missiledestroyers. Though these developments could be seensimply as a direct response to Soviet moves, theincrease in Chinese capability also had obviousimplications for the wider region. Throughout the1980s the Chinese were able to maintain relativelylarge production runs of destroyers and frigates.Though still of comparatively uncomplicated designs,by fitting both indigenous and foreign sourcedequipment these vessels were able to field crediblecapabilities in many areas of naval warfare. Like theSoviets, the Chinese also demonstrated theirwillingness to use force and employed their warshipsin action against the Vietnamese on several occasionsduring the 1980s.Even in isolation these developments would nodoubt have caused a regional response. However,they were combined with clear signals from theUnited States that it expected regional nations to takeadequate measures for their own defence, thereduction or elimination of insurgent threats tointernal security, and the growing economic strengthof the region. Perhaps even more significant, were themajor changes in maritime regimes brought about bythe 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,under which most regional nations gained extensiveoffshore resource zones.Most recently the region has witnessed the effectsof the collapse of the Soviet Union and in particularthe wholesale deterioration of the ex-Soviet Pacificfleet. Though this is a change of major strategicsignificance and has virtually removed the possibilityof a threat from that direction, in Asia-Pacific terms itmust be seen in the context of the PLA-N’simproving capacity to project power into disputedterritorial waters and the perceived draw down ofUnited States forces in the region. In the opinion ofmany analysts the previous, and relativelycomfortable, bipolar balance of power has beenreplaced by an atmosphere of uncertainty. The oftenexpressed fear is that a power vacuum now exists,with the region in consequence becoming morecomplex, multipolar and increasingly volatile. Eventsover the past year in the South China Sea 3 and TaiwanStrait 4 do nothing to contradict this view and anyconflict that does occur in the future will almostcertainly have a dominant maritime dimension.

58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997Changes in Security EmphasisThe net effect of the influences noted has been achange in security emphasis, and in particular a moveaway from the threat of internal insurgency and landassault and towards self-reliance in maritime security.The balance of defence budgets has undoubtedlytilted towards maritime capabilities and this has had adirect impact on the types of platforms and systemsbeing acquired. These transformations can beidentified throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but areespecially apparent within South-East Asia.Singapore’s continuing economic growth forexample, has allowed the acquisition of modernweapons in all three branches of the defence forces,but after years as the ‘third man’ the progressiveexpansion of the maritime forces is particularlynotable. Indeed it has recently been observed that,with the possible exception of the Philippines andBrunei, all ASEAN navies now possess assets thathave allowed a shift from the more traditional tobroader maritime tasks. 5The role of navies as a national symbol is wellknown within the region and there is no doubt anelement of international prestige and status in regionalnaval development. Nevertheless, the surfacecombatants in service today show a vast improvementin capability over those of only twenty years ago.This is apparent not only in terms of weaponry, butalso in an increased ability to gather, process and acton information. Especially when integrated withmaritime patrol aircraft and national strategicsystems, a modern vessel of frigate size is able tomaintain an operational horizon out to at least 200miles. Moreover, through advances in data handlingand automation a contemporary warship normallyoffers far easier handling than its predecessors,making their introduction into regional inventories farless intimidating and in many functions reducing thetime required to achieve operational effectiveness.Though there remain what have been aptly describedas ‘supermarket’ style acquisitions – for exampleIndonesia’s procurement of a large number of ex-EastGerman vessels in 1993 – capability expansion ingeneral reflects operational realities and considerableadvances have been made in the formulation ofindigenous strategy and doctrine.Regionally, one of the first imperatives has beento include the protection of offshore assets andresources in addition to the traditional defence ofports and coastlines. Though this responsibility doesnot necessarily require highly capable ships, it doesrequire units able to readily respond to third partydetections, maintain a presence and demonstrategraduated force if necessary. Earlier force structureswere for the most part unsuitable, since inadequatelong-range sensors, low-endurance and poor seakeepingqualities meant that patrol boats could notventure far from a friendly coast and would certainlybe ineffective in the boundary regions of an exclusiveeconomic zone (EEZ). The acquisition of largersurface units provides a more versatile alternative,allowing most of these limitations to be addressedwhile also providing for the better surveillanceinherent in a more stable platform and the option of ahelicopter capability.In this context Malaysia is a particularly goodexample of a nation attempting to cope with theproblem of a territory fragmented by water and withmaritime forces trying to fulfil both naval andcoastguard roles. Prior to the 1980s the RoyalMalaysian Navy (RMN) possessed only a fewfrigates and missile-armed fast attack craft. Though inpractical terms simply the nucleus of a warfightingforce, in conjunction with a force of riverine patrolcraft this was sufficient while the Western alliancemaintained its naval presence. However, afterMalaysia had declared her 200 nm EEZ in 1980, theRMN found itself handed responsibility for policingthis vast area in addition to the defence of sovereignterritory. Funds became available for expansion andnew capabilities and for a brief period in the mid-1980s the RMN was the fastest growing navy in Asia.The acquisition of new capabilities has not beenwithout difficulties but the RMN has at least beenassisted in its expansion by the more general nationalplan to industrialise. Navies are technologicallyorientated and like other regional navies the RMN hasfound that the continuing push for industrialisationbrings with it an improving capacity to operate andmaintain sophisticated systems. The dilemma offinding a proper balance between the constabularyand warfighting roles remains but a partial solution isbeing sought in the RMN’s current plan for a largebuy of offshore patrol vessels. 6 These craft will becapable of a flexible and graduated response, fittedwith a full combat system, helicopter and guns, butretaining space and weight for anti-ship and antiaircraftmissiles.With less extensive littoral zones Singapore’smaritime security problems tend to be less complexthan those of Malaysia. Yet Singapore has long feltthat its small size, and hence lack of defensive depth,requires the ability to detect and challenge potentialthreats well beyond its borders. Patrol boats armed

THE PLACE OF THE SURFACE COMBATANT IN REGIONAL NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 1975-9659with SSM initially filled this role but, while thesepacked a powerful punch in anti-surface operations,they invariably lacked the command and controlfacilities for coordinated operations with other navaland air assets and could do virtually nothing tocontribute in more specialised areas of warfare. As theexperience of the Iraqi Navy during the 1991 Gulf Warclearly demonstrated, without an anti-air capabilitystrike-craft are extremely vulnerable. Similarly withoutan anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability there islittle that can be done to protect either your own craftor an escorted vessel against submarines. 7In addressing perceived shortfalls, increasingcapability has sometimes been seen in terms ofproviding more ‘reach’ to maritime forces and hencethe danger of provoking a neighbouring response.There have certainly been fears expressed of aregional arms race, however, in reality, the emphasishas not been so much on force projection as on theprotection of shipping. Thus, the Singaporean Navy,having decided that its area of direct interest coveredthe length of the Strait of Malacca and out to 500miles in other directions, began planning its ‘SeaLines of Communication’ strategy in the early 1980s.By 1986 the decision had been made to build largersurface combatants, notably the six Victory Classcorvettes. Commissioned between 1990 and 1991these vessels were a considerable advance over theprevious Sea Wolf class missile boats, incorporating afull combat data system, variable depth sonar andASW torpedoes. In 1996 a further advance incapability was taken with the decision to fit thecorvettes with the Israeli ‘Barak’ air defence missile.Thailand, with its unusual coastline is faced withspecial difficulties in maritime security, but is anothergood example of a regional nation engaged in a wellcalculatednaval expansion program. On paper theRTN has been numerically strong for many years butin practical terms has been hampered by the shortrange and lack of capability possessed by the majorityof its forces. Operational concepts originally focussedon the requirement for the close defence of the Gulfof Thailand and eastern seaboard. Though occasionalforays would be made into the Gulf, patrols generallyremained within 15–20 miles of the coast. 8 Threemodern general purpose frigates were acquiredbetween 1971-74, followed by missile-armed fastattack craft in the late 1970s. With continualmodernisation increasingly sophisticated weaponsand sensors have been fitted to these units, whilebetween 1991 and 1996 six Chinese design frigateswere added as a cheap training force with somecombatant capability.Some confusion as regards naval roles andresponsibilities was apparent in the late 1980s but,like Singapore, Thailand has now recognised that herlong-term survival depends on the uninterrupted flowof trade. As firm evidence of this increasing interestin maritime security, Thailand has embarked on amuch more ambitious naval program, centred on asmall aircraft carrier due to commission in 1997.Though its main tasks are said to be SARcoordination and EEZ surveillance, the capability toembark VSTOL aircraft clearly goes far towardscreating a blue-water force able to exercise limitedsea control on both the east and west coasts. Nowjustified as a force that should be capable of bothresource protection and trade defence the RTN maywell provide a clear signpost to future maritimedefence developments in the region.Table 3. Regional surface combatants 1995 - numbers and average ageFrigates Corvettes Fast attack Large patrol Coastal patrol(average age) (average age) craft - missile craft craft(average age) (average age) (average age)Brunei - - 3 (16) - 6 (16)Indonesia 17 (27) 16 (12) 4 (15) 16 (16) 25 (5)Malaysia 4 (6) 2 a (10) 8 (16) 27 b (25 -Philippines 1 (52) 10 (51)- - 5 (4) 34 (9)Singapore - 6 (4) 7 (18) 6 (24) 8 (14)Thailand 13 (22) 5 (5) 6 (18) 17 (20) 35 (23)a. Listed as frigates in 1985b. Includes two offshore patrol vesselsSource: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1995-96

60AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997ConclusionsThe future security demands of the Asia-Pacificregion are essentially maritime in nature and withmany regional nations possessing the economicresources to take positive action there are anincreasing number of what might be termed‘medium’ maritime powers, capable of limited seacontrol operations outside their immediate coastalregions. This development has come about through ageneral requirement to detect and react to anadversary in the maritime approaches and the needfor each nation at least to be capable of activelyprotecting and exploiting its own EEZ.Regional navies have shown a steady growthsince 1975 and now expect to undertake a far broaderrange of maritime missions increasingly utilising theirown unique strategy and doctrine. The role of surfacecombatants is central to this revised maritime outlook,for they are highly visible assets able to provide avariety of response options across the entire spectrumof peace and conflict operations. Further quantitativeand qualitative improvements can be expected inregional navies as they attempt to maintain or achievebalanced fleets and answer the ever increasingdemands within their maritime jurisdictions.NOTES1. Recognising the limitations inherent in a simple comparison ofnumbers Goldrick instead uses a hierarchy of naval capabilityto act as a framework for the measurement of trends. See,J.V.P. Goldrick, ‘Developments in regional maritime forces:force structure’, in Australia’s Maritime Bridge into Asia, S.Bateman & D. Sherwood eds., Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995.2. Britain announced its decision to withdraw its force east ofSuez in 1969 and though it has maintained naval deploymentsto the Far East on a regular basis the last major warshipspermanently based in the region were withdrawn in the mid-1970s.3. China’s occupation of Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.4. China undertook live firing exercises in an apparent attempt tointimidate Taiwan.5. Goldrick, p. 106. Though even Brunei is now planning toacquire corvettes with SAM and SSM capabilities.6. See for example J.N. Mak ‘The maritime priorities ofMalaysia’, in Maritime Change Issues for Asia R. Babbage andS. Bateman eds., Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993.7. During the next 10 years Asia is expected to be the dominantworldwide market for submarines. Defense News, November18-24, 1996, p. 10.8. J. Morgan and D. Fryer, ‘Defense’, in Marine Policy inSoutheast Asia, G. Kent and M. Valencia eds, University ofCalifornia Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 259.David Stevens is the Director of Naval Historical Studies in the Maritime Studies Program. Prior to this appointment he had servedfor 20 years with the RAN, including time as the anti-submarine warfare officer onboard HMA Ships Yarra and Hobart and onexchange in HMS Hermione. Other postings included attachment to the Staff of the Commander of the RAN Task Group during the1990-91 Gulf War and three years in HQADF Development Division. In 1992 he graduated from the ANU with a Masters Degree inStrategic Studies.

Book ReviewsLODGE IN VIETNAM: A PATRIOT ABROAD:byAnneBlair. YaleUniversityPress, New Haven,1995, xv, 200 P. : Ill., Maps; 24CM.Reviewed by Michael FogertyHenry Cabot Lodge, Jr., (1902-1985); Americanstatesman; scion of a patrician Massachusetts family;was elected to first of three terms as Republicansenator in 1936; was army combat officer in WWII;served as ambassador to UN from 1953 to 1960,when he became Richard Nixon’s running mate inNixon’s unsuccessful first campaign for thepresidency, was ambassador to South Vietnam (1963-64, 1965-67) when war there was escalating; laterwas one of succession of U.S. representatives atprotracted peace talks in Paris. [Adapted from 1985Current Biography Year Book].This publication was originally prepared as a Ph.Dthesis in History at Monash University in 1992 –where the author currently teaches as a researchfellow. The dissertation was based on US Governmentand Saigon embassy documents obtained under theUS Freedom of Information Act, the Lodge Paperscollection (opened 1989) and interviews withAmerican, Vietnamese and Australian officials whoserved with Ambassador Lodge on Vietnam duties inWashington and Saigon, 1963-1967.While one might normally expect such a book tobe written by an American researcher, perhaps closerto the actual years and the main players, its Australianauthor has produced a clearly written work ofawesome scholarship and penetrating analysis –showing an adroit understanding of public policy. Sheskillfully interprets the various challenges Lodgefaced and explains why in response he acted as hedid. Here Dr Blair provides a dramatic and lucidaccount of Lodge and his steward-ship of the USmission in Vietnam during those fateful years. Anoddity – a republican in a Democratic administrationkeen to demonstrate its political bi-partisanship onVietnam.Despite being jointly located in American studiesgroup, it also has an Australian angle – briefly for thecameo appearances by an army officer (ColonelFrancis Serong) and a diplomat (the late BruceWoodberry). Futhermore, the author notes that “…theAustralian embassy had good relations with Diem.”For this reason, the book will be obvious relevance inappealing to many Australians whose experience ofVietnam also traversed that period.The book describes the anguish of the USadministration in formulating an effective foreignpolicy towards the war. Crime writer James Ellroywould have categorised that history as “…the privatenightmare of public policy.” However, to be fair toboth Ellroy and the decision-makers, the authorcontends that the absence of any coherent policy wasitself the problem. In his desperation, Kennedycommissioned numerous high-level visits to Vietnamin search of a policy. “The fact-finding missions,however, were a symptom of Kennedy’s impatiencewith Vietnam, combined with his desire to delay amajor policy review of America’s aims there.”All this was not helped by the competing rivalriesbetween the various agencies who should have cooperatedtogether in prosecuting the war rather thanfighting each other. “…(Lodge) did not understand,or wish to learn about, the management skillsnecessary to a modern ambassador in charge of alarge overseas team.” In simpler terms, Johnsonregarded him a dilettante. Dr Blair’s book alsoprovides the required ballast in Vietnam studies.There are many worthy books covering militaryaspects of the war but this book corrects the balance.Here we have a path-breaking contribution whichexamines the diplomatic and strategic dimensions ofUS foreign policy in Indo China during thoseformative years.Primarily, this book remains a fascinating politicalbiography of Lodge in his diplomatic career – hisVietnam days. It is also a compelling psychologicalstudy of Lodge for his skill in managing publicopinion. To be sure, Lodge retained presidentialambitions and he strongly lobbied for a high levelappointment to demonstrate his anti-Communistcredentials. Ambassador Lodge’s appointment wascontroversial for his role in Diem’s ouster. The authorwrites of his influence in large brush strokes – leavingno doubt to his legacy. Dr Blair develops herargument with excitement and the necessary tensiondescribing the background to the major foreign policydecisions taken at critical periods during the Lodgemissions.The book is a success in that the author does notcarry any identifiable ideological baggage – showingonly hard research and sound conclusions. Dr Blairstates that Lodge was out of his depth in Vietnam.Yet curiously, in the same breath, she argues that

62AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997“…(I)n his Vietnam assignments, Lodge was a figureof immense authority and prestige. It is a pity, then,that his authority and noble aspirations on which itwas based did not represent more coherent and betterjudgedpolicies.”It may have been for this reason that Lodge pushedto be drafted for the Paris peace talks in 1969. Onewriter observed that he was given no chance tosucceed. “He had been undermined repeatedly by theadministration’s own efforts at outside secret talks.Despite all of Lodge’s attempts to achieve progress inParis, Nixon and Kissinger had reduced his efforts toa mere charade. They had made use of Lodge’scredibility and reputation, and then deliberatelyenfeebled his authority to carry out the assignmentproperly.” (See Kent G. Sieg, ‘The Lodge PeaceMission of 1969 and Nixon’s Vietnam Policy’,“Diplomacy and Statecraft”, volume 7, March, 1996,number 1.This is one of the ironies of this book. Surely, it isa boutique publication which targets a givenacademic audience yet it deserves a wider audience –it is written in such a fashion and style that willengage the attention of anyone fortunate to read it. Itshould go beyond the campus and standard libraryorders. Where once we did not understand thoseportentous events here the author painfully tells uswhy so many countries became involved to the extentthey did. This book is highly recommended as avaluable contribution to the literature and for generalreading overall.NEW ZEALAND AND THE KOREAN WARVOLUME II COMBAT OPERATIONS: by IanMcGibbon. Oxford University Press, Auckland,1996.Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel G.J. Harper,RNZAECIn 1993 Ian McGibbon’s first volume of theofficial history of New Zealand’s involvement in theKorean War was published to wide acclaim. Subtitled“Politics and Diplomacy”, it was regarded by manycommentators to have been the best book yetproduced on New Zealand’s defence and foreignpolicy. McGibbon’s second volume of the history,that dealing with combat operations, was eagerlyawaited.In Volume II of the history McGibbon hasproduced the definitive account of New Zealand’scombat experience in Korea. Despite it beingMcGibbon’s first work of military history at theoperational and tactical level, he has handled the taskwith great dexterity. Every major and minor operationof 16 Field Regiment, the main New Zealand Armyunit sent to Korea, is covered here and McGibbon haspieced its story together from a wide range of sources.Not forgotten either are the other units – the transportcompanies, signallers and so on. Also prominent isthe story of the New Zealand naval presence – wheretwo frigates of the RNZN were part of themonotonous, lengthy and arduous UN blockade ofNorth Korea.Despite the relatively long duration of the NewZealand combat forces in Korea – from August 1950– November 1954 – there were few high points. Themain two were the battles of Kap’yong and MaryangSan (Hill 317), and historians will not find any betteraccounts of these battles than is featured here. Yet forthe New Zealanders most of the war involved staticoperations of supporting units established on existingpositions and stalemate. The nature of the conflict andthe type of unit sent to Korea – a deliberate decisionby the New Zealand Government – was reflected inthe low-level of casualties making Korea the leastcostly of all major conflicts in which New Zealandhas been involved.Although every significant action has been piecedtogether from a variety of sources and McGibbon hasa fluid and easy writing style, the stalemated nature ofthe war, the type of unit sent and the small-scale ofNew Zealand’s commitment to Korea does notnecessarily make for exciting reading.In fact some of the most interesting parts of thisbook do not relate to combat operations at all. Theselection process for “Kayforce”, as the Armydeployment was called, makes fascinating reading.Among those selected for active service from theinitial flood of volunteers in August 1950 was a mansuffering from broken ribs, a Tongan overstayer, aboy of sixteen years of age, and a man recentlyreleased on parole from a mental institution.In a chapter on coalition warfare is an account ofhow New Zealanders interacted with their UN allies.It is little wonder that between the New Zealandersand Australians there developed a “special bond”although most outsiders could not recognise it. Asone New Zealander wrote home every timeAustralian and New Zealand troops met there were“volleys of hard words, mud, water, old eggs oranything throwable. The other UN forces think weare crazy, but actually we are the only troops whohave such a strong bond of comradeship and that’sour way of showing it”. Not understanding this closerelationship, an American soldier witnessing someKiwi soldiers abusing Australians stated, “Gee! Youguys sure don’t like one another!” while a seniorBritish officer once ordered that only politeexchanges of greeting were to be permitted between

BOOK REVIEWS63the New Zealand and Australian Army drivers. Bothsides immediately complied and produced suchlengthy, time consuming and sickly greetingsbetween each other (“Felicitations, my Antipodeanbrother!”) that all concerned were soon ordered toreturn to the older and much healthier forms ofaddress.This meticulously researched and very readableaccount of New Zealand’s combat operations inKorea has filled an important gap in New Zealand’smilitary history. It has been well worth the wait.STILL THE SAME: Reflections on active servicefrom Bardia to Baidoa, compiled and edited byGarth Pratten & Glyn Harper, Army DoctrineCentre, Mosman 1996, illustrated paperback, 280pages.Reviewed by A. ArgentWhat a pity the idea that led to this book wasn’tseized upon two generations of soldiering ago. Eventhe rather cumbersome wire recorders of those dayswould have captured a goldmine of experiences fromcommanders of all levels from both the World Wars.Fifty years on, students at the Army Commandand Staff College between 1992 and 1995interviewed a number of officers who commandedunits or sub-units on active service and who patently,over the years, have given quite an amount of thoughtand energy in training for war and leadership.One editor of this book is a consultant historian atthe Army Doctrine Centre; the other, after service inthe Australian Army, is now the Director of NewZealand’s Army Military Studies Institute.Those interviewed by the Staff College studentsinclude a former CGS, Lieutenant General SirThomas Daly who was, firstly, the adjutant of a 2ndAIF infantry battalion and then a brigade major in theDesert and during the siege of Tobruk and, finally, thecommanding officer of his original battalion atBalikpapan and another CO, who commanded aregular battalion in Somalia, hence the “Baidoa” ofthis book’s sub-title. The “Bardia” comes from Major“Jo” Gullett’s reflections and he needs nointroduction. His “Not As a Duty Only” stands alone.There is also contribution from a 2/6 Battalion officerwho served in it as a platoon commander – MajorDavid Hay.Active service in northwest Europe, Korea,Malaya, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and SouthVietnam (six interviews for Australia’s longest war)is also covered. It is not all infantry battalion service.the SAS and Armour are included.The editors have written a thoughtful introduction– “The Use of Oral History in Military HistoryResearch”– and there is an equally thoughtfulconclusion. This book is a timely and welcomepublication because it reminds all that the only reasonfor any defence force is to train for war and to fight,something it seems often forgotten in the plethora ofpeacetime reviews and re-organisations.Unfortunately, there are a number of irritatingmisprints – it was Operation Jaywick, the tank is aCenturion, the ship of shame until the Navy took itover was Jeparit and there is no such unit as theRoyal Irish Guards.THE BAYONETS OF THE REPUBLIC:Motivation and Tactics in the Army ofRevolutionary France, 1791-94. by John A. Lynn.Westview Press, Colorado, 1996. 356 Pages.Reviewed by Major Darren Kerr, Aust. IntHave you ever wondered how tall was the averagecitizen-soldier in the army of revolutionary France in1794? What about the percentage of 1792 volunteerswho served two years in the French revolutionaryarmy? If so, wonder no more because John Lynn ishere to answer all the questions you have had, andmore.Although somewhat facetious, my introductionshould give you some idea of the depth of research inJohn Lynn’s latest book, The Bayonets of theRepublic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army ofRevolutionary France, 1791-94. This book is areworking of the first edition which was published in1984 and is a detailed examination of the Armee duNord, probably the most important of the Frenchrevolutionary armies. John Lynn, a professor ofhistory at the University of Illinois, is one of theworld’s foremost experts on the armies ofrevolutionary France. In Bayonets of the Republic, hetakes that extensive knowledge and provides a veryreadable and fascinating examination of the reasonfor the success of the Armee du Nord; successhistorically attributed to revolutionary zeal andmassed bayonet charges, and little else.Few people will approach this book with anyknowledge of the Armee du Nord and yet most willprobably have heard of its leaders – the comte deRochambeau, the marquis de Lafayette, CharlesFrancois Dumouriez and Jean Baptiste Jourdan. TheArmee du Nord was raised in 1791 in the postrevolutionaryperiod when France feared armedintervention by the monarchs of Europe. The fact thatthe monarchs of Europe would have been hardpressedorganising a weekend BBQ, let alone aninvasion of France, was not known to the leaders ofthe revolution and the levee en masse was born.During the period 1791-94, the Armee du Nord lost

64AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 125 JULY/AUGUST 1997many battles but held the frontier largely intact andeventually defeated the armies sent against it. Thequestion that Lynn seeks to answer is “To what canthe ultimately victorious career of the Nord beattributed?” His answer is finally a simple one – “thecitizen-soldiers which made up the army” – arrivingat this answer is the complex part.The book is divided into three broad sections.Section One provides a narrative history of thecampaigns of the Armee du Nord and introduces thenames and events crucial to the remainder of thebook. Section Two discusses a theory of combateffectiveness and examines in minute detail thecomposition, control and motivation of the army.While Section Three outlines the doctrine, trainingand tactics which ultimately led to victory. Militaryreaders are likely to find the final section of mostinterest.The overall aim of the book is to develop aconvincing theory of combat effectiveness which canaccount for the ultimate success of the Nord. Theconclusion Lynn reaches is that a combination of highmotivation plus effective tactics resulted in thesuperior French performances. As Lynn writes:Troops were committed and spirited, possessed ofboth endurance and energy. The flexiblecombinations of infantry formations, ablysupported by artillery, allowed them to adjusttactics to terrain and circumstances. As aconsequence, an analysis of victory in the northmust be an analysis of the combat effectiveness ofthe Armee du Nord.What makes this book so fascinating is therelevance today of his detailed observations on theconstituents of combat effectiveness. His analysiscould be applied to any army throughout history andthe result would be equally illuminating. The bookshould be of interest to both the military reader as asort of “how-to” primer and the general historicalreader as a lively and readable addition to historicalliterature. A very worthwhile purchase.(The average height was 1.67m and 23% were1792 volunteers)VICTOR TWO: by Peter Crossland, BloomsburyPublishing, Great Britain, 1996 soft cover 179pp, 8pages of black and white photos, $19.95.Reviewed by Captain M.C. StewartThe English SAS were apparently embarrassed bythe success of the book Bravo Two Zero because itmade famous the least successful of the SAS missionsin the Gulf War. I initially thought that Victor Twowould redress the balance in that regard, however Iwas proven wrong. Victor Two is a blatant attempt tocash in on the rash of books about the SAS in theGulf War started by Bravo Two Zero and is a sorryeffort not worth time taken to read it.Crossland writes informally, mostly in the firstperson from the viewpoint of an infantry Private andthen a Trooper in the SAS. The book is short andlacks substance. There are several attempts to pad itout, chapter headings account for 19 pages alone andthe liberal use of second hand stories throughout, suchas a twelve page summary of the Bravo Two Zeromission, complete the job. This is very disappointingbecause the strength of books of this type is the grittydetail of first person narrative relating personalexperiences.The section dealing with the SAS in the Gulf isfilled with character assassinations, descriptions ofpolitical infighting amongst the Squadron hierarchy,bad intelligence, poor equipment, poor leadership andgeneral ineptitude from many of the key members.Throughout the book Crossland mostly refers to allranks by their first names which, while perhaps thepractice in the SAS makes it difficult to work out whois who in a squadron size organisation.The main action is a description of a vehiclemounted, squadron level raid on Victor Two, analready damaged Iraqi radar installation that wasthought to be guiding mobile Scud launchers. Theactual attack from orders group to withdrawal isbarely successful and covers a mere 22 pages. Thebook is sub-titled “Inside Iraq: The Crucial SASMission” while on the back cover it is described as“The inside story of the SAS mission that turned thetide of the Gulf War”. The Victor Two mission wasneither crucial nor the turning point of the Gulf War,indeed, this implies that the Coalition, on the eve ofDesert Storm, would have lost the war had it not beenfor the Victor Two mission. Crossland and a colleaguethemselves suspect that the attack is simply done sothat the SAS could say it had launched a squadronlevel attack in the campaign and so that the troopscould be “blooded” (their term).Crossland’s personal problems are described atlength throughout the book. Most of these problemsare brought on by his infidelity and his son’s terminalillness, either way I felt sorry for those whom theyaffected and was not interested in them in theslightest.Overall Victor Two is a poor book attempting toride a current wave of popularity for works of thistype. Its descriptions of the SAS in the Gulf arehardly inspiring and the character assassinations,political infighting and total ineptitude describingmany of the actions will only deepen theembarrassment of the British SAS.