Theoretically, however, the government had simply undertaken a ‘transferability ofpenal policy’ (Tonry, 2001: 527). In this sense, the government was making anothergesture by transferring the placement of punishment, but doing little to alter thepunishment itself. This dispersion was considered an ‘effective alternative’ to prison,<strong>and</strong> at the same time, it served another purpose as it was a way of expediting thereduction in the prison population (Burton, 2006e: Par. 5). Tonry (2001: 527) notesthat this form of transfer, provides a ‘punitive sentencing option that can plausiblysubstitute for imprisonment, <strong>and</strong> be calibrated to assure proportionality ofpunishment’. Furthermore, for the government, it was seen as a costeffectivealternative to imprisonment; thus, Tonry (2001: 527) argues, sparing ‘the offendersthe pains <strong>and</strong> the state the costs of imprisonment’. However, the increased relianceon home detention led to further criticisms about being ‘soft’ on crime, with NationalParty member Kate Wilkinson stating:We have an increasing prison population. We are building, atexorbitant costs, more prisons. But softening the sentences is not theright, or the safe, way to reduce the number of prisoners.(New Zeal<strong>and</strong> Parliament, 2006: Par. 11)Furthermore, changes to the Bail Act, which had arisen from public, political <strong>and</strong>media pressure in the aftermath of the Ashley <strong>and</strong> Burton cases, placed the onus ondefendants to justify being released on bail (rather than the prosecution justifying acustodial rem<strong>and</strong>) (Burton, 2006d). As a result, fewer offenders received bail <strong>and</strong> therem<strong>and</strong> prisoner population grew substantially. In 2000, the rem<strong>and</strong> prisonpopulation was thirteen percent of the prison population at 767 prisoners (Ministryof Justice, 2008). <strong>By</strong> 2008, the rem<strong>and</strong> population (including custodial <strong>and</strong>sentenced rem<strong>and</strong> prisoners) was twenty percent of the total prisoner population(Department of Corrections, 2008b) with numbers reaching 1718 (Department ofCorrections, 2008a). This was an increase of 124 percent over eight years. In thesame period, the custodial prisoner population increased by 36 percent. If the rem<strong>and</strong>prison population had increased at the same rate as the prison population, the rem<strong>and</strong>population would have been about 1,043 by 2008, <strong>and</strong> the total prison populationwould be around 655 less than the actual prison muster; reducing the prison rate per100,000 <strong>and</strong>, in turn, the fiscal dem<strong>and</strong>. If the government had indeed been dedicatedto reconstructing penal policy, one would have expected the Effective Interventions96
package to prioritise this issue. However, the rem<strong>and</strong> interventions only includedexp<strong>and</strong>ing electronic monitoring for defendants on bail (which would add to thefiscal costs) <strong>and</strong> plans for a more efficient pretrial court process (Burton, 2006d).The reason for lack of any major intervention once again came down to public safetywith the Minister of Justice noting:Radical changes to rem<strong>and</strong> are not recommended because the size ofany possible gains would be outweighed by the inevitable increase inthe risk of offending on bail <strong>and</strong> absconding.(Burton, 2006d: Par. 6)This was despite the fact that from 2004 to 2006 less than half of defendants onrem<strong>and</strong> were sentenced to a custodial sentence (Smith, 2007), which suggests thatthese individuals posed little risk in the first place.The 2008 General ElectionIn a final bid to salvage its credibility <strong>and</strong> show its commitment to criminal justiceexpertise, the Labourled government introduced a Criminal Justice Advisory Boardin April 2008. Then Minister of Justice Annette King stated that the Boardsappointees consisted of ‘highly respected people who reflect the diversity of thecommunity, <strong>and</strong> who will bring a range of skills <strong>and</strong> perspectives to the board’(King, 2008: Par. 5). It was designed to help generate informed public debate oncriminal justice issues <strong>and</strong> as King stated, it would ‘[h]elp facilitate constructivecommunity dialogue about criminal justice issues <strong>and</strong> solutions’ (King, 2008: Par.4). The establishment of the Board was the government’s final attempt to enhancepublic underst<strong>and</strong>ing of crime <strong>and</strong> punishment <strong>and</strong>, in turn, undermine the influenceof penal populism.However, the 2008 general election interrupted the Labour government’s attempt toresist the forces of populism. The National Party considered the proposal for aSentencing Council to be a representation of the previous Labour government’sweakness. It was a sign that the government had ‘forgotten what they were elected todo’ (Power, 2008b: Par. 39), instead of being heralded as a solution to risingimprisonment <strong>and</strong> a way out of the populist penal environment. This view isillustrated in the following statement by then shadow Justice Minister Simon Power:97
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AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
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ContentsAbstract ..................
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IntroductionIn September 2007, New
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Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
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Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
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the exterior of electoral politics,
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social conditions, towards that whi
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penal policy development where they
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implementation of this legislation.
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increasingly aware of crime, gainin
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immigration was considered a threat
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in agricultural exports, particular
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The time would seem to be appropria
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In keeping crime out of the public
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The Labour Party’s response to th
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across a multitude of family househ
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Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
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dominant feature of New Zealand soc
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Despite its manifest contradictions
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Governments and their civil servant
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The Victims Task Force believed tha
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- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
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- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
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- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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- Page 69 and 70: However, the Labourled government
- Page 71 and 72: 6). While these opposing parties po
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- Page 77 and 78: had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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- Page 83 and 84: were designed to address New Zealan
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- Page 89 and 90: Because of the capability of the me
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- Page 95: given the difficulties in measureme
- Page 99 and 100: emained insecure and overtly puniti
- Page 101 and 102: the end of its tenure. As a result,
- Page 103 and 104: The thesis has explained and analys
- Page 105 and 106: main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108: Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112: Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114: Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116: Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118: Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
- Page 119 and 120: Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
- Page 121 and 122: Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
- Page 123 and 124: New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
- Page 125 and 126: asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
- Page 127 and 128: O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
- Page 129 and 130: Prisoners in line for waist restrai
- Page 131 and 132: Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
- Page 133 and 134: http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
- Page 135 and 136: contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111