line for waist restraints," 2007). It was noted by then Acting Prime Minister MichaelCullen that this was a direct result of one specific case: ‘I think it is worth remindingourselves that this issue has arisen essentially because a young prisoner in custodywas assaulted <strong>and</strong> killed by another prisoner’ (New Zeal<strong>and</strong> Parliament, 2007e:Section 1) 38 . The government’s ability to implement penal policy once again restedwith public expectations as constructed through the media. While it had attempted toreconstruct penal policy, which would have seen a reduction in crime, reoffending,<strong>and</strong> imprisonment, the government was too weak to stay committed to theinterventions <strong>and</strong> resist public pressures for change. Instead of following throughwith its initial plans for Effective Interventions, it yielded to populist dem<strong>and</strong>s,changing laws based on the strength of extraordinary cases to prove it was onceagain in line with public sentiment <strong>and</strong> mood.The Underlying Rhetoric of Law <strong>and</strong> OrderThereafter, the government announced that the Effective Interventions would ‘enablethe government to “stay tough, <strong>and</strong> be smarter” about crime <strong>and</strong> punishment’(Burton, 2006c: Section 2). The government was once again making symbolicgestures to determine its legitimacy. Initially, the gestures made by Governmentwere aimed at the public to show that it was ‘tough’ <strong>and</strong> in line with publicsentiment <strong>and</strong> mood. The government’s execution of Effective Interventions seemedof less concern than the outward appearance that something was being done to stemthe everincreasing prison population in a costeffective manner. For instance, thelongterm programmes designed to prevent crime, targeted at primary (earlyinterventions), secondary (intervention into youth offending) <strong>and</strong> tertiary (addressingprolific offenders) levels, offered very few new initiatives <strong>and</strong> seemed to be a lowpriority for the government despite the admittance by the Prime Minister that ‘morecan be done on all these scores’ (Clark, 2006: Par. 24). The Ombudsmen’s report(2007: 39) noted that38The decision had also come down to cost effectiveness, where van restraints were considerablycheaper than recommendations made in an Ombudsman’s report on prisoner transport, which wouldhave seen separate prison compartments <strong>and</strong> would have come at a cost of up to $30 million ("Prisonvans get belts," 2008).94
given the difficulties in measurement [of crime prevention] in asystem where statistical results are important as a record of both theorganisation’s outputs <strong>and</strong> the individual’s work performance, crimereduction may well not be given the focus it deserves.Indeed, the government chose to prioritise issues that would achieve immediatepractical results, adopting a conservative view that focused on the costeffectivemanagement of crime control. In 2008, it was noted in an Effective Interventionsprogress report that, in July 2006, ‘Cabinet approved funding for initiatives thatsaved prison beds in the short term’ (Burton, 2008: Par. 11). In contrast, thereappeared to be little urgency in addressing longterm initiatives aimed at reducingcrime, as these provided little in the way of immediate political kudos.The government’s attempt to introduce costeffective initiatives also meant a largeamount of attention was placed on the benefits of home detention.Home detention is an effective alternative for low risk offenders whowould otherwise receive a short sentence of imprisonment. Itprovides positive support for reintegration <strong>and</strong> rehabilitation ofoffenders; has low rates of reconviction <strong>and</strong> reimprisonment; highcompliance rates; <strong>and</strong> lower costs than prison.(Burton, 2006e: Par. 5, emphasis added)It was estimated that changes to home detention would see a reduction in the needfor prison beds by 310, whilst simultaneously reducing overall costs, as the annualcost for holding an offender in prison was $59,170, compared with $21,640 on homedetention (Burton, 2006e). The Sentencing Amendment Act, which came into forceon 1 October 2007, made home detention a ‘sentence in its own right’ (Clark, 2006:Par. 48). Previously, when an offender was sentenced to two years or less, courts hadthe power to grant the offender leave to apply for home detention (known as frontend home detention) ("Sentencing Act," 2002) 39 . The changes meant home detentionwas available as an alternative to imprisonment for lowerrisk offenders, involving amaximum term of 12 months, which could also be combined with a term ofcommunity work or a fine ("Sentencing Amendment Act," 2007).39Backend home detention occurs where the defendant is released on home detention by the ParoleBoard prior to their parole release date, a factor that was not affected by the new initiatives.95
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AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
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ContentsAbstract ..................
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IntroductionIn September 2007, New
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Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
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Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
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the exterior of electoral politics,
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social conditions, towards that whi
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penal policy development where they
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implementation of this legislation.
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increasingly aware of crime, gainin
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immigration was considered a threat
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in agricultural exports, particular
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The time would seem to be appropria
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In keeping crime out of the public
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The Labour Party’s response to th
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across a multitude of family househ
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Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
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dominant feature of New Zealand soc
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Despite its manifest contradictions
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Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
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- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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- Page 67 and 68: I remind [the National Party] that
- Page 69 and 70: However, the Labourled government
- Page 71 and 72: 6). While these opposing parties po
- Page 73 and 74: One development in particular incre
- Page 75 and 76: policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
- Page 77 and 78: had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
- Page 81 and 82: 2004: 44). The situation worsened i
- Page 83 and 84: were designed to address New Zealan
- Page 85 and 86: $3.341 million annually from 2009/2
- Page 87 and 88: organisation, was interested in bur
- Page 89 and 90: Because of the capability of the me
- Page 91 and 92: The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
- Page 93: ‘parole should be a privilege, no
- Page 97 and 98: package to prioritise this issue. H
- Page 99 and 100: emained insecure and overtly puniti
- Page 101 and 102: the end of its tenure. As a result,
- Page 103 and 104: The thesis has explained and analys
- Page 105 and 106: main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108: Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112: Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114: Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116: Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118: Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
- Page 119 and 120: Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
- Page 121 and 122: Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
- Page 123 and 124: New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
- Page 125 and 126: asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
- Page 127 and 128: O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
- Page 129 and 130: Prisoners in line for waist restrai
- Page 131 and 132: Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
- Page 133 and 134: http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
- Page 135 and 136: contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111