By Tess Bartlett - Rethinking Crime and Punishment

line for waist restraints," 2007). It was noted by then Acting Prime Minister MichaelCullen that this was a direct result of one specific case: ‘I think it is worth remindingourselves that this issue has arisen essentially because a young prisoner in custodywas assaulted and killed by another prisoner’ (New Zealand Parliament, 2007e:Section 1) 38 . The government’s ability to implement penal policy once again restedwith public expectations as constructed through the media. While it had attempted toreconstruct penal policy, which would have seen a reduction in crime, reoffending,and imprisonment, the government was too weak to stay committed to theinterventions and resist public pressures for change. Instead of following throughwith its initial plans for Effective Interventions, it yielded to populist demands,changing laws based on the strength of extraordinary cases to prove it was onceagain in line with public sentiment and mood.The Underlying Rhetoric of Law and OrderThereafter, the government announced that the Effective Interventions would ‘enablethe government to “stay tough, and be smarter” about crime and punishment’(Burton, 2006c: Section 2). The government was once again making symbolicgestures to determine its legitimacy. Initially, the gestures made by Governmentwere aimed at the public to show that it was ‘tough’ and in line with publicsentiment and mood. The government’s execution of Effective Interventions seemedof less concern than the outward appearance that something was being done to stemthe ever­increasing prison population in a cost­effective manner. For instance, thelong­term programmes designed to prevent crime, targeted at primary (earlyinterventions), secondary (intervention into youth offending) and tertiary (addressingprolific offenders) levels, offered very few new initiatives and seemed to be a lowpriority for the government despite the admittance by the Prime Minister that ‘morecan be done on all these scores’ (Clark, 2006: Par. 24). The Ombudsmen’s report(2007: 39) noted that38The decision had also come down to cost effectiveness, where van restraints were considerablycheaper than recommendations made in an Ombudsman’s report on prisoner transport, which wouldhave seen separate prison compartments and would have come at a cost of up to $30 million ("Prisonvans get belts," 2008).94