which comes a dramatic increase up until 2006, followed by a small decline. WhileNew Zeal<strong>and</strong>’s imprisonment rate was increasing, paradoxically, the crime rate haddeclined, peaking in 1992 at 131 per 100,000 of the population before undergoing aseries of fluctuations <strong>and</strong> stabilising at 99 per 100,000 of population in 2004 as seenin Figure 2.140Recorded <strong>Crime</strong> Per 1,000 of population1201008060402001988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Year (Cal<strong>and</strong>er Year)Figure 2: Recorded <strong>Crime</strong> in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> per 1,000 of Population from 1988 to 2007 (NewZeal<strong>and</strong> Police, 2001, 2008).This thesis addresses the phenomenon of growing imprisonment at a time ofdeclining crime by examining the significant social, political, <strong>and</strong> economic changesthat have taken place in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> from the early post1945 (postwar) years tothe present. It will be argued that these changes, along with evolving cultural values,have contributed to a punitive shift in penal policymaking. Drawing on keycommentators who have addressed these issues (such as Bottoms, 1995; Garl<strong>and</strong>,2001; Loader, 2006; Pratt, 2007, 2008; Pratt & Clark, 2005; Roberts, Stalans,Indermaur, & Hough, 2003), the thesis explores the rise of anticrime, provictimlobby groups in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>, which have become increasingly influential in theimplementation of penal policy. The thesis will explore how New Zeal<strong>and</strong>, from1999, became particularly vulnerable to penal populism (discussed below).estimates are based on all those people specified in the census including overseas visitors <strong>and</strong> thoseNew Zeal<strong>and</strong> residents temporarily overseas meaning there are frequent fluctuations in the de factopopulation in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>.8
Thereafter, the Labourled coalition government attempted to change direction byintroducing a series of initiatives entitled Effective Interventions that would, interalia, see the introduction of a Sentencing Council aimed to depoliticise sentencing.In so doing, the government ‘welcomed back’ expert knowledge to penalpolicymaking (in the form of the Law Commission). To some extent, this began topay dividends, as is reflected in the decline in the rate of imprisonment from 2007 to2008, as shown in Figure 1. However, the centreright National Party won the 2008election, jettisoned the Effective Interventions strategies, quickly imposed restraintson parole <strong>and</strong> introduced plans for longer prison sentences. The thesis thus exploresthe power <strong>and</strong> purchase of penal populism in the midst of these political strugglesaround punishment.What is Penal Populism?A great deal has been written on the concept of penal populism (Bottoms, 1995;Freiberg & Gelb, 2008; Garl<strong>and</strong>, 2001; Pratt, 2007; Roberts, 2008; Roberts, et al.,2003). In 1993, one of the first writers on this issue, Sir Anthony Bottoms (1995:40), coined the phrase ‘populist punitiveness’ to ‘convey the notion of politicianstapping into, <strong>and</strong> using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the public’sgenerally punitive stance’ 2 . Since then, notions of populism, <strong>and</strong> more importantlypenal populism, have been explored to explain the significant shift that has takenplace regarding the role of ‘the public’ in the criminal justice system. Populism canbe seen to reflect the disenchantment felt by a distinct segment of society whobelieve they have been left out, or simply forgotten, by a government that is thoughtto favour less worthy members of the population (Gustafson, 2006; Pratt, 2007). Inthis context, penal populism has been used to explain the relationship that hasdeveloped between one such ‘forgotten’ group – crime victims <strong>and</strong> theirrepresentatives – <strong>and</strong> government (Pratt, 2007). This new body, made up of ‘pressuregroups, citizens’ rights advocates, talkback radio hosts <strong>and</strong> callers <strong>and</strong> so on’,claims to speak on behalf of ‘ordinary people’ <strong>and</strong> have become increasinglyinfluential in policy development (Pratt, 2007: 12). This has ensured that law <strong>and</strong>order has become a fundamental element in both the public <strong>and</strong> political arena,2Here, punitivity will be used to refer to public responses that indicate support for the harsh control ofoffenders.9
- Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
- Page 5 and 6: ContentsAbstract ..................
- Page 7: IntroductionIn September 2007, New
- Page 11 and 12: Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
- Page 13 and 14: the exterior of electoral politics,
- Page 15 and 16: social conditions, towards that whi
- Page 17 and 18: penal policy development where they
- Page 19 and 20: implementation of this legislation.
- Page 21 and 22: increasingly aware of crime, gainin
- Page 23 and 24: immigration was considered a threat
- Page 25 and 26: in agricultural exports, particular
- Page 27 and 28: The time would seem to be appropria
- Page 29 and 30: In keeping crime out of the public
- Page 31 and 32: The Labour Party’s response to th
- Page 33 and 34: across a multitude of family househ
- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
- Page 37 and 38: dominant feature of New Zealand soc
- Page 39 and 40: Despite its manifest contradictions
- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
- Page 47 and 48: [New Zealand was] one of the safest
- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
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[h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
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illicit a response from the communi
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Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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The willingness by Opposition MPs t
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I remind [the National Party] that
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However, the Labourled government
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6). While these opposing parties po
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One development in particular incre
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policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
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had removed suspended sentences as
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Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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2004: 44). The situation worsened i
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were designed to address New Zealan
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$3.341 million annually from 2009/2
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organisation, was interested in bur
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Because of the capability of the me
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The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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‘parole should be a privilege, no
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given the difficulties in measureme
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package to prioritise this issue. H
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emained insecure and overtly puniti
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the end of its tenure. As a result,
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The thesis has explained and analys
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main determinants are addressed. As
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Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110:
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
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Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
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Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
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Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
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Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
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Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
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Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
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New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
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asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
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O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
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Prisoners in line for waist restrai
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Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
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http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
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contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111