law <strong>and</strong> order referendum meant that public sentiment <strong>and</strong> mood determined penalpolicy where it was driven by powerful law <strong>and</strong> order lobby groups. The suddeninclusion of the Law Commission, however, indicated that the government wasattempting to reconstruct contemporary penal policy by h<strong>and</strong>ing penal power back toexperts in criminal justice. This was reiterated by Justice Minister Mark Burtonwhen he boasted of the government’s fortune in having ‘two of the country’sforemost experts’ on sentencing included in the decisionmaking process (Burton,2006a: Section 7). The introduction of the Sentencing Council Act on 1 November2007 was further evidence that the government was attempting to draw alternativevoices into the decisionmaking process. It established the Sentencing Council as anindependent body, with ten representatives including: four judges, the Chair of theParole Board <strong>and</strong> five lay members with ‘expertise or underst<strong>and</strong>ing’ on a range ofcriminal justice issues (such as policing, victim issues <strong>and</strong> Māori issues) (LawCommission, 2006b: 33). This indicated a willingness by the Labour government toinclude representatives of the community in the decisionmaking process, but only ifthey were informed <strong>and</strong> knowledgeable on criminal justice issues. In effect,sentencing policy was no longer to be determined by ‘public opinion’ as reflected inthe 1999 referendum, but by a newly constituted Sentencing Council.The Sentencing CouncilAs an expert body, one of the Law Commission’s biggest concerns was the level ofjudicial discretion in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>’s sentencing <strong>and</strong> parole practices. It was noted inits report, for example, that… the sentencing system remains a highly permissive one,characterised by substantial judicial discretion as to the way in whichthe purposes <strong>and</strong> principles of sentencing should be translated intosentencing levels.(Law Commission, 2006a: 18)While it has been noted by Spigelman (1999: 6) that judicial discretion is animportant feature of sentencing arrangements, for the Law Commission it was thelevel of discretion that was cause for concern. The Commission, as a governmentcould be made with regards to parole legislation in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> to ensure that the time served by theprisoner was more in line with the sentence imposed by the court (Law Commission, 2006b).86
organisation, was interested in bureaucratic efficiency. The broad discretion beingexercised meant significant inconsistencies had been found between judges as wellas between courts, with disparities exposed particularly with regard to lower leveloffences (Law Commission, 2006a). A study conducted on behalf of the LawCommission, for instance, revealed that some courts were ‘systematically moresevere than others’ particularly in relation to the number of convictions resulting inimprisonment (see the Appendix of ‘Sentencing Guidelines <strong>and</strong> Parole Reform’ forfurther information). In the past, it argued, this inconsistency led to a lack of publicconfidence in the judiciary, <strong>and</strong> in turn, calls for harsher sentencing.The Law Commission (2006b) also noted that, along with inconsistency, there was apublic perception of judicial leniency. Part of this perceived leniency was due to thefact that, on average, offenders were serving about 62 percent of their sentences inprison (Law Commission, 2006b), a product of the 2002 parole legislation. This, theLaw Commission (2006b: 47) acknowledged, ‘did little to mitigate the anger <strong>and</strong>frustration of victims <strong>and</strong> others who believe that courtimposed sentences do notmean what they say’. As a result, the Law Commission recommended that forshortterm sentences of twelve months or less, sentences should be served in full(where previously offenders were released after serving half their sentence). Forlongterm sentences, (those over twelve months) the prisoner would become eligiblefor parole at twothirds of their sentence or at twelve months, whichever was longer(Law Commission, 2006b). In addition, judges would be required to articulateexactly how the sentence would be carried out (for example, if an offender wassentenced to six years the judge was required to stipulate that at least four of thosewere to be in custody, <strong>and</strong> further, that the remainder of the sentence would have theoffender in or out of custody depending on a Parole Board’s assessment). Under theSentencing Act 2002, judges were only required to state the nominal sentence ‘whichdoes nothing to inform the victim, the offender, <strong>and</strong> the general public about whatthe sentence means in practice’ (Law Commission, 2006b: 57). It was intended thatthis emphasis on ‘built in sentencing’ would restore public credibility to thesentencing process. It would also give legitimacy to the reduced penalties that wereto be introduced as a substitute for the restriction on parole.87
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AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
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ContentsAbstract ..................
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IntroductionIn September 2007, New
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Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
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Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
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the exterior of electoral politics,
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social conditions, towards that whi
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penal policy development where they
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implementation of this legislation.
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increasingly aware of crime, gainin
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immigration was considered a threat
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in agricultural exports, particular
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The time would seem to be appropria
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In keeping crime out of the public
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The Labour Party’s response to th
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across a multitude of family househ
- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
- Page 37 and 38: dominant feature of New Zealand soc
- Page 39 and 40: Despite its manifest contradictions
- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
- Page 47 and 48: [New Zealand was] one of the safest
- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
- Page 65 and 66: The willingness by Opposition MPs t
- Page 67 and 68: I remind [the National Party] that
- Page 69 and 70: However, the Labourled government
- Page 71 and 72: 6). While these opposing parties po
- Page 73 and 74: One development in particular incre
- Page 75 and 76: policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
- Page 77 and 78: had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
- Page 81 and 82: 2004: 44). The situation worsened i
- Page 83 and 84: were designed to address New Zealan
- Page 85: $3.341 million annually from 2009/2
- Page 89 and 90: Because of the capability of the me
- Page 91 and 92: The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
- Page 93 and 94: ‘parole should be a privilege, no
- Page 95 and 96: given the difficulties in measureme
- Page 97 and 98: package to prioritise this issue. H
- Page 99 and 100: emained insecure and overtly puniti
- Page 101 and 102: the end of its tenure. As a result,
- Page 103 and 104: The thesis has explained and analys
- Page 105 and 106: main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108: Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112: Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114: Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116: Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118: Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
- Page 119 and 120: Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
- Page 121 and 122: Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
- Page 123 and 124: New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
- Page 125 and 126: asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
- Page 127 and 128: O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
- Page 129 and 130: Prisoners in line for waist restrai
- Page 131 and 132: Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
- Page 133 and 134: http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
- Page 135 and 136: contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111