6). The Labour government was at this time striving for ‘universal security’ (SocialSecurity Department, 1938: 5). This meant that citizens were able to rely on thegovernment for cash benefits as well as on a supplementary health benefit systemthat provided medical, hospital, pharmaceutical, maternity, <strong>and</strong> supplementaryservices to New Zeal<strong>and</strong>ers (Social Security Department, 1938).Along with a reliance on welfare, citizens were also able to feel secure knowing theyhad access to a <strong>Crime</strong>s Compensation Tribunal as well as a ‘nofault’ compensationsystem which had been in operation since 1900 (Accident CompensationCommission, 2008). The <strong>Crime</strong>s Compensation Tribunal arose out of the CriminalInjuries Compensation Act 1963 <strong>and</strong> was the first scheme in the world to offerinjured victims compensation from the state, via the Compensation Tribunal(Stenning, 2008) 9 . The theory behind this policy was that a victim of personalviolence was considered a consequence of the state’s failure to protect its citizens(Stenning, 2008). This was subsumed within the Accident Compensation Act 1972,affirming workers rights <strong>and</strong> providing ‘cover to all persons injured in motor vehicleaccidents in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to other injured persons coming within the definitionof “earners”’ (Accident Compensation Commission, 1973: 3). Injured workers werealso able to sue an employer for negligence adding to employee security. In 1974 theAccident Compensation Commission (ACC) added amendments that gave everyonecover for personal injury by accident (Accident Compensation Commission, 1974:2). The attempt to offer universal security to citizens meant that a large segment ofthe general population were entitled to provisions, with 931,446 social securitybenefits (covering almost 45 percent of the population) in force in March 1953(Social Security Department, 1955). At this stage, members of the public were ableto feel comfortable knowing they had ‘an automatic share in the total production ofthe community’ (Sutch, 1966: 238).Even when economic difficulties began to surface in the 1970s, as a result of ‘adeepening world recession <strong>and</strong> stagnating international trade’ (Tizard, 1975: 2), theextensive provisions offered by the state meant citizens continued to have faith instate power. New Zeal<strong>and</strong> had long relied on exports from the agricultural sector tomaintain a prosperous economy. This became a challenge when there was a collapse9An injury was defined as those who had suffered bodily harm, mental or nervous shock from crime,or pregnancy (Stenning, 2008).24
in agricultural exports, particularly due to declining meat <strong>and</strong> wool prices (Belich,2001). The collapse had originated from the expansion of service sector industries<strong>and</strong> consequently resulted in a declining export share (Tizard, 1975). While Britainhad remained the leading market for New Zeal<strong>and</strong> during the early postwar yearstaking 66 percent of New Zeal<strong>and</strong> exports in 1950 – by 1970 this had reduced to just36 percent (Belich, 2001). Despite these economic difficulties, there was no retreatfrom the idea of the strong central state. In the early 1980s, the leader of the NationalParty, Sir Robert Muldoon, sponsored a ‘Think Big’ state interventionist schemedesigned to strengthen the economy <strong>and</strong> relieve citizens of any doubts they hadregarding economic wellbeing (Belich, 2001). The strategy required that thegovernment borrow heavily from overseas investors (creating large external deficit)whilst using the borrowed funds for large scale industrial projects (such as asyntheticpetrol plant) (Smith, 2005). At that time, however, the solution toeconomic problems was still to have faith in the strong central state.Penal Policy in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> from 1954 to 1984The presence of a strong central state that was committed to welfare was extended toall members of the community, even those who came into contact with the criminallaw. The underlying assumptions of penalwelfarism that prevailed in otherAnglophone countries during the postwar era were also evident in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>penal policy development: reformation, rehabilitation <strong>and</strong> welfare, <strong>and</strong> proportionatepunishment, as well as there being a consistent reliance on criminological expertise<strong>and</strong> knowledge. Two pivotal documents published by the Department of Justice wereextremely influential in this regard:(a) ‘A Penal Policy for New Zeal<strong>and</strong>’This report (Department of Justice, 1954) addressed what was in 1952 thought to bethe high rate of imprisonment in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> – 55 per 100,000 of the population(New Zeal<strong>and</strong> official yearbook, 1954). As noted previously, the Māori populationwas disproportionately represented in prison statistics accounting for 12.6 percent ofarrests <strong>and</strong> 13.1 percent of convictions, while this group accounted for only 5 percent25
- Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
- Page 5 and 6: ContentsAbstract ..................
- Page 7 and 8: IntroductionIn September 2007, New
- Page 9 and 10: Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
- Page 11 and 12: Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
- Page 13 and 14: the exterior of electoral politics,
- Page 15 and 16: social conditions, towards that whi
- Page 17 and 18: penal policy development where they
- Page 19 and 20: implementation of this legislation.
- Page 21 and 22: increasingly aware of crime, gainin
- Page 23: immigration was considered a threat
- Page 27 and 28: The time would seem to be appropria
- Page 29 and 30: In keeping crime out of the public
- Page 31 and 32: The Labour Party’s response to th
- Page 33 and 34: across a multitude of family househ
- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
- Page 37 and 38: dominant feature of New Zealand soc
- Page 39 and 40: Despite its manifest contradictions
- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
- Page 47 and 48: [New Zealand was] one of the safest
- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
- Page 65 and 66: The willingness by Opposition MPs t
- Page 67 and 68: I remind [the National Party] that
- Page 69 and 70: However, the Labourled government
- Page 71 and 72: 6). While these opposing parties po
- Page 73 and 74: One development in particular incre
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policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
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had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80:
Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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2004: 44). The situation worsened i
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were designed to address New Zealan
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$3.341 million annually from 2009/2
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organisation, was interested in bur
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Because of the capability of the me
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The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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‘parole should be a privilege, no
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given the difficulties in measureme
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package to prioritise this issue. H
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emained insecure and overtly puniti
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the end of its tenure. As a result,
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The thesis has explained and analys
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main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108:
Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110:
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112:
Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114:
Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116:
Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118:
Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
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Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
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Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
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New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
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asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
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O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
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Prisoners in line for waist restrai
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Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
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http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
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contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111