from this shift in economic <strong>and</strong> social arrangements as a result of two furthercoincidental factors:(a) The influence of the mass media on public perceptions ofcrimeThe growth of the mass media enhanced crime visibility, further fuelling concernsabout it. The increasing sophistication of technology during the postwar years sawtelevision become an established part of family life by the 1960s. Initially,programming remained a ‘statesponsored public service monopoly’ (Hilmes, 2003:14). Since then, however, the deregulation <strong>and</strong> commercialisation of broadcastinghas seen an increase in private sector enterprises along with the rapid increase incable <strong>and</strong> satellite channels (Humphreys, 1996; Pratt, 2007). This growth was seen inthe United Kingdom where in 1981 there were just three terrestrial televisionchannels, but by 1995, around 5 million homes had satellite dishes <strong>and</strong> access toaround 100 channels (O'Malley, 2001). In 2001, pay television had reached 44percent of households in the United Kingdom – 20 percent of all television viewing(Hilmes, 2003). This meant that television channels became competitive.Consequently, there was an increase in crime shows because of their ‘intrinsicattraction’ to viewers (Pratt, 2007: 71). While the professional police officer hasalways been an attractive <strong>and</strong> popular genre (Reiner, 1992), the more competitivenature of television saw the presentation of crime become simplified <strong>and</strong>sensationalised, using short, dramatic sequences to entertain the public.The prevalence of crime in the media was then exaggerated by the shift towardstabloid style crime news. Tabloidisation is present in specific media forms <strong>and</strong> hasbeen made possible by an increase in the ‘commercialization of modern life <strong>and</strong> acorresponding decline in “traditional values”’ (Turner, 1999: 60). The term ‘tabloid’journalism originated from the New York Daily News <strong>and</strong> the New York Post <strong>and</strong>was used to refer to ‘screaming headlines’ in small copy newspapers (often regardingcelebrity issues) conveyed in a sensationalised format to grab attention <strong>and</strong> sellissues (Shearer, 2008: 275). More recently, however, it has also been used to refer tocurrent affairs <strong>and</strong> reality television crime shows, such as 60 Minutes <strong>and</strong> Cops inBritain, <strong>and</strong> talkback television shows such as Oprah in the United States (Turner,1999). This has seen a shift away from informative, knowledge based treatments of14
social conditions, towards that which is visually entertaining yet simplistic in value(Turner, 1999). What has also become clear is that while fears <strong>and</strong> anxieties may notbe linked directly to crime rates, these feelings are closely linked to the massmedia’s representation of crime (Davis, 1952; Roberts, 2001; Salisbury, 2004).(b) The politicisation of crime <strong>and</strong> the changing role of the victimAs a result of the concerns that media coverage of crime generated, crime controlbecame increasingly central to political life. This politicisation has opened penalpolicy up to fierce debate from both left <strong>and</strong> right wing politicians who have taken tousing punitive law <strong>and</strong> order tactics in an attempt to gain support from the public(Garl<strong>and</strong>, 2001). Prior to the 1980s, leftwing political parties mainly stayed awayfrom punitive policies <strong>and</strong> instead chose to advance crime policy through welfareprogrammes (Young, 2006). In contrast, rightwing political parties were advocatesof harsher criminal justice policies based around deterrence <strong>and</strong> individualresponsibility. Since then, however, these tactics have changed substantially. In1992, for example, the United States Democratic c<strong>and</strong>idate Bill Clinton gainedsuccess using punitive policies in an attempt to outbid rightwing parties onpunitivity (Applebome, 1992). This punitive focus, on who can be the ‘toughest’ onlaw <strong>and</strong> order, has seen the attractiveness of slogans such as ‘Three Strikes <strong>and</strong>You’re Out!’ <strong>and</strong> ‘Zero Tolerance’ grow as both left <strong>and</strong> rightwing politicians try togain public approval by being ‘tough’ on law <strong>and</strong> order.This politicisation of crime control has also helped to transform victimhood. Up untilthe 1970s, the focus was on the offender, <strong>and</strong> victims remained largely excludedfrom debates around criminal justice (Fattah, 1992b). When victim issues wereaddressed, it was mainly from groups drawing attention to the need for victimcompensation (Henderson, 1992). Since then, however, the development ofvictimhood has changed this substantially, initially prompted by the rise of thewomen’s movement. Groups campaigning on behalf of women were concerned withmaking changes to sexual assault <strong>and</strong> violent crime laws, as these were considered tobe the product of patriarchal power (Rock, 1986) 6 . However, more recent dem<strong>and</strong>s6At this time, feminists began to argue that the word ‘victim’ itself emphasised ‘passivity’ <strong>and</strong>‘powerlessness’, in contrast the active resistance to oppression many women had to display in theirlives in order to ‘survive’ (Walklate, 2008). Green (1993: 112) argues that this in effect has madefeminist criminology ‘to a large extent, victimology’, because of the ‘bourgeois analysis of women as15
- Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
- Page 5 and 6: ContentsAbstract ..................
- Page 7 and 8: IntroductionIn September 2007, New
- Page 9 and 10: Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
- Page 11 and 12: Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
- Page 13: the exterior of electoral politics,
- Page 17 and 18: penal policy development where they
- Page 19 and 20: implementation of this legislation.
- Page 21 and 22: increasingly aware of crime, gainin
- Page 23 and 24: immigration was considered a threat
- Page 25 and 26: in agricultural exports, particular
- Page 27 and 28: The time would seem to be appropria
- Page 29 and 30: In keeping crime out of the public
- Page 31 and 32: The Labour Party’s response to th
- Page 33 and 34: across a multitude of family househ
- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
- Page 37 and 38: dominant feature of New Zealand soc
- Page 39 and 40: Despite its manifest contradictions
- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
- Page 47 and 48: [New Zealand was] one of the safest
- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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The willingness by Opposition MPs t
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I remind [the National Party] that
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However, the Labourled government
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6). While these opposing parties po
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One development in particular incre
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policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
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had removed suspended sentences as
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Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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2004: 44). The situation worsened i
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were designed to address New Zealan
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$3.341 million annually from 2009/2
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organisation, was interested in bur
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Because of the capability of the me
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The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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‘parole should be a privilege, no
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given the difficulties in measureme
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package to prioritise this issue. H
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emained insecure and overtly puniti
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the end of its tenure. As a result,
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The thesis has explained and analys
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main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108:
Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110:
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112:
Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
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Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
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Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118:
Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
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Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
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Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
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New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
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asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
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O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
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Prisoners in line for waist restrai
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Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
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http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
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contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111