2.5, United States 5.0 <strong>and</strong> New Zeal<strong>and</strong> 1.0 (Bean, Layard, & Nickell, 1987). Suchlow levels were enhanced by high economic growth <strong>and</strong> low levels of inflation,adding to citizen wellbeing <strong>and</strong> security (Hazledine, 1984). In addition, jobs were‘for life’ <strong>and</strong> the welfare state was simply a ‘safety net’ for those who might need it(Bauman, 1997: 36).(b) Community involvement <strong>and</strong> social capitalA second characteristic of the early postwar years was the strength of socialcohesion, a feature enhanced by enthusiastic community engagement. Putnam(2000), for example, illustrates this by reference to high levels of religiousobservance, trade union membership, membership of voluntary organisations <strong>and</strong> soon. These activities then provide social capital (Putnam, 2000). The earliest writingon this subject was produced by Hanifen (1916: 19):[Social capital is] that in life which tends to make these tangiblesubstances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely,goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy <strong>and</strong> social intercourse amonga group of individuals <strong>and</strong> families who make up a social unit …It is, therefore, the contact between an individual <strong>and</strong> the rest of the community thatbrings about an accumulation in social capital, whereby conditions in the communityimprove. For postwar Anglophone societies, social capital, <strong>and</strong> the benefits that itbrought – cohesion, trust, community engagement <strong>and</strong> networking – were consideredcrucial in maintaining a successful <strong>and</strong> evolving society. Outlets of social capital hadenhanced the security provided by governments, resulting in a trusting <strong>and</strong> cohesivesocial body.These features of the early postwar years had served as a strong foundation forpenal policymakers. Criminal justice matters were not yet politicised <strong>and</strong> so therewas little need for the community to become involved in them. If the crime rate wasmentioned <strong>and</strong> any anxieties surfaced, experts – that is ‘politicians, senioradministrators, penal reformers <strong>and</strong> academic criminologists’ – were able to wardthese off (Loader, 2006: 563), believing the benefits associated with welfare <strong>and</strong>prosperity would eventually solve the crime problem (Garl<strong>and</strong>, 2001). The ability ofexperts to control penal policy matters was a fundamental characteristic of postwarcriminal justice (Loader, 2006). Consequently, criminal justice issues remained on12
the exterior of electoral politics, <strong>and</strong> crime was treated as an issue that should be keptout of the public arena as it was ‘potentially explosive <strong>and</strong> emotionally charged’(Loader, 2006: 569).From PenalWelfarism to Penal Populism<strong>By</strong> the 1970s, however, the security <strong>and</strong> cohesion of postwar Anglophone societieshad begun to erode (see Garl<strong>and</strong>, 2001; Putnam, 2000). In particular, economicstability began to crumble during the 1970s <strong>and</strong> employment patterns shifted awayfrom primary <strong>and</strong> secondary sector employment, to a massive increase in jobavailability in service sector industries (Advisory Committee on Prices <strong>and</strong> Incomes,1986) 5 . These jobs offered less security <strong>and</strong> were either parttime, low paid jobs orhighly skilled professional jobs, out of reach of those no longer needed in primary<strong>and</strong> secondary industries. Over the next decade, unemployment rose markedly <strong>and</strong>,for many, this unemployment was for increasingly long periods. The ‘life long’ jobsthat had offered so much security <strong>and</strong> stability to citizens during the early postwaryears had been stripped away. Reliance on the welfare state safety net became a wayof life for many.The growing decline in social solidarity <strong>and</strong> the unease associated with this wasexacerbated by the growth of crime across Anglophone societies (Kury & Ferdin<strong>and</strong>,1999). When examining Canada, for instance, the overall crime rates roseconsiderably from 1960 to 1990 (Statistics Canada, 2004). In 1962, the total criminalcode offence rate was 2,771 per 100,000 of the population <strong>and</strong> by 1982 it hadreached a rate of 8,773 (Statistics Canada, 2004). Ten years on it was peaking at arate of 10,040 (Statistics Canada, 2004). Similarly, in the United States the crimerate rose steadily from a rate of 1,887 per 100,000 of the population in 1960 to a rateof 5,484 in 1993 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008c). This pattern of rising crimeadded to the growing sense of insecurity amongst the publics of these countries (forstatistics on Australia <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> see, for example, Australia Bureau of Statistics,1970; Barclay, et al., 2001; Hicks & Allen, 1999). Penal populism then emerged5Generally speaking, the primary sector includes industries such as agriculture, fishery <strong>and</strong> farming,which produce products from natural resources, while the secondary sector includes industries such asmanufacturing, electricity <strong>and</strong> construction that make usable products (Heisz & Cote, 1999). Theservice sector is comprised of those industries excluded from the secondary <strong>and</strong> primary sector, suchas tourism, government, marketing, hospitality <strong>and</strong> social services, where the emphasis is on theconsumer (Australia Bureau of Statistics, 1986).13
- Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
- Page 5 and 6: ContentsAbstract ..................
- Page 7 and 8: IntroductionIn September 2007, New
- Page 9 and 10: Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
- Page 11: Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
- Page 15 and 16: social conditions, towards that whi
- Page 17 and 18: penal policy development where they
- Page 19 and 20: implementation of this legislation.
- Page 21 and 22: increasingly aware of crime, gainin
- Page 23 and 24: immigration was considered a threat
- Page 25 and 26: in agricultural exports, particular
- Page 27 and 28: The time would seem to be appropria
- Page 29 and 30: In keeping crime out of the public
- Page 31 and 32: The Labour Party’s response to th
- Page 33 and 34: across a multitude of family househ
- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
- Page 37 and 38: dominant feature of New Zealand soc
- Page 39 and 40: Despite its manifest contradictions
- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
- Page 43 and 44: The Victims Task Force believed tha
- Page 45 and 46: eferendum into legislation, motivat
- Page 47 and 48: [New Zealand was] one of the safest
- Page 49 and 50: governments in the hope that ‘suc
- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64:
Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
- Page 65 and 66:
The willingness by Opposition MPs t
- Page 67 and 68:
I remind [the National Party] that
- Page 69 and 70:
However, the Labourled government
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6). While these opposing parties po
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One development in particular incre
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policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
- Page 77 and 78:
had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80:
Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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2004: 44). The situation worsened i
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were designed to address New Zealan
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$3.341 million annually from 2009/2
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organisation, was interested in bur
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Because of the capability of the me
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The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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‘parole should be a privilege, no
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given the difficulties in measureme
- Page 97 and 98:
package to prioritise this issue. H
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emained insecure and overtly puniti
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the end of its tenure. As a result,
- Page 103 and 104:
The thesis has explained and analys
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main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108:
Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110:
Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112:
Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114:
Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116:
Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118:
Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
- Page 119 and 120:
Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
- Page 121 and 122:
Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
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New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
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asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
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O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
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Prisoners in line for waist restrai
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Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
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http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
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contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111