where public sentiments continually overrule ‘expert’ knowledge (Christie, 1993;Pratt, 2007; Pratt & Clark, 2005). Penal populism, then, has seen a shift in powerrelations away from the criminal justice ‘establishment’ towards, in varying degrees,citizens’ groups <strong>and</strong> politicians who have worked to align themselves with this‘establishment’.One of the consequences of this has been that, for Anglophone societies in particular,prison numbers are the highest ever recorded per 100,000 of population (Barclay,Tavares, & Siddique, 2001). This has occurred despite a widespread decline inreported crime, evident in both recorded crime statistics <strong>and</strong> victim surveys (Bureauof Justice Statistics, 2008a; Gallup, 2008; HM Prison Service, 2008; Home Office,2008; Mayhew & Reilly, 2007; MirrleesBlack, 2001; Roberts, et al., 2003). Forexample, when examining prison statistics in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, one can see aparadox of rising imprisonment in a society with declining crime rates. The HMPrison Service reported in July 2006 that the imprisonment rate was just over 78,000(HM Prison Service, 2006) <strong>and</strong> by July 2008 this had reached 83,601 (HM PrisonService, 2008), a seven percent increase in two years. This increase occurred despitethe British <strong>Crime</strong> Survey revealing in 2008 that crime was the lowest it had been inEngl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales since 1981 when the victim survey was first published (HomeOffice, 2008). Similarly, in the United States, imprisonment continues to rise rapidlywhere at midyear 2007 there were approximately 2.3 million prisoners, with animprisonment rate of 509 per 100,000 residents for persons sentenced to one year ormore, up from 501 per 100,000 at midyear 2006 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,2008b) 3 . Yet, in 2007, according to a National <strong>Crime</strong> Victimisation Survey, property<strong>and</strong> violent crime rates in the United States were the lowest they had been since1973, with figures showing violent crime at 20.7 per 1,000 persons (aged 12 orolder), a 43 percent decrease since 1998 (McCarthy, 2008). These statistics are anillustration of what has become typical to many Anglophone industrial societies:escalating imprisonment in a time of declining crime.What was it, though, that led to penal populism? It is clear that it emerged out of thebreakdown of the penal arrangements that had dominated Anglophone societies inthe post war period, referred to by Garl<strong>and</strong> (2001) as penalwelfarism.3These prisoners were held in federal or state prisons <strong>and</strong> in local jails (Bureau of Justice Statistics,2008b).10
Postwar Security <strong>and</strong> PenalwelfarismThe early postwar years were defined by a number of characteristics that formed thebasis of a solid <strong>and</strong> secure society. Not only were Anglophone societies able to takepleasure in the comforts of economic prosperity <strong>and</strong> a strong welfare state, the highlevel of public involvement in society also served to strengthen community ties <strong>and</strong>with it social cohesion. These solid <strong>and</strong> stable elements of society resounded in thepenal policy of that day, where a strong penalwelfare framework prevailed. Garl<strong>and</strong>(2001: 44) explains this phenomenon:Like all social institutions, penalwelfarism was shaped by a specifichistorical context <strong>and</strong> rested upon a set of social structures <strong>and</strong>cultural experiences. Its ways of thinking <strong>and</strong> acting made sense tothose who worked in the field, but they also resonated with thestructures of the broader welfare state society, <strong>and</strong> with the ways oflife that these reflected <strong>and</strong> reproduced. Penalwelfarism drewsupport from – <strong>and</strong> relayed support to – a particular form of state <strong>and</strong>a particular structure of class relations … In short, its characteristicways of thinking <strong>and</strong> acting, particularly its modernism <strong>and</strong> its‘social’ rationality, were embedded in the forms of life created by thepolitical <strong>and</strong> cultural relations of the postwar years.The strength of penalwelfarism was drawn from the economic, social <strong>and</strong> politicalstructure of the postwar years. This involved in particular:(a) Security <strong>and</strong> wellbeingAnglophone societies during the early postwar years were characterised by thestrong presence of the welfare state. This form of governance was one based oninclusion <strong>and</strong> solidarity, where it was anticipated that all citizens would be broughttogether on an equal footing (Garl<strong>and</strong>, 2001). The ability of the strong welfare stateto provide crossclass security <strong>and</strong> stability allowed citizens to feel protected <strong>and</strong>secure in their daily lives. At the same time, the extensive welfare state was fundedlargely by ‘full employment’ (Broadberry, 1994; Hazledine, 1984; Rosenberg,1960) 4 . During the 1950s, all Anglophone societies were able to benefit fromexceptionally low levels of unemployment. The average percentage of citizensunemployed from 1956 to 1957 was: in Australia 2.2, Canada 4.9, United Kingdom4The term ‘full employment’ has been used to denote the high level of employment in any givensociety <strong>and</strong> has differed across countries <strong>and</strong> over time. The general consensus is that fullemployment is based on the lowest margin of unemployment that can be sustained without incurringsignificant pressures on the economy (Fisher, 1946; Gower, 1989)11
- Page 3 and 4: AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
- Page 5 and 6: ContentsAbstract ..................
- Page 7 and 8: IntroductionIn September 2007, New
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- Page 15 and 16: social conditions, towards that whi
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- Page 21 and 22: increasingly aware of crime, gainin
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- Page 25 and 26: in agricultural exports, particular
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- Page 35 and 36: Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
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- Page 41 and 42: Governments and their civil servant
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- Page 51 and 52: McVicar paints of himself as the
- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
- Page 55 and 56: This combination of circumstances c
- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
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illicit a response from the communi
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Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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The willingness by Opposition MPs t
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I remind [the National Party] that
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However, the Labourled government
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6). While these opposing parties po
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One development in particular incre
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policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
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had removed suspended sentences as
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Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
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2004: 44). The situation worsened i
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were designed to address New Zealan
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$3.341 million annually from 2009/2
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organisation, was interested in bur
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Because of the capability of the me
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The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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‘parole should be a privilege, no
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given the difficulties in measureme
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package to prioritise this issue. H
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emained insecure and overtly puniti
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the end of its tenure. As a result,
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The thesis has explained and analys
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main determinants are addressed. As
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Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
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Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
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Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
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Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
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Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
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Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
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Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
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Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
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New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
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asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
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O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
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Prisoners in line for waist restrai
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Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
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http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
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contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111