‘innovative’ (Collins, 2009b: Par. 1) way of approaching prison expansion, although,the private sector will have a vested interest in maintaining high levels ofimprisonment. Such high rates can be expected, given that the prison population inMay 2009 was 195 per 100,000 (8,300 prisoners) (Broun, 2009), up from 185 per100,000 of population in 2008 (International Centre for Prison Studies, 2008), thusproving that the slight decline from 2007/2008 was a ‘false down’ <strong>and</strong> the Nationalgovernment has renewed its commitment to penal populism. Added to privatisationare proposals for double bunking. This is seen as a costcutting solution toNew Zeal<strong>and</strong>’s burgeoning prison population, adding 1,000 beds to New Zeal<strong>and</strong>’sprisons (despite the effects this has both on prison staff <strong>and</strong> on prisoners) (Collins,2009a). The government has also announced that Mount Crawford prison will bereopened in July 2009 to deal with rising numbers, after it was closed in June 2008when prison numbers were in decline (Williamson, 2009). These strategies illustratethe acceptance of high prison numbers in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> are suggestive of the newdirection penal policy will take in future years.It has become clear that for those wanting to resist penal populism, one of thestrongest forces is the punitive discourse that has become so engrained in both public<strong>and</strong> political debate on penal policy. This has been exacerbated by groups such as theSensible Sentencing Trust who use this type of rhetoric to gain public <strong>and</strong> politicalsupport. The media’s continual reliance on simplified crime reporting, which offersno indepth analysis of crime <strong>and</strong> justice, has meant that the public continue to bepresented with a distorted view of reality. As a result, punitive policies put forwardby the Trust <strong>and</strong> politicians are increasingly seen as attractive to the public whoseanxieties surrounding crime remain high. Moreover, any efforts to oppose penalpopulism, such as the previous government’s Effective Interventions strategies,come across as being ‘soft’, as they are positioned against the punitive discourse thathas become so familiar in penal policy debates. Potentially, then, strategies opposingpenal populism need the strength to counter the punitive tide that has once againbeen created; otherwise, any opposing strategies of penal populism will beundermined, as was previously the case with the Labour government <strong>and</strong> itsEffective Intervention initiatives.102
The thesis has explained <strong>and</strong> analysed the consolidation of the Sensible SentencingTrust in New Zeal<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the influence it has had in penal policy development. As adepiction of the force of penal populism in New Zeal<strong>and</strong>, the Sensible SentencingTrust has secured itself a position in the public <strong>and</strong> political arena, unlike morefragile pressure groups, which coalesce very quickly then soon disappear. Theauthority it has gained as a perceived representative voice for victims means itsviews are increasingly used in the media. Furthermore, politicians continue to alignthemselves with the Trust to show they are committed to victims of crime. Overall,this looks set to continue as the National Party has promised to place the victim atthe centre of the criminal justice system (Power, 2008a).The thesis has also explained the changing role of the victim in the criminal justicesystem, where the victim has become central to public <strong>and</strong> political debate onsentencing <strong>and</strong> penal policy. The present government’s priorities could not havebeen clearer when, after coming to power, it announced that the $5.8 million setaside for the Sentencing Council, the project of the previous Labour government,along with the $90,000 that was to be spent on the Criminal Justice Advisory Boardannually (Power, 2009), would be used to establish a Victims’ CompensationScheme. Along with this, the government has pledged to bring ‘fairness’ back to thecriminal justice system, a fairness that involves prioritising the rights of victimsrather than their offenders (Power, 2008b). This, however, seems likely to be anotherset of symbolic gestures made by the government to crime victims, where theyreceive only token compensation (while all convicted offenders at sentencing alsohaving to pay a $50 levy for the victim fund). This will once again raise publicexpectations surrounding victims’ rights, as was the case with the Victims RightsAct 2002, giving further momentum to the Sensible Sentencing Trust <strong>and</strong> populistforces. Justice Minister Simon Power, for example, states that ‘[f]airness is theexpectation that criminals don’t get more rights than their victims’, <strong>and</strong> further, thatfairness was the government responding to public fears about crime (Power, 2008b:Par. 5). What can be seen, therefore, is a return to the constraints of penal populism,where the definition of ‘fairness’ in contemporary New Zeal<strong>and</strong> involves degradingthe rights of offenders if this favours victims.103
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AcknowledgementsWriting this thesis
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ContentsAbstract ..................
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IntroductionIn September 2007, New
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Thereafter, the Labourled coaliti
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Postwar Security and Penalwelfa
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the exterior of electoral politics,
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social conditions, towards that whi
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penal policy development where they
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implementation of this legislation.
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increasingly aware of crime, gainin
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immigration was considered a threat
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in agricultural exports, particular
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The time would seem to be appropria
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In keeping crime out of the public
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The Labour Party’s response to th
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across a multitude of family househ
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Changes in New Zealand mediaThe dif
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dominant feature of New Zealand soc
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Despite its manifest contradictions
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Governments and their civil servant
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The Victims Task Force believed tha
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eferendum into legislation, motivat
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[New Zealand was] one of the safest
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governments in the hope that ‘suc
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- Page 53 and 54: that New Zealanders have been expos
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- Page 57 and 58: Sympathy, empathy, commiseration an
- Page 59 and 60: [h]ad not risen from the ‘victims
- Page 61 and 62: illicit a response from the communi
- Page 63 and 64: Reform Bill). The Trust made submis
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- Page 67 and 68: I remind [the National Party] that
- Page 69 and 70: However, the Labourled government
- Page 71 and 72: 6). While these opposing parties po
- Page 73 and 74: One development in particular incre
- Page 75 and 76: policymaking 32 . From 2000 to 2006
- Page 77 and 78: had removed suspended sentences as
- Page 79 and 80: Chapter Four:Resistance to Penal Po
- Page 81 and 82: 2004: 44). The situation worsened i
- Page 83 and 84: were designed to address New Zealan
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- Page 87 and 88: organisation, was interested in bur
- Page 89 and 90: Because of the capability of the me
- Page 91 and 92: The case of Graeme BurtonThe second
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- Page 95 and 96: given the difficulties in measureme
- Page 97 and 98: package to prioritise this issue. H
- Page 99 and 100: emained insecure and overtly puniti
- Page 101: the end of its tenure. As a result,
- Page 105 and 106: main determinants are addressed. As
- Page 107 and 108: Atkinson, J. (2002). Structures of
- Page 109 and 110: Bureau of Justice Statistics (2008b
- Page 111 and 112: Cullen, P., & Lloyd, C. (1991). Lob
- Page 113 and 114: Department of Statistics (N.Z) (199
- Page 115 and 116: Hall, G., & O'Driscoll, S. (2002).
- Page 117 and 118: Johnson, R. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P.
- Page 119 and 120: Maguire, M. (2002). Crime data and
- Page 121 and 122: Ministry of Justice (2002a). Senten
- Page 123 and 124: New Zealand Parliament (1993a). Cri
- Page 125 and 126: asket.co.nz.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/searc
- Page 127 and 128: O'Conner, D. (2006). Effective Inte
- Page 129 and 130: Prisoners in line for waist restrai
- Page 131 and 132: Sentencing Amendment Act. (2007). R
- Page 133 and 134: http://www.stats.govt.nz/products
- Page 135 and 136: contours of New Zealand (pp. 1111