Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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Modern Thermonuclear WarheadA modern thermonuclear warhead may contain both plutonium and highly enriched uranium(Average estimated values are 4 kg and 25 kg of plutonium and HEU, respectively)Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
Nuclear Arsenals, 2009(based on estimates by NRDC/FAS)CountryUnited StatesRussiaNuclear Warheadsabout 10,000(5000 deployed + 5000 awaiting dismantlement)about 10,000(large uncertainty as to number awaiting dismantlement)France fewer than 300United Kingdom 185China about 240Israel 100-200Pakistan about 60India about 60North Korea fewer than 5Conference on Disarmament, Geneva 21 August 2009
Page 1 and 2: Scope and Verification of aFissile
Page 3 and 4: About IPFMEstablished in January 20
Page 6 and 7: Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyGlo
Page 10 and 11: HEU Stockpiles, 2008Global stockpil
Page 12 and 13: The Naval HEU Problemin a Disarming
Page 14 and 15: The Civilian Plutonium Problemin a
Page 16 and 17: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 18 and 19: CoverageAll production and use of c
Page 20 and 21: A Conference of States Parties (CSP
Page 22 and 23: Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyVer
Page 24 and 25: 1: Shutdown FacilitiesLargest HEU a
Page 26 and 27: New challenge: For enrichment plant
Page 28 and 29: 4. Challenge Inspections at Militar
Page 30 and 31: 6. Non-diversion of HEU in the Nava
Page 32 and 33: Overall Conclusions1. The technical

Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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