Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
4. Challenge Inspections at Military Nuclear Sites: Managed Access PrecedentsAdditional Protocolin non-weapon statesFM(C)T inweapon statesChemical WeaponsConventionanywhereMilitarynuclear sitesFacilities that have analoguesin non-weapon statesanywherein weapon andnon-weapon statesIssue is nuclear activities at nuclear sites.Select sensors to reveal enrichment or reprocessing but not sensitive weapon or fuel-related informationManaged access under the U.S.-IAEA Additional ProtocolLimited by a national-security exclusion but only Department of Defense invoked blanket exemption.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has required its licensees and Department of Energy many of itsfacilities to plan for IAEA managed access (list was published)Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
5. Non-Diversion of Material Declared Excess for Weapon Purposes(while in classified form)1996-2002 Trilateral (IAEA-Russia-US) Initiative developed approach to check thata container holds more than a threshold amount of weapon-grade plutoniumplutonium ?weapon-grade ?more than x kg ?“Attribute Verification System” (AVNG)incl. Neutron and Gamma DetectorResults communicated by red or green lightsthrough information barrierIPFM is working on corresponding approachfor HEU componentsContainer withclassified plutoniumcomponentConference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
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- Page 3 and 4: About IPFMEstablished in January 20
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- Page 8 and 9: Modern Thermonuclear WarheadA moder
- Page 10 and 11: HEU Stockpiles, 2008Global stockpil
- Page 12 and 13: The Naval HEU Problemin a Disarming
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- Page 16 and 17: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
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- Page 20 and 21: A Conference of States Parties (CSP
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- Page 24 and 25: 1: Shutdown FacilitiesLargest HEU a
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- Page 32 and 33: Overall Conclusions1. The technical
5. Non-Diversion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Material</strong> Declared Excess for Weapon Purposes(while in classified form)1996-2002 Trilateral (IAEA-Russia-US) Initiative developed approach to check thata container holds more than a threshold amount <strong>of</strong> weapon-grade plutoniumplutonium ?weapon-grade ?more than x kg ?“Attribute <strong>Verification</strong> System” (AVNG)incl. Neutron <strong>and</strong> Gamma DetectorResults communicated by red or green lightsthrough information barrierIPFM is working on corresponding approachfor HEU componentsContainer withclassified plutoniumcomponentConference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
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