Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyVerification ChallengesFrank von HippelPrinceton UniversityConference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
Verification Challenges1. Shutdown facilities2. Enrichment plants3. Reprocessing plants4. Managed access to military nuclear sites5. Weapon-origin fissile material6. HEU in Naval-reactor fuel cyclePrecedents for verification exist in NPT safeguardsin non-weapon states but some important difference.Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 21 August 2009
Page 1 and 2: Scope and Verification of aFissile
Page 3 and 4: About IPFMEstablished in January 20
Page 6 and 7: Fissile Material (Cutoff) TreatyGlo
Page 8 and 9: Modern Thermonuclear WarheadA moder
Page 10 and 11: HEU Stockpiles, 2008Global stockpil
Page 12 and 13: The Naval HEU Problemin a Disarming
Page 14 and 15: The Civilian Plutonium Problemin a
Page 16 and 17: Design Recommendations for an FM(C)
Page 18 and 19: CoverageAll production and use of c
Page 20 and 21: A Conference of States Parties (CSP
Page 24 and 25: 1: Shutdown FacilitiesLargest HEU a
Page 26 and 27: New challenge: For enrichment plant
Page 28 and 29: 4. Challenge Inspections at Militar
Page 30 and 31: 6. Non-diversion of HEU in the Nava
Page 32 and 33: Overall Conclusions1. The technical

Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty

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