The Navy Vol_49_Part1 1987 - Navy League of Australia

27navies sail.the seven seas with SignaaLThe familiar Signaal dome onwarships is a symbol of ultimateweapon control. Signaal, a leaderin radar and controTsystems (ormilitary and civil applicationsaround the world, is a mem her otthe Philips international group olcompanies.Suppliers to 27 naviesincluding the Royal AustralianNavy and others in the Pacificregion, Signaal maintains anindustrial presence in Australia atthe Defence Electronics Facility atPhilips Moorchank plant in NSW.Signaal and Philips are ideallyplaced to service Australia's futuredefence needs with systemsmeeting the most stringentoperational requirements andin-country facilities providingAustralian Industry Involvementand on-going support in line withgovernment policy.@ SIGNAALPhilips Defence Communication Systems15 Blue Street. North Sydney, 2060Phone (02) 922 0181even with ihe much greater operational availability ol the six new submarine, we will nothave enough to have mote than one at sea onone coast and two on the other at any onetime We would have enough to give a goodaccount of ourselves in a short conflict, over alonger period of even limited conflict we wouldbe vulnerable Providing greater number* ofships, aircraft and submarine* is a mattei ofmoneyProviding the extra personnel foi thosegreater numbers of ships, etc is a much morecomplex and difficult taskWhilst most of us accept the heavy priorityemphasis that Defence and Government haveplaced on the acquisition of long lead timeequipment, we must also recognise that this hasbeen m part at the expense of personnel andrelated aspectsThus, we find the Chief of Naval Staffwriting, in "Navy News", of October 31 lastyear that "Manpower is our Number OneProblem" Part of the causes are governmentpolicy - no additional civilian ot uniformedpersonnel are allowed, none whatever (or anyreason whatever Other causes areunintentional In spile of high unemployment incivilian life personnel are leaving the Navy inloo great numbersThe more people who leave, the greater isthe recruiting effort required to replace themWorse still, the more new entries, the greater isthe number of key personnel required to trainthe new entries Therefore, there are fewerpeople to man the "sharp end" of Navy — theReel and frontline helicopter squadronsThen, new types of ships, submarines andAircraft require retraining of existing personnelLimited numbers mean personnel beingretrained cannot be leplaced in the Fleet Fuelrestrictions limit operational training timeAll these factors lead, in turn, to fallingstandards of operaticnal training This is an areain which the RAN still retains the lead in ourregion That lead will be lostDEALING with the shortage in themanagement sense is not easyNevertheless, much is beini; achievedin alleviating the problem The really worryingaspect is that Defence seems unable to determine the basic cause of named people leavingthe Sen/tees early Unless, and until the causeof the problem is determined, an effectivesolution cannot be implementedTo the outsider some of the problems seemto have obvious causes For example, there isgreat difficulty in getting enough people tovolunteer for submarines Yet. in a time of perpetual inflation, the submarine allowance hasnot been reviewed in seven years'"Other problems involve not unly Navy butthe other two Services as well The taxing ofreservists' pay can be charitably described asunwise Downright stupid, would be a moreobjective description of a measure which, tosave a small sum. caused a mass exodus andresulted In spending a sum many limes largeron recruiting and (taming the replacementsIt may be argued (hat the personnel problemis short i.-rni and thus should be excluded froma preview of the RAN twenty-live years fromnow It can be argued more cogently that,unless and until it is clear that the causes of. andsolution to the problem have been identifiedthe piobk-m will be with us twenty five yearshenceAll these aspects, material and manpowergood and disappointing, will influence theRAN. twenty five years from nowHowever, there is one further concern, theparamount concern which must have • profoundly adverse influence on the RAN and thedefence of AustraliaThat concern is the fotmulation of thenation's defence strategy There are some veryseriouserrorsDuring this writers discussions with manymembers of the ADF. it has become clear thatalmost all thinking people in the ADF believethat the strategy of demal is inadequate -deterrence must play a much greater roleAt the more detailed level, there Is strongevidence that key areas ol our strategy formulation are based on dangerously optimistic assessmentsof our positionFor example, the Dibb Report quotes theStrategic Basis as stating that our vital coastalseaborne trade is vulnerable, but gives anoption to coastal shipping as alternative modesol ishorel transport Yet one nuimi oil companyhas since written to the Department ol Defencethat. "We are certain It is not feasible, eithernow. or in the foreseeable future to move theexisting volumes of petroleum crudes andproduct around the Australian coast by landbased modes of transport *Another major oil company advised Defencethat it "would require five hundred road tankersto deliver each and every day. )ust to maintainproduction" at one relatively small refinery Theletter goes on to highlight problems ol usingpipelinesTiE plain fact is that sea transport is used!o move oil products around Australiabecause it is the most economic methodHigh though the cost of defence may be. itmakes far more sense to pay the defenceinsurance premium than to pay the massivecost penalty of thousands of uneconomic trucksto use every day during peace timeYet this fact is not recognised at nationalstrategy-making levelTo compound this, overseas trade has beenlargely dismissed as not worth defending in theStrategic Basis (as Quoted in the Dibb Report)The astonishing specific implication is made thata loss ol 'only |!V)" 3% ol GDP. due to attackson overseas trade, would be acceptableLast, but by no means least. India is notregarded by the Department of Defence as aregional Power India's very considerable andever growing offensive capability is thus disregardedin formulation of our force structureIndia has ten submarines Her modernisationprogramme is ahead ol ours — her two newestsubmarines are a generation newer than ourOberons Furthermore. India will have twentysubmarines in service in the early 1990s Herexisting ten boats have the endurance to keepfive boats off our coasts at any one time Indiahas two aircraft carriers, with supporting underway replenishment ships and escort Yet. lorstrategy formulation purposes, the Departmentof Defence does not regard India as a regionalPower, and thus disregards IndiaThe equipment planned for Navy will offerour Officers and Sailors a rewarding career atthe personal levelHowever, a nation which gets Its strategywrong, which Ignores Inescapable, althoughunwelcome tacts. Is In deep defence trouble.The facts outlined above demonstrate thatwe have our maritime defence strategy badlywrong.Page Twenty-sixDefenceCommunicationSystemsPHILIPSAHtARNSOS'January, 1987bread it's frrresh!Health and Nutritious Breads,For Customer Enquiries Phone:71 3311FIELDER BAKERIESPRINCES HWY, UNANDERRA, NSW, 2526Official Suppliers to RANJanuary, 1987 THE NAVY Paga Twanty-aevan