performance, reliability and lower operational costs.Spey. Adour. RB199. Gem. Viper Gnome.Altogether, Rolls-Royce provide power for more than 16,000military engines in 83 military aircraft types in87 countries.ROLLSH*ROYCEROLLS-ROYCE pic. 65 BUCKINGHAM GATE. LONDON SWIE 6AT.ROLLS-ROYCE OF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, I4TH FLOOR. 50 BRIDGE STREET SYDNEY. NSW 2000.RTM322SING a strategy specified byU Government, the Dibb Reportincludes a number oi recommendationsregarding equipment.<strong>The</strong>se recommendations and otherinformation, some <strong>of</strong> which havealready been approved, and some<strong>of</strong> which are still under study, tellus the capabilities the RAN willhave in AD 2011.Twenty-five yean from now. the RAN will• Be at a serious technological disadvantagecompared with many regional Powers• Be unable to defend out overseas trade lorlonger than a very short period• Have strong capabilities within the 200nautical mile 11/• Be in a position where personne' problemsare the most likely limiting laclorIn force structure terms. <strong>Navy</strong> can expect tohave these assets• A squadron o) highly capable diesel electricsubmarines armed with the very latestweapons and sensors• Nine "blue water' escort ships, all with areadefence surface to air missile systems Atleast until the DDG's are replaced, only thesix FFGs will have helicopters However,each FFG will have two <strong>of</strong> the most capablehelicopters available• Eight light patro! frigates replacing the sixRiver Class destroyer escorts and some <strong>of</strong>the Fremamle Class patrol boats It will bevery difficult to assess the effectiveness <strong>of</strong>the light patrol frigates until we know a greatdeal more about their weapons, sensors andseakeepmg capabilities• A numerically inadequate but qualitativelyexcellent, estuarial minehunitng force, withsome, as yet undetermined, minesweepingcapability• Ten patrol boats, replacing the remainder <strong>of</strong>the fifteen Fremantle Class <strong>The</strong>sereplacements are expected to be markeHlymore seaworthy than the Frerr.antle designwhich was not intended for protractedoperations in the Bass Strait and similarareasIn addition, but very important, the NavalReserves will be much enhanced in numbe'sand breadth <strong>of</strong> roleJanuary, 1967India tngate, UDAYGIRIby A. W.GRAZEBROOK,RS ONHMAS TOBRUK and LCHs. no nsp/acerrwnfs m sightFurther, and very significantly, die new consiruction submarine protect and light patrolmgate protect will ensure the devek>pment <strong>of</strong>an <strong>Australia</strong>n naval defence industry, far morecapable <strong>of</strong> equipping and supporting the RANthan at any time since World War IIAll that reads well However, there are someserious gupsAir cover.Amphibious warfare.Numbers, andPersonnel and standards <strong>of</strong> trainingOver the past fifteen years, the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong>has devoted much attention to the problem(now lack) <strong>of</strong> certain types <strong>of</strong> vitally importantair cover Many hours <strong>of</strong> volunteer upaid labourwere devoted by the <strong>Navy</strong> <strong>League</strong> to theessential need for fighter cover for our <strong>Navy</strong> Atone stage <strong>of</strong> the Invincible saga, we felt successhad been achievedHowever, disaster intervened Now <strong>Navy</strong> hasno fully integrated fighter cover <strong>The</strong> capabilities<strong>of</strong> the RAAF are severey limited by range, bythe muhi role nature <strong>of</strong> the FA 18s. by theattitude <strong>of</strong> the Canberra leaders <strong>of</strong> the RAAFand by the lack o) an effective combinedmaritime command and control structureUnless this is changed, and there it no Sign <strong>of</strong>this 25 yea" bom now, (as todayl. <strong>Navy</strong> willonly be able to operate in waters out <strong>of</strong> range <strong>of</strong>hostile shore or earner based aircraftr- this context, we must recognise that there.in- now two regionally owned aircraftearners (apart from those that can be movedin by distant powers) and that regional Powersare acquiring longer ranged shore based aircraft— in one case, the longest ranged aircraft available in the world today <strong>The</strong> walets in whichthe RAN can operate will be dangerouslyconfined<strong>Australia</strong>'s amphibious warfare capability hasalready been emasculated by the reduction toteserve <strong>of</strong> the LCHs and the removal <strong>of</strong> HMASTOBRUK to a base at Sydney - far from thetroops with whom she would have to workUnder the Dibb recommendations, neitherTOBRUK. nor the LCHs will be replaced whenthey reach the end <strong>of</strong> their service lives <strong>The</strong>lack <strong>of</strong> such a capability will mean that wecannot even land vehicles on our own territory,except through a fully equipped portWhilst we will have good ships, submarinesand helicopters we will lack sufficient numbersto hold our own in the region For examplePage Twenty-five
27navies sail.the seven seas with SignaaL<strong>The</strong> familiar Signaal dome onwarships is a symbol <strong>of</strong> ultimateweapon control. Signaal, a leaderin radar and controTsystems (ormilitary and civil applicationsaround the world, is a mem her otthe Philips international group olcompanies.Suppliers to 27 naviesincluding the Royal <strong>Australia</strong>n<strong>Navy</strong> and others in the Pacificregion, Signaal maintains anindustrial presence in <strong>Australia</strong> atthe Defence Electronics Facility atPhilips Moorchank plant in NSW.Signaal and Philips are ideallyplaced to service <strong>Australia</strong>'s futuredefence needs with systemsmeeting the most stringentoperational requirements andin-country facilities providing<strong>Australia</strong>n Industry Involvementand on-going support in line withgovernment policy.@ SIGNAALPhilips Defence Communication Systems15 Blue Street. North Sydney, 2060Phone (02) 922 0181even with ihe much greater operational availability ol the six new submarine, we will nothave enough to have mote than one at sea onone coast and two on the other at any onetime We would have enough to give a goodaccount <strong>of</strong> ourselves in a short conflict, over alonger period <strong>of</strong> even limited conflict we wouldbe vulnerable Providing greater number* <strong>of</strong>ships, aircraft and submarine* is a mattei <strong>of</strong>moneyProviding the extra personnel foi thosegreater numbers <strong>of</strong> ships, etc is a much morecomplex and difficult taskWhilst most <strong>of</strong> us accept the heavy priorityemphasis that Defence and Government haveplaced on the acquisition <strong>of</strong> long lead timeequipment, we must also recognise that this hasbeen m part at the expense <strong>of</strong> personnel andrelated aspectsThus, we find the Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Staffwriting, in "<strong>Navy</strong> News", <strong>of</strong> October 31 lastyear that "Manpower is our Number OneProblem" Part <strong>of</strong> the causes are governmentpolicy - no additional civilian ot uniformedpersonnel are allowed, none whatever (or anyreason whatever Other causes areunintentional In spile <strong>of</strong> high unemployment incivilian life personnel are leaving the <strong>Navy</strong> inloo great numbers<strong>The</strong> more people who leave, the greater isthe recruiting effort required to replace themWorse still, the more new entries, the greater isthe number <strong>of</strong> key personnel required to trainthe new entries <strong>The</strong>refore, there are fewerpeople to man the "sharp end" <strong>of</strong> <strong>Navy</strong> — theReel and frontline helicopter squadrons<strong>The</strong>n, new types <strong>of</strong> ships, submarines andAircraft require retraining <strong>of</strong> existing personnelLimited numbers mean personnel beingretrained cannot be leplaced in the Fleet Fuelrestrictions limit operational training timeAll these factors lead, in turn, to fallingstandards <strong>of</strong> operaticnal training This is an areain which the RAN still retains the lead in ourregion That lead will be lostDEALING with the shortage in themanagement sense is not easyNevertheless, much is beini; achievedin alleviating the problem <strong>The</strong> really worryingaspect is that Defence seems unable to determine the basic cause <strong>of</strong> named people leavingthe Sen/tees early Unless, and until the cause<strong>of</strong> the problem is determined, an effectivesolution cannot be implementedTo the outsider some <strong>of</strong> the problems seemto have obvious causes For example, there isgreat difficulty in getting enough people tovolunteer for submarines Yet. in a time <strong>of</strong> perpetual inflation, the submarine allowance hasnot been reviewed in seven years'"Other problems involve not unly <strong>Navy</strong> butthe other two Services as well <strong>The</strong> taxing <strong>of</strong>reservists' pay can be charitably described asunwise Downright stupid, would be a moreobjective description <strong>of</strong> a measure which, tosave a small sum. caused a mass exodus andresulted In spending a sum many limes largeron recruiting and (taming the replacementsIt may be argued (hat the personnel problemis short i.-rni and thus should be excluded froma preview <strong>of</strong> the RAN twenty-live years fromnow It can be argued more cogently that,unless and until it is clear that the causes <strong>of</strong>. andsolution to the problem have been identifiedthe piobk-m will be with us twenty five yearshenceAll these aspects, material and manpowergood and disappointing, will influence theRAN. twenty five years from nowHowever, there is one further concern, theparamount concern which must have • pr<strong>of</strong>oundly adverse influence on the RAN and thedefence <strong>of</strong> <strong>Australia</strong>That concern is the fotmulation <strong>of</strong> thenation's defence strategy <strong>The</strong>re are some veryseriouserrorsDuring this writers discussions with manymembers <strong>of</strong> the ADF. it has become clear thatalmost all thinking people in the ADF believethat the strategy <strong>of</strong> demal is inadequate -deterrence must play a much greater roleAt the more detailed level, there Is strongevidence that key areas ol our strategy formulation are based on dangerously optimistic assessments<strong>of</strong> our positionFor example, the Dibb Report quotes theStrategic Basis as stating that our vital coastalseaborne trade is vulnerable, but gives anoption to coastal shipping as alternative modesol ishorel transport Yet one nuimi oil companyhas since written to the Department ol Defencethat. "We are certain It is not feasible, eithernow. or in the foreseeable future to move theexisting volumes <strong>of</strong> petroleum crudes andproduct around the <strong>Australia</strong>n coast by landbased modes <strong>of</strong> transport *Another major oil company advised Defencethat it "would require five hundred road tankersto deliver each and every day. )ust to maintainproduction" at one relatively small refinery <strong>The</strong>letter goes on to highlight problems ol usingpipelinesTiE plain fact is that sea transport is used!o move oil products around <strong>Australia</strong>because it is the most economic methodHigh though the cost <strong>of</strong> defence may be. itmakes far more sense to pay the defenceinsurance premium than to pay the massivecost penalty <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> uneconomic trucksto use every day during peace timeYet this fact is not recognised at nationalstrategy-making levelTo compound this, overseas trade has beenlargely dismissed as not worth defending in theStrategic Basis (as Quoted in the Dibb Report)<strong>The</strong> astonishing specific implication is made thata loss ol 'only |!V)" 3% ol GDP. due to attackson overseas trade, would be acceptableLast, but by no means least. India is notregarded by the Department <strong>of</strong> Defence as aregional Power India's very considerable andever growing <strong>of</strong>fensive capability is thus disregardedin formulation <strong>of</strong> our force structureIndia has ten submarines Her modernisationprogramme is ahead ol ours — her two newestsubmarines are a generation newer than ourOberons Furthermore. India will have twentysubmarines in service in the early 1990s Herexisting ten boats have the endurance to keepfive boats <strong>of</strong>f our coasts at any one time Indiahas two aircraft carriers, with supporting underway replenishment ships and escort Yet. lorstrategy formulation purposes, the Department<strong>of</strong> Defence does not regard India as a regionalPower, and thus disregards India<strong>The</strong> equipment planned for <strong>Navy</strong> will <strong>of</strong>ferour Officers and Sailors a rewarding career atthe personal levelHowever, a nation which gets Its strategywrong, which Ignores Inescapable, althoughunwelcome tacts. Is In deep defence trouble.<strong>The</strong> facts outlined above demonstrate thatwe have our maritime defence strategy badlywrong.Page Twenty-sixDefenceCommunicationSystemsPHILIPSAHtARNSOS'January, <strong>1987</strong>bread it's frrresh!Health and Nutritious Breads,For Customer Enquiries Phone:71 3311FIELDER BAKERIESPRINCES HWY, UNANDERRA, NSW, 2526Official Suppliers to RANJanuary, <strong>1987</strong> THE NAVY Paga Twanty-aevan
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