The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning

The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning

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182 Political-economic capitalist transformationvirtue of the Fordist-Keynesian regime that a balance of forces,however tenuous, could be created through which the mechanismscausing the over accumulation problem - the pace of technologicaland organizational change together with the struggle over labourcontrol - could be kept sufficiently under control so as to assuresteady growth. But it took a major crisis of overaccumulation toconnect Fordist production with a Keynesian mode of state regulationbefore some kind of steady macro-economic growth could be assuredfor any extended period. The rise of a particular regime ofaccumulation has to be seen, then as now, as the outcome of a wholehost of political and economic decisions, by no means always consciouslydirected towards this or that specific end, provoked bypersistent manifestations of the overaccumulation problem.3 Absmption of overaccumulation through temporal and spatialdisplacement provides, in my judgement, a much richer and longlasting,but also much more problematic, terrain upon which to tryand control the overaccumulation problem. The argument here israther complicated in its details, so I shall again draw upon accountspublished elsewhere (Harvey 1982, 1985c).(a) Temporal displacement entails either a switch of resourcesfrom meeting current needs to exploring future uses, or an accelerationin turnover time (the speed with which money outlaysreturn profit to the investor) so that speed-up this year absorbsexcess capacity from last year. Excess capital and surplus labour can,for example, be absorbed by switching from current consumption tolong-term public and private investments in plant, physical and socialinfrastructures, and the like. Such investments mop up surpluses inthe present only to return their value equivalent over a long · timeperiod in the future (this was the principle that lay behind the publicworks programmes used to combat the slump conditions in the1930s in many advanced capitalist countries). The capacity to makethe switch depends, however, upon the availability of credit and thecapacity for 'fictitious capital formation.' The latter is defined ascapital that has a nominal money value and paper existence, butwhich at a given moment in time has no backing in terms of realproductive activity or physical assets as collateral. Fictitious capital isconverted into real capital to the degree that investments are madethat lead to an appropriate increase in useful assets (e.g. plant andmachinery that can be profitably deployed) or commodities (goodsand services which can be profitably sold). For this reason temporaldisplacement into future uses is a short-run palliative to the overaccumulationproblem unless, that is, there is continuous displace-Theorizing the transition 183ment via continuously accelerating rates of fictitious capital formationand expanding volumes of longer-term investment. All of thisdepends upon some continuous and state-backed dynamic growth inindebtedness. Keynesian policies after 1945 in the advanced capitalistcountries in part had such an effect.Absorption of surpluses through accelerations in turnover time -a strong feature in the recent period of flexible accumulation - posesa different kind of theoretical problem. Heightened competition certainlyprovokes individual firms to speed up their turnover time(those firms with the faster turnover time tend to gain excess profitsthereby, and so survive more easily). But only under certain conditionsdoes this produce an aggregate acceleration of turnover timeso as to permit aggregate absorption of surpluses. Even then, this is,at best, a short-run palliative, unless it proves possible to acceleratesocial turnover time continuously year by year (a solution thatwould surely imply strong write-offs of past assets in any case, sincespeed-up usually entails new technologies which displace the old).(b) Spatial displacement entails the absorption of excess capitaland labour in geographical expansion. This 'spatial fix' (as I haveelsewhere called it) to the overaccumulation problem entails the. production of new spaces within which capitalist production canproceed (through infrastructural investments, for example), the growthof trade and direct investments, and the exploration of new possibilitiesfor the exploitation of labour power. Here, too, the creditsystem and fictitious capital formation, backed by state fiscal, monetary,and, where necessary, military power, become vital mediatinginfluences. And it also follows that the manner of prior occupationof the spaces into which capitalism expands, and the degrees ofresistance encountered there, can have profound consequences. Insome spaces there has been a history of fierce resistance to theimplantation of Western capital (e.g. China), whereas in other spaces(e.g. Japan or the more recent cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, orTaiwan), dominant or even subordinate classes have aggressivelyinserted themselves into what they saw as a superior economic system.If continuous geographical expansion of capitalism were a real possibility,there could be a relatively permanent solution to the overaccumulationproblem. But to the degree that the progressive implantationof capitalism across the face of the earth extends the spacewithin which the over accumulation problem can arise, so geographicalexpansion can at best be a short-run solution to the overaccumulationproblem. The long-run outcome will almost certainly be heightenedinternational and inter-regional competition, with the leastadvantaged countries and regions suffering the severest consequences.

184 Political-economic capitalist transformation(c) Time-space displacements, of course, have a double powerwith respect to absorption of the overaccumulation problem, and inpractice, and particularly to the degree that fictitious capital formation(and, usually, state involvement) is essential to both temporal andspatial displacement, it is the combination of the temporal and spatialstrategies that counts. Lending money (often raised on, say, Londonor New York capital markets through fictitious capital formation) toLatin America to build long-term infrastructures or to purchasecapital equipment which will help to generate output for manyyears to come, is a typical and powerful form of absorption ofoveraccumulation.How, then, did Fordism solve the inherent overaccumulationtendencies of capitalism? Before World War II it lacked the appropriateregulatory apparatus to do very much more than engagein some tentative pursuits of temporal and spatial displacement (mainlywithin countries, though overseas direct investment on the part ofUS corporations did begin in the 1920s), and was therefore forced,for the most part, into savage devaluation of the sort achieved in the1930s and 1940s. Since 1945 - and largely as a consequence ofdetailed war-time planning to stabilize the post-war economic order- there emerged a fairly coherent accumulation strategy built aroundcontrol of devaluation and the absorption of overaccumulation byother means. Devaluation through violent swings in the businesscycle was brought under control and reduced to the kind of steadydevaluation through planned obsolescence that posed relatively minorproblems. On the other hand, a strong system of macro-economiccontrol was instituted which controlled the pace of technological andorganizational change (mainly through corporate monopoly power),kept the class struggle within bounds (through collective bargainingand state intervention), and kept mass production and mass consumptionroughly in balance through state management. But thismode of regulation would not have been anywhere near as successfulas it evidently was, had it not been for the strong presence of bothtemporal and spatial displacements, albeit under the watchful eye ofthe interventionist state.By 1972, for example, we find Business Week complaining that theUS economy was sitting atop a mountain of debt (though fromcurrent heights it all looks like a mole-hill now; see figure 2.13).Keynesian debt-financing, initially intended as a short-term managementtool to control business cycles, had, predictably, becomesucked into an attempt to absorb over accumulation by continuousexpansion of fictitious capital formation and consequent expansionTheorizing the transition 185of the debt burden. Steady expansion of long-term investments,orchestrated by the state proved a useful way, at least up until themid-1960s, to absorb any excess capital or labour. Spatial displacement(combined, of course, with long-term indebtedness) was aneven more powerful influence. Within the United States the radicaltransformation of metropolitan economies (through the suburbanizationof both manufacturing and residences), as well as the expansioninto the South and West, absorbed vast quantities of excess capitaland labour. Internationally, the reconstruction of the economiesof Western Europe and Japan, accelerating flows of foreign directinvestment, and the enormous growth in world trade played a criticalrole in absorbing surpluses. Planning for postwar 'peace with prosperity'in World War II emphasized the need for a global strategyfor capital accumulation within a world where trade and investmentbarriers were to be steadily reduced and colonial subservience replacedby an open system of growth, advancement, and co-operation withina decolonized capitalist world system. Even though some facets ofthis programme were to prove ideological and illusory, enough of itscontent was realized to make a spatial revolution in global tradingand investment entirely possible. -It was primarily through spatial and temporal displacement thatthe Fordist regime of accumulation resolved the overaccumulationproblem during the long postwar boom. The crisis of Fordism canto some degree be interpreted, therefore, as a running out of thoseoptions to handle the over accumulation problem. Temporal displacementwas piling debt upon debt to the point where the only viablegovernment strategy was to monetize it away. This was done, ineffect, by printing so much money as to trigger an inflationary surge,which radically reduced the real value of past debts (the thousanddollars borrowed ten years ago has little value after a phase of highinflation). Turnover time could not easily be accelerated withoutdestroying the value of fixed capital assets. New geographical centresof accumulation - the US South and West, Weste_ffi Europe andJapan, and then a range of newly-industrializing countries - werecreated. As these Fordist production systems came to maturity, theybecame new and often highly competitive centres of overaccumulation.Spatial competition intensified between geographically distinctFordist systems, with the most efficient regimes (such as the Japanese)and lower labour-cost regimes (such as those found in third worldcountries where notions of a social contract with labour were eitherlackin.g or weakly enforced) driving other centres into paroxysmsof devaluation through deindustrialization. Spatial competitioninte ;ified, particularly after 1973, as the capacity to resolve the

182 Political-economic capitalist transformationvirtue <strong>of</strong> the Fordist-Keynesian regime that a balance <strong>of</strong> forces,however tenuous, could be created through which the mechanismscausing the over accumulation problem - the pace <strong>of</strong> technologicaland organizational change together with the struggle over labourcontrol - could be kept sufficiently under control so as to assuresteady growth. But it took a major crisis <strong>of</strong> overaccumulation toconnect Fordist production with a Keynesian mode <strong>of</strong> state regulationbefore some kind <strong>of</strong> steady macro-economic growth could be assuredfor any extended period. <strong>The</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> a particular regime <strong>of</strong>accumulation has to be seen, then as now, as the outcome <strong>of</strong> a wholehost <strong>of</strong> political and economic decisions, by no means always consciouslydirected towards this or that specific end, provoked bypersistent manifestations <strong>of</strong> the overaccumulation problem.3 Absmption <strong>of</strong> overaccumulation through temporal and spatialdisplacement provides, in my judgement, a much richer and longlasting,but also much more problematic, terrain upon which to tryand control the overaccumulation problem. <strong>The</strong> argument here israther complicated in its details, so I shall again draw upon accountspublished elsewhere (Harvey 1982, 1985c).(a) Temporal displacement entails either a switch <strong>of</strong> resourcesfrom meeting current needs to exploring future uses, or an accelerationin turnover time (the speed with which money outlaysreturn pr<strong>of</strong>it to the investor) so that speed-up this year absorbsexcess capacity from last year. Excess capital and surplus labour can,for example, be absorbed by switching from current consumption tolong-term public and private investments in plant, physical and socialinfrastructures, and the like. Such investments mop up surpluses inthe present only to return their value equivalent over a long · timeperiod in the future (this was the principle that lay behind the publicworks programmes used to combat the slump conditions in the1930s in many advanced capitalist countries). <strong>The</strong> capacity to makethe switch depends, however, upon the availability <strong>of</strong> credit and thecapacity for 'fictitious capital formation.' <strong>The</strong> latter is defined ascapital that has a nominal money value and paper existence, butwhich at a given moment in time has no backing in terms <strong>of</strong> realproductive activity or physical assets as collateral. Fictitious capital isconverted into real capital to the degree that investments are madethat lead to an appropriate increase in useful assets (e.g. plant andmachinery that can be pr<strong>of</strong>itably deployed) or commodities (goodsand services which can be pr<strong>of</strong>itably sold). For this reason temporaldisplacement into future uses is a short-run palliative to the overaccumulationproblem unless, that is, there is continuous displace-<strong>The</strong>orizing the transition 183ment via continuously accelerating rates <strong>of</strong> fictitious capital formationand expanding volumes <strong>of</strong> longer-term investment. All <strong>of</strong> thisdepends upon some continuous and state-backed dynamic growth inindebtedness. Keynesian policies after 1945 in the advanced capitalistcountries in part had such an effect.Absorption <strong>of</strong> surpluses through accelerations in turnover time -a strong feature in the recent period <strong>of</strong> flexible accumulation - posesa different kind <strong>of</strong> theoretical problem. Heightened competition certainlyprovokes individual firms to speed up their turnover time(those firms with the faster turnover time tend to gain excess pr<strong>of</strong>itsthereby, and so survive more easily). But only under certain conditionsdoes this produce an aggregate acceleration <strong>of</strong> turnover timeso as to permit aggregate absorption <strong>of</strong> surpluses. Even then, this is,at best, a short-run palliative, unless it proves possible to acceleratesocial turnover time continuously year by year (a solution thatwould surely imply strong write-<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> past assets in any case, sincespeed-up usually entails new technologies which displace the old).(b) Spatial displacement entails the absorption <strong>of</strong> excess capitaland labour in geographical expansion. This 'spatial fix' (as I haveelsewhere called it) to the overaccumulation problem entails the. production <strong>of</strong> new spaces within which capitalist production canproceed (through infrastructural investments, for example), the growth<strong>of</strong> trade and direct investments, and the exploration <strong>of</strong> new possibilitiesfor the exploitation <strong>of</strong> labour power. Here, too, the creditsystem and fictitious capital formation, backed by state fiscal, monetary,and, where necessary, military power, become vital mediatinginfluences. And it also follows that the manner <strong>of</strong> prior occupation<strong>of</strong> the spaces into which capitalism expands, and the degrees <strong>of</strong>resistance encountered there, can have pr<strong>of</strong>ound consequences. Insome spaces there has been a history <strong>of</strong> fierce resistance to theimplantation <strong>of</strong> Western capital (e.g. China), whereas in other spaces(e.g. Japan or the more recent cases <strong>of</strong> Hong Kong, Singapore, orTaiwan), dominant or even subordinate classes have aggressivelyinserted themselves into what they saw as a superior economic system.If continuous geographical expansion <strong>of</strong> capitalism were a real possibility,there could be a relatively permanent solution to the overaccumulationproblem. But to the degree that the progressive implantation<strong>of</strong> capitalism across the face <strong>of</strong> the earth extends the spacewithin which the over accumulation problem can arise, so geographicalexpansion can at best be a short-run solution to the overaccumulationproblem. <strong>The</strong> long-run outcome will almost certainly be heightenedinternational and inter-regional competition, with the leastadvantaged countries and regions suffering the severest consequences.

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