The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning
The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning
170 Political-economic capitalist transformationintervene in currency markets - has intensified ever since, becomingeven more emphatic in the wake of the 1987 stock market crash.There has been, in short, a struggle to win back for the collectivityof capitalist states some of the power they have individually lost overthe past two decades. This trend was institutionalized in 1982, whenthe IMF and the World Bank were designated as the central authorityfor exercising the collective power of capitalist nation states overinternational financial negotiations. Such power is usually deployedto force curbs on public expenditure, cuts in real wages, and austerityin fiscal and monetary policy, to the point of provoking a wave ofso-called 'IMF riots' from Sao Paulo to Kingston, Jamaica, and fromPeru to the Sudan and Egypt since 1976 (see Walton, 1987, for acomplete list).There are many other signs of continuity rather than rupture withthe Fordist era. The massive government deficits in the United States,mainly attributable to defence, have been fundamental to whatevereconomic growth there has been in world capitalism in the 1980s,suggesting that Keynesian practices are by no means dead. Neitherdoes the commitment to 'free-market' competition and deregulationentirely fit with the wave of mergers, corporate consolidations, andthe extraordinary growth of interlink ages between supposedly rivalfirms of different national origin. Arenas of conflict between thenation state and trans-national capital have, however, opened up,undermining the easy accommodation between big capital and biggovernment so typical of the Fordist era. The state is now in a muchmore problematic position. It is called upon to regulate the activitiesof corporate capital in the national interest at the same time as it isforced, also in the national interest, to create a 'good business climate'to act as an inducement to trans-national and global finance capital,and to deter (by means other than exchange controls) capital flight togreener and more profitable pastures.While the history may have varied substantially from one countryto another, there is strong evidence that the modalities and targetsof, as well as the capacity for, state intervention have changed substantiallysince 1972 throughout the capitalist world, no matter whatthe ideological complexion of the government in power (the recentexperience of the French and Spanish socialists further helps substantiatethe point). This does not mean, however, that state interventionismhas generally diminished, for in some respects - particularlyregarding labour control - state intervention is more crucial nowthan it ever was.This brings us, finally, to the even thornier problem of the ways inwhich norms, habits, and political and cultural attitudes have shiftedFrom Fordism to flexible accumulation 171since 1970, and the degree to which such shifts integrate with thetransition from Fordism to flexible accumulation. Since the politicalsuccess of neo-conservatism can hardly be attributed to its overalleconomic achievements (its strong negatives of high unemployment,weak growth, rapid dislocation, and spiralling indebtedness are offsetonly by control of inflation), several commentators have attributedits rise to a general shift from the collective norms and values, thatwere hegemonic at least in working-class organizations and othersocial movements of the 1950s and 1960s, towards a much morecompetitive individualism as the central value in an entrepreneurialculture that has penetrated many walks of life. This heightenedcompetition (in labour markets as well as amongst entrepreneurs)has, of course, proved destructive and ruinous to some, yet it hasundeniably generated a burst of energy that many, even on the left,compare favourably with the stifling orthodoxy and bureaucracy ofstate control and monopolistic corporate power. It has also permittedsubstantial redistributions of income to be achieved, which haveadvantaged, for the most part, the already privileged. Entrepreneurialismnow characterizes not only business action, but realms of life asdiverse as urban governance, the growth of informal sector production,labour market organization, research and development, andit has even reached into the nether corners of academic, literary, andartistic life.While the roots of this transition are evidently deep and complicated,their consistency with a transition from Fordism to flexibleaccumulation is reasonably clear even if the direction (if any) ofcausality is not. To begin with, the more flexible motion of capitalemphasizes the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the fugitive, and thecontingent in modern life, rather than the more solid values implantedunder Fordism. To the degree that collective action was therebymade more difficult - and it was indeed a central aim of the drivefor enhanced labour control to render it thus - so rampant individualismfits into place as a necessary, though not a sufficient, conditionfor the transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation.It was, after all, mainly through the burst of new business formation,innovation, and entrepreneurialism that many of the new systems ofproduction were put into place. But, as Simmel (1978) long agosuggested, it is also at such times of fragmentation and economicinsecurity that the desire for stable values leads to a heightenedemphasis upon the authority of basic institutions - the family,religion, the state. And there is abundant evidence of a revival ofsupport for such institutions and the values they represent throughoutthe Western world since about 1970. Such connections are, at
172 Political-economic capitalist transformationleast, plausible, and they ought, therefore, to be given more carefulscrutiny. The immediate task at hand is to outline an interpretationof the roots of such a major transition in capitalism's dominantregime of accumulation.10Theorizing the transItIonTo the degree that we are witnessing a historical transition, still farfrom complete and in any case, like Fordism, bound to be partial incertain important respects, so we have encountered a series of theoreticaldilemmas. Can we grasp theoretically the logic, if not thenecessity, of the transition? To what degree do past and presenttheoretical formulations of the dynamics of capitalism have to bemodified in the light of the radical reorganizations and restructuringstaking place in both productive forces and social relations? And canwe represent the current regime sufficiently well to get some grip onthe probable course and implications of what appears to be an ongoingrevolution?The transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation has, in fact,posed serious difficulties for theories of any sort. Keynesians,monetarists, neo-classical partial equilibrium theorists, appear just asbefuddled as everyone else. The transition has also posed seriousdilemmas for Marxists. In the face of such difficulties, many commentatorshave abandoned any pretence of theory, and simply resortedto data-chasing to keep pace with the rapid shifts. But heretoo there are problems - what data are key indicators rather thancontingent series? The only general point of agreement is that somethingsignificant has changed in the way capitalism has been workingsince about 1970.The first difficulty is to try to encapsulate the nature of thechanges we are looking at. In tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 I summarizethree recent accounts of the transition. The first, a rather celebratoryaccount by Halal (1986) of the new capitalism, emphasizes the positiveand liberatory elements of the new entrepreneurialism. The second,by Lash and Urry (1987), emphasizes power relations and politics inrelation to economy and culture. The third, by Swyngedouw (1986),provides much more detail on transformations in technology and the
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172 Political-economic capitalist transformationleast, plausible, and they ought, therefore, to be given more carefulscrutiny. <strong>The</strong> immediate task at hand is to outline an interpretation<strong>of</strong> the roots <strong>of</strong> such a major transition in capitalism's dominantregime <strong>of</strong> accumulation.10<strong>The</strong>orizing the transItIonTo the degree that we are witnessing a historical transition, still farfrom complete and in any case, like Fordism, bound to be partial incertain important respects, so we have encountered a series <strong>of</strong> theoreticaldilemmas. Can we grasp theoretically the logic, if not thenecessity, <strong>of</strong> the transition? To what degree do past and presenttheoretical formulations <strong>of</strong> the dynamics <strong>of</strong> capitalism have to bemodified in the light <strong>of</strong> the radical reorganizations and restructuringstaking place in both productive forces and social relations? And canwe represent the current regime sufficiently well to get some grip onthe probable course and implications <strong>of</strong> what appears to be an ongoingrevolution?<strong>The</strong> transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation has, in fact,posed serious difficulties for theories <strong>of</strong> any sort. Keynesians,monetarists, neo-classical partial equilibrium theorists, appear just asbefuddled as everyone else. <strong>The</strong> transition has also posed seriousdilemmas for Marxists. In the face <strong>of</strong> such difficulties, many commentatorshave abandoned any pretence <strong>of</strong> theory, and simply resortedto data-chasing to keep pace with the rapid shifts. But heretoo there are problems - what data are key indicators rather thancontingent series? <strong>The</strong> only general point <strong>of</strong> agreement is that somethingsignificant has changed in the way capitalism has been workingsince about 1970.<strong>The</strong> first difficulty is to try to encapsulate the nature <strong>of</strong> thechanges we are looking at. In tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8 I summarizethree recent accounts <strong>of</strong> the transition. <strong>The</strong> first, a rather celebratoryaccount by Halal (1986) <strong>of</strong> the new capitalism, emphasizes the positiveand liberatory elements <strong>of</strong> the new entrepreneurialism. <strong>The</strong> second,by Lash and Urry (1987), emphasizes power relations and politics inrelation to economy and culture. <strong>The</strong> third, by Swyngedouw (1986),provides much more detail on transformations in technology and the
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