The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning
The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning The Condition of Postmodernity 13 - autonomous learning
142Political-economic capitalist transformationFrom Fordism to flexible accumulation143363228Share of US exports in OEeD tradeImports as share of US GNP242016Rate of accumulation- 251284 • •••••••••••••••••• •••••••• ••• •• ••••. . ', " ". . . . . . . . .. . . . . .%O+--,----,-----,-----_,----,-----._----_,----_,,_,1948 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987Figure 2.3 US share in GECD trade and manufacturing imports as apercentage of GNP in the USA, 1948-1987(Sources: GECD, Historical Statistics of the United States and EconomicReports to the President).c0',p:::l 5E:::lU 4Uro-0Q)+'ro.. 1..Profit rate- 2015Q)+'10 +'4=o5 0.inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictionsof capitalism became more and more apparent. On thesurface, these difficulties could best be captured by one word: rigidity.There were problems with the rigidity of long-term and large-scalefixed capital investments in mass-production systems that precludedmuch flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariantconsumer markets. There were problems of rigidities in labour markets,labour allocation, and in labour contracts (especially in theso-called 'monopoly' sector). And any attempt to overcome theserigidities ran into the seemingly immovable force of deeply entrenchedworking-class power - hence the strike waves and labour disruptionsof the period 1968-72. The rigidities of state commitments alsobecame more serious as entitlement programmes (social security,pension rights, etc.) grew under pressure to keep legitimacy at a timewhen rigidities in production restricted any expansion in the fiscalbasis for state expenditures. The only tool of flexible response lay inmonetary policy, in the capacity to print money at whatever rateappeared necessary to keep the economy stable. And so began theinflationary wave that was eventually to sink the postwar boom.Behind all these specific rigidities lay a rather unwieldy and seeminglyfixed configuration of political power and reciprocal relations thatbound big labour, big capital, and big government into what increasinglyappeared as a dysfunctional embrace of such narrowlydefined vested interests as to undermine rather than secure capitalaccumulation.14 l(a)454035302520 - 0.01 5 -(b)Pre-tax -manufacturi ngPre-tax -all companiesFigure ?4 Business accumulation and profit rates in the advanced capitalistcountnes, 1950-1982 (after Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison) and profit ratesas () pen ; entage ? f the replacement cost of capital stock and (b) percentage rnatzonal mcome m the USA, 1948-1984(Source: Pollin, 1986)
From Fordism to flexible accumulation 145.Dot)oō"' * '".:e l':ro :::Jc.... -.!;; >-o-0 -00 -... 0...u OJ'"OJo.ro01'" ..OJ OJ.. >.c ro... >-. :;:: o0.p Ero.-0OJ01ro...c:OJeOJc...oNoNoN8NocoooNoNo8oCOocoo
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- Page 65 and 66: 7IntroductionIf there has been some
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- Page 105 and 106: 12IntroductionMarshall Berman (1982
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142Political-economic capitalist transformationFrom Fordism to flexible accumulation143363228Share <strong>of</strong> US exports in OEeD tradeImports as share <strong>of</strong> US GNP242016Rate <strong>of</strong> accumulation- 251284 • •••••••••••••••••• •••••••• ••• •• ••••. . ', " ". . . . . . . . .. . . . . .%O+--,----,-----,-----_,----,-----._----_,----_,,_,1948 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987Figure 2.3 US share in GECD trade and manufacturing imports as apercentage <strong>of</strong> GNP in the USA, 1948-1987(Sources: GECD, Historical Statistics <strong>of</strong> the United States and EconomicReports to the President).c0',p:::l 5E:::lU 4Uro-0Q)+'ro.. 1..Pr<strong>of</strong>it rate- 2015Q)+'10 +'4=o5 0.inability <strong>of</strong> Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions<strong>of</strong> capitalism became more and more apparent. On thesurface, these difficulties could best be captured by one word: rigidity.<strong>The</strong>re were problems with the rigidity <strong>of</strong> long-term and large-scalefixed capital investments in mass-production systems that precludedmuch flexibility <strong>of</strong> design and presumed stable growth in invariantconsumer markets. <strong>The</strong>re were problems <strong>of</strong> rigidities in labour markets,labour allocation, and in labour contracts (especially in theso-called 'monopoly' sector). And any attempt to overcome theserigidities ran into the seemingly immovable force <strong>of</strong> deeply entrenchedworking-class power - hence the strike waves and labour disruptions<strong>of</strong> the period 1968-72. <strong>The</strong> rigidities <strong>of</strong> state commitments alsobecame more serious as entitlement programmes (social security,pension rights, etc.) grew under pressure to keep legitimacy at a timewhen rigidities in production restricted any expansion in the fiscalbasis for state expenditures. <strong>The</strong> only tool <strong>of</strong> flexible response lay inmonetary policy, in the capacity to print money at whatever rateappeared necessary to keep the economy stable. And so began theinflationary wave that was eventually to sink the postwar boom.Behind all these specific rigidities lay a rather unwieldy and seeminglyfixed configuration <strong>of</strong> political power and reciprocal relations thatbound big labour, big capital, and big government into what increasinglyappeared as a dysfunctional embrace <strong>of</strong> such narrowlydefined vested interests as to undermine rather than secure capitalaccumulation.14 l(a)454035302520 - 0.01 5 -(b)Pre-tax -manufacturi ngPre-tax -all companiesFigure ?4 Business accumulation and pr<strong>of</strong>it rates in the advanced capitalistcountnes, 1950-1982 (after Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison) and pr<strong>of</strong>it ratesas () pen ; entage ? f the replacement cost <strong>of</strong> capital stock and (b) percentage rnatzonal mcome m the USA, 1948-1984(Source: Pollin, 1986)