Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012 - ADB Compliance Review ...

© 2012 Asian Development BankAll rights reserved. Published in 2012.Printed in the Philippines.ISBN 978-92-9092-614-6 (Print), 978-92-9092-615-3 (PDF)Publication Stock No. RPT124504Cataloging-In-Publication DataAsian Development Bank.Accountability Mechanism policy 2012.Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2012.1. Accountability Mechanism. 2. Asian Development Bank. I. Asian Development Bank.By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term“country” in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of anyterritory or area.ADB encourages printing or copying information exclusively for personal and noncommercial use with properacknowledgment of ADB. Users are restricted from reselling, redistributing, or creating derivative works forcommercial purposes without the express, written consent of ADB.Note: In this publication, “$” refers to US dollars.Asian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila, PhilippinesTel +63 2 632 4444Fax +63 2 636 2444www.adb.orgFor more information about the Problem-Solving function, please contactSpecial Project Facilitator6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila, PhilippinesTel +63 2 632 4825Fax +63 2 636 2490spf.adb.orgFor more information about the Compliance Review function, please contactOffice of the Compliance Review Panel6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila, PhilippinesTel +63 2 632 4149Fax +63 2 636 2088crp.adb.orgThis is a typeset version of the official policy paper approved by the Asian Development Bank Board of Directorson 24 February 2012.Printed on recycled paper.

ContentsAppendixes1. Terms of Reference for Review of the Accountability Mechanism 432. Summary of the Consultation Process 453. Experience since 2003 484. Summary of Eligible Complaints for the Consultation Phase, 2004–2011 525. Summary of Requests for the Compliance Review Phase, 2004–2011 576. Number of Cases in Different Accountability Mechanisms 627. Summary Assessment of the ADB Accountability Mechanism 648. Comparison of Accountability Mechanisms 679. Information Disclosure Requirements underthe ADB Accountability Mechanism 72iv

Review GroupReview of theAccountabilityMechanism PolicyWorking Group ChairMembers aSecretariatE. Westreicher, Executive DirectorS. Shamsuddin, Alternate Executive DirectorG. B. Thapa, Alternate Executive DirectorC. J. (Stan) Vandersyp, Alternate Executive DirectorR. M. Nag, Managing Director GeneralX. Fan, Principal Planning and Policy Economist,Strategy and Policy DepartmentaD. Rooken-Smith, former Alternate Executive Director, was a working group member untilMay 2011.vi

Executive SummaryIn 1995, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)established an Inspection Function to providean independent body that people affectedby ADB-assisted projects could appeal to formatters relating to ADB’s compliance with itsoperational policies and procedures. In 2003,following an extensive review, ADB introducedthe Accountability Mechanism, which built onthe Inspection Function. The AccountabilityMechanism was designed to enhance ADB’sdevelopment effectiveness and project quality;be responsive to the concerns of project-affectedpeople and fair to all stakeholders; reflect thehighest professional and technical standards in itsstaffing and operations; be as independent andtransparent as possible; and be cost-effective,efficient, and complementary to the other supervision,audit, quality control, and evaluationsystems at ADB.At the 43rd Annual Meeting of the ADB Board ofGovernors held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May2010, the President announced a joint Boardand Management review of the AccountabilityMechanism. A Board–Management workinggroup was established to undertake the review.The working group engaged two independentinternational experts to assist with the review.The objective of the review was to take stock ofthe ADB experience, draw from the experiencesof similar mechanisms, and examine the scopefor improving the Accountability Mechanism. Thereview included extensive public consultations.The review concludes that the ADB AccountabilityMechanism has several strengths. The mechanismwas a pioneer among multilateral developmentbanks in institutionalizing the problemsolving function for public and private sectoroperations. The dual functions of consultation andcompliance review effectively complement eachother, ensure the right balance between independenceand effectiveness, and are conceptuallysound and practically valid. The AccountabilityMechanism is transparent, participatory,credible, and effective. Both the consultation andcompliance review phases have been useful anddelivered effective outcomes.The Accountability Mechanism complementsother problem solving and compliance systemsat ADB. It reflects ADB’s philosophy thatproblem prevention and compliance should bemaximized in its operations, and also that onceproblems and noncompliance occur, they shouldbe addressed promptly at the project and operationallevels. The Accountability Mechanismis the “last resort” for dealing with problemsand noncompliance that were not preventedor solved at the project and operational levels.The design of the Accountability Mechanismalso recognizes that ADB has several welldevelopedaudit, evaluation, and learning systemsto ensure that its operations are conductedin accordance with operational policies and procedures,and deliver the intended results. TheAccountability Mechanism complements thesesystems by serving as a focused mechanismfor project-affected people, thereby enhancingADB’s development effectiveness.However, the review also identified several weaknessesthat could be improved upon:(i) Enabling direct access to compliancereview. ADB should eliminatethe requirement that affected peoplemust start with the consultation processbefore they can file for compliancevii

Executive Summaryreview. This will address the perceptionthat the problem solving function mighthave reduced recourse to the compliancereview function. It can also shortendelays for people who want to file forcompliance review directly.(ii) Establishing a single entry point. OnceADB provides direct access to both problemsolving and compliance review, acomplaint receiving officer should beappointed to serve as the single entrypoint to receive and forward all complaints.This would improve the accessibilityof the Accountability Mechanism.(iii) Addressing site visit issues. ADBshould use its good offices and establishedinstitutional mechanisms to assistthe Compliance Review Panel (CRP) inobtaining access for site visits. Whena borrowing country declines to grantaccess to a site, Management will submitan information paper to the Boardexplaining why the country declined thesite visit. The CRP should complete acompliance review even if a borrowingcountry declines a site visit request.(iv) Enhancing independence. Severalmeasures are required to improve theCRP’s independence. For example, theBoard should appoint CRP membersbased on the recommendation of theBoard Compliance Review Committee inconsultation with the President. Thiswould improve on the current practiceof having CRP members appointedby the Board based on the President’srecommendation.(v) Clarifying the roles of compliancereview. The compliance review shouldfocus on findings of alleged harm andnoncompliance. Management shouldpropose remedial actions for the Board’sapproval. The CRP should be providedwith an opportunity to comment onManagement’s proposed remedialactions and communicate its commentsto the Board.(vi) Clarifying the cutoff date. ADB shouldchange the cutoff date for filing complaintsfrom the issuance date of theproject completion report to 2 yearsafter the loan or grant closing date. Thiswould improve the clarity, certainty, andpublic awareness of the cutoff date.(vii) Improving efficiency. Because theAccountability Mechanism is demanddriven,it should have two types ofoperating costs: (a) fixed costs tomaintain and operate the mechanism,regardless of the number of complaints;and (b) variable costs to respond tochanges in demand. The monitoringtime frames of the Office of the SpecialProject Facilitator (OSPF) and the CRPshould be tailored to suit each project.These will promote the optimal useof resources, while providing effectiveservices to affected people. TheAccountability Mechanism processesshould be simplified.(viii) Enhancing tracking. The current trackingby the OSPF and Office of theCompliance Review Panel (OCRP) ofthe processes and results in addressingthe complaints should be complementedby more systematic trackingby the operations departments of theineligible complaints forwarded to themby the OSPF or OCRP. This will improvethe transparency and responsivenessof the Accountability Mechanism. Thecomplaint receiving officer should haveaccess to the tracking information bythe OSPF, OCRP, and the operationsdepartments.(ix) Improving awareness. The OSPF andOCRP should undertake more systematicand effective outreach activitieswithin ADB and in developing membercountries.viii

Executive Summary(x) Enhancing learning and promotinga culture change. The AccountabilityMechanism provides opportunitiesfor ADB to learn lessons and do better.For the Accountability Mechanismto be viewed as a positive tool fordevelopment effectiveness, a culturechange is needed.These changes are expected to improve theaccessibility, credibility, efficiency, and effectivenessof the Accountability Mechanism. ix

Introduction11. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) createdthe Inspection Function in 1995 to providean open forum for public scrutiny to ensure thatADB complies with its operational policies andprocedures. 1 Building on the Inspection Functionand benefiting from intensive public consultations,ADB introduced the AccountabilityMechanism in 2003. 2 The AccountabilityMechanism encompasses two mutually supportivefunctions: problem solving and compliancereview. An effective Accountability Mechanismto address the grievances of people adverselyaffected by ADB-financed projects and ensurecompliance with ADB operational policies andprocedures is fundamental to equitable and sustainabledevelopment.2. ADB intends to ensure that theAccountability Mechanism remains adequateand effective in keeping with international bestpractices. At the 43rd Annual Meeting of theADB Board of Governors in Tashkent, Uzbekistanin May 2010, the President announced that theADB Board of Directors and Management wouldjointly review the Accountability Mechanism. 3A working group was established in April 2010comprising four members of the Board and themanaging director general. The working groupfinalized the terms of reference (TOR) for thereview in June 2010 in consultation with theBoard, and engaged two international externalexperts to provide independent advice.Appendix 1 presents the TOR of the review.3. The objectives of the review are to takestock of the ADB experience, draw on the experiencesof similar mechanisms at other multilateralfinancial institutions, and examine the scope forimproving the Accountability Mechanism. Thereview has included wide-ranging public consultationswith a broad spectrum of stakeholdersthrough face-to-face meetings, multiple stakeholderworkshops, and visits to project sites. Tosystematically respond to stakeholder comments,ADB has produced a series of review documents:two consultation papers, two working papers,and the final paper. The consultation paperswere completed in February and June 2011,and the working papers were considered by theBoard in April and October 2011. The workinggroup has sought public comments througha dedicated Accountability Mechanism reviewwebsite. 4 Appendix 2 summarizes the consultationsundertaken as part of the review.4. This paper presents key findings of thereview and proposes changes to strengthen theaccessibility, credibility, efficiency, and effectivenessof the Accountability Mechanism. 1ADB. 1995. Establishment of an Inspection Function. Manila.2ADB. 2003. Review of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New Accountability Mechanism. Manila.3The Accountability Mechanism policy was declared effective on 12 December 2003. It envisaged a review by Management3 years after it went into effect, i.e., by the end of 2006. The review was deferred because the Office of the Special ProjectFacilitator had only received four eligible complaints by the end of 2006, and the Compliance Review Panel had received onlytwo requests (only one of which was eligible). Further, ADB has been undertaking policy reforms since 2005, including adoptingthe new Safeguard Policy Statement in 2009. This had implications for the Accountability Mechanism.4ADB. Accountability Mechanism Review. http:// www.adb.org/AM-Review1

Establishment and Evolutionreview for private and public sector operations. 9The Accountability Mechanism policy stressedthat problem solving should precede compliancereview to enable immediate resolution ofthe concerns of project-affected people. At thesame time, it provided complainants with theoption to exit the consultation phase and requesta compliance review.10. Dedicated institutional support has beenprovided to both the consultation and compliancereview phases to reflect their distinctivefeatures and needs. The SPF handles the consultationphase, assisted by the Office of the SpecialProject Facilitator (OSPF), and reports directly tothe President. The compliance review phase ishandled by three CRP members, one of whomis the chair. The CRP is assisted by the Office ofthe Compliance Review Panel (OCRP). It reportsdirectly to the Board on all activities, except forsome specific activities 10 for which the CRP reportsto the Board Compliance Review Committee(BCRC). Both the SPF and CRP are empowered tomonitor the implementation of remedial actions.The Accountability Mechanism policy covers bothpublic and private sector operations.11. From the time the AccountabilityMechanism became effective in December2003 until the end of 2011, the OSPF received39 complaints. 11 Of these, 13 were found eligiblefor problem solving, 24 were ineligible, andeligibility determination for 2 complaints isongoing. The CRP received 5 requests for compliancereview over the same period, of which4 were eligible and 1 was ineligible. Appendix 3summarizes the experience since 2003. 9The compliance advisor ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation was the first to introduce problem solving forprivate sector operations. ADB was the first to introduce problem solving for both public and private sector operations.10See para. 102 of the 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy (footnote 2) for the specific activities.11The cases received by OSPF are termed “complaints” in the 2003 policy.3

3Assessment of theAccountabilityMechanism12. This section provides an assessment ofthe current Accountability Mechanism based onfeedback from consultations, a review of documents,and project site visits. Both strengths andweaknesses have been identified.StrengthsPioneer in Introducingthe Problem Solving Function13. The 2003 Accountability Mechanism introduceda new dimension of accountability: theproblem solving function. A majority of stakeholderspreferred an Accountability Mechanismconsisting of two functions—problem solvingand compliance review—during the publicconsultations leading to the adoption of the2003 policy. The adoption of the problem solvingfunction was a significant innovation that wasexpected to be particularly positive and beneficialfor project-affected people by addressing theirproblems. In addition to addressing their concerns,development agencies should empowerproject-affected people to participate in theproblem solving process, rather than justletting them be recipients of the inspection results.Following ADB, most international financialinstitutions have instituted problem solving intheir own accountability mechanisms.14. At the same time, ADB continues to placehigh importance on compliance review. Theproblem solving and compliance review functionscomplement each other. The consultations in2010 confirmed that these dual functions areworking well and remain sound.Emphasis on Independenceand Effectiveness15. The dual Accountability Mechanism functionsrequire an appropriate institutional setupto ensure their independence and effectiveness.The 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy stipulatesthat the CRP should be independent fromManagement to ensure the credibility of its investigationof alleged ADB noncompliance with itsoperational policies and procedures. Therefore,under the policy, the CRP reports directly to theBoard except on certain activities where it reportsto the BCRC (footnote 10). The CRP membershave nonrenewable terms of 5 years. This is consideredappropriate for drawing on fresh experienceand minimizing external influence. Thus,the CRP operates with a high degree of independencefrom Management.16. The 2003 Accountability Mechanism policyrequires that the SPF be independent from operations.The SPF reports directly to the Presidentand should not be involved in the formulation,processing, or implementation of any project.This arrangement is considered appropriate forstriking a balance between (i) the need for anobjective and detached perspective on a project,and (ii) the need for sufficient knowledge of andexperience with ADB operations.17. Striking this balance suggests that theconsultation phase should be located underManagement for two reasons. First, the problemsolving process is not for determining liabilityor apportioning blame. Rather, it is designed toaddress genuine complaints about ADB-assistedprojects through informal, consensus-based4

Assessment of the Accountability Mechanism26. In addition to executing and implementingagencies, operations departments deal withimplementation issues, including addressingconcerns of project-affected people. ADB staffand executing agencies have progressivelybecome more familiar with the safeguard policiesand more conscious of preventing problemsand ensuring compliance. They recognize thatdealing with problems and compliance issuesafter they occur is suboptimal compared to preventingthe problems and ensuring compliancein the first place. Moreover, solving problemsearly is better than delaying their resolution. Alloperations departments have dedicated safeguardteams, and some have set up dedicatedsafeguard units. Numerous training sessions onsafeguards have been held in ADB and DMCseach year. When problems occur, operationsdepartments are ADB’s first point of entry inaddressing them.27. The Accountability Mechanism augmentsthese existing systems by providing a “last resort”process for dealing with problems and complianceissues that were not prevented or solved atthe project and operational levels. Research onaccountability mechanisms highlights the needfor multiple mechanisms within an institution toaddress the concerns of project-affected people.The ADB system conforms to this principle. Earlyproblem prevention, problem solving, and complianceare beneficial for affected people, DMCs,and ADB. Where problems occur, ADB’s philosophyis to respond promptly and effectively at theproject and operational levels. Complaints to theSPF and CRP should only occur as exceptions.The Accountability Mechanism has been, andshould continue to be, the last resort for bothproblem solving and compliance review.Horizontal Complementarity:The Accountability Mechanismas an Integral Part of ADB’sCompliance Systems28. The design of the AccountabilityMechanism recognizes that ADB already hasseveral well-developed audit, evaluation, andlearning systems. It is designed to complementthese systems.29. To address concerns of project-affectedpeople, the Accountability Mechanism is set upas a demand-driven mechanism. Project-affectedpeople report problems and alleged noncompliance.ADB works with stakeholders to resolveproblems and address noncompliance that hascaused, or is likely to cause, direct and materialharm to project-affected people.30. To ensure lessons are learned and toenhance development effectiveness, theIndependent Evaluation Department (IED) evaluatesactivities to help the Board of Directors,Management, and decision makers in DMCs knowwhether expected outcomes have been achieved.IED’s evaluations cover all aspects of ADB operations,including policies, strategies, projects,practices, and procedures. These evaluationsemphasize effective feedback on performanceand use of lessons identified to improve thedevelopment effectiveness of ADB operations.One dimension of the evaluation is compliancewith ADB policies during and after projectimplementation, irrespective of alleged harm.IED reviews are driven by ADB’s own initiatives aswell as by the demands of stakeholders.31. To ensure that ADB resources are usedeconomically, efficiently, and for the intendedpurposes, the Office of the Auditor Generalregularly audits ADB’s financial, administrative,and information systems. The Office ofAnticorruption and Integrity deals with allegedfraud and corruption in activities financed,administered, or supported by ADB. It also proactivelyconducts reviews related to procurementto reduce the risk of corrupt and fraudulentpractices in ADB projects. The Central OperationsServices Office focuses on procurement qualityassurance. The Office of Risk Management isresponsible for the overall management of ADB’scredit, market, and operational risks.32. In addition, the Board has variouscommittees on oversight: Audit, Budget,7

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012Compliance Review, Development Effectiveness,and Ethics.33. All these mechanisms are designed toensure that ADB operations are carried out inaccordance with approved operational policiesand procedures, and deliver the intended results.ADB’s philosophy is that accountability shouldbe mainstreamed across all operations andactivities. The Accountability Mechanism playsan important and unique role as a focused anddemand-driven mechanism for project-affectedpeople and for development effectiveness.Delivering Effective Results34. Consultation phase. Of the 13 eligiblecomplaints received by the OSPF between 2004and 2011, 7 were fully or partially resolved,2 were withdrawn, 1 was not resolved, and 3 arestill undergoing consultation and monitoring ofimplementation of agreements. The 2 withdrawnand 1 unresolved complaints, as well as 1 partiallyresolved and 1 resolved complaint, weresubmitted to the CRP. 1535. For the ineligible complaints, the OSPFinformed the complainants how to pursue theirgrievances through the operations departments;they then resolved many of the issues after propercontacts were made. This is a significant aspectof OSPF operations. The OSPF has assumed aninformal role in connecting complainants withthe appropriate ADB staff. In all the cases, theOSPF informed the complainants that they cancome back to OSPF if they are still dissatisfiedafter working with the operations departments.When a complaint is found ineligible, the OSPFinforms the complainants that they can submita request to the CRP. Thus, in addition to directlyaddressing the problems of affected people, theconsultation phase has also provided a usefulchannel to link them with operations departmentsand the CRP. Appendix 4 summarizes theeligible complaints dealt with by the OSPF.36. Compliance review phase. Since 2004,the CRP has conducted a compliance review onthe Sri Lanka Southern Transport DevelopmentProject and monitored the implementation ofthe Inspection Panel’s recommendations on theChashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III).The implementation of the recommendations onboth of these projects was satisfactory.37. On the Southern Transport DevelopmentProject, the CRP concluded in its fifth and finalannual monitoring report that ADB had compliedwith all the recommendations with the exceptionof one that had been superseded by events. 16The CRP played an important role in bringing theproject into compliance. Consultations inSri Lanka indicated that the CRP’s work helped toaddress the problems faced by the affected peopleand facilitated the government’s improvementof its own systems. On the Chashma Right BankIrrigation Project (Stage III), the CRP found thatby 2009 ADB had fulfilled 24 of the 29 Boardapprovedrecommendations and had madesufficient progress on the 4 partially compliedwithrecommendations. One recommendationwas superseded by events and could not becomplied with. Appendix 5 summarizes therequests dealt with by the CRP.High Degree of Transparency38. The ADB Accountability Mechanism hasmaintained a high degree of transparency ininformation disclosure, while ensuring thatthe required confidentiality is also met. Boththe OSPF and OCRP have proactively posted15The withdrawn cases were the Melamchi Water Supply Project in Nepal and the Visayas Base-Load Power DevelopmentProject in the Philippines. The request for compliance review on the Melamchi Water Supply Project was found ineligible,while the request on the Visayas Base-Load Power Development Project was eligible. The unresolved case was the Sri LankaSouthern Transport Development Project and the partially resolved case was the People’s Republic of China: Fuzhou EnvironmentalImprovement Project. The complaint on the CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Bishkek–Torugart Road), Project 2, in theKyrgyz Republic was fully resolved. All these 5 cases were submitted to the CRP.16ADB. 2011. Annual Monitoring Report to the Board of Directors from 15 May 2010 to 22 March 2011 on the Implementationof Remedial Actions for the Southern Transport Development Project in Sri Lanka. Manila.8

Assessment of the Accountability Mechanisminformation on their websites. A review of theaccountability mechanism websites across differentdevelopment institutions suggests that theADB Accountability Mechanism compares favorablyin terms of its comprehensiveness and clarityof disclosed information.Accountability as a Learning Mechanism39. The Accountability Mechanism hascontributed to learning by ADB as well as DMCs.The findings of both the OSPF and OCRP arewidely disseminated through their websites. As apart of enhanced learning efforts, the OSPF andOCRP have started to provide training coursesto staff and undertake more outreach activitiesin DMCs.40. The 2003 Accountability Mechanism policyemphasizes the role of the OSPF in strengtheningthe internal problem solving function of theoperations departments. The OSPF has developedguidelines for establishing and implementinggrievance redress mechanisms in various DMCs.The OSPF also developed a project complainttracking system in 2009 together with the Officeof Information Systems and Technology and theIndia Resident Mission. 17 This system, whichis gradually being adopted by other residentmissions, provides a user-friendly way oftracking complaints.41. To facilitate learning, the OCRP establishedan internet-based platform for people workingon different accountability mechanisms toexchange views. 18 It also established a system totrack the implementation of remedial actions. InSri Lanka, implementation of the ADB safeguardpolicy in the Southern Transport DevelopmentProject led to the establishment of governmentsafeguard and grievance redress systems, andthe compliance review enhanced the implementationof these systems.42. Staff, Management, and the Board increasinglysee the Accountability Mechanism as a toolfor ADB to respond positively to public scrutiny.The Accountability Mechanism helps ADB tolearn lessons and improve its project quality.Weaknesses43. The assessment has also identifiedsome weaknesses in the 2003 AccountabilityMechanism.Lack of Direct Access to the ComplianceReview Function44. Under the 2003 Accountability Mechanismpolicy, complainants are required to start with theconsultation phase. The 2003 policy adopted thissequential approach to address problems facedby project-affected people before addressing thequestion of ADB’s compliance. Project-affectedpeople were thought to be more interested inhaving their complaints addressed first. The 2003Accountability Mechanism policy also providesoptions for complainants to exit the consultationprocess and request a compliance review.45. The requirement to start with the consultationprocess has generated two issues. First,some stakeholders, especially NGOs, argue thatthe OSPF has blocked the access of complainantsto the compliance review. Second, according tosome stakeholders, this requirement may haveprolonged the process for people who wanted toaccess compliance review in the first place. ADBneeds to consider giving complainants directaccess to the compliance review function.46. Under the 2003 Accountability Mechanismpolicy, complainants can exit the consultationphase and proceed to the compliance reviewat various predefined points, one of which is17ADB. 2010. Office of the Special Project Facilitator, 2009 Annual Report. Manila. p. 20.18ADB. 2009. Piloting of a Community of Practice for Independent Accountability Mechanisms. Manila (approved for$150,000). The network is available on http://iamnet.adb.org9

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012when the complainants have serious concernsabout compliance issues during step 7 of theconsultation process, entitled “implementationof the course of action.” At this stage, thecomplainants can request a parallel compliancereview (paras. 42 and 88, 2003 AccountabilityMechanism policy, footnote 2). However, the2003 policy is unclear on what “implementationof the course of action” means. This lack of clarityhas led to confusion in practice. The transitionpoint between the consultation and compliancereview processes should be clarified.Need for a Single Entry Point47. If project-affected people are to be able todirectly access either the problem solving functionor the compliance review function, ADB needs toestablish a single entry point where complainantscan easily access the Accountability Mechanism.This entry point should be both credible andefficient.Uncertainty on Site Visits48. Site visits to borrowing countries by theCRP are controversial. 19 In both internal and externalconsultations, strong views were expressedthat site visits are essential for the effectivenessof compliance review, stakeholder participation,and independent verification of facts and allegedpolicy violations. As a result, some stakeholdershave suggested that ADB insist on site visits inthe mechanism; otherwise, they have argued,the Accountability Mechanism process wouldbe compromised. Some of these stakeholderssuggested that site visits and general cooperationwith the CRP should be included in the conditionsof loan agreements for all projects. DMC governments,however, have argued that ADB has nobasis to mandate site visits through loan agreementsbecause the compliance review is aboutADB’s compliance with its own policies andprocedures, not about a borrower’s breach of anyobligations, which are dealt with separately.49. The 2003 Accountability Mechanism policyrequires obtaining a borrowing country’s consentfor a site visit. The policy (para. 56, 2003Accountability Mechanism policy, footnote 2)states the following: “If, as many stakeholdersbelieve, site visits are important to the compliancereview process, then a sensible approachis to enable site visits to take place in consultationwith the borrowing country. When theBoard approves the proposed mechanism, thepolicy and procedures should assume the goodfaith cooperation of all parties in the compliancereview process, including the borrowing country.This would also contribute to a collaborativespirit of improving ADB accountability and policycompliance. Seeking prior consent of the borrowingcountry, under an operating assumption thatsuch consent would be routinely given, wouldbe preferable to the heavy-handed approach ofincluding conditions in the loan agreement.”50. The advantage of the approach in the2003 policy is its clarity on the requirement ofthe borrowing country’s consent. This requirementis also consistent with those of other MDBaccountability mechanisms. The disadvantageis that the policy is silent on the process andresponsibility for obtaining the consent froma borrowing country. Further, it lacks clarity onhow ADB should deal with a situation wherea borrowing country declines a request for asite visit.51. The opinions on site visits are deeplydivided. ADB needs to address issues surroundingsite visits by drawing on the extensiveconsultations it conducted and the experiencesof ADB and other MDBs.Need to Enhance the Independenceand Effectiveness of the ComplianceReview Panel52. The CRP’s independence can be enhancedin several areas. First, CRP members are appointed19In this document, the term “borrower” includes grant recipients, and the term “loan” includes grants.10

Assessment of the Accountability Mechanismby the Board, but on the President’s recommendation.Second, a senior staff member is assignedas the secretary of the OCRP. Public consultationsindicate that some stakeholders see the OCRPsecretary as a representative of Management.Third, the CRP does not have a formal workprogramming and budgeting process, reducingthe opportunities for systematic work planning.53. The effectiveness of the CRP should alsobe improved. The CRP has little interaction withManagement and staff. Unlike with the WorldBank’s Inspection Panel, ADB’s compliance reviewphase does not give Management the opportunityto respond before the eligibility of a requestis determined. The borrower is also not given theopportunity to respond to the draft CRP report,even though it is primarily responsible for implementingremedial actions. This gap can diminishgoodwill and undermine the effectiveness of theAccountability Mechanism. CRP members are notevaluated, potentially reducing the accountabilityof the Accountability Mechanism. The BCRCalso has little interaction with the CRP, which mayreduce appropriate Board oversight and necessarydialogue.Need to Clarify the Roles of theCompliance Review Panel54. Under the 2003 Accountability Mechanismpolicy, the CRP has been mandated to make recommendationsto bring projects into compliance.Since 2003, however, the CRP has madebroad recommendations on how to bring aproject into compliance, while Management hasdeveloped remedial actions in consultation withthe borrower. This policy stipulation and practicehave created three problems. First, the CRPrecommendations are sometimes too specificand detailed, blurring the mandates betweencompliance review and project design and implementationby operations departments. 20 Second,the CRP recommendations are sometimes toobroad, touching upon the adequacy and suitabilityof ADB policies and procedures, even thoughthe 2003 Accountability Mechanism states thatthis should not be part of compliance review(para. 72, 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy,footnote 2). 21 Third, the CRP has not been givenan opportunity to comment on Management’sremedial actions, limiting the CRP’s sharing of itsknowledge on the project. The role of the CRPneeds to be clarified.Lack of Clear and PredictableCutoff Dates55. The current cutoff date for filing a complaintis the issuance of the project completionreport (PCR). Using the PCR as a cutoff date hascreated problems since this date is uncertain.PCRs are issued 1–2 years after project completion,but the exact dates are difficult to knowin advance. In practice, the time frame in whichthe PCRs are issued varies significantly. The cutoffdates need to be more predictable.Efficiency Improvement Possibilities56. Time. For the consultation phase, theaverage time for determining eligibility is about47 days. For eligible cases, the average time fromreceiving a complaint to starting to implementthe course of action has been about 170 days. Forthe compliance review phase, the average timefrom receiving a request to the CRP informingthe requesters of the eligibility was about20 days. Only 2 requests have gone throughthe full compliance review process—it took anaverage of 367 days from receiving the requeststo informing the requesters about the Board’s20For example, in the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III), it was recommended that ADB discuss with theGovernment of Pakistan the possibility of extending the project completion date, utilizing surplus loan proceeds to addressthe problems, and ensuring long-term funding (i.e., for at least 5 years) for the implementation of a full environmentalmanagement plan.21For example, in the case of the Sri Lanka Southern Transport Development Project, the CRP recommended that ADB developadditional guidance for inclusion in the handbook on resettlement (ADB. 1998. Handbook on Resettlement: A Guide to GoodPractice. Manila).11

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012decision on the CRP review report. 22 Other MDBaccountability mechanisms also customarily takemore than a year to complete the problem solvingor compliance review process.57. The long duration of AccountabilityMechanism processes may be attributed primarilyto two factors. First, the processes are complex.Field consultations indicate that project-affectedpeople still have difficulty filing complaints.Second, consultation and compliance review areintensive processes that often require hiring mediatorsor experts. The processes are initiated fromManila and field visits can only be carried out periodically.During the site visits to the CommunityEmpowerment for Rural Development Project 23 inIndonesia, local communities expressed a strongdesire to use the ADB resident mission to expediteproblem solving.58. The CRP has set its monitoring time frameat 5 years for every project, even though the2003 Accountability Mechanism policy and theOperations Manual (section L1) have not prescribedsuch a time frame. This one-size-fits-allapproach demands time and resources from theaffected people, DMCs, and ADB. A more flexibletime frame tailored to each project would bemore efficient.59. Costs. The costs associated with theAccountability Mechanism include the directoperating costs and indirect costs of staff time,the potential increases in costs of implementingprojects, and the costs to affected people.ADB shoulders the operating costs. In 2009, theoperating cost was $2.1 million. 24 Because theAccountability Mechanism is demand driven,the operating costs vary from year to year.Some costs have to be incurred to maintain theAccountability Mechanism regardless of thenumber of complaints received. However, ADBneeds to ensure that adequate resources areavailable for the Accountability Mechanism torespond effectively to the requests of projectaffectedpeople, while not putting in place largeexcess capacity that leads to inefficient use ofscarce resources.60. A common concern among the DMCsis that the Accountability Mechanism causessignificant costs above the normal project implementationand compliance costs that they mustbear. DMCs have identified the following possiblecosts related to the Accountability Mechanism:(i) delays in project implementation, which leadto cost escalation, cost overruns, higher commitmentcharges, and postponed benefits while thecountry repays the loan and interest as originallyscheduled; (ii) changes of scope that require morefunding and make project design sub optimalfor the beneficiaries as a whole; (iii) highercompensation above the Safeguard PolicyStatement requirements; (iv) higher administrativecosts; and (v) nonfinancial costs such as riskaversion by ADB to avoid needed but complexprojects, lack of innovation, and the tendency tofocus on compliance rather than developmentresults. For example, the Government of Sri Lankaestimated the costs related to the AccountabilityMechanism for the Southern TransportDevelopment Project at about $45.0 millionbecause of delays in project implementationand cost escalations. In the Chashma project,the PCR indicated that $12.5 million of the totalADB loan was disbursed for implementation ofthe remedial action plan. DMCs expressed theiruneasiness in bearing the costs resulting fromADB’s noncompliance with ADB’s operationalpolicies and procedures.61. However, the costs incurred in theAccountability Mechanism processes must bebalanced against the potential benefits that22The duration from receiving the request to providing information to the requesters about the Board’s decision was 223 daysfor the Southern Transport Development Project and 511 days for the Fuzhou project.23ADB. 2000. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loans and Technical AssistanceGrant to the Republic of Indonesia for the Community Empowerment for Rural Development Project. Manila (Loan 1765-INOfor $115 million, approved on 19 October 2000).24The operating costs include salary, benefits, relocation, consultants, business travel, and representation.12

Assessment of the Accountability Mechanismthe mechanism generates in solving problems ofproject-affected people, ensuring ADB’s compliancewith its policies and procedures, andcontributing to the development effectivenessof ADB operations (paras. 28–37). ADB needsto be fully aware of the costs and demonstratethe benefits of the Accountability Mechanism toensure its credibility and ownership by DMCs.Better understanding of the benefits and costsof the Accountability Mechanism will also help indesigning and implementing an effective policy.62. The Accountability Mechanism processesalso require the project-affected people tospend time and resources. A protracted processdemands extra time and effort, and puts a burdenon their work and daily life. The transaction coststo address the problems faced by project-affectedpeople need to be minimized. From the outset,ADB should make the utmost efforts to ensureproblem prevention, problem solving, and compliance.If problems and noncompliance occur,they should be addressed as quickly as possible.Inadequate Awareness and Tracking63. Consultations revealed limited awarenessof the Accountability Mechanism, especiallyamong local communities. Reaching people withlimited internet access remains a huge challenge.Awareness among staff also needs to be continuallyenhanced through in-house training andawareness-raising activities.64. While the cases dealt with by the SPF andCRP have been well tracked, no system is inplace to track the ineligible complaints that theOSPF forwarded to the operations departmentsbecause the complainants did not make priorgood faith efforts to resolve the problems withthe operations departments. This informationgap should be addressed.Insufficient Learning65. Staff, Management, and the Boardincreasingly see the Accountability Mechanismas a tool for ADB to respond positively to publicscrutiny and learn how the organization can dobetter. However, the perception that the compliancereview is adversarial remains. More interactionsare needed among the SPF, CRP, staff,Management, and DMCs for constructive dialogueand learning. Further positive interactionswill change the perception of the compliancereview from an adversarial process to a positiveinstrument for learning and development.Too Few Compliance Review Requests?66. The OSPF received 39 complaints between2004 and 2011, while the CRP received 5 requestsover the same period. Some stakeholders arguedthat the CRP received too few requests. However,the limited recourse to compliance review is inline with the experience of other MDBs. TheWorld Bank Inspection Panel investigated 33 eligiblerequests from 1994 to 2011, an averageof fewer than 2 eligible cases a year for an institutionwhose portfolio is nearly 4 times the sizeof ADB’s. The Office of the Compliance AdvisorOmbudsman of the International FinanceCorporation and the Multilateral InvestmentGuarantee Agency received 127 complaintsfrom 2000 to 2010, but only 8 went throughthe full compliance audit process. The AfricanDevelopment Bank has received 7 cases since2007, of which 2 were eligible for compliancereview. Appendix 6 presents the number of casesreceived by different accountability mechanisms.67. Consultations suggested various reasons forthe low number of compliance review requests atADB. A major reason is that a bottom–up, multilevelproblem prevention and solving mechanismhas been in place (paras. 22–27). Most of thegrievances are handled at the project and operationallevels. The Accountability Mechanism isthe last resort for problem solving and compliancereview, and complaints submitted to itshould occur as exceptions. However, awarenessof the Accountability Mechanism is also limited,contributing to the low number of requests. Inaddition, the Accountability Mechanism processis complicated. Some stakeholders believe thatthe requirement that affected people start at13

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012the consultation stage—before they can requestfor compliance review—may also have reducedrecourse to compliance review.68. Thus, the reasons for the low number ofcompliance review cases are mixed. ADB needs tostrengthen the positive aspect of effective problemsolving and compliance at the project andoperations department levels, while addressingissues related to awareness, accessibility, and thelack of direct access to the CRP.69. Appendix 7 summarizes the AccountabilityMechanism’s strengths, weaknesses, and potentialareas for improvement, reflecting the fourdesirable attributes of an accountability mechanism:accessibility, credibility, efficiency, andeffectiveness. 25 25E. B. Weiss. 2007. Note on Criteria for Evaluating Accountability Institutions in MDBs. Address to 4th Meeting ofAccountability Mechanisms. London, England. 21 June. Presented in World Bank. 2009. Accountability at the World Bank:The Inspection Panel at 15 Years. Washington, DC. pp.109–113.14

Major Proposed Changesof a necessary site visit, the CRP may give addedweight to the complainants’ views.Enhancing the Independence ofCompliance Review83. The review leading to the establishment ofIED provides insights on how the independenceof the CRP could be improved. 28 Several changesdrawing from the IED model are proposed. First,CRP members should be appointed by the Boardbased on the recommendation of the BCRC inconsultation with the President—a process similarto the appointment of the director general ofIED. This would depart from the current practiceof the Board appointing CRP members based onthe President’s recommendation. Second, theCRP chair should be the head of the OCRP withfull responsibility for running the office, insteadof a senior staff member serving as the secretaryof the OCRP. Third, the CRP’s work program andbudget process should be strengthened. The CRPchair should be responsible for preparing acombined CRP and OCRP annual work plan andbudget. The annual work plan and budget shouldbe endorsed by the BCRC in consultation withthe President, reviewed by the Board’s BudgetReview Committee, and approved by the Board.84. The review leading to the establishmentof IED also concluded that independence alonedoes not ensure accountability and high-qualityevaluations. Appropriate Board oversight isnecessary to promote effectiveness and accountabilityof an independent mechanism. Like theDevelopment Effectiveness Committee’s rolewith IED, the BCRC should be the focal point forthe CRP’s interaction with the Board and an avenuefor regular dialogue on the AccountabilityMechanism. To enhance accountability, the BCRCshould provide written annual performance feedbackon each CRP member, similar to the writtenannual performance feedback the DevelopmentEffectiveness Committee provides on the directorgeneral of IED. The BCRC will seek inputs fromthe CRP chair in providing performance feedbackto the other two CRP members.Clarifying the Roles ofCompliance Review85. To better use the expertise of the CRP andManagement, the compliance review shouldascertain the alleged direct and material harm,and determine whether such harm was theresult of ADB’s failure to comply with its operationalpolicies and procedures. Responding tothe CRP findings, Management should proposeremedial actions in consultation with the borrower,and submit these to the Board for consideration.To benefit from the CRP’s insightson the project, the CRP should have an opportunityto comment on Management’s proposedremedial actions. The clarification of the roles ofthe CRP and Management will enable the CRPto use the knowledge it has acquired during thereview process to comment on Management’sremedial actions. It will also allow Managementto utilize its competency in project design andimplementation to identify remedial actions tobe discussed and agreed upon with the borrowerand approved by the Board. This approach willstrengthen the role of the CRP in shaping remedialactions, and also clarify the specific functionsof the CRP and Management. The CRP will monitorthe implementation of the remedial actions.86. The IED experience demonstrates thatwhile independence is an important prerequisitefor the credibility of a mechanism, itshould not mean isolation. Consistent with thepartnership principle, the CRP should seek toengage all stakeholders concerned throughoutthe review process. The borrower should beinformed about a complaint before and afterits eligibility is determined and should havean opportunity to respond to the draft CRPcompliance review reports. This will help build28ADB. 2008. Review of the Independence and Effectiveness of the Operations Evaluation Department. Manila.17

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012understanding from early on and facilitate theimplementation of remedial actions. Like theWorld Bank’s Inspection Panel, the CRP shouldprovide the opportunity for Managementto respond before the eligibility of a requestis determined. However, the CRP alone isresponsible for all stages and outcomes of thecompliance review process.Clarifying the Cutoff Date87. Establishing the cutoff date for filing complaintsbased on the PCR lacks predictability sincethe date of PCR is uncertain. Some stakeholderssuggested extending the cutoff date to sometimebeyond the issuance of the PCR. However,as the issuance of the PCR is uncertain, extendingthe date based on the PCR will not addressthis problem. A better option might be choosinga date that is known more clearly in advance.The loan or grant closing date is predictable andis disclosed to the public throughout the projectcycle. 29 The cutoff date for filing complaintscould be 2 years after the loan or grant closingdate, which would provide more clarity and certainty,and is also on average longer than the currentPCR-based cutoff date. 3088. Appendix 8 compares the key features ofaccountability mechanisms in nine developmentagencies, including the cutoff dates.Improving EfficiencyImproving Processes89. The consultation phase of theAccountability Mechanism requires complainantsto provide written comments on the SPF reviewand assessment reports. This requirement hassometimes been a burden on complainants anddelays the process. Instead, it should be offeredas one option for complainants, rather than asa requirement. Complainants’ feedback can beobtained through more user-friendly and fastermeans, such as meetings, discussions, and telephonecalls. While the SPF should inform thePresident about the complaints and results,the current requirement that the SPF consultwith the President on the procedural steps isunnecessary and should be dropped.90. Operations departments and project-levelgrievance redress mechanisms should have morescope for problem solving. The SPF can engagethe operations department concerned and theproject-level grievance redress mechanism if theSPF thinks this will improve the efficiency andeffectiveness of problem solving. The SPF shoulddecide on the degree and manner of the engagementon a case-by-case basis.91. The SPF and CRP should adopt a moreflexible monitoring time frame tailored to eachproject. SPF monitoring should generally notexceed 2 years and CRP monitoring shouldgenerally not exceed 3 years.92. The documentation requirements forfiling a complaint can be simplified. The requirementsshould focus on essential information thatenables the processing of a complaint, whilemaking requirements such as specification ofthe complainants’ desired outcomes optional.Meanwhile, requiring a minimum amountof information will help reduce the time forprocessing the complaint later on.93. The Accountability Mechanism policyshould enable complainants to provide additionalinformation and evidence on their complaintduring the problem solving or compliancereview processes. This will increase the flexibilityfor the complainants to strengthen their cases.29According to the Project Administration Instruction (4.05), the loan or grant closing date is the last date for the borrowers towithdraw from the loan or grant account.30An analysis of PCR issuance dates between 2008 and October 2011 shows a large variation, highlighting the uncertainty andunpredictability. The loan or grant closing dates plus 2 years will on average provide about 280 more days compared to thePCR issuance dates.18

Major Proposed ChangesImproving Cost Effectiveness94. Because the Accountability Mechanismis demand-driven, its costs can conceptually beseparated into two parts: (i) fixed costs, regardlessof the number of complaints, to maintainand operate the Accountability Mechanism;and (ii) variable costs based on demand andworkload. 31 The OSPF currently has one internationalstaff in addition to the SPF, one nationalstaff, and one administrative staff. The OCRPhas two international staff, one national staff,and two administrative staff supporting the CRPchair and two other CRP members. Based on areview of their past workloads, it is proposedthat the basic structure for the OSPF and OCRPbe similar.95. The 2003 policy provides for the CRP chairto work full-time for a minimum of 1 year toorganize the OCRP and undertake other relatedtasks (para. 97, 2003 Accountability Mechanismpolicy, footnote 2). However, since 2003, the CRPchair has been full-time in 6 of the 7 years, whilethe CRP members have been part-time. This hasbeen shown to be an appropriate arrangement.To strengthen the CRP and to enable the chairto fulfill the mandate as the head of OCRP, theworking group recommends that the CRP chairwork full-time.Improving Awareness andEnhancing Learning96. The joint OSPF and OCRP outreach strategiesshould support three kinds of activities:(i) improving the awareness of ADB staff;(ii) undertaking targeted outreach for governmentproject teams; and (iii) working withresident mission staff, and undertaking regulardissemination activities in DMCs involving localcommunities, governments, NGOs, and otherrelevant stakeholders. Each resident missionshould have focal person working with projectteams on grievance handling and AccountabilityMechanism outreach. Operations staff shouldbe the main conduit for disseminating informationabout the Accountability Mechanism,which should be viewed as a tool for learningand development effectiveness, instead ofbeing adversarial.97. The OSPF and OCRP track the processesand outcomes of all the complaints they havehandled. The tracking should be extended tocomplaints that were forwarded to the operationsdepartments because of a lack of priorgood faith efforts by complainants to solve theproblems with the operations department concerned.The operations departments are alsoencouraged to keep records of meetings andother discussions with complainants. This shouldenrich the information for analyzing and reducingproblems. Some good practices have alreadystarted (para. 40).98. The OSPF and OCRP should distill lessonsfrom their operations. The OSPF and CRPcurrently produce separate annual reports. Ajoint Accountability Mechanism annual reportis recommended to promote synergy. The OSPFand OCRP currently have separate websites, leadingto fragmentation and less accessibility. TheOSPF and OCRP websites—and all other informationrelated to the Accountability Mechanism—should be consolidated under a commonAccountability Mechanism website within ADB’spublic website (adb.org). Similarly, the OSPFand OCRP (or the SPF and CRP) logos and letterheadsshould be placed under a common ADBAccountability Mechanism logo and letterhead.99. The OSPF, OCRP, IED, and RSDD shouldproduce a joint learning report every 3 yearsto distill lessons and insights. A collaborativeeffort among these departments would enhance31The term “fixed costs” in this paper refers to the resources required to support the basic structure of the AccountabilityMechanism regardless of the number of requests. This will include the basic number of staff, offices, and other facilities tomaintain and operate the Accountability Mechanism. The term “variable costs” refers to the resources required to respond tofluctuating demand. This could be satisfied, for example, by staff consultants and contractual staff.19

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012learning, guide staff in improving project designand implementation, help ADB avoid the recurrenceof common problems, and facilitate aculture change so that the AccountabilityMechanism is viewed as a positive toolfor learning.100. Interactions between the AccountabilityMechanism, the Board, Management, and staffwill accelerate the application of lessons learned.The OCRP should provide regular (e.g., quarterly)briefings to the BCRC. One of the sessions caninvolve the joint OSPF and OCRP disseminationof the Accountability Mechanism annual report.The OSPF and OCRP should continue their trainingand workshops for ADB staff.101. ADB should also revise some terms tosharpen the Accountability Mechanism messages.First, the “consultation phase” shouldbe renamed the “problem solving function.”The 2003 policy used the term “consultation”because of the concern that the term “problemsolving” would create the expectation that allproblems would be solved by the OSPF. However,consultations undertaken as a part of this reviewindicate that this risk is not significant. “Problemsolving” would more accurately reflect the natureand objective of this function. Second, the 2003policy refers to cases received by the OSPFas “complaints,” while those received by theCRP are “requests.” To promote simplicity anddistinguish Accountability Mechanism issuesfrom general requests that can be raised withany part of ADB, it is proposed that the casesreceived by the OSPF and CRP be referred to as“complaints” and the people asking for thembe referred to as “complainants.” Third, as thecomplainants will choose either problem solvingor compliance review, the term “phase,” whichimplies a sequential approach, should be replacedwith the term “function.” 20

The RevisedAccountabilityMechanism Policy5102. This section uses the 2003 policy as a basisand incorporates the recommendations outlinedin Section 4 and other necessary changes.Objectives and Guiding Principles103. The objectives of the AccountabilityMechanism will be to provide an independentand effective forum for people adversely affectedby ADB-assisted projects to voice their concernsand seek solutions to their problems, and torequest compliance review of the alleged noncomplianceby ADB with its operational policiesand procedures that may have caused, or is likelyto cause, them direct and material harm.104. The Accountability Mechanism is designedto (i) increase ADB’s development effectivenessand project quality; (ii) be responsive to the concernsof project-affected people and fair to allstakeholders; (iii) reflect the highest professionaland technical standards in its staffing and operations;(iv) be as independent and transparent aspossible; (v) be cost-effective and efficient; and(vi) be complementary to the other supervision,audit, quality control, and evaluation systemsat ADB.105. The Accountability Mechanism will be a“last resort” mechanism. ADB must continue tostrengthen its project design, implementation,and learning mechanisms to prevent problemsand ensure compliance from the outset, andto deal with the legitimate concerns of projectaffectedpeople at the project and operationallevels wherever possible.Structure106. The Accountability Mechanism will havetwo functions. The problem solving function willbe led by the SPF who will respond to problemsof local people affected by ADB-assisted projectsthrough a range of informal and flexiblemethods. The compliance review function willbe led by the CRP, which will investigate allegednoncompliance by ADB with its operationalpolicies and procedures that has caused, oris likely to cause, direct and material harm toproject-affected people.107. To provide an easily accessible singleentry point for project-affected people, thistwo-pronged structure will be supportedby the CRO who will receive all complaintsfrom people seeking access to theAccountability Mechanism.Human and Financial ResourcesThe Problem Solving Function108. The SPF will head the OSPF, which will haveone other international staff member and twoadministrative or national staff members. TheSPF will be a special appointee at a level equivalentto a director general. Appointed by thePresident after consultation with the Board, theSPF will report directly to the President. The OSPFmay engage technical experts as consultants inaccordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Useof Consultants (2010, as amended from timeto time) and other arrangements satisfactory to21

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012ADB to assist the OSPF’s work, including monitoringactivities.109. The selection criteria for the SPF willinclude (i) the ability to deal thoroughly and fairlywith complaints; (ii) integrity and independencefrom the operations departments; (iii) exposureto developmental issues and living conditionsin developing countries; and (iv) knowledge of,and experience with, the operations of ADB orcomparable institutions, and/or private sectorexperience. Mediation skills will be an asset. TheSPF’s term will be 3 years and may be renewablefor another 2 years. The SPF must not haveworked in any ADB operations departments forat least 5 years before the appointment. TheSPF must disclose immediately to the Presidentany personal interest or significant prior involvementin a project that is subject to problemsolving procedures. The SPF will have access to allADB staff and Management, and all ADB recordsthat the SPF deems relevant, except personalinformation that is typically restricted.110. The President will evaluate the performanceof the SPF. The work planning, budgeting,and staffing of the OSPF will be processed in thesame way as other ADB departments. Necessaryflexibility will be ensured in the work plans andbudget to accommodate the demand-drivennature of the problem solving function. Anyadditional human and financial resources for theOSPF, if required, will be approved through thework program and budget framework process orby the President. 32 The Budget, Personnel, andManagement Systems Department (BPMSD) willhandle the administrative processes according toADB guidelines.The Compliance Review Function111. Compliance Review Panel. The CRP willhave three members, one of whom will be thechair. The CRP chair will be full time and the twoCRP members will be part time and called onwhen required. CRP members will be appointedby the Board upon the recommendation of theBCRC in consultation with the President. TheBCRC will direct the search and selection process,which may involve the use of an executive searchfirm if the BCRC considers it necessary. BPMSDwill handle the administrative processes.112. Each panel member will have a 5-year,nonrenewable term. Two panel members will befrom regional member countries, with at leastone from a DMC. The third panel member willbe from a nonregional member country. Theselection criteria for panel members will include(i) the ability to deal thoroughly and fairly withthe complaints; (ii) integrity and independencefrom Management; (iii) exposure to developmentalissues and living conditions in developingcountries; and (iv) knowledge of, and experiencewith, the operations of ADB or comparable institutions,and/or private sector experience.113. Directors, alternate directors, directors’advisors, Management, staff, and consultantswill be ineligible to serve on the CRP until at least3 years have elapsed from their time of employmentwith ADB. After serving on the CRP, panelmembers will be barred from any future employmentat ADB. A panel member may be removedin the same way as he or she was appointed onthe grounds of inefficiency and/or misconduct.A panel member will be disqualified from participatingin a compliance review if he or shehas a personal interest or has had significantprior involvement in a project under compliancereview. A panel member must disclose immediatelyto the BCRC any personal interest orsignificant prior involvement in a project subjectto compliance review.114. The CRP will be a fact-finding body thatreports to the Board through the BCRC. CRPmembers will not be subject to the formal annualperformance review process for staff. However,the BCRC chair, in consultation with other BCRC32Resource needs from, for example, an unanticipated rise in complaints can be addressed by hiring contractual staff orconsultants.22

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012Legal Advice122. The Office of the General Counsel willadvise the OSPF, SPF, OCRP, CRP, BCRC, and Boardon matters concerning ADB’s legal status, rights,and obligations under the Agreement Establishingthe Asian Development Bank (the Charter) 34 andany agreement to which ADB is a party, and onany other matters relating to ADB’s rights andobligations with respect to any complaintrequesting problem solving or compliance reviewunder the Accountability Mechanism policy.123. Consistent with the current practice, theOffice of the General Counsel will facilitate theCRP’s access to specialist legal advice on the lawsand regulations of the borrowing countriesconcerned as necessary.FunctionsReceiving Complaints124. The CRO will(i) receive all complaints from people seekingaccess to the Accountability Mechanismand promptly acknowledge them;(ii) provide information to complainants;(iii) forward complaints to the OSPF or CRPbased on the choice of complainants; orforward complaints that are beyond thescope of the Accountability Mechanism,such as those relating to procurementor corruption, to other relevant departmentsand offices;(iv) copy the relevant parties (e.g., the OSPF,CRP, and operations department) if thecomplaints are not forwarded to them,stressing the importance of maintainingconfidentiality of the complainants’identities if required by complainants;(v) register the complaints;(vi) maintain the landing page of theAccountability Mechanism websitewithin ADB’s public website throughworking with the OSPF, OCRP, andDepartment of External Relations (DER);(vii) have access to the OSPF, OCRP, andoperations departments about the statusand process of complaints;(viii) inform the complainants about whomto contact after complaints have beenregistered; and(ix) undertake other work as assigned by theSPF and CRP chair.125. The CRO will carry out all functions withobjectivity and neutrality.Problem Solving126. The problem solving function will assistpeople directly, materially, and adverselyaffected by specific problems caused by ADBassistedprojects through informal, flexible, andconsensus-based methods with the consent andparticipation of all parties concerned. The generalapproaches will include (i) consultative dialogue,(ii) information sharing, (iii) joint fact-finding,and (iv) mediation. The SPF may suggest variousspecific approaches to resolve problems, suchas convening meetings, organizing and facilitatingconsultation processes, or engaging in afact-finding review of the situation. The problemsolving function will be outcome-driven. It willnot focus on the identification and allocation ofblame, but on finding ways to address the problemsof the project-affected people.127. The SPF problem solving function will alsoaim to strengthen the internal problem solvingprocesses of operations departments. The SPFwill carry out activities designed to improvethe overall internal problem solving functionsof ADB.128. The OSPF will(i) process complaints requesting problemsolving;(ii) obtain from the operations departmentsall materials relating to the complaints;34ADB. 1966. Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila.24

The Revised Accountability Mechanism Policy(iii) engage with all relevant parties, includingthe complainants, the borrower, theADB Board member representing thecountry concerned, Management, andstaff to gain a thorough understandingof the issues to be examined duringproblem solving;(iv) facilitate consultative dialogue, promoteinformation sharing, undertake jointfact-finding, and/or facilitate the establishmentof a mediation mechanism;(v) inform the Board and other stakeholdersabout the results of problem solvingactivities;(vi) monitor the implementation of theremedial actions agreed upon duringthe problem solving process;(vii) collate and integrate internal and externalexperiences with problem solvingto be fed back into ADB's operations,including the formulation, processing,or implementation of projects;(viii) provide generic support and advice tooperations departments in their problemprevention and problem solvingactivities, but not for specific casesunder problem solving by the operationsdepartments;(ix) work with the OCRP to produce a clear,simple, informative, and succinct informationpacket about the AccountabilityMechanism, highlighting the differentprocesses and remedies available underthe two functions; 35(x) prepare and publish AccountabilityMechanism annual reports 36 jointly withthe OCRP;(xi) produce a learning report every 3 yearsthrough joint efforts with the OCRP, IED,and RSDD; 37(xii) conduct outreach programs withinADB and with the public that willinclude a holistic introduction tothe Accountability Mechanism whilefocusing on specific subjects;(xiii) work with the CRO, OCRP, and DER tomaintain the problem solving and compliancereview interfaces in a commonADB Accountability Mechanism websitewithin ADB’s public website to improvethe access, coherence, and comprehensivenessof the information; and(xiv) conduct other activities required to carryout the problem solving function effectivelyand efficiently.129. The OSPF problem solving function willnot replace the project administration andproblem solving functions of operations departmentswhich are an inherent part of their work.Operations departments have the initial responsibilityfor responding to the concerns of affectedpeople. The operations departments will alsocontinue to improve their problem preventionand problem solving capabilities. The SPF’srole will be confined to ADB-related issues onADB-assisted projects. The SPF will not interferein the internal matters of any DMC andwill not mediate between the complainants andlocal authorities.Compliance Review130. The Compliance Review Panel. The CRPwill be a fact-finding body on behalf of theBoard. The CRP will investigate alleged noncomplianceby ADB with its operational policies andprocedures in any ADB-assisted project in thecourse of the formulation, processing, or implementationof the project that directly, materially,and adversely affects local people. A compliancereview will not investigate the borrowing country,the executing agency, or the private sectorclient. The conduct of these other parties will be35Para. 160 provides the key points that should be contained in the information packet.36The Accountability Mechanism annual report is approved by the President (for the OSPF section) and the BCRC (for the CRPsection).37The CRP chair, SPF, director general of IED, and director general of RSDD may rotate to chair the preparation of the learningreport.25

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012considered only to the extent that they are directlyrelevant to an assessment of ADB’s compliancewith its operational policies and procedures. Thecompliance review will not provide judicial-typeremedies, such as injunctions or monetary damages.Relative to a request for problem solvingwith the SPF, a request for compliance review isnot an appeal to a higher authority.131. The CRP will(i) process complaints requesting compliancereview;(ii) engage with all relevant parties andstakeholders concerned, including thecomplainants, the borrower, the ADBBoard member representing the countryconcerned, Management, and staff togain a thorough understanding of theissues to be examined during the compliancereview;(iii) coordinate its activities, to the extentappropriate, with those of the compliancereview mechanism of any othercofinancing institution that is conductinga separate compliance review of thesame project;(iv) conduct thorough and objective reviewsof compliance by ADB;(v) engage all stakeholders concernedthroughout the compliance reviewprocess;(vi) consult with the complainants, the borrower,the Board member representingthe country concerned, Management,and staff on its preliminary findings; andaddress any resulting comments;(vii) issue draft reports to the complainants,the borrower, the BCRC, Management,and the operations departmentconcerned;(viii) issue its final compliance review reportto the Board;(ix) complete the compliance review even ifa borrowing country refuses to grant asite visit (para. 201);(x) provide comments on Management’sproposed remedial actions to bring aproject into compliance;(xi) monitor the implementation of decisionsmade by the Board and produceannual monitoring reports;(xii) prepare and publish AccountabilityMechanism annual reports (footnote 36)jointly with the OSPF;(xiii) produce a learning report every 3 yearsthrough joint efforts with the OSPF, IED,and RSDD;(xiv) develop a roster of independent technicalexperts who can assist the CRP incarrying out its work; and(xv) liaise with accountability mechanisms atother institutions.132. The CRP chair will(i) perform all the functions listed for theCRP;(ii) serve as the head of the OCRP and havefull responsibility for running the OCRP;(iii) manage the OCRP as an effective, efficient,and independent office, includingmanaging the OCRP’s personnel,budget, and work program under theoversight of the BCRC, and in accordancewith ADB rules and procedures;(iv) assign member(s) of the CRP to conductcompliance review and monitoring tasksin consultation with the BCRC;(v) provide regular (e.g., quarterly) briefingsto the BCRC, one of which maybe combined with the briefing on theAccountability Mechanism annualreport;(vi) prepare the annual work plan andbudget for the CRP and OCRP;(vii) engage stakeholders in the compliancereview process and ensure that compliancereview results are communicatedto them and the public;(viii) ensure high-quality professional workand set quality standards for OCRPoutputs;(ix) formulate and implement the OCRP’swork program as approved by theBoard, and report to the Board throughthe BCRC on the activities of the CRP andOCRP; and26

The Revised Accountability Mechanism Policy(x) provide input to the BCRC’s annual performancefeedback on CRP members.133. Office of the Compliance Review Panel.The OCRP will(i) support the work of the CRP;(ii) work with the OSPF to produce a clear,simple, informative, and succinct informationpacket about the AccountabilityMechanism, highlighting the differentprocesses and remedies available underthe two functions; 38(iii) conduct outreach programs withinADB and with the public that willinclude a holistic introduction to theAccountability Mechanism while focusingon specific subjects;(iv) in coordination with the OSPF, operationsdepartments, the NGO Center,and DER, ensure that such informationdissemination and public outreach isintegrated with ADB’s activities to promoteinteraction with project beneficiariesand stakeholders, including civilsociety groups;(v) work with the CRO, OSPF, and DER tomaintain the problem solving and compliancereview interfaces in a commonADB Accountability Mechanism websitewithin ADB’s public website to improvethe access, coherence, and comprehensivenessof the information; and(vi) facilitate the CRP’s communicationand coordination with the Board,Management, the OSPF, and staff.134. Board Compliance Review Committee.The BCRC will(i) clear the CRP’s proposed TOR for compliancereview before they are releasedby the CRP;(ii) review the CRP’s draft compliance reviewreports;(iii) review the CRP’s draft reports on monitoringimplementation of remedialactions approved by the Board as aresult of a compliance review before theCRP finalizes them;(iv) decide and adjust the CRP monitoringtime frames;(v) review and endorse the combinedCRP and OCRP annual work plan andbudget;(vi) search for CRP members in consultationwith the President;(vii) provide written feedback to all CRPmembers on their performance; 39(viii) in case of a borrowing country’s rejectionof a CRP site visit, dialogue withManagement on the reasons for theborrowing country’s refusal; and(ix) serve as the focal point for the CRP’scommunication and dialogue with theBoard on the Accountability Mechanism.135. BCRC’s function in clearing the proposedTOR and reviewing the draft compliance reviewreports will be to ensure that the CRP operateswithin the scope of the compliance review functionas set out in the Accountability Mechanismpolicy. The BCRC will review the CRP’s monitoringreports to ensure that the CRP has carried out asatisfactory process in monitoring the implementationof any remedial actions approved by theBoard following the compliance review.136. Board of Directors. The key responsibilitiesof the Board of Directors with regard toCRP include(i) overseeing the CRP’s work through theBCRC;(ii) appointing and/or removing CRP memberson the recommendation of theBCRC in consultation with the Presidentthrough an open process;(iii) authorizing compliance reviews;(iv) considering CRP final compliance reviewreports;(v) considering and deciding onManagement’s proposed remedialactions in response to the CRP’sfindings; and38Para. 160 provides the key points that should be contained in the information packet.39The feedback of the CRP chair will be taken into consideration in the feedback to other CRP members.27

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012(vi) approving the combined annual workplan and budget of the CRP and OCRP.ADB Management and Staff137. ADB Management and staff will(i) ensure that the OSPF and CRP have fullaccess to project-related information incarrying out their functions;(ii) provide assistance to the OSPF on problemsolving;(iii) coordinate with the CRP on compliancereview;(iv) propose remedial actions to bring aproject into compliance in response toCRP’s findings, in consultation with theborrower;(v) assist in mission arrangements for theOSPF, CRP, and OCRP; and provide otherassistance to them as needed;(vi) track the ineligible complaints that wereforwarded to the operations departmentsbecause of the complainants’ lackof prior good faith efforts to solve theproblems and issues with the operationsdepartments; and(vii) engage in problem prevention and problemsolving, and seek to ensure compliancewith ADB operational policies andprocedures.EligibilityWho Can File Complaints138. For both the problem solving and compliancereview functions, complaints may be filedby (i) any group of two or more people in a borrowingcountry where the ADB-assisted project islocated or in a member country adjacent to theborrowing country who are directly, materially,and adversely affected; (ii) a local representativeof such affected persons; or (iii) a nonlocal representativeof such affected persons, in exceptionalcases where local representation cannot be foundand the SPF or CRP agrees. If a complaint is madethrough a representative, it must clearly identifythe project-affected people on whose behalf thecomplaint is made and provide evidence of theauthority to represent such people.139. For the compliance review, complaintsmay also be filed by any one or more ADB Boardmembers, after first raising their concerns withManagement, in special cases involving allegationsof serious violations of ADB’s operationalpolicies and procedures relating to an ongoingADB-assisted project. These alleged violationsmust have, or are likely to have, a direct, material,and adverse effect on a community or othergrouping of individuals residing in the countrywhere the project is being implemented or residingin a member country adjacent to the borrowingcountry. The conduct of the compliancereview requested by a Board member will notaffect or limit the existing rights of Board membersto request or initiate reviews of ADB policiesand procedures.140. Compliance reviews cover only ADBassistedprojects. 40 The filing of a complaint toeither the SPF or CRP will not suspend or otherwiseaffect the formulation, processing, or implementationof the project unless agreed to by theborrower concerned and ADB.Scope and Exclusions141. Problem solving function. The problemsolving function will be outcome-driven, focusingnot on the identification and allocation of blame,but on finding ways to address the problems ofthe people affected by ADB-assisted projects.The scope of the problem solving function willbe broader than the compliance review function.People who believe they have been or will bedirectly, materially, and adversely affected by anADB-assisted project can use the problem solvingfunction regardless of whether ADB operationalpolicies and procedures have been compliedwith. However, the problem solving function40The term “ADB-assisted project” refers to a project financed or to be financed, or administered or to be administered, by ADB;and covers both sovereign and nonsovereign operations.28

The Revised Accountability Mechanism Policywill be limited to ADB-related issues concerningADB-assisted projects.142. Complaints will be excluded if they are(i) about actions that are not related toADB’s action or omission in the course offormulating, processing, or implementingADB-assisted projects;(ii) about matters that complainantshave not made good faith efforts toaddress with the operations departmentconcerned;(iii) about matters already considered bythe SPF, unless the complainants havenew evidence previously not available tothem and unless the subsequent complaintcan be readily consolidated withthe earlier complaint;(iv) about an ADB-assisted project for which2 or more years have passed since theloan or grant closing date; 41(v) frivolous, malicious, trivial, or generatedto gain competitive advantage;(vi) about decisions made by ADB, the borroweror executing agency, or the privatesector client on the procurement ofgoods and services, including consultingservices;(vii) about allegations of fraud or corruptionin ADB-assisted projects or by ADB staff;(viii) about the adequacy or suitability ofADB’s existing policies and procedures;(ix) within the jurisdiction of ADB’s AppealsCommittee or ADB’s AdministrativeTribunal, or relate to ADB personnelmatters; and/or(x) about ADB’s non-operational housekeepingmatters, such as finance andadministration.143. The problem solving function will alsoexclude matters being dealt with or alreadydealt with by the CRP (including those that havecompleted the compliance review process),except those complaints considered ineligible forcompliance review by the CRP.144. The Accountability Mechanism policy willnot require complainants’ good faith effortsto solve problems with project-level grievanceredress mechanisms as a precondition fortheir access to the Accountability Mechanism.However, complainants will be encouraged tofirst address their problems with the projectlevelgrievance redress mechanisms to facilitateprompt problem solving on the ground.145. Compliance Review Function. The CRPwill examine whether the direct and materialharm alleged by the complainants is the resultof ADB’s failure to follow its operational policiesand procedures in the course of formulating, processing,or implementing an ADB-assisted project.The scope of compliance review will be ADB’soperational policies and procedures as they relateto formulating, processing, or implementing anADB-assisted project. The applicable operationalpolicies and procedures will depend on whetherthe complaint concerns a proposed or an ongoingproject. A “proposed project” refers to a projectbeing prepared that has not been approvedby the Board or the President (as delegated bythe Board). An “ongoing project” refers to a projectthat has been approved by the Board or thePresident (as delegated by the Board). For a proposedproject, the time frames refer to the policiesand procedures that were in effect when thecomplaint was filed with the CRP. For an ongoingproject, these refer to policies and proceduresthat were in effect at the time of the Board’s orPresident’s approval of the project, unless otherwisespecified in the relevant project, procedural,or policy documents.146. The Board will decide whether a policyis an operational policy subject to compliance41For programmatic operations, such as multitranche financing facilities, additional financing, and policy-based lending, thecutoff will be tranche- (or its equivalent) based. For projects whose loan or grant closing dates are kept open after projectcompletion for purposes such as capitalizing interest payments and liquidation, the cutoff date will be 2 years after theproject completion date.29

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012review, 42 and the CRP will determine which partof the operational policies and procedures was oris not complied with after carrying out a compliancereview. The ADB’s operational policies andprocedures subject to compliance review willnot include guidelines and/or similar documentsor statements.147. The CRP must be satisfied that there is evidenceof the coexistence of (i) direct and materialharm caused by the ADB-assisted project,(ii) noncompliance by ADB with its operationalpolicies and procedures, and (iii) the noncomplianceas a cause for such harm.148. All types of complaints excluded from theproblem solving function will also be excludedfrom the compliance review function with theexception of item (iii) in para. 142. In addition,for the purpose of compliance review, the followingwill also be excluded:(i) complaints relating to actions that arethe responsibility of other parties, suchas a borrower, executing agency, orpotential borrower, unless the conductof these other parties is directly relevantto an assessment of ADB’s compliancewith its operational policies andprocedures;(ii) complaints that do not involve ADB’snoncompliance with its operational policiesand procedures;(iii) complaints being dealt with by the SPFup to the completion of step 3 underthe problem solving function (paras.164–173);(iv) complaints relating to the laws, policies,and regulations of the DMC governmentconcerned unless they directly relate toADB’s compliance with its operationalpolicies and procedures; and/or(v) complaints about matters alreadyconsidered by the CRP, unless thecomplainants have new evidence previouslynot available to them andunless the subsequent complaintcan be readily consolidated with theearlier complaint.149. The CRP will not consider the policiesand procedures of other institutions except tothe extent that ADB’s policies and procedureshave explicit reference to those of the otherinstitutions.How to File a Complaint150. Complaints must be in writing and preferablyaddressed to the CRO. Complaints may besubmitted by mail, fax, e-mail, or hand deliveryto the CRO at ADB headquarters. Complaintsfrom people seeking access to the AccountabilityMechanism will also be accepted by any ADBoffice, such as a resident mission or representativeoffice, which will forward them to the CRO.The working language of the AccountabilityMechanism is English, but complaints may besubmitted in any of the official or national languagesof ADB’s DMCs. In cases where the complaintsare submitted in languages other thanEnglish, additional time will be required fortranslation. The identities of complainants will bekept confidential unless the complainants agreeto disclose their identities, but anonymous complaintswill not be accepted. 43151. The complaint must specify the following:(i) names, designations, addresses, andcontact information of the complainantsand their representative;(ii) if a complaint is made through a representative,identification of the projectaffectedpeople on whose behalf thecomplaint is made and evidence of theauthority to represent them;42Whether a policy is subject to the Accountability Mechanism is generally indicated in the policy when it is submitted tothe Board for its consideration. The ADB Operations Manual clearly indicates whether a specific section is subject tocompliance review.43The identities of representatives will not be kept confidential, but will be disclosed to ensure transparency.30

The Revised Accountability Mechanism Policy(iii) whether the complainants choose tokeep their identities confidential;(iv) whether the complainants choose toundergo problem solving with the OSPFor compliance review with the CRP;(v) a brief description of the ADB-assistedproject, including the name and location;(vi) a description of the direct and materialharm that has been, or is likely to be,caused to the complainants by the ADBassistedproject;(vii) a description of the complainants’ goodfaith efforts to address the problems firstwith the operations department concerned,and the results of these efforts;and(viii) if applicable, a description of the complainants’efforts to address the complaintwith the OSPF, and the results ofthese efforts.152. Complainants can also provide the followingoptional information:(i) an explanation of why the complainantsclaim that the direct and materialharm alleged is, or will be, causedby the alleged failure by ADB to followits operational policies and proceduresin the course of formulating, processing,or implementing the ADB-assistedproject;(ii) a description of the operational policiesand procedures that have not beencomplied with by ADB in the course offormulating, processing, or implementingthe ADB-assisted project;(iii) a description of the complainants’efforts to address the problems with theproject-level grievance redress mechanismsconcerned, and the results ofthese efforts;(iv) the desired outcome or remedies thatcomplainants believe ADB should provideor help through the AccountabilityMechanism; and(v) any other relevant matters or facts withsupporting documents.Processing Complaints153. The complainants will decide and indicatewhether they want to undergo the problem solvingor compliance review function. They can exitthe problem solving function and file for compliancereview. Complainants can also requestcompliance review upon the completion ofstep 3 of the problem solving process (paras.170–173) if they have serious concerns oncompliance issues. Complainants can exit ordisengage from either the problem solving orcompliance review function at any time, which willterminate the process. However, complainantscannot switch from compliance review to problemsolving during the compliance review process,or request problem solving upon the completionof a compliance review. Complainantscan provide additional information or evidenceon the complaint during the problem solvingor compliance review processes. However, complaintsabout different issues will be filed as newcomplaints. The OSPF and CRP will determineindependently whether the complaint meetstheir respective eligibility criteria. The OSPF andCRP will fully share information and analysis witheach other on the complaint.154. The indicative steps are described inparas.155–195. The term “days” refer to workingdays unless otherwise specified.Receiving Complaints155. Step 1: Receiving and registering a complaint.The complainants or their representativefile a complaint with the CRO. Complaintsreceived by any other ADB departments or officesfrom people seeking to access the AccountabilityMechanism will be forwarded to the CRO.The CRO will inform the SPF, the CRP chair, and theoperations department concerned about thecomplaint within 2 days of receiving it; attachinga copy of the complaint letter. In copying orforwarding the information, the CRO will takenecessary measures to ensure the confidentialityof the complainants’ identities (for example, by31

The Revised Accountability Mechanism PolicyThe Problem Solving Function162. The problem solving process is expectedto take about 180 days from the registration ofthe complaint to an agreement on the remedialactions. This excludes translation time, anyrequest for extension to provide information orfile documents, and the time needed by the partiesto facilitate the resolution of their problems.The SPF may draw on the project-level grievanceredress mechanisms and/or the operationsdepartments to resolve problems.163. Step 1: Determining eligibility. Afteracknowledging the complaint, the SPF will screenthe complaint and determine its eligibility within21 days of receiving the complaint forwardedby the CRO. 44 To find a complaint eligible, theSPF must be satisfied with the following requirements:(i) the complaint satisfies all eligibilitycriteria and scope and does not fall within anyof the exclusions (paras. 141–143); and (ii) theSPF believes, at his or her sole discretion, that theSPF’s involvement could be useful.164. In determining whether the complaint iseligible, the SPF will review whether the complainantsmade prior good faith efforts to solvethe problems with the operations departmentconcerned. The SPF will forward the complaintto the operations department concerned if thecomplainants did not make such efforts. The SPFwill consult and seek information from relevantparties, such as the complainants, the borrower,and the operations department concerned. TheSPF should also ascertain whether confidentialityis being requested by the complainantsand take the necessary actions to ensure suchconfidentiality.165. The SPF will report the decision on eligibilityto the President, with a copy to the vicepresidentconcerned, the operations department,and the CRO. The SPF will inform the complainantsupon the determination of eligibility.166. Step 2: Review and assessment. If thecomplaint is eligible, the SPF will review andassess the complaint to (i) understand the historyof the complaint, (ii) confirm the stakeholders,(iii) clarify the issues of concern and the optionsfor resolving them, (iv) explore the stakeholders’readiness for joint problem solving, and (v) recommendhow the problem can best be solved.167. The review may include site visits; interviews;and meetings with the complainants, theborrower, and any other people the SPF believeswould be helpful and beneficial. The SPF willobtain information from the operations departmentand, if necessary, request the operationsdepartment’s advice and support. The SPF willfield fact-finding missions on his or her own initiative;or participate, in consultation with theoperations department, in special project administrationmissions of the operations department.168. The SPF will complete the review andassessment, and report the findings to thePresident, with a copy to the vice-president concerned.The SPF will also send the findings tothe complainants, the borrower, and the operationsdepartment concerned, with a request fortheir comments. Based on the assessment andtaking into account the comments received, theSPF will decide, solely at his or her discretion,whether to (i) proceed with problem solving,or (ii) determine that no further problem solvingefforts will be purposeful and conclude theprocess. The SPF is expected to take 120 daysfrom determination of eligibility to complete thereview and assessment.169. Step 3: Problem solving. If problem solvingproceeds, the SPF will assist the parties toengage in resolving the problem. The problemsolving process will depend on the circumstances.The OSPF may facilitate a consultative dialogue,promote information sharing, undertake jointfact-finding, facilitate the establishment of a mediationmechanism, and/or use other approaches to44The forwarding of the complaint by the CRO to the SPF does not constitute a determination of the eligibility of the complaint.33

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012problem solving. The time required for the problemsolving will vary depending on the nature,complexity, and scope of the problems.170. Implementing the problem solving processrequires the consent of every party involved.Except for the SPF, a party can walk away fromthe process if the party does not consider it purposefulor if there is no consensus. This wouldformally close the problem solving process.171. Remedial actions that are adopted asa result of the problem solving process will bereflected in a written agreement or series ofagreements among the parties. Remedial actionsinvolving a change in the project will requireapproval according to ADB’s applicable procedures,and agreement by the borrower.172. When the problem solving process hasbeen completed (with or without any agreement),the SPF will submit a report to thePresident, with a copy to the vice-president andthe operations department concerned, summarizingthe complaint, steps to resolve the issues,decisions by the parties concerned, and theagreement, if any, by the parties concerned. TheSPF will issue this report and furnish it to the complainants,the borrower, the CRP, and the Boardfor information.173. Upon completion of this step, the complainantscan also file for compliance review ifthey have serious concerns on compliance issues,to be carried out with the implementation andmonitoring of the remedial actions (step 4).174. Step 4: Implementation and monitoring.The relevant parties will implement the agreedupon remedial actions, and the SPF will monitorthe implementation. The SPF will report annuallyto the President, with a copy to the Board,regarding the status of implementation. As partof the monitoring process, the SPF will consultwith the complainants, the borrower, and theoperations department concerned. The monitoringtime frame will be project specific dependingon the implementation of the remedial actions,but will generally not exceed 2 years. All stakeholders,including the public, may submit informationregarding the status of implementationto the SPF.175. The SPF’s monitoring reports will be sentto the complainants, the borrower, and the operationsdepartment concerned; and submittedto the President and the Board for information.The SPF will produce annual monitoring reportsfor a complaint if the monitoring time frameexceeds 1 year. If the monitoring time frame isabout 1 year or less, the monitoring results maybe included in the SPF final report described instep 5. In monitoring the remedial actions, theSPF can either produce monitoring reports for asingle complaint or combined monitoring reportsfor multiple complaints.176. Step 5: Conclusion of the problem solvingprocess. When the monitoring has beencompleted, the SPF will prepare a final reportand submit it to the President, the complainants,the borrower, the operations department, theCRP, the BCRC, and the Board for information.The SPF can either produce a final report for asingle complaint or a combined final report formultiple complaints.The Compliance Review Function177. The complainants will be informed aboutwhether the Board has authorized the compliancereview they have requested about 70 daysafter receipt of the CRO’s notification of registrationof the complaint. They will be informed ofthe outcome of the Board decision on the CRPfinal report about 200 days after the receipt ofthe notification of registration of the complaint.These periods exclude time for translation, anyrequest for extension to provide information orfile documents, and the time for conductingthe compliance review, which is not time-bound(paras. 184–185).178. Step 1: Requesting Managementresponse. After acknowledging the complaint,the CRP will carry out the initial assessment34

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012opportunity to record their views, if any. Thecompliance review may include desk reviews,meetings, discussions, and a site visit.185. Step 5: Compliance Review Panel’sdraft report. Upon completion of its compliancereview, the CRP will issue a draft report ofits findings to the complainants, the borrower,and Management for comments and responseswithin 45 days. The CRP will also forward thedraft report to the BCRC for its review. Each partywill be free to provide comments, but only theCRP’s final view on these matters will be reflectedin its final report.186. The CRP compliance review report willfocus on the specific complaint. It will documentthe CRP’s findings concerning any noncompliance,and alleged direct and material harm. Itwill include all relevant facts that are needed tofully understand the context and basis for theCRP’s findings and conclusions. It will focus onwhether ADB failed to comply with its operationalpolicies and procedures in formulating,processing, or implementing the project in relationto the alleged direct and material harm. Itwill also ascertain whether the alleged direct andmaterial harm exists. If noncompliance is foundand the alleged direct and material harm is confirmed,the report will focus on establishing thenoncompliance as a cause for the alleged harm.187. For assessing direct and material harm, thewithout-project situation will be used as the basecase for comparison, taking into consideration theavailability of information. Non-accomplishmentsand unfulfilled expectations that do not generatedirect and material harm compared to the without-projectsituation will be excluded. 46 Becausethe assessment of direct and material harm in thecontext of the complex reality of a specific projectcan be difficult, the CRP will exercise careful judgmenton these matters and will be guided by ADBpolicies and procedures where relevant.188. Step 6: Compliance Review Panel’s finalreport. Within 14 days of receiving the responsesto the CRP’s draft report from the complainants,the borrower, and Management, the CRP willconsider these responses and make changes asnecessary before the CRP issues its final reportto the Board through the BCRC. The CRP’s finalreport will attach the responses from the complainants,the borrower, and Management, anda matrix prepared by the CRP summarizing howit has responded to such responses. The CRP’sfindings will be reached by consensus among thepanel members. In the absence of a consensus,the majority and minority views will be stated.189. Step 7: Board consideration of theCompliance Review Panel Report. Within21 calendar days of receiving the CRP’s finalreport, the Board will consider the report. Within7 days after the Board’s consideration, theCRP’s final report, with the responses from thecomplainants, the borrower, and Managementattached, will be released to the complainantsand the borrower.190. Step 8: Management’s remedial actions.If the CRP concludes that ADB’s noncompliancecaused direct and material harm, Managementwill propose remedial actions 47 to bring theproject into compliance with ADB policies andaddress related findings of harm. Because thelegal ownership of the project lies with theborrower, which also has the principal responsibilityfor implementing the remedial actions,Management must obtain the agreement of theborrower on the remedial actions. Managementmay consult the CRP in developing the remedialactions. Management will refer its draft remedialactions to the CRP and seek its comments to beprovided within 5 days. Upon receiving the CRPcomments, Management will submit a reporton the proposed remedial actions to the Board,attaching the CRP comments. The report willinclude the parties responsible for implementing46During the eligibility determination or the compliance review, if the CRP finds that the alleged direct and material adverseeffect is not totally or partially caused by ADB’s noncompliance, its eligibility determination and/or compliance review reportwill state this without analyzing the direct and material adverse effect itself or its causes.47These may include an action plan.36

The Revised Accountability Mechanism Policythe remedial actions, estimates of costs to implementthe remedial actions, and parties to shoulderthe costs. The expected duration betweenthe Board’s consideration of the CRP finalcompliance review report and Management’ssubmission of the proposed remedial actions tothe Board is 60 days.191. Step 9: Board’s decision. The Board willconsider Management’s proposed remedialactions within 21 calendar days of receivingthem. The Board will make a decision regardingthe remedial actions to bring the projectinto compliance and/or mitigate any harm, asappropriate. Within 7 days after the Board’s consideration,the Board’s decision, Management’sremedial actions, and the CRP comments will bereleased to the complainants and the borrower.192. Step 10: Monitoring and conclusion. TheCRP will monitor implementation of any remedialactions approved by the Board. It will report tothe Board concerning implementation of Boarddecisions related to remedial measures, includingits determination on the progress in bringing theproject into compliance.193. Any remedial actions in relation to projectscope or implementation approved by the Boardwill be carried out in accordance with applicableADB policies and procedures. Unless the Boardspecifies a different timetable, the CRP will reporton the progress annually. The CRP chair, in consultationwith the BCRC, will determine whichCRP member(s) will conduct the monitoring exerciseeach year. The monitoring time frame will beproject-specific depending on the implementationof the remedial actions, but will generally notexceed 3 years. The final monitoring report willalso conclude the compliance review process.194. The methodology for monitoringmay include (i) consultations with the complainants,the borrower, the Board memberconcerned; Management; and staff; (ii) a reviewof documents; and (iii) site visits. The CRP willalso consider any information received from thecomplainants and the public regarding the statusof implementation. The CRP will forward its draftmonitoring reports to the BCRC for review. It willfinalize the reports in consultation with the BCRCbefore making them available to the complainants,the borrower, the Board, Management,staff, and the public.Operations Departments’ Tracking ofComplaints and Roles195. Operations departments will address problemsor issues relating to complaints forwardedto them by the OSPF or CRP because the complainantsdid not make prior good faith effortsto solve the problems or issues with the departments.Operations departments should ascertainwhether confidentiality is being requested by thecomplainants and take the necessary actions toensure such confidentiality. Operations departmentswill track the process and results in resolvingthese complaints. They can develop a trackingsystem. In doing so, they may take advantageof the existing project complaint tracking systems,such as the system developed by the OSPF in 2009in collaboration with the Office of InformationSystems and Technology and the India ResidentMission. Operations departments, including residentmissions, are encouraged to keep recordsof meetings, correspondence, and other relevantinformation regarding complaints.196. At the end of the process of addressing theineligible complaints forwarded to the operationsdepartments by the OSPF or CRP, the operationsdepartment will produce a report summarizingthe complaint, issues, actions taken to addressthe problems or issues, decisions or agreementsby parties concerned, results, and lessons.197. Operations departments play an essentialrole in problem prevention, problem solving, andensuring compliance, as follows:(i) As a part of project design and implementation,operations departmentsengage in day-to-day problem prevention,problem solving, and prevention ofnoncompliance with ADB’s operationalpolicies and procedures.37

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012(ii) During the Accountability Mechanismprocesses, operations departments contributeto smooth problem solving, andprovide necessary cooperation for theeffective compliance review.(iii) Operations departments are a key partyin ensuring the implementation ofthe remedial actions as a result of theAccountability Mechanism processes.Site Visits198. Site visits should be a routine and noncontroversialaspect of the AccountabilityMechanism. ADB will adopt a partnershipapproach to help ensure that necessary site visitsby the CRP take place. Goodwill and collaborationbetween the CRP and the borrowing countrieswill be necessary. Site visits will take placein consultation with the borrowing country andafter obtaining the borrowing country’s consentfor both sovereign and nonsovereign operations.ADB expects borrowing countries to cooperateand allow site visits to take place.199. The CRP is responsible for arranging sitevisits and ensuring the independence of the process.Management and staff, especially thosein resident missions, will facilitate the CRP visitswhen required and when requested by the CRP.Resident missions may assist in obtaining theborrowing country government’s consent, andmay share the site visit and compliance reviewTOR with the borrowing country government.The TOR will clearly explain why a site visit is necessary,what will be reviewed, and how it will beconducted. The scope of the TOR will be limitedto the specific complaint. The CRP is encouragedto seek the assistance of the ADB Boardmember representing the borrowing country,and will share the TOR with the Board memberbefore submitting a mission request to the DMCthrough the resident mission.200. If a site visit is declined, Management willdiscuss with the borrowing country the reasonsfor not accepting the requested visit. Inconsultation with the BCRC and the borrowingcountry, Management will convey the reasons tothe Board through an information paper.201. If a site visit is declined, the CRP will completethe compliance review and deliver its findingsand final views without a site visit. The CRPwill use all available information, and may makeappropriate assumptions and draw appropriateinferences in completing the compliance review.The CRP will present the best and most detailedanalysis possible after exhausting the most costeffectiveand logical alternative means to acquirethe necessary information. In the absence of anecessary site visit, the CRP may give addedweight to the complainants’ views.Transparency andInformation Disclosure202. The OSPF and CRP operations will be astransparent as possible, both within ADB andwith the public. Information disclosure to thepublic will be consistent with the fundamentalsof the Public Communications Policy (2011). Theproposed disclosure requirements are set out inAppendix 9.203. A common ADB Accountability Mechanismwebsite will be set up within the ADB website todisseminate information on both problem solvingand compliance review to enable easy accessand ensure synergy. The OSPF and OCRP willhave their own components within this commonwebsite. Any other information related to theAccountability Mechanism will also be posted onthe common Accountability Mechanism website. 48The common pages (the so-called landing pages)linking the OSPF and OCRP components, andother information related to the Accountability48The OSPF and CRP currently have separate websites, with information on the Accountability Mechanism scattered betweenthem as well as other websites. This fragmented arrangement will be rectified by having one Accountability Mechanismwebsite within ADB’s public website.38

The Revised Accountability Mechanism PolicyMechanism within the site, will be regularlyupdated and improved. The OSPF and CRP willeach have distinctive logos and letterheads, buttheir logos and letterheads will be placed undera common ADB Accountability Mechanism logoand letterhead. The OSPF and OCRP outreachto the public will include an introduction to theAccountability Mechanism in general, while alsofocusing on specific subjects.204. The nature of problem solving and compliancereview demands an appropriate degreeof confidentiality. For example, general descriptionsabout the process and final solution can bemade public, but substantive details about thediscussions should be kept confidential. The finalagreement and resolution will also be kept confidentialif the parties so request. Any informationsubmitted to the OSPF or OCRP on a confidentialbasis may not be released to any other partieswithout the consent of the party that submittedit. When requested, the SPF and CRP maywithhold the identities of the complainants fromother stakeholders.205. The SPF and CRP chair will have the authorityto issue press releases and public communications,as appropriate. Before doing so, the SPF orCRP will inform DER, not for purposes of review,but to provide ADB with an opportunity toprepare responses to queries from the media orthe public.206. The SPF and CRP, and all staff working onthe Accountability Mechanism, will exercise discretionand maintain a low profile while makingsite visits or otherwise operating in the borrowingcountry. The SPF and CRP will not give any mediainterviews at any stage of the AccountabilityMechanism process.Application207. The Accountability Mechanism applies toall ADB-assisted sovereign and nonsovereignoperations. In cases where country safeguardsystems are used for ADB-assisted projects inaccordance with the Safeguard Policy Statement(2009), the use of the country safeguard systemswill not alter the role and function of ADB’sAccountability Mechanism, including the role ofthe OSPF and CRP. In the event of a claim, theCRP could examine ADB’s assessment of theequivalence between ADB’s policy scope, triggers,and applicable principles with the countrysafeguard systems (and any additional measuresagreed upon to achieve equivalence) in materiallyachieving the objectives of the Safeguard PolicyStatement, as well as ADB’s project supervision inaccordance with the Safeguard Policy Statement(para. 20, page 81). The AccountabilityMechanism will also apply to ADB-administeredcofinancing operations.Awareness and Learning208. The OSPF and OCRP should update theiroutreach strategies regularly (for example, every3 years). The OSPF, OCRP, and staff should undertakethree kinds of outreach activities to achievea positive culture change.209. Internal. This outreach should improveawareness and disseminate lessons to ADB staffthrough workshops, training courses, and orientationsessions. The Accountability Mechanismshould be included as part of regular staff training.The Accountability Mechanism should beseen as an important instrument for learning,and for ensuring project quality and developmenteffectiveness. The SPF and OSPF, the CRPand OCRP, staff, Management, and the Boardshould all promote a culture change to eliminatethe remaining perception that the AccountabilityMechanism is adversarial.210. National level. The OSPF and OCRP shouldhold regular dissemination activities in DMCs.They should distribute simple, pictorial-based anduser-friendly descriptions of the mechanism. Ineach resident mission, a staff member should bedesignated as a focal person for handling grievancescaused by ADB financed projects. Someresident missions have already assigned such39

Accountability Mechanism Policy 2012focal persons; this practice should be extendedto all resident missions.211. Project level. Improving the awareness ofthe Accountability Mechanism requires that ADBstaff work as conduits to disseminate information.Staff, working with the borrower, will disseminateinformation early in the project cycleabout the Accountability Mechanism and itsavailability as a recourse in case other mechanismsfor dealing with harmful project effects arenot successful. The intensity and format of thisactivity will vary with the nature of the project.Operations departments will focus on projectswith a high degree of safeguard risks, such asprojects with heavy resettlement. Pamphlets innational or official languages, community noticeboards, audiovisual materials, or other appropriateand effective means will be used to informpeople. The Safeguard Policy Statement requiresthat grievance redress mechanisms be set up atthe project level. It also requires government staffand/or project proponents working on the grievanceredress mechanisms to organize awarenessseminars in coordination with resident missions,project teams, local government units, and executingagencies. ADB can explore the possibilityof outsourcing outreach activities to credibleNGOs or civil society organizations. Gender issueswill be taken into consideration when designingthe outreach strategy.212. The joint learning reports by the OSPF,OCRP, IED, and RSDD will distill ADB’s experience,insights, and lessons, including the AccountabilityMechanism’s development impacts, benefits,and costs. The Accountability Mechanism annualreports will (i) outline key activities and outputsof the Accountability Mechanism; (ii) summarizethe complaints; (iii) analyze the developmentimpact of the Accountability Mechanism;(iv) discuss the benefits; (v) record and monitorthe direct and indirect costs on project-affectedpeople, the borrowers, and ADB for each project;and (vi) provide other relevant information andanalysis. To guide future policy design and implementation,Management will engage expert(s) toundertake a study on the benefits and costs ofthe revised Accountability Mechanism. 49Effective Date andTransition Period213. The revised Accountability Mechanismwill become effective 3 months after the dateof the Board of Directors’ approval of the policy,superseding the 2003 Accountability Mechanismpolicy (footnote 2). 50 Complaints and/or requestsfiled before the effectiveness of the revisedAccountability Mechanism policy will followthe 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy andrelated procedures. 49This is akin to a regulatory impact assessment. The study will assess the impacts of both the 2003 Accountability Mechanismand the revised Accountability Mechanism policy. It will analyze the incremental impacts induced by the changes introducedin the revised policy. In analyzing the costs, the study will especially cover items (vii) and (viii) in the terms of reference on thereview of the Accountability Mechanism (para. 5, Appendix 1).50The 2003 policy requires the OSPF and CRP to prepare operating and administrative procedures. These procedures are notrecommended under this revised policy to reduce duplication and increase transparency. Any necessary operating and administrativeprocedures will be reflected in the policy and/or the Operations Manual.40

Resource Implications6214. The proposed changes in the AccountabilityMechanism policy are expected to have resourceimplications for ADB in the following areas:(i) More outreach activities will requireadditional resources. The OSPF andOCRP spent about $130,000 in 2010 onoutreach. Assuming that the outreachexpenditures were to double, an annualincremental cost of about $130,000 willbe required.(ii) The proposal that each resident missionassign a staff member as a focal personfor handling grievances caused byADB financed projects will mean additionalcosts. Some resident missions willassign existing staff as the focal persons.However, some resident missionswill require additional staff. The annualincremental cost for the focal persons isestimated to be $220,000.(iii) The engagement of a full-time CRO willrequire additional costs. The estimatedannual cost will be $50,000.(iv) Some costs will be reduced because theOCRP will have one fewer internationalstaff member and one fewer administrativeor national staff member. The reductionis estimated to be $250,000.215. The net annual cost increase from theseitems is estimated to be $150,000. 51 Thus, theoverall budget implications from the policychanges are expected to be moderate. This estimaterepresents the direct operating costs toADB. Other direct and indirect costs to projectaffectedpeople, DMCs, and ADB will depend onthe number and nature of the complaints. 51The cost estimation does not include annual increases because of inflation and salary adjustments. These incremental costsneed to be added during the implementation of the revised Accountability Mechanism policy.41

7Recommendation216. The President recommends that the Boardapprove the revised Accountability Mechanismpolicy as described in Section 5 of this paper. 42

Appendix 1Terms of Reference for Review of theAccountability Mechanism1. In 1995, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) established its Inspection Functionto provide a forum for project beneficiaries to appeal to an independent body regardingmatters relating to ADB’s compliance with its operational policies and proceduresin ADB-assisted projects. 1 In 2003, following an extensive review, ADB introduced thecurrent Accountability Mechanism, 2 building on the Inspection Function. TheAccountability Mechanism was designed to enhance ADB’s development effectivenessand project quality; be responsive to the concerns of project-affected people and fair toall stakeholders; reflect the highest professional and technical standards in ADB staffingand operations; be as independent and transparent as possible; and be cost-effective,efficient, and complementary to the other supervision, audit, quality control, and evaluationsystems already in place at ADB. The Accountability Mechanism was declared effectiveon 12 December 2003. At the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors ofADB in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in May 2010, the President announced that ADB wouldundertake a review of its Accountability Mechanism. A joint Board and Management52 53working group was subsequently established for this purpose.2. The objective of the review is to examine the scope for improvements in theAccountability Mechanism. The review will be broad-based and include the followingaspects:(i) an analysis of the effectiveness and adequacy of the Accountability Mechanismin light of its historical perspectives and objectives, and the principles contextualizedin the 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy;(ii) an evaluation of ADB’s experience with the Accountability Mechanism since2003, reflecting the changing context of ADB operations, especially theadoption of Strategy 2020; 3 54(iii) comparison and analysis of ADB’s Accountability Mechanism with otherrelevant comparators;(iv) consultation with stakeholders including the public, project-affected people,governments, ADB Board members, Management, operations staff, andnongovernment and civil society organizations;(v) the addressing of key issues arising out of the analysis, comparison, evaluation,and consultation; and(vi) recommendations, based on this analysis, for changes and improvements in thepolicies, the functioning of the Accountability Mechanism, and its operatingand administrative procedures.1ADB. 1995. Establishment of an Inspection Function. Manila.2ADB. 2003. Review of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New Accountability Mechanism. Manila.3ADB. 2008. Strategy 2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank, 2008–2020. Manila.43

Appendix 13. The review will include public consultation to be carried out in three phases. Thefirst phase will be inviting public comments on the Accountability Mechanism policythrough the ADB website. The second phase will be country consultations in developedand developing member countries. The proposed locations were Frankfurt, Islamabad,Jakarta, Manila, Tokyo, and Washington, DC. 4 Consultation will include governments,nongovernment organizations, the private sector, and, where possible, project beneficiariesand affected people. The third phase will be an invitation for public comments on theworking group report through the ADB website, for which a dedicated AccountabilityMechanism review website was established. 554. The following key issues were included in the external experts’ terms of references:(i) the approach to site visits under the existing Accountability Mechanism, whichrequires permission from the borrowing country to carry out site visits;(ii) limited recourse to the compliance review phase;(iii) the mechanism’s degree of independence, including reporting lines, ownership,and dissemination of Accountability Mechanism documents and materials, aswell as issues of budgeting, staffing, performance assessment, access to independentlegal advice, and the right to engage experts and consultants;(iv) affected people’s access to the mechanism;(v) eligibility criteria for filing a complaint;(vi) the effectiveness of the Office of the Compliance Review Panel and ADB indisseminating information and conducting public outreach, indicated byawareness of the ADB Accountability Mechanism;(vii) an assessment of the implications of bringing projects into compliance in termsof time required, delays, and increased financial costs;(viii) the concerns of developing member countries in particular and the broaderimpact that the Accountability Mechanism has had on ADB’s approach todecision making and project selection;(ix) from the experience of ADB and similar institutions, the extent of benefitsobtained by complainants and/or adversely affected people; and(x) any other issues viewed as important for improving the ADBAccountability Mechanism.4Islamabad was later replaced with Colombo, Sri Lanka because of flooding in Pakistan in late 2010.44

Appendix 2Summary of the Consultation Process1. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is committed to consulting all stakeholdersto ensure the quality of the Accountability Mechanism review. As an integral part ofthe review, ADB carried out intensive and extensive public consultations beginning inJune 2010.2. The consultation process included(i) consulting with all Board members, Management, and a large number of staffin both headquarters and field offices;(ii) consulting a broad spectrum of external stakeholders, including project-affectedpeople, project beneficiaries, project executing and implementing agencies,governments, nongovernment organizations, the private sector, academia,think tanks, and people working on accountability mechanisms of otherinstitutions;(iii) holding in-country and regional consultations in six countries—Germany,Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and the United States—andconsulting Canadian stakeholders through a videoconference;(iv) establishing a dedicated website for the review (http://www.adb.org/AM-Review/) and posting four papers for public comments on the reviewwebsite: (a) the 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy, which was posted for12 weeks from June to September 2010; (b) the review’s first consultation policy,posted for 8 weeks from February to April 2011; (c) the working paper, postedfor 1 month from April to June 2011; and (d) the second consultation paper,posted from July to August 2011; and(v) posting all public comments received on the review website, along with summariesof in-country consultations; and the external experts’ issues paper, presentations,and various drafts of the review reports.3. The working group on the review was highly transparent throughout theAccountability Mechanism review process. The Accountability Mechanism review websiteincludes information on the composition of the working group, the review terms ofreference, the review timetable, the external experts’ issues paper, the external experts’report, and various drafts of the review paper. All the draft policy papers were releasedto the public on the same day as they were circulated to the Board for consideration.Important documents, such as the consultation policy paper, were translated into severallanguages of developing member countries (DMCs). To ensure wide participation,invitations to comment on the Accountability Mechanism policy drafts and participationin in-country workshops were extended to all interested stakeholders by posting iton the Accountability Mechanism review website. ADB provided written responses onkey points received from the consultation process and released them on the review’s45

Appendix 2website. ADB acknowledges with thanks the inputs of all workshop participants and allcontributors who provided comments during the consultations.4. Since June 2010, the working group has frequently held meetings to discuss theissues, public consultations, options, and the direction of the review. The Board metthree times in informal Board seminars to discuss the terms of reference of the review,the external experts’ review report, and the working group’s consultation policy paper.5. The review paid special attention to reaching project-affected people. The reviewmission met with project-affected people, project beneficiaries in general, and those whorequested meetings in the DMCs it visited. To learn from similar mechanisms, the reviewmission met with the people working on the accountability mechanisms of the WorldBank, International Finance Cooperation, European Investment Bank, Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and Overseas PrivateInvestment Corporation of the United States. The mission also met with staff of theUnited States Agency for International Development. The outcome of all public consultations,including a summary and presentation of group findings in the workshops, areposted on the review’s website.6. Consultations were fruitful and benefited from the wide participation of stakeholders.Feedback reinforces the validity of problem solving and compliance review inthe ADB Accountability Mechanism. Both functions are seen as integral parts of theAccountability Mechanism that effectively complement each other. Many stakeholdersacknowledged the innovation and many other strengths of the 2003 AccountabilityMechanism. While stakeholders agree on many issues, there is much debate onsome others:(i) Site visits. While some stakeholders believe site visits should be mandatory,others argue they should take place only with the consent of the borrowingcountry.(ii) Direct access to the compliance review phase. Some stakeholders considerit desirable and logical to start with the problem solving function. Others holdthat affected people should be able to choose which function to start with.(iii) Eligibility criteria for filing complaints. Some stakeholders suggest that cutoffdates for filing complaints should be clarified and extended beyond the issuanceof the project completion report, that individuals should be allowed to filecomplaints instead of the current minimum requirement of two people, andthat people who are indirectly and not materially harmed should be able to filecomplaints. Other stakeholders consider current eligibility criteria to be sound.(iv) Mandate of the Accountability Mechanism. Some stakeholders suggestthat the mandate of the Accountability Mechanism should be expanded tocover procurement and anticorruption measures, while others argue that theAccountability Mechanism should focus on solving problems and compliancewith ADB operational policies and procedures, noting that procurement andcorruption issues are covered by other dedicated mechanisms.(v) Number of requests to the Compliance Review Panel. Some stakeholdersbelieve that the sequential approach prevented some people from participatingin the compliance review phase. Others argue that the sequential process isjustified and that the limited number of compliance review cases is a result of46

Summary of the Consultation Processthe existence of other problem solving and compliance functions in projects andoperational departments.(vi) Costs to developing member countries. Some believe that the AccountabilityMechanism imposes significantly higher costs on DMCs than other policies,such as safeguard policies. Others believe that the cost to ensure compliance isnecessary for achieving project quality.7. More information on the consultation and other aspects of the AccountabilityMechanism is available at http://www.adb.org/AM-Review/.47

Appendix 3Experience since 2003The Consultation Phase1. The Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) received 39 complaints from thetime the Accountability Mechanism became effective in December 2003 until the end of2011. 1 Of these, 13 were found eligible, 24 were ineligible, and eligibility determinationfor 2 complaints is ongoing. On average, the OSPF received about 5 complaints a year(Table A3.1). 56Table A3.1 Complaints Received by the Office of theSpecial Project Facilitator, By YearYear Total Complaints Eligible Complaints2004 3 22005 1 12006 6 12007 2 12008 0 02009 13 42010 7 22011 a 7 2Total 39 13aTwo complaints are undergoing eligibility assessment.Source: Office of the Special Project Facilitator complaints registry as of 31 December 2011.2. Of the 24 ineligible complaints, the complainants in 15 cases had not made priorgood faith efforts to solve the problems with the operations departments of the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB); the complainants in 3 cases were not materially and adverselyaffected by ADB-assisted projects; 2 complaints were filed after the project completionreports (PCRs) had been issued; concerns had been addressed or efforts were under waywhen 2 complaints were received; and 2 complaints were related to procurement issues,which were handled by the Central Operations Services Office. Table A3.2 presents thereasons why complaints were found ineligible.1The cases received by OSPF are termed “complaints” in the 2003 policy.48

Experience since 2003Table A3.2 Reasons Complaints Were Found Ineligible, 2004–2011Reasons Number Share of Total (%)Complainants had not first addressed the problems with 15 62.5the concerned operations departmentsComplainants were not materially and adversely affected 3 12.5by the projectProject completion report issued 2 8.3Procurement related 2 8.3Efforts to address problems by the operations2 8.3departments were under way or concerns had beenaddressedTotal 24 100.0Source: Office of the Special Project Facilitator complaints registry as of 31 December 2011.3. The transportation infrastructure sector had the most complaints (17), accountingfor 43.6% of the total. It was followed by water and other municipal infrastructure andservices with 9 complaints. The high number of complaints in these sectors was partlythe result of their large portfolio of projects. Overall, the infrastructure sectors (transport,water, and energy) accounted for 79.5% of the complaints, consistent with theshare of these projects in the ADB portfolio (Table A3.3).Table A3.3 Complaints Received by Sector, 2004–2011Sector Total Share of Total (%)Transportation infrastructure 17 43.6Water and other municipal infrastructure9 23.1and servicesEnergy 5 12.8Agriculture and natural resources 4 10.3Industry and trade 1 2.6Rural infrastructure 1 2.6Education 1 2.6Regional technical assistance 1 2.6Total 39 100.0Note: Percentages may not total 100% because of rounding.Source: Office of the Special Project Facilitator complaints registry as of 31 December 2011.4. Most of the complaints (65.9%) were related to resettlement, inadequate information,and consultation and participation. Within resettlement, the major complaintsconcerned insufficient compensation (Table A3.4).49

Appendix 3Table A3.4 Issues Raised in Complaints, 2004–2011IssuesNumber ofTimes Raisedin Complaints Share of Total (%)Resettlement, compensation, and land acquisition 32 36.4Information 15 17.0Consultation and participation 11 12.5Agriculture, natural resources, and environment 11 12.5Village infrastructure a 8 9.1Community and social issues b 5 5.7Livelihood 2 2.3Others c 4 4.5Total 88 100.0aThis includes school reconstruction, bus stops, underpass for agricultural machinery, cattle passes, anddistributary links.bThis includes issues on gender, health, social uplift program, social impact assessment, andindigenous people.cThis includes issues on high electricity rates, power sector reform, and procurement.Source: Office of the Special Project Facilitator complaints registry as of 31 December 2011.The Compliance Review Phase5. The Compliance Review Panel (CRP) received five requests for compliance reviewduring 2004–2011, of which four were eligible and one was ineligible.6. The CRP carried out a site visit to determine eligibility in response to a requestfor compliance review in the Nepal Melamchi Water Supply Project. 2 However, the CRPcould not ascertain the alleged harm and noncompliance, and the request was deemedineligible. The CRP carried out a compliance review on the Sri Lanka Southern TransportDevelopment Project and monitored the implementation of remedial actions for 5 years.3 57 58 59 60The final monitoring mission was completed in March 2011.7. On the Fuzhou Environmental Improvement Project 4 in the People’s Republicof China, the CRP issued its report in October 2010 without a conclusion. 5 The CRPstated it would be inappropriate to issue any findings or make any recommendationswithout a site visit. The CRP monitored the implementation of the inspection panel’s2ADB. 2000. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan toNepal for the Melamchi Water Supply Project. Manila (Loan 1820-NEP for $120 million, approved on21 December 2000).3ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to theDemocratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Southern Transport Development Project. Manila (Loan1711– SRI[SF] for $90 million, approved on 25 November 1999).4ADB. 2005. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to thePeople’s Republic of China for the Fuzhou Environmental Improvement Project. Manila (Loan 2176-PRC for$55.8 million, approved on 29 July 2005).5ADB. 2010. Report to the Board of Directors on the Compliance Review Process for Request No. 2009/1,Regarding the Fuzhou Environmental Improvement Project. Manila (Loan 2176-PRC).50

Experience since 2003recommendations on the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III) in Pakistan 6between 2004 and 2010, although security conditions had precluded any CRP site visitssince 2007. The CRP found the last two requests, 7 from the Kyrgyz Republic 8 and thePhilippines, 9 61 62 63 64to be eligible.Table A3.5Requests for Compliance ReviewRequestNumberDateReceived aProject Name2004/1 2 Dec 2004 Sri Lanka: Southern Transport Development Project (LoanNo. 1711-SRI). Eligible.2004/2 6 Dec 2004 Nepal: Melamchi Water Supply Project (Loan No. 1820-NEP).Ineligible.2009/1 3 Jun 2009 People’s Republic of China: Fuzhou EnvironmentalImprovement Project (Loan No. 2176-PRC). Eligible.2011/1 25 May 2011 Philippines: Visayas Base-Load Power Development Project(Loan No. 2612/7303-PHI). Eligible.2011/2 23 May 2011 Kyrgyz Republic: CAREC Transport Corridor (Bishkek–TorugartRoad) Project 2 (Loan No. 2533-KGZ(SF)). Eligible.Special Monitoring Mandate: Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III). In August 2004,the directors approved the CRP monitoring the implementation of the Board decision on theinspection request for this project. This is a unique monitoring mandate for the CRP.CRP = Compliance Review Panel, SF = Special Funds.aWith requisite basic information.Source: Compliance Review Panel registry of requests.6ADB. 1991. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan andTechnical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project(Stage III). Manila (Loan 1146-PAK for $185 million, approved on 17 December 1991).7The cases received by the CRP are referred to as “requests” in the 2003 policy.8ADB. 2009. Report and Recommendation of the President: Proposed Loan and Asian Development FundGrant to the Kyrgyz Republic for the CAREC Transport Corridor 1 (Bishkek–Torugart Road) Project 2. Manila(Loan 2533-KGZ for $28 million, approved on 14 July 2009).9ADB. 2009. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan for theVisayas Base-Load Power Development Project in the Philippines. Manila (Private Sector Loan 7303-PHI for$100 million, approved on 11 December 2009).51

Appendix 4Summary of Eligible Complaints for theConsultation Phase, 2004–2011Projects Complainants and Issues Status1. Melamchi Water SupplyProject in Nepal(Loan 1820-NEP [SF],approved on 21 December2000)ADB: $120 million, with sevencofinanciersThe complaints were receivedon 3 May 2004. Four individualsfiled complaints regarding(i) access to information;(ii) environmental impactassessments;(iii) land acquisition,compensation, andresettlement;(iv) indigenous people;(v) the social upliftmentprogram;(vi) agriculture; and(vii) forestry.The complainants withdrew and fileda request with the CRP on 6 December2004. After its eligibility mission, theCRP deemed the case ineligible.2. Southern TransportDevelopment Project inSri Lanka(Loan 1711-SRI [SF], approvedon 25 November 1999)ADB: $90 millionJBIC: $120 million3. Community Empowermentfor Rural DevelopmentProject in Indonesia(Loan 1765-INO, approved on19 October 2000)The OSPF carried out a reviewand site visit. It concluded thattwo of the complainants werenot adversely or materiallyaffected and that the remainingtwo were affected but treatedfairly by the project and,where appropriate, receivedcompensation.Complaints were received on9 June 2004 from three NGOsrepresenting 25 complainantsregarding(i) environmental impactassessments,(ii) the social impactassessment, and(iii) compensation andresettlement.The complaint was received on21 February 2005. It was filed byeight people: three representingNGOs and five villagers whorequested confidentiality. Theissues raised regardedThe complaint was concluded withouta resolution. The OSPF retained anexternal mediator who concluded thatthe complainants’ grievances could notbe resolved by a mediated settlement.The complainants filed a request withthe CRP on 2 December 2004.The issues were resolved to thesatisfaction of all parties.In its final report, the OSPF concludedthat it was “confident that futurecomplaints will be dealt with efficientlythrough [the] project’s complaintmechanism at the local level.” acontinued on next page52

Summary of Eligible Complaints for the Consultation Phase, 2004–2011Table continuedProjects Complainants and Issues StatusADB: $65 million from OCRand $50 million from SpecialFunds(i) flaws in the design andconstruction of villageinfrastructure,(ii) the sequencing of projectcomponents,(iii) information dissemination,and(iv) participation in decisionmaking.4. National HighwayDevelopment SectorInvestment Program,Tranche 1, in Pakistan(Loan 2231-PAK, approved on15 February 2006)ADB: $180 million from OCR5. Phnom Penh to Ho Chi MinhCity Highway Project in theGreater Mekong Subregion(Loan 1659-CAM: approvedon 15 December 1998)ADB: $40 million fromSpecial FundsThe complaint was receivedon 9 September 2006, filed bythe Committee of Affectees ofMuzaffargarh Bypass, comprising53 members. Issues raisedincluded(i) the realignment of a bypass,(ii) resettlement andcompensation for losses,and(iii) information disseminationand consultation.The complaint was received on30 July 2007.The NGO Forum on Cambodiafiled the complaint on behalf ofaffected people in the villagesof Krang Khok, with 41 affectedpeople, and Steung Slot, with22 affected people, on thefollowing issues:(i) compensation,(ii) land titling, and(iii) livelihoods.Issues raised in the complaint wereresolved to the satisfaction of all parties.The OSPF annual report noted: “Thecomplainants confirmed that they weresatisfied with their compensation andthe underpass. This complaint was thusresolved.” bThe OSPF annual report noted: “Atthe request of the complainants, [the]OSPF postponed the consultationprocess while the government andthe ADB Cambodia Resident Missionpursued efforts to solve the problems.During 2009, ADB approved a TAfor an income restoration programaimed at helping the affected personsdeal with their accumulated debtburdens and reestablish their livelihoodactivities. This development offered anopportunity to solve the problems thatthe complainants had originally broughtto [the] OSPF.” c6. Fuzhou EnvironmentalImprovement Projectin the PRC(Loan 2176-PRC, approved on29 July 2005)ADB: $55.8 million from OCR,with commercial financingThe complaint was received on15 January 2009 from a groupof seven families that were to beresettled under the Nantai Islandriver rehabilitation component ofthe project. The complaint wasabout resettlement.The OSPF closed the complaint in 2010after the TA started and issued a finalreport. The TA has subsequently beenfully implemented.In formulating a course of action, theOSPF believed a structured participatoryconsultation was needed. This wouldbe assisted by an independent mediatorto improve communication amongthe parties, help them understandone another, and support a jointsearch for solutions. The SPF hired amediator from Hong Kong, China. Thegovernment agreed to provide theaffected people with economy houses.continued on next page53

Appendix 4Table continuedProjects Complainants and Issues Status7. Southern Punjab BasicUrban Services Project inPakistan(Loan 2060/2061-PAK,approved on 18 December2003)ADB: $45 million from theADF and $45 million fromOCR8. Rawalpindi EnvironmentalImprovement Project(Sewage Treatment PlantComponent) in Pakistan(Loan 2211/2212-PAK,approved on 13 December2005)ADB: $20 million from OCRand $40 million from the ADFThe complainants are notregistered local residents butmoved to the area in 1994when they purchased land fromlocal farmers and constructedtheir houses. The governmentconsiders the land purchaseillegal and not entitled undergovernment rules to the samecompensation as for residents.The complainants felt this wasinconsistent with ADB’s 2004resettlement plan.The complaint was receivedon 27 February 2009. Thesignatory was an individual whoclaimed that he represented58 complainants (43 men and15 women) who were negativelyaffected by the wastewatertreatment plant. The issuesincluded(i) resettlement, and(ii) the environment.The complaint was received on28 May 2009. The complainantswere a group of 25 residents ofaffected villages.The issues raised included(i) land acquisition, and(ii) compensation.By 31 March 2009, five of the sevenhouseholds decided to accept thecompensation package arrived atthrough the mediation, but twohouseholds did not accept it. Thegovernment extended the deadlinefor accepting the package twice, butthe two families remained unwillingto accept it and submitted a requestdated 28 April 2009 to the CRP. Thegovernment decided to change thedesign for rehabilitating the river so thatthe houses of all seven families wouldnot need to be demolished.ADB closed the loan in July 2009without construction of the wastewatertreatment plant, but issues ofland acquisition payments andcompensation for damages remained.OSPF’s consultant interviewed all thecomplainants, and the SPF met againwith them and the other stakeholdersin October 2011. It was agreed thatfinal compensation payments would bemade, and the OSPF plans to close thecomplaint when payments have beencompleted. Problem solving is ongoing.The OSPF final report stated thatthe national law on land acquisitionstipulated that only the courts couldrevise land compensation rates, so theconsultations were unable to resolvethat issue.In view of this, and considering that theproject had been closed with no clearindication of if or when the sewagetreatment plant would be built, the SPFconcluded that no further consultationwould be purposeful, and the complaintwas partially resolved and closed. TheOSPF, however, made it clear that,should the sewage treatment plant betaken up under a new loan, and if thecomplainants felt they were harmed byan act or omission of ADB, they couldcome back to the OSPF.continued on next page54

Summary of Eligible Complaints for the Consultation Phase, 2004–2011Table continuedProjects Complainants and Issues Status9. CAREC Transport CorridorI (Zhambyl Oblast Section)Investment Program,Tranche 2, in Kazakhstan(Loan MFF-2562-KAZ,approved on 7 October 2009)ADB: $187 million from OCR10. Education Sector ReformProject in Tajikistan(Loan 2053-TAJ, approved on17 December 2003)ADB: $7.5 million from theADFThe complaint was received on5 November 2009. The twosignatories claimed to representat least 30 other villagers. AnNGO, the Taraz Press Club PublicUnion, facilitated the complaint.Issues raised included(i) information dissemination,(ii) participation,(iii) cattle passes, and(iv) an underpass for agriculturalmachinery.The complaint was received on5 August 2010. Complainantsrequested confidentiality andclaimed to file the complaint onbehalf of 9,000 people. Theyauthorized members of theNGO Forum and CSSC Kalam torepresent them.From the OSPF’s monitoring report,March 2011: The OSPF conducted areview and assessment in January 2010and facilitated three consultations inMarch 2010, during which agreementwas reached on the location of anunderpass, an additional underpass,an approach road for agriculturalmachinery, the location of culverts,and information sharing. TheOSPF is monitoring the ongoingimplementation of the agreements,which is well advanced in all cases. dA joint monitoring group agreed onrehabilitation works and monitoredtheir implementation. The SPF joinedthe final monitoring visit in October2011, which confirmed the satisfactorycompletion of the works. The OSPFclosed the complaint and issued a finalreport.11. CAREC Transport Corridor1 (Bishkek–Torugart Road),Project 2, in the KyrgyzRepublic(Loan 2533-KGZ, approved on14 July 2009)ADB: $28 million12. Integrated Citarum WaterResources ManagementInvestment Program,Project 1, in Indonesia(Loan 2500/2501-INO,approved 4 December 2008)ADB: $500 millionmultitranche financing facilityIssues raised included(i) information,(ii) consultation, and(iii) school reconstruction.The complaint was receivedon 20 September 2010. It wasfiled by three residents of theaffected area who requestedthat their identities not to bepublished. They authorized anNGO representative to file thecomplaint on their behalf. Theircomplaint is on compensation.The complaint was receivedon 4 January 2011. Threecomplainants requestedthat their identities be keptconfidential and authorizedan NGO, People’s Alliance onCitarum (ARUM), to representthem.Issues are(i) resettlement; and(ii) compensationThe OSPF review and assessment wascompleted, and an agreement wasreached and is being monitored. Thecomplaint was thus resolved, but thecomplainants submitted the compliancereview request to the CRP.The OSPF conducted capacitydevelopment in nonviolentcommunication and negotiation skills,and provided guidance and advice tothe complainants, MOTC, and CWRDbased on the agreed course of action.The complainants received their finalcompensation payment in August 2011.The OSPF closed the complaint andissued its final report.The review and assessment wascompleted. The parties agreed oncommunication, an exchange ofinformation, and the OSPF’s rolein monitoring the updating andimplementation of the resettlementplan.Monitoring of the implementation ofthe agreements is ongoing.continued on next page55

Appendix 4Table continuedProjects Complainants and Issues Status13. Visayas Base-Load PowerDevelopment Project in thePhilippines(Loan 2612-PHI,approved 11 December 2009)ADB: $100 million privatesector loanThe complaint was receivedon 28 February 2011. Thesignatories stated that theyfiled the complaint on behalfof the residents of affectedcommunities; 6 signatoriesrequested confidentiality.Only one resident opted tobe identified together witha member of Freedom fromDebt Coalition, an NGOrepresenting them.Issues included(i) consultation,(ii) information, and(iii) environmental impact.Complainants withdrew after theOSPF review and assessment, and theconsultation process was terminated.The complainants filed a request forcompliance review in May 2011.aADB. 2005. Final Report of the Special Project Facilitator on Community Empowerment for Rural Development in IndonesiaADB Loan 1765(SF)/1766-INO. Manila, para. 23, p. 6.bADB. 2009. Consultation Phase of the ADB Accountability Mechanism, Office of Special Facilitator Annual Report. Manila. p. 6.cADB. 2008. Consultation Phase of Accountability Mechanism Annual Report 2007. Manila. p. 8.dADB. 2011. Monitoring Report of the Special Project Facilitator on the Complaint on CAREC Transport Corridor I (ZhambylOblast Section) [Western Europe-Western People’s Republic of China International Transit Corridor] Investment Program –Project 2 ADB Loan 2562-KAZ (22 October 2008). Manila. p. 2.ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADF = Asian Development Fund, CAREC = Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation,CRP = Compliance Review Panel, CSSC = Civil Society Support Center, CWRD = Central and West Asia Department,JBIC = Japan Bank for International Cooperation, MOTC = Ministry of Transport and Communications, NGO = nongovernmentorganization, OCR = ordinary capital resources, OSPF = Office of the Special Project Facilitator, PRC = People’s Republic ofChina, SF = Special Funds, SPF = special project facilitator, TA = technical assistance.Source: ADB.56

Appendix 5Summary of Requests for theCompliance Review Phase,2004–2011Projects Requests Responses Results1. Chashma RightRiver Bank IrrigationProject, Stage 3, inPakistan(Loan 1146-PAK,approved on17 December 1991)ADB: $185.0 millionin 1991 andsupplementaryfinancing of$33.5 million inJune 1999The request was receivedon 4 June 2002 underthe previous InspectionFunction of ADB. Thecomplaint was lodgedby four individualsauthorized to representpeople affected by theproject.The requesters statedthat ADB breached itsoperational policies andprocedures in formulatingand processing thesupplementary financingproject, with materialadverse effect onChashma-affected people.Issues included projectinducedflooding andinvoluntary resettlement;inadequate compensationfor loss of land, otherassets, and livelihoods;and a lack of informationsharing, consultation, andparticipation of affectedpeople.In March 2003, BICsubmitted its report tothe Board recommendingthat an inspection beginin December 2003.The Board approvedthe recommendation,and an inspectionpanel conducted theinvestigation in early2004. The inspectionpanel submitted its finalreport in June 2004.The CRP noted thatrequesters disengaged inMarch 2004 when theinspection panel carriedout its investigation inthe project area becauseof their “dissatisfactionwith the developmentand consultationprocesses associatedwith the grievanceredress and settlementcommittee (GRSC) andits recommendations,the Board’s supportfor the GRSC, and thedevelopment of theaction plan.” aAfter 5 years ofmonitoring, the CRPconcluded in June 2010that(i) ADB complied with24 of the 29 recommendations,(ii) ADB partly compliedwith 4 recommendations,and(iii) 1 recommendationhad been supersededby events.Of the 4recommendationsthat ADB had partiallycomplied with, the CRPconcluded that sufficientprogress was madeand that, under thesecircumstances, the CRPdid not need to extendits monitoring mandatebeyond 5 years.In August 2004,the Board approvedmonitoring by the CRPof the implementationof the remedial actionsto bring the project intocompliance.The CRP prepared andissued annual monitoringreports from 2005 to2009. The 2009 reportwas the fifth and lastmonitoring report.continued on next page57

Appendix 5Table continuedProjects Requests Responses Results2. Nepal MelamchiWater Supply Project(Loan 1820-NEP[SF], approved on 21December 2000)ADB: $120 millionSF loanThe CRP received arequest from four peopleon 12 November 2004.The following complaintswere raised:(i) inappropriateor inadequateinformationdisclosure,(ii) displacement andlack of adequatecompensation andresettlement,(iii) loss of livelihoodswith the shuttingdown of waterdrivengrain mills andmicro hydroelectricgeneration forlocal use,(iv) the destruction ofcommunity forests,(v) the destruction ofirrigation canals,(vi) damage to cropsand livelihoods byreduced flows, and(vii) displacement andother adverse effectson indigenous peopleand communities.The request wassubmitted by the JointOrganization of theAffected Communitiesof the Colombo–MataraHighway on 2 December2004, representing28 project-affectedpeople. The requestersstated alleged violationsof ADB’s operationalpolicies and proceduresthat had caused harmto them. The policyviolations were in theareas ofThe CRP obtained fromthe SPF materials relatingto the complaint in theconsultation phase.It carried out a deskbasedreview of relevantmaterials and consultedwith stakeholders. TheCRP also carried out aneligibility review missionin Nepal, including a sitevisit to the project area.The CRP filed a mission tovisit the project site andcould not verify allegeddirect and material harmor policy violations.The CRP subsequentlydeemed the requestineligible.3. Southern TransportDevelopment Projectin Sri Lanka(Loan 1711-SRI [SF],approved on 25November 1999)ADB: $90 millionJBIC: $120 millionADB: $90 millionsupplementaryfinancing loanapproved in March2008(i) the environment,(ii) involuntaryresettlement,(iii) the incorporation ofsocial dimensions inADB operations,(iv) governance,(v) economic analysis,(vi) benefit monitoringand evaluation,The CRP conductedan extensive review ofavailable documentationin Manila and inColombo. It carriedout interviews with therequesters and projectaffectedpeople, as wellas with a wide rangeof current and paststaff, consultants, andcontractors associatedwith the project. Withthe support of theGovernment of Sri Lanka,project-affected people,and ADB staff, the CRPvisited the project sitetwice to become familiarwith the issues andchallenges faced by allstakeholders.The CRP determined thatthe request was eligible,and the Board authorizeda compliance review on10 January 2005.The CRP has monitoredthe implementation of theremedial actions identifiedin the final report on theinvestigation.The CRP has monitoredthe implementation of theremedial actions identifiedin the final report on theinvestigation.The CRP concludes in itsfourth annual monitoringreport for the SouthernTransport DevelopmentProject that considerableprogress was made inimplementing the recommendationsformulatedin 2005. Of the original19 recommendations,17 were fully compliedwith, and 2 were partiallycomplied with.58continued on next page

Summary of Requests for the Compliance Review Phase, 2004–2011Table continuedProjects Requests Responses Results(vii) gender anddevelopment in ADBoperations,(viii) the processing ofloan proposals,(ix) the formulation andimplementation ofloan covenants,(x) the procurement ofgoods and services,and(xi) anticorruptionactions.The alleged harmincluded the loss ofhomes, the loss oflivelihoods, damage tothe environment, thedegradation of wetlands,the dispersion ofintegrated communities,damage to five temples,the negative effects ofresettlement, and humanrights violations.The CRP received arequest signed by twoindividuals for compliancereview on 3 June 2009.The SPF had previouslydealt with a complaintfrom seven affectedhouseholds.4. FuzhouEnvironmentalImprovement Projectin the PRC(Loan 2176-PRC,approved on 29 July2005)ADB: $55.8 millionfrom OCR, withcommercial financingThe issues raised relatedto ADB’s InvoluntaryResettlement Policy(1995), including(i) insufficientcompensation toreplace lost housingfor residents withoutlegal title,(ii) the absence ofrehabilitationmeasures to offsetlost income, and(iii) inadequateinformationdissemination andconsultation.The CRP began with adesk review of documentsand concluded that asite visit was necessary tocorroborate the claimsmade by the requestingparties. The governmentrefused the CRP’s site visitfor the following reasons:(i) The resettlement planwas in accordancewith relevant PRCand ADB policies.(ii) The governmentrerouted the river,which made thecompliance reviewrequest obsolete.(iii) Previous project sitevisits by the OSPFshould provide theCRP with sufficientinformation for itscompliance review.In the government’sview, the proposedsite visit wastherefore no longernecessary.The CRP stated that it wasunable to complete thecompliance review forlack of a site visit.continued on next page59

Appendix 5Table continuedProjects Requests Responses ResultsThe CRP acknowledgedthe decision of the PRCto change the projectdesign; however, itstated that the changewas made after thecompliance reviewrequest had been filed.As part of the eligibilityprocess, the CRP statedthat the change inproject design wouldnot obviate the needto investigate whetherADB had previouslyfailed to comply with itsoperational policies andprocedures.5. CAREC TransportCorridor (Bishkek–Torugart Road)Project 2, in theKyrgyz Republic(Loan No. 2533-KGZ,approved 14 July2009)ADB: $28 million fromthe ADFThe CRP received therequest on 23 May 2011from five alleged affectedpeople who requestedconfidentiality. They arerepresented by NGOForum on ADB. Theissues raised are relatedto ADB’s InvoluntaryResettlement Policy,including:(i) compensation forstore demolition,(ii) registration of andregistration fee for anew store, and(iii) loan repaymentscheme.The CRP has determinedthat this case is eligible;and has submitted arequest for the Board toauthorize the compliancereview.The terms of referencefor the compliance reviewwere provided to theBoard and the requesterson 24 August 2011.Compliance review isongoing.The request wasfiled during theimplementation ofthe course of actionrecommended by the SPF.continued on next page60

Summary of Requests for the Compliance Review Phase, 2004–2011Table continuedProjects Requests Responses Results6. Visayas Base-LoadPower DevelopmentProject in thePhilippines(Loan No. 2612-PHI,approved 18 August2009)ADB: $100 millionprivate sector loanThe CRP received therequest from allegedaffected people whorequested confidentiality.The requesters arerepresented by an NGOand an engineer. Theyfiled a complaint on25 May 2011. Issuesinclude(i)adverse impact of theproject on the healthof affected residents,and(ii) adverse effect ofcarbon dioxideemissions on theenvironment.The CRP has determinedthat this case is eligible.The Board authorized thecompliance review on11 July 2011.Board Compliance ReviewCommittee cleared theTOR on 28 July 2011.Compliance review isongoing.aADB. 2005. Annual Monitoring Report 2004-2005 to the Board of Directors on Implementation of Remedial Actions on theInspection Request on the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III) in Pakistan (ADB Loan No. 1146-PAK[SF]). Manila.para 9, p. 2.ADB = Asian Development Bank, BIC = Board Inspection Committee, CRP = Compliance Review Panel, JBIC = Japan Bank forInternational Cooperation, NGO = nongovernment organization, OCR = ordinary capital resources, OSPF = Office of theSpecial Project Facilitator, PRC = People’s Republic of China, SF = Special Funds, SPF = special project facilitator, TOR = termsof reference.Source: ADB.61

Appendix 6Number of Cases in DifferentAccountability MechanismsAsian DevelopmentBank: AccountabilityMechanism2004 toDecember2011Compliance Review PanelSpecial Project FacilitatorTotal Eligible Ineligible Total Eligible IneligibleEligibilitydeterminationongoing5 4 1 39 13 24 2Source: Asian Development Bank complaints registry and registry of requests.World Bank:InspectionPanel1994to 21October2011Total requestsreceivedaIncluding double and triple requests in 6 projects.Source: World Bank Inspection Panel website (various reports).Eligible forinvestigationNot eligible forinvestigationNo recommendationmadeEligibilitydeterminationongoing76 a 33 22 6 1InternationalFinanceCorporation:ComplianceAdvisorOmbudsmanFY2000–FY2010Totalcomplaints/requestsEligible forombudsmanassessmentNot eligible forombudsmanassessmentDid not gothroughombudsmanassessmentEligible forcomplianceaudit127 72 51 4 8Source: Compliance Advisor Ombudsman Annual Report FY2010 and Review FY2000–10.Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank:IndependentConsultation andInvestigationMechanismEstablishedin 1994 andreorganized inFebruary 2010Total casesregisteredMay 2010–August 2011Eligible forconsultationphaseIneligible forconsultationphaseEligible forcompliancereview17 12 5 2Source: Inter-American Development Bank website.AfricanDevelopmentBank:IndependentReviewMechanism2004–2011Total number of casesregistered since 2007Eligible forcompliancereviewEligible forproblemsolving7 2 31 ineligible1 eligibilitydeterminationongoingSources: African Development Bank requests register and various reports. http://www.afdb.org62

Number of Cases in Different Accountability MechanismsEuropean Bankfor Reconstructionand Development:Project ComplaintMechanism (PCM)IndependentRecourseMechanism from2004, replaced byPCM in March 2010IndependentRecourseMechanism15 registeredcomplaintsProject Complaint Mechanism8 complaints registered as of 22 December 2011Eligible forproblemsolving: 3Sources: Independent Recourse Mechanism various reports and PCM register (website).Eligible forcompliancereview: 2Ongoing eligibilityassessment: 3European InvestmentBank (EIB): ComplaintsMechanismApproved in February2010, supersedingComplaints Policy of 2008Source: EIB complaints office annual activity reports.EIB include procurement cases. There were 15 complaints in2007 and 40 in 2008, most related to procurement. Therewere 2 cases on environmental and social impacts in 2007and 7 cases in 2008.Japan Bank for InternationalCooperation: Office of Examinersfor Environmental Guidelines2003–2011 1 complaint received in 2007, ineligibleSource: Annual report of the Examiners for Environmental Guidelines.US OverseasPrivate InvestmentCorporation:Office ofAccountability2005–2011Total requests receivedsince 30 November 2011Eligible forcompliancereviewEligible forproblemsolving6 2 11 ineligible2 eligibilitydeterminationongoingSources: Overseas Private Investment Corporation public registry (website), cases and reports (http://www.opic.gov/doing-business/accountability/registry), and Office of Accountability 4-year report.63

Appendix 7Summary Assessment of theADB Accountability MechanismAreas Strengths Weaknesses Proposed ChangesAccessibilityAwarenessSystematic outreach has Awareness is limited. Enhance outreach.increased.Eligibility Cutoff date is late. Project completion report Clarify cutoff date.is unpredictable as acutoff date.ProcessNo mandatoryrequirement for citingspecific policy violations.The process for problemsolving is complex.Simplify the process.Document requirementsare minimal.English and other nationalor official languages canbe used.IndependenceSubmission can bethrough various meansand to various points.CredibilityThe arrangement that theCRP reports to the Boardand SPF reports to thePresident is well suited tothe distinct nature andneeds of the consultationand compliance reviewprocesses.CRP appointments arerecommended by thePresident.Senior staff working asthe head of OCRP.CRP and OCRP workplanning and budgetingfragmented.Enhance CRPindependence in line withIED.Enhance interactionamong the CRP,Management, and staff.MonitoringThe SPF and the CRP areempowered to monitorimplementation ofremedial actions.Interaction is lackingbetween the CRP andManagement, creatingthe risk of the CRP’sisolation.continued on next page64

Summary Assessment of the ADB Accountability MechanismTable continuedTransparencyParticipationTimeAreas Strengths Weaknesses Proposed ChangesA high degree oftransparency is achievedby systematicallyand comprehensivelydisclosing information,giving due considerationto confidentiality.Requesters andManagement canrespond to the draft CRPcompliance review report.Problem solvingempowers complainantswith an active role indecision making.The expected time frameis clearly specified in thepolicy.Complaints referredback to operationsdepartments are nottracked.Management response tothe request is lacking atthe eligibility stage.CRP reports are notshared with theborrowing country.EfficiencyProcesses are lengthy.The CRP monitoring timeframe of 5 years for everyproject is rigid and long.Track complaints referredback to operationsdepartments.Introduce Managementresponse before theeligibility determination.Inform and coordinatewith the borrowingcountry.Simplify processes.Fully utilize grassrootsmechanisms for problemprevention, problemsolving, and earlycompliance.CostsStructureRelevanceSequenceADB has providedsufficient resourcesfor the AccountabilityMechanism.EffectivenessA sound dualconsultation-andcompliancereviewstructure is in place.Both consultation andcompliance review havebeen relevant.Problem solving was giventop priority.Complainants can exit theconsultation stage andfile for compliance reviewat multiple points.There is no distinctionbetween the basic costrequired to maintain andoperate the AccountabilityMechanism and theflexible costs required torespond to fluctuatingdemand.Requiring complainantsfirst to approach the SPFcreates perception andpractical issues.Optimize the SPF and CRPmonitoring time frame.Define the fixed costsrequired regardless of thenumber of cases.Allocate variable costsat optimum levels basedon demand and workrequirements.Enable direct access tothe CRP.continued on next page65

Appendix 7Table continuedMandateLearning lessonsAreas Strengths Weaknesses Proposed ChangesDedicated support existsfor the consultation andcompliance phases.Systematic learning hastaken place.The OSPF advisory rolehas been beneficial.The practice of theCRP making broadrecommendations andManagement identifyingremedial actions isconfusing. The CRPhas not been given anopportunity to commenton Management’sremedial actions.Learning is still limited.Compliance reviewis sometimes seen asadversarial.Site visits Visit policy is defined. No policy dealing withsituations of borrowingcountries’ refusal.OutcomesConsultation andcompliance review delivertangible outcomes foraffected people andimprove project quality.Actual implementation isproblematic.Focus compliance reviewon fact-finding, andprovide an opportunityfor the CRP to commenton Management’sproposed remedialactions.Improve learning.Promote a change ininstitutional culture.Learning from theexperience of ADB andother accountabilitymechanisms, developa sound approach toaddress problems.Addressing the issuesabove will contribute toimproved outcomes.ADB = Asian Development Bank, CRP = Compliance Review Panel, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, OCRP = Officeof the Compliance Review Panel, OSPF = Office of the Special Project Facilitator, SPF = special project facilitator.Source: ADB.66

Appendix 8Comparison ofAccountability MechanismsAreas ADB a World Bank Other InstitutionsMilestonesInspection Functionestablished in 1995.Inspection Functionreviewed in 2002 and2003.Accountability Mechanismcreated in 2003.Accountability Mechanismreviewed between 2010and 2012.First among multilateraldevelopment banks toestablish an inspectionpanel (1993).Inspection panel reviewedand clarified in 1996 and1999.AfDB: Independent ReviewMechanism established in2004, amended in June2010 following a review in2009.EBRD: IndependentRecourse Mechanismin place between July2004 and March 2010;new Project ComplaintMechanism becameoperational in March 2010.EIB: Complaints Mechanismapproved in February 2010,superseding ComplaintsMechanism Policy of June2008.IADB: IndependentInvestigation Mechanismestablished in 1994,changed in 2010 toIndependent Consultationand InvestigationMechanism.IFC: Compliance AdvisorOmbudsman established in1999. It amended its 2004operational guidelines in2006 and 2007.JBIC: Summary ofprocedures to submitobjections concerning JBICguidelines for confirmationof environmental and socialconsiderations adopted in2003. Procedures updatedin October 2009.OPIC: Board approvedgeneral policy andguidelines on accountabilityand advisory mechanismand established Office ofAccountability in 2005.continued on next page67

Appendix 8Table continuedAreas ADB a World Bank Other InstitutionsNumber of cases 2004–December 2011SPF: Total 39; eligible 13.CRP: Total 5; eligible 4.1994–2011Inspection panel: Total76 requests; eligible forinspection 33.AfDB (2004–2011): Totalof 7 cases since 2007, ofwhich 2 were eligible forcompliance review and3 for problem solving.EBRD (2004–2011): Totalof 22 cases, 15 underIndependent RecourseMechanism and 8 underProject ComplaintMechanism.EIB (2007–2008): Totalof 55 cases (includingprocurement and humanresources issues) received in2007 and 2008.IADB (1994–2011): Total of17 cases in 2010–2011.IFC (2000–2010). Total of127 cases, of which 8 wentthrough the complianceaudit process.JBIC (2003–2011): Total of1 case; ineligible.OPIC (2005–2011): Totalof 6 cases, 1 eligible forproblem solving and 2 forcompliance review.Policy coverageADB’s operational policiesand procedures concerningformulation, processing,and implementation ofADB-financed projects.World Bank’s operationalpolicies and procedureswith respect to thedesign, appraisal, and/orimplementation of projects.EBRD: Focused onenvironmental, social, andpublic disclosure aspects.EIB: Policies on institutionalgovernance, strategyguidelines, codes ofconduct, transparency andcorporate responsibility,anti-fraud, thematiclending policies, geographicpolicies, cooperationwith third parties and/orinternational organizations,and project-cycle-relatedpolicies and procurement.IADB and AfDB:Operational policies andprocedures.68IFC: Focused onenvironmental and socialaspects.continued on next page

Comparison of Accountability MechanismsTable continuedAreas ADB a World Bank Other InstitutionsJBIC: The examiner forenvironmental guidelinesis tasked with ensuringcompliance with guidelinesfor confirmation ofenvironmental and socialconsiderations.Procurement andcorruptionCutoff datesOPIC: Environmental,social, labor, humanrights, and transparencystandards.Excluded. Excluded. All excluded these twoaspects, except EIB, whichincludes procurement.Up to the issuance of thePCR.The request to be filedbefore loan financing issubstantially disbursed (upto 95% disbursement).AfDB: 12 months after thephysical completion of aproject, or 12 months afterthe final disbursement, orthe date of cancellation ofthe undisbursed amount.EBRD: 12 months followingthe last disbursement (Bankstill maintains a financialinterest).EIB: 1 year from the dateon which the facts uponwhich the allegationis grounded could bereasonably known by thecomplainant.IADB: 24 months after thelast disbursement.IFC: Not mentioned in therules.JBIC: Complaints can befiled between the time aloan agreement is executedand the time whendisbursement is completed.OPIC: Claims made beforeor after OPIC’s support ofa project are not eligible.OPIC’s support is deemedto end at the terminationof OPIC’s contractualrelationship with a project,or when a financialintermediary is no longercontractually engaged inthe project.continued on next page69

Appendix 8Table continuedAreas ADB a World Bank Other InstitutionsMinimum numberof people2 people. 2 people. AfDB and JBIC: 2 people.IFC, IADB, EIB, EBRD, andOPIC: 1 person.Direct and indirecteffectsStructureOnly people who aredirectly, materially, andadversely affected.SPF and OSPF.CRP and OCRP.Only people who aredirectly, materially, andadversely affected.Inspection Panel and itssecretariat.All requiring direct andmaterial harm for eligibility,except EIB and IFC.IFC, EBRD, EIB, JBIC, andOPIC: Each with a unit oroffice that is responsiblefor both problem solvingand compliance review, andreports to the president(except for EIB, whichreports to the managementcommittee).AfDB: Head of ComplianceReview and MediationUnit to work on problemsolving and support expertson compliance review,reporting to both the Boardand the president.IADB: Ombudsperson,panel, and executivesecretary reporting to theBoard.AfDB: Head of ComplianceReview and MediationUnit appointed by thepresident with concurrenceof Board and reportsadministratively to thepresident and functionallyto the Board for projectsalready approved bythe Board, and to thepresident for proposedprojects not yet approvedby the Board; expertpanel appointed by theBoard on the president’srecommendation.Appointmentsand reportingThe SPF appointed by thePresident, after consultationwith the Board, and reportsto the President.CRP members appointedby the Board upon therecommendation of thePresident; the CRP reportsto the Board.Secretary of the OCRPappointed by the President.Compliance review onlyby the inspection panel;no formal problem solvingfunction.World Bank panel membersappointed by the Boardbased on president’snomination; panel reportsto the Board.Executive secretaryappointed by the presidentafter consultation with theBoard.IFC, OPIC, EBRD, andEIB: No secretariat;accountability mechanismunit heads appointed by,and report to, the president(except the EIB unit, whichreports to the managementcommittee).continued on next page70

Comparison of Accountability MechanismsTable continuedAreas ADB a World Bank Other InstitutionsSite visitsSite visits after obtainingconsent from theborrowing country.Inspection in the territoryof such country shall becarried out with its priorconsent (1993 resolution,para. 21).Any additional site visitneeds to be invited by thecountry (1999 clarification,para. 16).Uses country offices toobtain mission clearanceand meetings for theInspection Panel.JBIC: Examiners appointedby and report to thepresident; secretaryappointed by the humanresources department.IADB: Ombudsman, panel,and executive secretaryappointed by and report tothe Board.IADB: Any part of theprocess to be conductedin the territory of theborrower and/or recipientcountry may be conductedonly after obtaining thewritten non-objection ofthe country (2010 policy,para. 49).AfDB, EBRD, EIB, andOPIC: Rules state that sitevisits may be undertakenbut no details given.JBIC: Site visits notmentioned, but examinerscan conduct interviews;the chair’s summary statesthat JBIC “is a governmentinstitution and shall accordadequate considerationsto the sovereignty of therecipient country.”aInformation for ADB is based on the 2003 Accountability Mechanism policy (footnote 2 of the main text).ADB = Asian Development Bank, AfDB = African Development Bank, CRP = Compliance Review Panel, EBRD = European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development, EIB = European Investment Bank, IADB = Inter-American Development Bank,IFC = International Finance Corporation, JBIC = Japan Bank for International Cooperation, OCRP = Office of the CompliancePanel, OPIC = Overseas Private Investment Corporation (United States), PCR = project completion report, SPF = special projectfacilitator.Sources: Policy, rules, and annual reports of various accountability mechanisms.71

Appendix 9Information Disclosure Requirementsunder the ADB Accountability Mechanism1. Complaints filed under the Accountability Mechanism will be registered on theAsian Development Bank (ADB) website within 2 days after the complaints are received.In cases where a complaint was forwarded to an operations department for handling,an end-of-process report prepared by the operations department will be posted on theADB website upon completion. In case a complaint is forwarded to the Special ProjectFacilitator (SPF) for problem solving or to the Compliance Review Panel (CRP) for compliancereview, the provisions in paras. 2–4 will apply. All days refer to working days unlessotherwise specified.Problem Solving Function2. The Office of the Special Project Facilitator will post the following information anddocuments on the ADB website:(i) the complaint letter—upon the SPF’s receiving the complaint letter and subjectto the agreement of the complainants; 165(ii) a general description of the complaint—upon the SPF’s receiving the complaintletter if the complainants have not consented to disclosure of the complaintletter;(iii) the SPF’s determination of eligibility of the complaint—upon the SPF’s determinationof the eligibility;(iv) the review and assessment report prepared by the SPF—upon completion, andsubject to the consent of the complainants and the borrower;(v) a summary of the review and assessment report—upon completion and if therelevant parties have not consented to disclosure of the full review and assessmentreport;(vi) a problem solving completion report summarizing the complaint, the stepsto resolve the issues, decisions by the parties concerned, and the agreement(if any) by the parties concerned, within 2 months upon the completion of theproblem solving process (with or without an agreement), and subject to theconsent of the complainants, the government, and/or client;(vii) a summary of the problem solving completion report—upon completion and ifthe relevant parties have not consented to disclosure of the full problem solvingcompletion report;(viii) monitoring reports—upon circulation to the President and the Board forinformation; and1“Upon” in the context of information disclosure means as soon as is reasonably practical and generally nolater than 14 calendar days.72

Information Disclosure Requirements under the ADB Accountability Mechanism(ix) the SPF’s final report—upon circulation to the complainants, the government,and/or client.Compliance Review Function3. The CRP will post the following information and documents on the ADB websiteat the times specified below:(i) the complaint letter (or the request for compliance review)—upon theCRP’s receiving the complaint letter and subject to the agreement of thecomplainants—within 7 days of receipt of the complaint;(ii) a general description of the complaint—within 7 days from the CRP’s receivingof the complaint letter if the complainants have not consented to disclosure ofthe complaint letter;(iii) the CRP report determining that the complaint is eligible and the Boarddecision on authorization of compliance review, together with Management’sresponse—within 7 days of the Board decision;(iv) the CRP report determining that the complaint is ineligible, together withManagement’s response—within 7 days of circulation of the report to theBoard;(v) the terms of reference for the compliance review within 10 days of the Board’sauthorization of the compliance review;(vi) the CRP’s final compliance review report, attaching responses, if any, to thedraft report from Management and, subject to their consent, from thecomplainants, the government, and/or client, as applicable—within 7 days ofthe Board’s consideration of the final report;(vii) Management’s proposed remedial actions, CRP comments on the remedialactions, and the Board’s decision—within 7 days of the Board’s decision; and(viii) monitoring reports on implementation of any remedial actions approved by theBoard—upon circulation to the Board and other stakeholders.4. The SPF and CRP will post the Accountability Mechanism annual reports on theAccountability Mechanism website within the ADB website upon completion. TheOffice of the Special Project Facilitator, the Office of the Compliance Review Panel,the Independent Evaluation Department, and the Regional and Sustainable DevelopmentDepartment will post the learning reports upon completion. The Board informationpaper on the reasons for a borrowing country’s rejection of a CRP site visit, if applicable,will be disclosed within 21 days after the submission to the Board.73