Republic of the Philippines - Campaign

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
People of the Philippines vs. Fortuna, et. al.
S. C. G. R. No. 141660-64
Lumanog – when it takes his non-testifying as a point against him (p. 29, fifth
paragraph):
In addition, and this is with respect to accused Lumanog
only, said accused did not testify despite the specific accusation
and evidence implication him to the Murder at bench. Such
silence, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Dolmendo (296
SCRA 371, Sept. 25, 1998) justifies an inference that the
accused is not innocent and may be regarded as a quasiconfession.
Co-related with our first point, the trial court apparently thought that, because he
did not testify, his defense was not substantial enough to present along with those of the
other accused who all testified. But even worse, the trial court took it against him “as a
quasi-confession.”
To support this “inference,” the trial court cites People vs. Delmendo (not
Dolmendo, 296 SCRA 371). But this Second Division ruling is of doubtful
constitutionality, and the Court sitting en banc should set things right and reverse that
Delmendo doctrine, in accordance with the Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3). It clearly offends
against the constitutional right to remain silent (Const., Art. III, Sec. 12[1]). Against the
implementing rule of criminal procedure which specifically provides that “His silence
shall not in any manner prejudice him.” (Rules of Court, Rule 115, Sec. 1[d], italics
supplied) And against other Supreme Court rulings as recapitulated in People vs.
Arciaga, et al. (G.R. No. L-38179, June 16, 1980):
No inference of guilt may also be drawn against an
accused upon his failure to make a statement of any sort. The
neglect or refusal of the accused to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him. Most importantly, both
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, an accused has the right
to remain silent. Such silence cannot be used as presumption of
his guilt. Only recently, in People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282,
this Court held, citing People vs. Esmundo, 27 Phil. 554, that an
accused has the right to decline to testify at the trial without
having any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to go on the
witness stand. We likewise held therein that a verdict of
conviction on the basis solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal
of the accused to take the witness stand to deny the charges
against him is a judicial heresy which cannot be countenanced.
Moreover, the foregoing is in consonance with the rule that an
accused should be convicted on the strength of the evidence
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