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APPELLANTS’ BRIEF People of the Philippines vs. Fortuna, et. al. S. C. G. R. No. 141660-64 In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called “radical relief” and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. 16 With more reason should radical relief be granted in the case at bar where there have been multiple violations of constitutional rights of the accused from their warrantless (stated otherwise, unwarranted) arrests up to in the judgment of conviction itself, as will be shown in the discussion of the next Assignment of Error VII. Part of that radical relief must be the application of several exclusionary rules in order to exclude inadmissible evidence pursuant to the Constitution’s Art. III, Secs. 3(2) and 12(3), in order to remove the “fruit of the poisonous tree” 17 – but in the case at bar, it is not just one “fruit” and not just one “tree” because of multiple violations of constitutional rights. And so, we have come to a point where the realm of human rights overlaps with the realm of evidence, both its admissibility and its appreciation. In accused Lenido Lumanog’s “Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration” dated 25 November 1999, he specifically prayed, among others, that the case against all the accused “be dismissed as radical relief for gross violations of their constitutional rights.” But this was denied by the trial court in its appealed Order of January 25, 2000 (Annex B), which stated (in p. 6) among its reasons for such denial: “The argument on alleged weak commitment, low regard and poor appreciation of human rights of the accused by this court is better addressed to the Commission on Human Rights or to the Supreme Court, lest this court be accused of another perceived violation of such rights in considering such argument as purely baseless.” 15 People vs. Viduya (189 SCRA 403). 16 Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70), citing Salonga vs. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438), Mean vs. Argel (115 SCRA 256), Yap vs. Lutero (105 Phil. 3007) and People vs. Zulueta (89 Phil. 880). 17 See the instructive discussion of this concept in the death penalty case of People vs. Alicando (251 SCRA 293). Page 92 of 127 92
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF People of the Philippines vs. Fortuna, et. al. S. C. G. R. No. 141660-64 Rather than face squarely this human rights issue with the importance it deserves (Const., Art. II, Sec. 11: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.”), the trial court takes the path of least resistance and passes the buck to the CHR or to the SC, even showing a cavalier attitude in the process. The courts are supposed to be the last bulwark of constitutional and human rights but the trial court in the case at bar was not equal to this task. 18 VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LEFT ACCUSED LENIDO LUMANOG OUT IN THE DECISION'S RECOUNTING OF THE RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUAL DEFENSES OF THE SIX REMAINING ACCUSED, AND RULED THAT LUMANOG'S NOT TESTIFYING BEFORE THE COURT JUSTIFIES AN INFERENCE THAT HE IS NOT INNOCENT AND MAY BE REGARDED AS A QUASI-CONFESSION. The first indication of the trial court’s bias or unfairness against accused Lenido Lumanog in its appealed Joint Decision of July 30, 1999 (Annex A) is that he was left out in its presentation of the respective individual defenses of the accused (pp. 7-16). Only he (among the six remaining accused) was left out. Even his sidekick co-accused Rameses de Jesus was given the benefit of such a presentation (pp. 10-12). In fine, the defense he presented through counsel was effectively not heard by the trial court. This leaving out was a violation of his constitutional right to procedural due process (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1 and 14[1]) and particularly his right to be heard by counsel (Const., Art. III, Sec. 14[2]; also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 14[3][d]); and Rules of Court, Rule 115, Sec. 1[c]). The “explanation” for that leaving out is found later in the appealed Joint Decision – a further indication of the trial court’s bias or unfairness against accused 18 Following Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.’s statement during CONCOM deliberations on July 18, 1986 regarding the abolition of the death penalty, “I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks,” as quoted in the death penalty case of People vs. Munoz (G.R. No. L-38969-70, February 9, 1989). Page 93 of 127 93
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