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Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

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A Proposal for <strong>Bank</strong>ing Reform:<strong>The</strong> <strong>The</strong>ory of a 100-Percent Reserve Requirement 755monetary-planning agency, on the control <strong>and</strong> management ofthe banking <strong>and</strong> financial system of any country. Even certaindistinguished politicians, such as the nineteenth-century AmericanPresident Andrew Jackson, understood this idea perfectly<strong>and</strong>, motivated by it, fiercely opposed the establishment of anycentral bank. Unfortunately their influence was not strongenough to prevent the creation of the current central-planningsystem in the sector of banking <strong>and</strong> finance, nor any of this system’sharmful effects, past or present, on our economies. 55Moreover, as the Public Choice School indicates, privilegedspecial interest groups <strong>and</strong> politicians will tend toexploit any fiduciary monetary system based on a statemonopoly on the issuance of money. In fact, politicians facethe irresistible temptation to try to buy votes with funds createdfrom nothing, an enticement analyzed by theorists of the“political cycle,” among others. 56 Furthermore the possibilityof exp<strong>and</strong>ing money <strong>and</strong> credit allows politicians to financetheir expenditures without resorting to taxes, which arealways unpopular <strong>and</strong> painful. At the same time, with thiscourse of action, the decrease in the purchasing power ofmoney works in politicians’ favor, since income taxes are generallyprogressive. For these reasons it is especially importantthat we find a monetary system which, like the one proposed55 Thus we should be especially critical of those authors who, such asAlan Reynolds, Arthur B. Laffer, Marc A. Miles <strong>and</strong> others, attempt toestablish a pseudo-gold-st<strong>and</strong>ard in which the central bank continues toplay the leading role in monetary <strong>and</strong> credit policy, but with a referenceto gold. Friedman has appropriately characterized this pseudo-goldst<strong>and</strong>ardas “a system in which, instead of gold being money, gold wasa commodity whose price was fixed by governments.” (See Friedman,“Has Gold Lost its Monetary Role?” p. 36). <strong>The</strong> proposals of Laffer <strong>and</strong>Miles appear in their book, International <strong>Economic</strong>s in an Integrated World(Oakl<strong>and</strong>, N.J.: Scott <strong>and</strong> Foresman, 1982). A brief, brilliant critique ofthese proposals can be found in Salerno, “Gold St<strong>and</strong>ards: True <strong>and</strong>False,” pp. 258–61.56 See, for example, chapter 5 (“Ciclo Político-Económico”) of Juan FranciscoCorona Ramón’s book, Una introducción a la teoría de la decisiónpública (Public Choice) (Alcalá de Henares; Madrid: Instituto Nacional deAdministración Pública, 1987), pp. 116–42, <strong>and</strong> the bibliography providedtherein. Remember also the references of footnote 57 of chapter 6.

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