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Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

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Central <strong>and</strong> Free <strong>Bank</strong>ing <strong>The</strong>ory 635THE CASE FOR A CENTRAL BANKThus began a prolonged controversy between free-bankingchampions <strong>and</strong> central-bank promoters. <strong>The</strong> latter offeredthe following arguments to support their case against theposition of the <strong>Bank</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> Free-<strong>Bank</strong>ing School:First, a free-banking system, by its very nature, even underoptimal conditions, would be prone to occasional, isolatedbank crises which would harm customers <strong>and</strong> holders of banknotes<strong>and</strong> deposits. <strong>The</strong>refore, under such circumstances,there is a need for an official central bank with the power tostep in to protect noteholders <strong>and</strong> depositors in the event of acrisis. This argument is clearly paternalistic <strong>and</strong> aimed at justifyingthe existence of a central bank. It ignores the fact thatwhen support is provided to those hit by a crisis, in the longrun such support merely tends to further hamper the smoothrunning of the banking system, which requires constant <strong>and</strong>active supervision <strong>and</strong> confidence on the part of the public.Supervision is relaxed <strong>and</strong> confidence bolstered when thegeneral public takes for granted the intervention of the centralbank to avoid any damage in the case of a bank failure. Moreoverbankers actually tend to exercise less responsibility whenthey too are sure of the central bank’s support should theyneed it. Hence it is quite credible that the existence of a centralbank tends to aggravate bank crises, as has been revealed evenrecently in several cases. <strong>The</strong> “deposit insurance” system inmany countries has played a major role in fostering perversebehavior among bankers <strong>and</strong> in facilitating <strong>and</strong> aggravatingbank crises. Nevertheless, from a political st<strong>and</strong>point theabove paternalistic argument can become extremely influential,even nearly irresistible, in a democratic environment. Atany rate, this first argument marks the beginning of the falseCoquelin, Chevalier, <strong>and</strong> others) <strong>and</strong> Currency School theorists in favorof a central bank (such as Lavergne, D’Eichtal, <strong>and</strong> Wolowsky). In Germanythe quarreling factions were led by Adolph Wagner <strong>and</strong> Lasker,on the side of free banking, <strong>and</strong> Tellkampf, Geyer, Knies, <strong>and</strong> Neisser, onthe side of the pro-central-bank Currency School. On this matter, seechapters 8 <strong>and</strong> 9 of Smith, <strong>The</strong> Rationale of Central <strong>Bank</strong>ing, pp. 92–132.

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