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Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

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494 <strong>Money</strong>, <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>Credit</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Cycles</strong>THE ECONOMIC RECESSIONS OF THE LATE 1970S AND EARLY 1990S<strong>The</strong> most characteristic feature of the business cycleswhich have followed World War II is that they have originatedin deliberately inflationary policies directed <strong>and</strong> coordinatedby central banks. During the post-war decades <strong>and</strong> well intothe late sixties Keynesian theory led to the belief that an“expansive” fiscal <strong>and</strong> monetary policy could avert any crisis.Grim reality sank in with the arrival of severe recession in the1970s, when stagflation undermined <strong>and</strong> discredited Keynesianassumptions. Moreover the 1970s <strong>and</strong> the emergence ofstagflation actually marked the rebirth of interest in Austrianeconomics, <strong>and</strong> Hayek received the 1974 Nobel Prize in <strong>Economic</strong>sprecisely for his studies on the theory of the businesscycle. As a matter of fact, the crisis <strong>and</strong> stagflation of the seventieswere a “trial by fire” which Keynesians did not survive,<strong>and</strong> which earned great recognition for Austrian School theorists,who had been predicting it for some time. <strong>The</strong>ir onlyerror, as Hayek admits, lay in their initial misjudgment of theduration of the inflationary process, which, unrestricted by oldgold-st<strong>and</strong>ard requirements, was prolonged by additionaldoses of credit expansion <strong>and</strong> spanned two decades. <strong>The</strong> resultother interventionary measures. In contrast to the myth oflaissez-faire, we have shown how government interventiongenerated the unsound boom of the 1920’s, <strong>and</strong> howHoover’s new departure aggravated the Great Depression bymassive measures of interference. <strong>The</strong> guilt for the GreatDepression must, at long last, be lifted from the shoulders ofthe free market economy, <strong>and</strong> placed where it properlybelongs: at the doors of politicians, bureaucrats, <strong>and</strong> the massof “enlightened” economists. And in any other depression,past or future, the story will be the same. (Rothbard, America’sGreat Depression, p. 295)We have not yet mentioned the European side of the Great Depression,an analysis of which appears in Lionel Robbins’s book, <strong>The</strong> Great Depression(1934). In a more recent work, <strong>The</strong> <strong>Credit</strong>-Anstalt Crisis of 1931 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), Aurel Schubert provides aclear account of the crisis of the Austrian banking system (though theunderlying theory at times leaves much to be desired).

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