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Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles - The Ludwig von Mises ...

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490 <strong>Money</strong>, <strong>Bank</strong> <strong>Credit</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Cycles</strong>a poor allocation of resources in the productive structure <strong>and</strong>subsequently, a deep depression. This is what actually happened.Indeed the goal of stability in the general price level ofconsumer goods was very nearly achieved throughout the1920s, at the cost of great credit expansion. This generated aboom which, in keeping with our theoretical predictions,affected mainly capital goods industries. Thus the price ofsecurities increased four-fold in the stock market, <strong>and</strong> whilethe production of goods for current consumption grew by 60percent throughout the period, the production of durable consumergoods, iron, steel, <strong>and</strong> other fixed capital goodsincreased by 160 percent. 97Another fact which illustrates the Austrian theory of thecycle is the following: during the 1920s wages rose mainly inthe capital goods industries. Over an eight-year period theyincreased in this sector by around 12 percent, in real terms,while they showed an average of 5 percent real growth in theconsumer goods industries. In certain capital goods industrieswages rose even more. For instance, they increased by 22 percentin the chemical industry <strong>and</strong> by 25 percent in the iron <strong>and</strong>steel industry.Apart from John Maynard Keynes <strong>and</strong> Irving Fisher,Ralph Hawtrey, the British Treasury’s Director of FinancialStudies, was another particularly influential economist in97 In other words high “inflation” was definitely a factor during thisperiod, but it manifested itself in the sector of financial assets <strong>and</strong> capitalgoods, not in the consumer goods sector (Rothbard, America’s GreatDepression, p. 154). In his article, “<strong>The</strong> Federal Reserve as a CartelizationDevice: <strong>The</strong> Early Years: 1913–1930,” chapter 4 in <strong>Money</strong> in Crisis, BarryN. Siegel, ed., pp. 89–136, Murray Rothbard offers us a fascinatingaccount of the development of the Federal Reserve’s policy from 1913 to1930, together with an analysis of the close, expansion-related cooperationbetween Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve, <strong>and</strong> MontaguNorman, governor of the <strong>Bank</strong> of Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> large-scale open marketoperations of the 1920s followed. <strong>The</strong>ir purpose was to inflate the Americanmoney supply in order to help the United Kingdom resolve its selfinflicteddeflation problem.

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