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DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICYAndrey RYABOVFro m Modest y to Globa l Leadership: The Evolving Mindset o f the Russian ElitesThe leading elites i n post-Soviet Ru ssia were socializ ed int o their internationa l environme nt during the 90s of th epa st century. At the same time, a new foreign policy community came into being. An important element of thisprocess was the formation and the articulation o f relevant interests, which took place both on the national level –where th ey served as commo n reference for the settlemen t of disputes – as well as o n the group level.Nevertheless, conflicts be tween various groups and corporate interests could frequently no t be solved b ycompromises o n the national l evel. In a number of c ases, this resu lted in contradictions in the foreign poli cy lineand illo gical and inconsequential actions of the government an d other foreign poli cy agencies.To tal k about foreign policy interests of society at large and of public opinion hardl y makes sens e. Thisphenomenon winds dow n t o a har d core interest, namely the wish to keep t he country out of ex pensive and longconflicts whi ch go with losses in human life, a reduction of livin g standards and other negative consequences. Asth e Chechen wars have demonstr ated, societ y wo uld risk such a conflict exclusivel y i f theonly crediblealternative t o w ar were the threat o f a whol esale destruction of the familiar life, worl d and public order byterrorism, regardless of whether t he citizens arri ve at this conclusio n themselves or whether it results from aconscious policy of (dis-) information engineered by the governmen t.This mindset reflects on e of the most importan t characteristic s of Russian post-Communist society. Society isimmo bile, even petrified, and it is no t ready to jeopardise the consumptio n level attained or accept cutbacks, noteven for the sake of the mo st nob le national ideals. Considering this facto r, one can say that if public opinio n hasany influen ce at all on foreign policy, its impact is never dire ct. Voters and society in gen eral represent a milieuwit h a certain ord er o f values whic h is, i n theor y , taken int o acc ount by the governmen t in its foreign policy.Beginning at the tur n o f the millenniu m, these value s have been based on the idea of Russia as a civilizatio n in itsown right, whi ch takes an independent pat h ; o f a country which has almost no genuine friends i n the modernworld and is surrounde d by enviers who cov et its riches and are afra id of Russia' s growing influence i n th e worl d .Howeve r, the attitude towards other countries is shaped primarily by national television. This fa ct is corroboratedb y all sociolo gical investigations. Tel evision , whic h is under tota l governmental contro l, is capable of generatinga hostile attitude towards a specific country overnigh t , even if it had been regarded as a friendly country before(the change of attitudes towards Ukraine as a consequence of the policies of the Russi an governmen t is a strikin gexample).I n this context, public opinion wit h its fixe d ideas about Russia' s environment and its gullibility plays the role of atool t o provide legitima cy for th e elites i n powe r. By highlighting the h armony of government policies with thesebasi c attitudes i n thei r official propag anda and information campaigns, th e elites demonstrate thei r dedication toth e popular cause and thei r resolve to act in t he national interest as perceived by the populace. In other words,public opinion performs tw o functions in foreign poli tics: societal attitudes play the role o f a passive soundingboard; they determ ine general directions and th ey are manipulated in order to generate mass loyalties and supportfo r the power elites, if political mobilization becomes necessar y. Such campaigns, however, have a short-termcharacter an d do no t af fect the everyday interests of the cit izens. Mass consciousness is neither capable o finfluencing foreign policy decision-making, if it is at varian ce with the latter, nor can it prod the leaders to takecerta in actions i n the international arena, whi ch are rational and make sense in th e eyes of the citizens, butcontradict the perception and the interests of the elites.One must therefore look at the positions of the leading elites if one asks for the interests whi ch drive Russianforeign politics. Two distin ct sets of interests of the new leading elites can be identifi ed in Russia's post-Sovietforeign politics: one that continues t he geopolitical superpower tradition, which was important for domesti cdevelopment and con sisted o f economic and militar y presence in order to influen ce the situation in certain worldregion s. The other materialized already during the post-Communi st period. I t is to realize th e economic interestso f the new elite s. It goes withou t saying that both sets are linked to specific interests of one or the other lobby.Nevertheless, bot h sets appe ar as the common denominator of all partia l elite intere sts on the nation al level. O ntop o f that, they ar e not voiced individuall y, bu t frequently are galvanized into large r units. Thei r relationshipdepends on a multi tude of factors, suc h as the economic situation and the support for for eign politics withmonetar y and manpower resources.– 3 –
The overarching interests of the post-Soviet elites have undergone considerable change during the last twodecades. Despite deep political and ideological cleavages, the Russian elites by and large took a consolidated anduniform position during the 90s. The aspiration was dominant “To actively use any chance to break with theSoviet past irrevocably and for good”1. For the post-Soviet elites, privitization and the creation of a new class ofowners as well as their political and economic integration ranked high on the agenda.The Western orientation of Russian politics was dictated by the apprehensions that market reform could triggerthe opposition of broad layers of the population, who were used to Soviet paternalistic patterns. On top of that,the dire situation of the economy and the country's dependence on international financial support played a role.The leading elites regarded the Western countries as the main guarantors for a successful break with the sovietpast, since they were facing domestic instability and the deficient legitimacy of the new post-Communistgovernment, which was further weakened by the economic reforms of 1992.The economic interests of the new leading elites emerged during the 1990s. They had to force the export ofvarious raw materials such as oil, gas, metals and wood to the West, in order to obtain the necessary financialmeans for the upcoming privatization. The only competitive manufacturing industries were those of chemistryand defense, whose volume was contracting rapidly. All this led to the genesis of a strongly export-orientedeconomy, which shouldered the role of a raw material provider for the leading industrial countries. The interest ofthe new leading elites to export resources to the world market became fundamental, long-term and general in thecontext of the fact that the income from the export of natural resources formed the basis of the budget.Incidentally, the share of income derived from the export of carbon hydrates continued to rise during the firstdecade of the new millennium. The control of these resources by the new post-Soviet elites was seen as a vehiclefor rapid integration with the global ones. At the same time, they expected that this process would be contingenton their special Russian conditions set by themselves.The marginality of geopolitical interests during the 90s had several causes. For one thing, Russia was not in aposition to pursue proactive foreign policies due to its scarce resources. It was therefore forced to abandon itspresence in many regions of the world. This was true of Africa, South and East Asia, the Near East and LatinAmerica. Secondly, the drive to break with the Soviet past through a rapprochement towards the West alsoimplied renouncing the geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union, whose legal successor Russia had become.The country was focused on survival and had not yet developed new geopolitical priorities. This happened onlyin the second half of the 90s, after society had turned away from the disappointing reforms and the leading eliteshad abandoned their hopes for a rapid Western integration. By and large, the discourse over geopolitical interestsduring the 90s was monopolized by the opposition and the counter-elites, who came out against market anddemocratic reforms.What were the changes in the new millennium? In the first line, the elites obtained full control over the assets ofthe Russian economy. The presidential elections of 1996 finished off speculation about a return of Communistrule. At the beginning of the new millennium, it had become abundantly clear that there was no danger of aCommunist restoration. This helped the new post-Soviet elites to establish and strengthen their monopoly ofpolitical power. They emerged as masters of the country in the full sense of the word. The increase of gas and oilprices permitted them to advance their positions toward the West more energetically. Russia's role in thisdialogue changed; Russia no longer was the petitioner, but insisted more and more on the role of an equal partneras the demand for carbon hydrates continued to rise.At the same time, the model of post-Soviet capitalism which emerged in the 90s showed that the ruling eliteswere not interested in rooting the Western liberal market order in Russia. The Russian model is based on themerger of political power and ownership in the hands of small elite circles and on its neo-feudal character whichis a type of patrimonialism. The disappointed Russian elites distanced themselves from the West, since they hadthe feeling of having been excluded from the club they had tried to join2.Consequently, the necessity of Western support for the reforms and the model function of the West was no longergiven. The shortcomings of the reform stoked the anti-Western and anti-liberal mood of the masses and this wasused by the elites as an additional collateral to enhance their domestic power. The idea of the “Russian Way”,which was immune from the impact of globalization, served as a vehicle to increase legitimacy. In this context,the Russian elites posed as the only protectors and spokesmen of the country in the international arena.1 Solov´ev, E.G., National Interests and Political Forces in Contemporary Russia, Moscow: Nauka, 2004, 130.2 Apparently the last attempt at Western integration was undertaken in 2001-2003, when Moscow stood fully behind the anti-terroroperation of the US and its allies in Afghanistan and closed its bases in Vietnam and Cuba. Nevertheless, the US considered these steps asthe fulfillment of an obligation and was not ready to honor it with a quid pro quo.– 4 –
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